JOURNAL of

MAY 26 1946

CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

285



CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA - - - - Oscar Jászi

FOUR POWER PACTS: 1933 - 1945 - - - René Albrecht-Carrié

THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE 1944 WARSAW UPRISING Julian Hochfeld

THE PROBLEM OF POST-WAR GERMANY - Francis C. Balling

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS BOOK REVIEWS

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

LUME FIVE

JOURNAL of CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FREDERICK B. ARTZ, Oberlin College F. Lee Benns, Indiana University Board of Editors DAVID BRYN-JONES, Carleton College RALPH H. LUTZ, Stanford University	ge
F. LEE BENNS, Indiana University RALPH H. LUTZ, Stanford University CHESTER W. CLARK, State University of Iowa	,
Consulting Editors	
SAMUEL H. CROSS, Harvard University PHILIP E. MOSELY, Hunter College WILLIAM J. ROSE, University of Lond R. W. SETON-WATSON, University of Lond	on
Managing Editor S. Harrison Thomson, University of Colorado	
Publication of the JOURNAL is made possible by subventions from the following institution Carleton College (Frank B. Kellogg Foundation), University of Colorado, Oberlin College, State University of Iowa.	is:
The JOURNAL is published quarterly in January, April, July and October at the University of Colorado. Annual subscription price: \$3.50. Single number \$1.00. Correspondence concerning subscriptions or advertising space should be addressed to the Managing Editor, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo. Agent in The United Kingdom B. H. Blackwell Ltd., 51 Broad St., Oxford. Contributions to the JOURNAL should addressed to the Managing Editor or any member of the Board of Editors.	he m:
BOOK REVIEWS	_
	64
Manning, Ukrainian Literature. Studies of the Leading Authors	
(N. D. Czubatyj)	65
Lednicki, Life and Culture of Poland as reflected in Polish Literature	
	66
	68
	70
Muncy, The Junker in the Prussian Administration under William II,	
	71
	73
Piłsudski, Wybór pism (M. Kridl)	74
	79
Kormos, Rumania (J. C. Campbell)	83
Davis, Pioneers in World Order, an American Appraisal of the League of Nations (D. Koenig)	0 6
Many The Constitution of t	84
Dallia TI DIC ', D' (O D')	85
Tilbourhold The Company of the transfer of	87
Taraby D: J Co (I C D)	89 91
Niethan Th. M. E. C. C. M. D. I.	92
Diago The Muie C. II. I	94
Wriston, Strategy of Peace (P. Slosson)	95
Gibson, The Road to Foreign Policy. A new approach to our future	,
problems (F. W. Pick)	96
Moulton & Moulin The Country 1 . 1 C	97

106

BOOKS RECEIVED

JOURNAL of CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

INDEX TO VOLUME FIVE April, 1945-January, 1946

ARTICLES

NC

	Albrecht-Carrié, René: Four Power Pacts: 1933-1945	17
	Albrecht-Carrié, René: The Northeastern Frontier of Italy	229
	Balling, Francis C.: The Problem of Post-War Germany	45
	Bilmanis, Alfred: The Struggle for the Domination of the Baltic -	119
	Bonatt, Edward: International Law and the Plebiscites in Eastern	
	Poland, 1939	378
	Charanis, Peter: The Schism Between the Greek and Roman	
	Church and Its Significance	260
	Clarke, James F.: Russia and Bulgaria, 1878-1944	394
	Dziewanowski, M. K.: "La Vertue de la Politique"	281
	Engel-Janosi, Friedrich: Austria in the Summer of 1870	335
	Hochfeld, Julian: The Social Aspects of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising	36
	Jászi, Oscar: Central Europe and Russia	1
	Kridl, Manfred: Poland and Russia in the Past and in the Future -	143
	Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Erik R.: The Southern Boundaries of Austria	245
	Malinowski, Wladyslaw R.: The Pre-War Unionization of Polish	
	Workers	176
	Marraro, Howard R.: American Documents on Italy's Annexation	
	of Venetia (1866)	355
	Pick, F. W.: Britain and Europe	270
	Thomson, S. Harrison: Kamil Krofta 1875-1945	288
	Valentin, Veit: Foreign Policy and High Finance in the Bismarckian	
	Period	165
	Werner, Alfred: Is Austria "Lebensfähig"?	109
) 7	TES AND DOCUMENTS	
ſ	Communiqué of the Polish Government in London, severing	
	diplomatic relations with the Czechoslovak Government in	
		46
	London, February 2, 1945	57
	The Czechoslovak Ministry of M. Zdeněk Fierlinger	185
	The Greek Ministry of Admiral Petros Voulgaris	185
	The Greek Ministry of Admiral Felios Volligaris	13)

	The Austrian Ministry of Dr. Karl Renner	186
	The Polish Ministry of M. Edward Osubka-Morawski	186
	The Trial and Death of Professor Pfitzner	290
	The Russo-Czechoslovak Pact of June 29, 1945 by which Czecho-	
	slovakia ceded the Carpatho-Ukraine to Russia	291
	province codes are companies and	
REV	IEWS	
	Bartlett, The League to Enforce Peace (M. W. Graham)	205
	Basch, A Price for Peace (F. Munk)	318
	Basch, A Price for Peace (F. Munk) Bilmanis, Baltic Essays (L. I. Strakhovsky)	296
	Boulding, The Economics of Peace (B. F. Hoselitz)	319
	Carr, Nationalism and After (F. W. Pick)	298
	Chamberlin, The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation (G. W. Simpson)	191
	Cohen, Vilna (I. Aleksandrowicz)	193
	Dallin, The Big Three (K. R. Pusta, Sr.)	418
	Dallin, The Real Soviet Russia (G. Denicke)	87
	Davis, ed., Pioneers in World Order, an American Appraisal of	
	the League of Nations	84
	Demographic Studies of Selected Areas of Rapid Growth	
	(W. S. Bernard)	419
	Doberer, The United States of Germany (F. L. Benns)	198
	Dorosh, Russian Constitutionalism (A. G. Mazour)	68
	Duranty, U.S.S.R.—The Story of Soviet Russia (M.V.)	79
	Engel-Janosi, The Growth of German Historicism (P. R. Anderson)	299
	Feis, The Sinews of Peace (Ervin Hexner)	202
	Fitzgerald, The New Europe. An Introduction to its Political	
	Geography (F. W. Pick)	420
	Fraenkel, Military Occupation and the Rule of Law. Occupation	
	Government In the Rhineland, 1918-1923 (F. T. Epstein) -	305
	Fraser, Germany Between Two Wars, a Study of Propaganda and	
	War Guilt (D. E. Lee)	311
	Gerschenkron, Bread and Democracy in Germany (O. H. Wedel) -	197
	Gibberd, (British Survey Handbooks) Greece (Peter Charanis) -	189
	Gibbson, The Road to Foreign Policy. A New Approach to Our	
	Future Problems (F. W. Pick)	96
	Goldschmidt, Legal Claims Against Germany (H. Leonhardt) -	415
	Gooch, et al, The German Mind and Outlook (F. W. Pick)	409
	Gronicka, Henry von Heiseler, a Russo-German Writer (M. W. Volm	1) 73
	Gross, Crossroads of Two Continents. A Democratic Federation	, , ,
	of East-Central Europe (A. J. Zurcher)	208
	Hanus, Church and State in Silesia Under Frederick the Great (Paul Fo	x) 403
	Harrison, Lithuania's Fight for Freedom (A. Senn)	308
	Hermens, The Tyrant's War and the People's Peace (J. B. Mason)	214
	Hirst, Principles of Prosperity (A. Basch)	325

Huot, Guns for Tito (V. Trivanovitch)	414
Hughes, The Popes' New Order: A Systematic Summary of the	
Social Encyclicals and Addresses from Leo XIII to Pius XII	
(D. Koenig)	301
International Currency Experience—Lessons of the Inter-War	
Period (P. Lohman)	422
Jacoby, Racial State (J. S. Roucek)	91
Jalland, The Church and the Papacy (M. L. W. Laistner)	64
Kuczynski, Germany: Economic and Labour Conditions Under	
Fascism (P. Lohman)	424
Keeton and Schlesinger, Russia and Her Western Neighbors	
(A. Bilmanis)	411
Kormos, Rumania (J. C. Campbell)	83
Lednicki, Life and Culture of Poland as reflected in Polish	
Literature (S. H. Thomson)	66
Lemkin, Axis Rue in Occupied Europe (W. J. Ehrenpreis)	209
Liptzin, Germany's Stepchildren (L. Kestenberg)	70
London, Backgrounds of Conflict (P. R. Anderson)	426
Lynch, The Diplomatic Mission of John Lothrop Motley to	
Austria, 1861-1867 (R. J. Rath)	300
MacCurdy, Germany, Russia, and the Future (W. S. Bernard) -	315
Malinowski, Freedom and Civilization (W. S. Bernard)	321
Manning, Ukrainian Literature. Studies of the Leading Authors	
(N. D. Czubatyj)	65
Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919. Organization and Procedure	
(F. W. Pick)	206
Marx, The Case of the German Jews vs. Germany (B. D. Weinryb)	85
Mayer, Max Weber and German Politics. A Study in Political	
Sociology (J. K. Pollock)	303
Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent (H. N. Howard)	188
Meyer, Von Bismarck, zu Hitler: _Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen	
(L. Kestenberg)	302
Mitrany, ed., Economic Development in S.E. Europe (A. Basch) -	309
Moodie, The Italo-Yugoslav Boundary (R. Albrecht-Carrié)	399
Moulton and Marlio, The Control of Germany and Japan	
(B. F. Hoselitz)	97
Muncy, The Junker in the Prussian Administration Under William	
II, 1888-1914	71
Nathan, The Nazi Economic System (A. Basch)	92
National Liberation Front (E.A.M. White Book, May 1944-	7.4
March 1945) (K. T. Argoe)	412
Newman, Balkan Background (R. Albrecht-Carrié)	190
Nizer, What To Do With Germany (R. G. Woolbert)	200
Pilsudski, Wybór pism (M. Kridl)	74
THOUGH, W YOU PISH (III. IIIIII)	/ 1

	Riess, The Nazis Go Underground (E. W. Fox) -		-	-	94
	Rose, The Rise of Polish Democracy (Feliks Gross)		-	-	194
	Rosinski, The German Army (F. Redlich)		-	-	401
	Schmitt, ed., Poland (W. J. Rose)			-	293
	Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars 1918-19-	41			
	(Fritz Epstein)		_	-	407
	Seydewitz, Civil Life in Wartime Germany. The Story	of.	the		
	Home Front (G. Jacoby)		_	_	312
	Steel, The Future of Europe (R. M. Brace)		_	-	417
	Steinberg, A Short History of Germany (C. V. Easum)		_	-	294
	Táborský, The Czechoslovak Cause (J. Hanć)		-	-	89
	Visson, The Coming Struggle for Peace (J. Hanč)		_	-	212
	Von Mises, Omnipotent Government (C. P. Malick)		-	-	200
	Wachsman, Jews in Post War Europe (A. Tartakower)			-	323
	Wellesley, Diplomacy in Fetters (F. W. Pick) -			-	409
	Whitton, ed., Second Chance: America and the Peace (S. B.			-	211
	Wriston, Strategy of Peace (P. Slosson)		_	-	95
	Ziff, The Gentlemen Talk of Peace (J. B. Wolf) -		-	-	317
SHC	ORTER NOTICES				
	Beneš, Návrat do vlasti				428
	Events Leading Up To World War II		-	-	216
	Harding, The Lost Waltz: A Story of Exile		_	-	219
	Hostovsky, The Hideout		_	-	220
	Konovalov, Russo-Polish Relations		-	-	216
	Menne, Armistice and Germany's Food Supply, 1918-192			_	-216
	Miller, Via Diplomatic Pouch			-	428
	Mizwa, ed., Nicholas Copernicus, A Tribute of Nations -			-	218
	Muran, We Fight on Slovak Rising in the German				429
	Sharkey, White Smoke over the Vatican				217
	Whyte, The Evolution of Modern Italy, 1715-1920 -		-	-	430
	Weiskopf, ed., Hundred Towers. A Czechoslovak Anthol	001	of		
	Creative Writing		-	-	219
	Weiss, Waltzing Volcano		-	-	218

JOURNAL of CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

VOLUME FIVE

APRIL, 1945

NUMBER ONE

CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA*

by Oscar Jászi

HE subject here presented is a very delicate one. We are still in an arduous war during which, some people think, no controversial matters should be touched upon in order not to hurt unity. However, I feel that independent thinking should not be interrupted and at least inside of our research fraternity problems should be discussed and clarified.

In order to avoid misunderstanding I wish to emphasize right at the beginning that during my whole life I have been greatly impressed and influenced by Russian literature and I have followed the Bolshevik experiment with growing interest as one of the greatest ventures of mankind for the realization of a new philosophy of life and ethics (because this is its essence and not simply the economic transformation). Furthermore, it is for me axiomatic, that without the most sincere and intimate cooperation between Russia and the other three big powers the dream of the United Nations will dissolve like a nebula which could not concentrate into a solar system. There is no other imaginable road to a durable peace at all comparable to this mutual cooperation so ardently hoped for by us all. Should the Soviets menace Europe the first step of attack would be the undermining of Central Europe.

To make my present position clearer allow me to state briefly the antecedents of my thought. Three years ago I was asked by the New York Council on Foreign Relations to write a short memorandum concerning the future of Hungary. As this paper had only private circulation, I beg to give you a few of its main conclusions.

^{*} This paper was delivered before the Modern History Section of the American Historical Association at its annual meeting in Chicago, December 28, 1944. Recent events have not changed the fundamental point of view of the author. Where some addenda or comments were needed, they are treated in footnotes in order to maintain the unity of the original text.

I

The interests of the Danubian countries are solidary, provided they

can get rid of certain nationalistic and class prejudices.

After the war the political and military security of this region must be maintained for a transitory period, not by the states which will emerge liberated or reshaped, but by the democratic forces which have defeated the totalitarian tyranny. For this purpose a permanent organization of the victorious powers must be created. Otherwise anarchy and bloody chaos will follow. The continuation of the military and economic sovereignty of the small states would lead to all those excesses of nationalism which plunged the world into the war.

Under the guidance of the victorious states a system of local federations should be developed as parts of a larger European Union. The ideal aim would be the federal organization of the whole Danube-Vistula region consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria, which would include a territory of about

540,000 square miles with more than 100,000,000 inhabitants.

Unfortunately—so I continued my statement—such a federation or any other federation of the liberated countries is for the near future impossible, without a radical remolding of their social and political structure. The feudal lords in Hungary, the military dictatorship in Yugoslavia, the corrupt dynastic capitalism in Rumania, the junta of the colonels in Poland, the absolutism in Greece and Bulgaria, would never accept a

federation limiting their economic and military sovereignty.

It is perfectly idle to believe that with the present backward peasantry and the masses of literally starving agricultural laborers a new political and international equilibrium could be built up in Central-Eastern Europe. The agricultural structure of those countries must be changed. The liquidation of the *latifundia* system is a fundamental necessity both for economic and political reforms. But the distribution of land in small parcels among peasant proprietors would not be enough, as some experiments after the last war have clearly demonstrated. The new proprietors would need capital, agricultural training, modern machinery, adequate cooperative institutions. A really gigantic task is thus to be faced, which could be accomplished only with the help of the victorious democracies. Semi-public development corporations should be created, analogous to the Tennessee Valley Authority. The expropriation of the feudal estates could follow under their guidance a well-planned course and the newly created peasant holdings could be coordinated in a structure adequate to the needs of modern agriculture.

The results of the Soviet agricultural experiment show the advantages of large scale production, but they show also the disadvantages of the destruction of individual peasant property. The bright features of large-scale production and those of the incentive of peasant property could be combined in a cooperative system. With the right rotation of crops, the necessary canalization and irrigation, the introduction of new fields of production, according to the needs of a world market, a grandiose work could be carried out which could be made a paying proposition in a few years.

An economically reconstructed and federated Central-Eastern Europe would lead inevitably to the solution of the vexed nationality problem. It is stupid and demagogic to speak of the innate hostility of the various tribes. Human nature in the Danubian region or elsewhere is essentially the same as in Switzerland. (Already before the first world war I used as my favorite symbol that of an "Eastern Switzerland" which by its geographical and climatic advantages would even surpass the possibilities of the Western.) The cure of the nationality rivalries is neither the barbaric expulsion of minorities carried out by the dictators, nor forced migration advocated unfortunately even by liberal statesmen, nor new strategic frontiers, but federalism, decentralization and equality of private and public rights.

Other advantages of local federations would also be conspicuous: the pooling of debts, mutual credit aid for development and emergency, agreements for a better division of labor, limitation of certain production, distribution of quotas for production and export, selling abroad in common to improve the bargaining power of the whole region, and common enterprises in transportation and river developments.

Finally I emphasized in my report that the formation of a Central-Eastern Federation would depend on the relation between the Western democracies, Soviet Russia and Germany.

II

That was the picture of Central Europe as it appeared to me three years ago, a few months after the invasion of Russia by her former comrades in arms, the Nazis. However, the brilliant military victories of the Russians have created a totally new situation. Though the problems to be solved have remained the same, the handling of them will become considerably different. The great change is that the future of this territory will depend far more on the aims and methods of Russia than on those of the United States and the British Commonwealth. Whether a division into spheres of influence was contemplated or not at Teheran, no realistic student of politics

will question that the Russian influence in that territory, whether we like it or not, will be preponderant.1 Russia will come out of this war as the greatest continental power of Europe. This power, having organized about two hundred millions of people on a territory covering one seventh of the land surface of the globe, under the toughest dictatorship of the world, backed by almost unlimited natural resources along with a new, energetic, nationalistic, and ambitious middle and upper class, and living in immediate economic and diplomatic contact with the adjacent small countries, will exercise an irresistible political and military control over them.2 This control will be the more dominant because, since the days of Czarist imperialism this region has been regarded by the Russians as belonging to the sphere of their natural expansion and as a precondition of the security of the Empire. Furthermore, powerful common tradtions of pan-Slavism and the cultural background of the Greek Orthodox Church give additional force to Russian supremacy over great parts of this region. The rebirth of Slav solidarity at the instance of Stalin, his nationalistic propaganda, and his compromise with the Orthodox Church show quite clearly that the old policy of Czarism will find a continuation, and the strong communistic ideology of her ruling élite will be supplemented by time-honored traditions of Russian history.

We should not forget that half of the population of Yugoslavia are members of the Orthodox Church; in Bulgaria they are two-thirds, in Rumania two-thirds; in Greece 99 per cent. In consequence the leaders of the Orthodox Church can exercise an influence also on non-Slav peoples like the Rumanians and the Greeks. This spiritual power was welcome to the rulers of Russia and when the Holy Synod was restored the newly elected Patriarch made a strong declaration for a second front, (September 1943). Surely an unusual performance for the head of a church!

On the other hand, the interests of the Western democracies and of

² Add to this that the population of Russia is forecast at 250 millions by 1970. "Such a population will be 25 millions greater than the combined population of all the countries of Northwestern and Central Europe." (*The Economist*, London, November 4, 1944). But see D. J. Dallin, *The Real Soviet Russia* (New Haven, 1944), p. 104ff., who does not appear

to be convinced of this likelihood.

The Dumbarton Oaks and the Crimean conferences have changed nothing in this situation. The issue is obscured by the purely theoretical discussion (under the pressure of pacifistic public opinion) as to whether a "global organization" or "spheres of influences" should be contemplated. As a matter of fact regional organizations under the divided leadership of the Big Three are inevitable due to their different immediate interests in different parts of the world and to the differing attractions which they exercise on their respective neighboring states in consequence of military, political, religious or traditional ties. Therefore the real test of statesmanship is not to deny the reality of regional organizations, but to coordinate them harmoniously in a larger whole.

America in this region will be only secondary from the point of view of their main lines of gravitation. Were the interests of the democracies and of Russia to clash concerning the western frontiers of Russia, it is almost unimaginable that Great Britain or the United States would go to war over these frontier quarrels. Both the British Parliament and our Congress would repudiate this idea, the more so because, with the exception of the Baltic states, Russia seems to have a stronger case, at least from the ethnographical point of view and considering the crude policy of forcible assimilation of pre-war Poland and Rumania. Mr. Churchill repeatedly stated in the British Parliament that the Russian territorial claim seems to him "reasonable and just". And we know now from the articles of Mr. Forrest Davis in the Saturday Evening Post about the Teheran conference (which seem to be an authentic summary of President Roosevelt's views) that he intentionally avoided any discussions about the frontiers in order not to damage his "grand design," which is to make an end to Russian isolation and to draw her into close cooperation with the democracies.

Looking at these facts and declarations one can scarcely doubt that Russia will be adamant concerning her so-called strategic frontiers from the Baltic to the Black Sea, with the further claims that she should annex a part of East Prussia with Königsberg, and that Poland should occupy parts of East Prussia as well as Danzig and Pomerania, including Stettin and perhaps a part of the Breslau region. The amazing and complacent reinterpretation of the Atlantic Charter by Mr. Churchill that we did not guarantee the territorial integrity of our enemies, but only assured our friends and allies that we have no intention of grabbing any of their possessions, is the foundation of this policy. Similarly it seems evident—both from authentic declarations and practical steps taken concerning Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslav Partizans, the Polish Free Movement—that Russia will not tolerate governments in her immediate neighborhood which could become organs of intrigue or military combination against her. Expressed in plain political language this means that the military and international policy of the adjacent small states must be coordinated with that of Russia.3 Or using a medieval term: they will be mediatized. As long as there is no powerful international organization, not only on paper, but in solid reality, nobody can say this claim of Russia is extravagant.

What makes the Russian situation almost impregnable is not only

³ The resolutions of the Crimean conference have fully corroborated these anticipations. Moreover, all the news coming from territories occupied by the Russians points in the same direction.

its strategical position but also the skillful game of Soviet diplomacy which operates with two irons in the fire. It could be easily shown that besides her leaning toward the democracies Russia did not break her connections with certain elements in Germany who would be eager to accept after the destruction of Hitlerism a German orientation towards Russia. On the eve of the 25th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, November, 1942, Marshal Stalin clearly expressed his policy: "... it is not our aim to destroy Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia. But the Hitlerite state can and should be destroyed. . . . It is not our aim to destroy all organized military force in Germany, for every literate person will understand that it is not only impossible in regard to Germany but also inadvisable for Russia. But Hitler's army can and should be destroyed . . ." This policy has never been repudiated. On the contrary, the Free Germany National Committee and the Union of German Officers organized among war prisoners in Moscow, in which even a grandson of Prince Bismarck is participating, has found a kind of official protection and could always be reactivated if Russia should find that her most essential war aims are opposed by the Western democracies.4 This volte-face could be made the more easily because the whole foreign policy of Russia after the end of the first World War was characterized, as Mr. David J. Dallin has cogently shown, by a strong affinity towards Germany and a hostile distrust of England and France which, according to the Marxian doctrine, were regarded as the bulwarks of capitalism, the arch-enemies of the Soviets.⁵

An old menace could re-occur which after the first World War gave the capitalistic democracies the "jitters." It is perhaps not out of place to recall the following passage of a memorandum of Lloyd George to the peace conference of 1919:

"The greatest danger that I see in the present situation is that Germany may throw her lot with Bolshevism and place her resources, her brains, her vast organizing power at the disposal of the revolutionary fanatics whose dream is to conquer the world for Bolshevism. . . . This danger is not mere chimera. . . . If Germany goes over to the Spartacists it is inevitable that she should throw in her lot with the Russian Bolsheviks. Once that happens, all Eastern Europe will be swept into the orbit of the Bolshevik revolution and within

⁴ See the broadcast of fifty captured high-ranking German officers. The New York Times, December 15, 1944.

⁵ The sharp turn of Russia against Germany (both against Hitlerism and Prussian militarism) and her advocacy of the dismemberment of Germany was one of the chief results of the Crimean conference. Immediately the Russian press denounced the former cooperation with the Prussian officers as a "calumnious" invention.

a year we may witness the spectacle of nearly three hundred million people organized into a vast Red army. . ."

III

There is, however, another problem of far greater importance which is not yet decided by the vis major of the war, and this is the future of the small and middle-sized states in the Danube region and in the Balkans. What will happen to these states causes a deep concern to all friends of Western culture and democratic self-government. Will the Russian colossus assimilate completely Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and the other countries of this area in the same way as the frontier regions were incorporated into her domain? Will these states, the majority of whom are of Western cultural orientation, not succumb to an aggressive, despotic, and totalitarian Sovietization? Of course certain Soviet enthusiasts are not alarmed by this possibility. They will say with Professor Schuman: do you not read newspapers, did you not read the declarations of Marshal Stalin and Foreign Commissar Molotov? They said as clearly as possible that they wish to maintain the national individuality and the self-government of those smaller nations; they wish to see them free and independent. The only thing which they ask of them is to establish truly popular governments which can be trusted by the Soviets never to enter into hostile military alliances or diplomatic intrigues against the Soviets. As long as the new states do not have such governments and cannot develop a homogeneous democratic and social structure, Soviet Russia will oppose any plans of federation among them. But if a new solid political structure were to be organized in those states, Russia would welcome a system of federation. Similarly, the able political thinker and vice-minister of foreign affairs of the exiled Czechoslovak Government, Hubert Ripka, is convinced that "the democratization of Russia and the whole soviet society . . . eliminated from Russian policy the imperialist aims which Tsarist Russia pursued against the smaller nations . . . becoming a genuinely peace-loving power. . ."6

Unfortunately, things are not quite so simple as this. Mr. Schuman and the other Soviet enthusiasts must know that the present rulers of Russia made analogous and even more solemn promises to the Baltic states. In a few months they were disregarded and those states, in the form of sham plebiscites and under pressure of mass-deportations were simply annexed to the Soviets. What is the guarantee that such things will not happen

⁶ East and West, London, 1944, p. 64.

in the Danubian region and in Germany? Therefore, the problem in question is a very real one.7

Of course there are other Soviet supporters who are even more enthusiastic. They deny the existence of the whole problem simply by saying: "What is the difference? If the whole of Central Europe should be Sovietized, this would only be a gain for the exploited masses!" I cannot enter into this controversy. It is a question of democratic and spiritual values, and a man who does not see this difference is similar to a color-blind person with whom one cannot argue concerning the values of Burne-Jones vs. Rubens.

How real this feeling of Western cultural solidarity is, has found a strong and unintentional expression in a recent article of President Beneš. "New Slavism." he states, should be "the expression of two of the profound ideas voiced by the great spirits of Slavic culture: Pushkin, Turgenev, Tolstov. Gorki, Mickiewicz, Krasiński, Kollár, Palacký, and Masaryk." One of these ideas is the confidence in the capacity of the common man; the other is the belief in the fundamentally humanitarian nature of mankind.8 Is it not strange that the strongest advocate of Russian leadership over the Slavs does not mention in this list a single representative of Bolshevik thought? Masaryk himself fought during his whole life the Marxist-Leninist philosophy. In the same spirit all able leaders of the Czechs emphasize that the new states will need the maintenance of their Western cultural ties and say with Ripka that "Bolshevism in its Russian form cannot be transplanted into a different social milieu; such an experiment, wherever it were essayed, could only be upheld by military force and systematic violence."9

All those who are genuinely interested in the future of Central Europe

⁷ Recent events in the countries occupied by the Soviets further accentuate the seriousness of this problem. Of course, as long as foreign correspondents are not freely admitted to those countries, we shall not know the real situation. But even the scanty news which has been published concerning the "democratization" of Poland. Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia shows a growing communistic influence and propaganda with the help of pseudoparties. Some acute observers rightly speak of an "uncanny unanimity" in the political life of those countries and of a "ventriloquial democracy." A memorandum of Juliu Maniu to the Russian Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vishinsky, of November 15, 1944, (and there is no reason to doubt the genuineness of this document) draws a sombre picture of the repression of the non-communist parties. But the gravest symptom of the situation is that General Nicolai Radescu, the former premier, just forced out of office by the parties dominated by the communists, sought and obtained refuge in the British Legation at Bucharest, because "his life was endangered." One might well ask how far the authority of the Allied Control Commission goes.

^{8 &}quot;The New Slav Policy" in Free World, May, 1944.

⁹ op. cit., p. 20.

should not be taken in by propagandistic slogans or promises. Of course I know that the Czechs, who can be regarded as the most Western-minded Slavs, do not have such doubts. Their leading statesmen in exile are sincerely convinced that the Russians will keep the Twenty Years' Treaty with Czechoslovakia literally. 10 On the other hand Russian Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries living in exile (among whom I have known some who have devoted their whole lives to the cause of socialism and democracy) entertain the most gloomy anticipations concerning the future policy of Stalin. Mr. D. J. Dallin is the strongest exponent of this group. They are convinced that nothing has been changed in the old policy of Stalin and that he will go as far as possible with the complete Bolshevization of Europe and Asia. They are expecting the bloodiest repression of former socialists or liberals of all the countries which would come under Russian domination, except those who would repent their past and submit abjectly to the official doctrine, both in theory and in practice. The Poles think likewise. What makes their compromise with Russia so difficult is not so much the frontier controversy as the fear of the Poles that the promised "strong and independent Poland" will be simply a vassal state of the Soviets.

IV

Those who are anxious for the future of European democracy must face these conflicting opinions with detachment and without bias, and must examine the various factors which will decide the ultimate issues. I begin with those arguments which support the pessimistic hypothesis. First of all—we are told—it cannot be doubted that Stalin and his close collaborators are still the same orthodox Marxists they have always been. They are inclined to make transitory practical concessions in case of emergency (as Lenin himself did) but they will never abandon their ultimate aims. It is utterly naive to believe that Stalin is a traitor who is trying to bring back the capitalistic system into the country. The communist ideology which he learned during his secret night studies in the Tiflis Theological Seminary, as a kind of new catechism, will remain his moral and political foundation. His sufferings before and during the revolution, his memories of Czarist prisons and tortures, his distrust of the capitalistic democracies, all make him impervious to any new political conception. When the NEP was introduced, many Western capitalists were convinced that Russia was

¹⁰ It was therefore probably a shock for them when, contrary to a previous agreement, Moscow unfolded the problem whether Carpathian Ukrainia (Ruthenia) should be annexed to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

returning to capitalism. Now we know that this was wishful thinking, that it was a policy of reculer pour mieux santer and was followed by complete socialization and the extermination of the Kulaks. It would be equally naive to believe that the dissolution of the Third International, the predominance of patriotic slogans over the communistic, the greater tolerance towards the church means a change of heart in the dictatorial circle. As late as 1938, in his history of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., Stalin repeated the oath which he took at the grave of Lenin: "On leaving us Lenin bade us be loyal to the principles of the Communist International. We swear to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will not spare our lives in fortifying and expanding the union of the toilers of the whole world, the Communist International!"11 Quite recently (August 1943) the influential magazine Under the Banner of Marxism admonished the teachers of theoretical Marxian sociology that they "must call attention in the class room to the specific peculiarities of the monopoly stage of capitalism, and indicate the place it occupies in history as the prelude to the social revolution of the proletariat."12

One of the fundamental theses of this International has been the spirit of isolationism, the distrust in collective security, and non-participation in coalitions of imperialistic countries. Their rivalries were to be used for the exclusive purpose of turning international wars into civil wars. The belief that a final war is inevitable between the capitalistic countries and the Soviets has been a dogma of Marxian ideology. At the same time they have been convinced that the clash between the rival capitalistic powers is a necessity based on economic laws. One of the closest intimates of Stalin, Lazar Kaganovich, enumerated in 1934 the main conflicts of the future: Britain against the United States, Germany against France, France against Italy, Britain against France, Italy against Germany. The main task of the proletariat was regarded as that of using these antagonisms of all their enemies for their own interest in order that the "thieves shall fall out for the benefit of the honest men." The participation of Soviet Russia in the League of Nations, formerly called by them a League of Brigands, the later alliance with Hitler and after that against Hitler, does not necessarily mean that the traditional conception of international relations has changed.

Finally,—the pessimists assert—the unlimited dictatorial structure of the Soviet State has remained unaltered in spite of the extremely democratic

Quoted by D. J. Dallin in Russia and Post-War Europe (New Haven, 1943), p. 155.

Quoted by the same author in The Real Soviet Russia (New Haven, 1944), p. 38.

Constitution of 1936 and the pretended remolding of the unitary state into a federation of sixteen independent republics. This totalitarian structure could make it easy for the ruling strata of militarists and bureaucrats to embark upon a policy of expansion and Sovietization. The new Russian ruling class is the exponent of the most unlimited raison d'état theory: The end sanctifies the means. No ideologic reservations or moral scruples will restrain Stalin from a course which he regards as of vital interest to the Soviet State. This policy gains additional strength from the idea of their world mission. Any increase in the power of the Soviet State will mean that the redemption of the exploited masses of the world comes nearer. On a basis of their past experiences and of their fundamental doctrine the pessimists say: "If the Russian dictators could make a world revolution without endangering that measure of socialism which they have accomplished in their own state, they would not hesitate to do so."

V

Fortunately, however, we hear far more optimistic opinions than the previous. Especially visiting statesmen and capitalists return from their short trips in Soviet Russia with quite antagonistic convictions. Their argument is approximately the following:—It is a long, long way from the state of Lenin to that of Stalin! A long, long way from the puritan "equality of labor and equality of pay" to the introduction of piece work, "socialist competition" and the Stakhanovist intensification of mass production; from the dogma of world revolution to the stipulation of Dumbarton Oaks; from abortions with state help to the glorification of fourteen "heroic mothers" with ten or more children each; from the union of the Militant Godless to cooperation with Patriarch Sergius; from the rabid antinationalism to the "patriotic war" and the opening of the Soviet Hall of Heroes to the despots Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and some victorious Tsarist generals; from the rejection of Panslavism and Neo-slavism to the new Slav solidarity; from the theory that there should be no difference between intellectual and physical labor to the establishment of the largest intellectual ruling class of the world; from humanitarian enthusiasm to the convict labor camps whose inmates are estimated between 12 and 20 millions; from the radical condemnation of surplus value to the turnover tax; from the crusade against imperialism to the overthrow of the Iran government which refused to give an immediate oil concession to the Soviets.

All these enormous changes may be characterized in one formula: from the belief in the "withering away of the State" to the greatest Levi-

athan which human history has known. Among all these changes the most significant seems to be the rebirth of a strong nationalistic spirit which penetrates not only the soviets, but also the elements most hostile to them. I heard from a distinguished Russian historian that he met recently a former high ranking Tsarist officer who had always hated the communist state and who has now become a great admirer of Stalin. And when the scholar reproached him for his inconsistency, the counter-revolutionary officer answered: "... Well, now all belongs to us... from Ragusa to Vladivostok!"

Looking over all these facts which could be easily expanded, the optimists will say:—Has this new State anything to do with the revolutionary state of Lenin? Yet the argument is not so refutable as it looks, though the soviets, quite significantly, do not repudiate these bourgeois hopes and are satisfied with the formula that Stalin is the true successor of Lenin. As a matter of fact, one could argue that the retreat of Stalin from the orthodox Marxian-bolshevik system is not greater than that of Lenin was when he abandoned war-communism and introduced the NEP.

VI

It is not my intention to exaggerate the importance of these ideological considerations, either those of the pessimists, or those of the optimists. Fortunately, Marshal Stalin, a keen realist, understands the terrific dangers of a sudden return to world revolution. We can safely assume, both from the point of view of the rulers and of the masses, that the chief motive of Russian foreign policy after this war will be to make the peace secure. Russia will need at least the hard work of one generation to restore her terrible losses in human life and treasures. It is a representative Soviet economist, Mr. Varga, who is pleading for a plan according to which ten million German citizens would be enrolled for ten years in a convict army for the rebuilding of Russia and for the restoration of the damages inflicted by the Nazis. Furthermore, Russia will need the economic and technical help of the leading democracies in this work of rehabilitation. These immediate considerations may be sufficiently strong to induce Russia to abstain from any foreign venture. Should she realize that a Sovietization of Central Europe would stir deeply the public opinion of the democracies, the Soviet leaders would scarcely dare to embark upon such a policy. Moreover, with some success in the "grand design" of President Roosevelt, with the growth of economic and cultural cooperation between the Soviets and the democracies, with the diminishing of the fear complex (that Russia would be inevitably attacked by a capitalistic coalition), an atmosphere could develop in which Russia would accept a growing partnership in international action and may definitely abandon the alternative of a close cooperation with Germany and may realize that alliance with Great Britain, France, and the United States would give to Soviet Russia far more power and security than a Panslavistic coalition plus Germany.

Under this hypothesis it seems not an overstrained optimism to assume that for the next twenty years or so Russia would loyally accept the new equilibrium, would not interfere with the cultural and national independence of Central European countries, and would abstain from an action which would disturb her cooperation with the democracies. Qui habet tempus, habet vitam. It will depend on the statesmanship of the democracies to make out of the armistice a real peace, to give fresh courage and democratic self-confidence to the small states, and to convince Russia of the seriousness and loyalty of our intentions. In any case, with a complete victory the problem of security for the next twenty years or so will not be a practical problem, because with a crushed Germany and Japan there cannot possibly be a recurrence of a balance of power policy. But a third World War would become inevitable if during this period we could not transform the war structure of victory into a real peace structure. Without this, slowly, almost imperceptibly, the germs of conflict and international tension would grow throughout the world. A downtrodden and humiliated Germany, a Japan without living space, India and other colonial territories in revolt, an autocratic and militarized China, would again lead to new disasters. Especially the Central European situation is fraught with imminent dangers. This war has mobilized vast popular energies which cannot be appeared without revolutionary changes. If the leading powers fail to provide an outlet for them, tension will grow and this tension cannot assume any other form than that of an increasing gravitation towards Russia. The fears and cautions previously expressed are practically non-existent in the mind of hungry masses and of the millions expelled from their native lands. To calm this tortured humanity by pre-war legitimism, sugarcoated with a few pseudo-reforms, is a reactionary utopia.

VII

What President Roosevelt has called his "grand design" is really the key to a durable peace. All plans for an international organization will depend on a sincere and efficient cooperation between Russia and the democracies. If this alliance of the four big powers should not last, we would

again face an unstable peace. Without such cooperation the United Nations can form only a second League of Nations with all the impotence and hypocrisies of the first one.

But how can the "grand design" be achieved? A purely passive and complacent attitude towards Russia will not help. The controversial issues should not be avoided, but discussed and settled. Referring to the topic of my task, I should say that if we shall regard Central Europe as a noman's land, Russia will inevitably Sovietize this territory. Russia must know and feel that Western democracies are not exhausted and decayed, but that they are alive and anxious to maintain democratic spiritual and moral values all over the world. Therefore, it was very wise of General Smuts when he emphasized the urgent need that the smaller democracies must be led, protected, and animated by a new faith through Great Britain. The African statesman has made, however, two grave mistakes. He forgot that the European democracies must also have the strong support of the most powerful democracy of the future, the United States. And he erred again when he spoke of France as a finished power. I believe, on the contrary, that if the European spirit is not dead, it must rely strongly on a rejuvenated France. Without a solid and conscious organization of world democracy (whatever the future form of a general international organization may be) our policy towards the Soviets can be only a policy of surrender and abdication—practically a new policy of appeasement.

The appeasement policy towards Hitler was based on the absurd assumption that by satisfying him from an economic and strategic point of view, we could solve the problem of peace. The unfortunate Mr. Chamberlain treated the Führer as another Lombard Street man, whereas Hitler was a tyrannical megalomaniac interested primarily in racism and world domination. Similarly, it would be a complete misunderstanding of the whole evolution of Soviet Russia to believe that her leaders, who are fighting for an utterly new conception of the world, could be appeased simply by economic or strategic concessions. It is high time, it seems to me, to realize that treaty agreements about frontiers, spheres of influence, advantageous trade agreements are not enough. We must fight the simplifications of a materialistic and behavioristic philosophy. A moral and spiritual rapprochement between Russia and the democracies is of enormous inportance. Between an autocracy and a democracy there may be military alliances and trade agreements, but no true and lasting cooperation.

Therefore, the main task of the New Pacifism which would avoid the simplifications and the hypocrisies of the pre-war peace movement must be to destroy those Chinese walls which have separated Soviet Russia from the West. To achieve this it is absolutely necessary to re-interpret mutually both our values and theirs. We should have it understood in our country that a purely jural democracy is not enough; that if the liberty of the spirit should come into conflict with the liberty of the stomach, the first will succumb; that unrestricted economic freedom would lead to a monopolistic tyranny; that extreme wealth is as demoralizing as extreme poverty; that a religion without the ideal of social justice is really "an opiate for the people"; that a purely declamatory or jural pacifism, without an effort to transform existing social and economic realities, is simply ridiculous.

On the other hand, we should try to convince the new Russia that even a secure, well-fed existence would be an abject burden without individual freedom; that a one hundred per cent planned economic system would mean a one hundred per cent slavery; that while property originating in violence, fraud, or gambling, should be curbed, property based on work is an essential element of all higher civilizations: that a genuine religious spirit, the spirit of Tolstoy or Mazzini, for instance, is a powerful dynamic force in all humanitarian efforts; that the spirit of class hatred and class war is as inimical to peace as that of race hatred and nationalistic war.

For a real rapprochement between Russia and the West, a powerful factor may develop in those great transformations which can be expected in Russia herself after this war. The Bolsheviks have performed two very important and lasting things: the wiping out of illiteracy and the liberation of her nationality groups from the joke of Russification. These great reforms have surely released very powerful democratic potentialities. It seems quite probable that after the gigantic efforts and unbelievable sufferings of the Russian people during this war, a conscious, daring and resolute new Russian minority will come into existence which will force their present rulers to put teeth into the famous democratic Constitution of 1936 and to offer a Bill of Rights not only on paper but in reality too. With this the deepest abyss would be bridged between us and Soviet Russia.

The harmonization of our two different economic systems should be not necessarily the essential aim of our efforts. As a matter of fact this process is already in full swing due to the growing collectivization of the West and to state capitalism in Russia. The really essential aim should be spiritual and moral reconciliation. Without this the United Nations idea will be not only frustrated, it will become ridiculous. We see already many grave symptoms to this effect. Mr. Churchill is carrying on his private war against the Greek fanatic followers of Marshal Stalin who ignores

the whole story. At the same time he regards the Polish, the Rumanian, the Bulgarian, the Yugoslav and the Hungarian situations as his own domain. Mr. Churchill opposed Count Sforza as a dangerous pétroleur; Moscow dropped Juliu Maniu, the only real leader of the Rumanian peasantry, under the pretext that he is too nationalistic, though one can hardly understand wherein Maniu's nationalism differs from that of the Czechs and the Yugoslavs. And more recently: the new Government in Hungary headed by two simon-pure Horthy generals is the Russian version of the Badoglio experiment, with the significant exception that men of the calibre of Sforza, Croce and Bonomi are lacking in it.

Such and similar facts do not indicate the beginning of a new world order; they rather point towards the continuation of power politics of the old type even now when we are still deep in the war. And this tendency will necessarily aggravate itself step by step if we are unable to bring to a common denominator our aims and values. I cannot see a higher and more congenial task for our universities and colleges than helping to bring West and East nearer to each other in a spirit of mutual trust and sympathy.

CLARK UNIVERSITY

FEBRUARY, 1945

FOUR POWER PACTS: 1933-1945

by René Albrecht-Carrié

N JANUARY 30, 1933 Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany. In view of the avowed intentions and record of the Nazis up to that time, this event, even under the most optimistic interpretation, posed a large question mark before the future of international relations. There was so much that seemed fantasy in the National Socialist ideology and program that many people were inclined to believe that the Nazis' bark would be worse than their bite and to regard much of their professed intentions as belonging to the realm of electoral propaganda. Yet, one could not be too sure, and in any case, one could hardly expect the Nazis, once they had achieved power, to stand still and not accomplish some far reaching transformation in the Germany of which they were now masters. It was only natural therefore that the various foreign offices should proceed to reexamine the foundations of their policies with an eye to possible eventualities.

Two major factors dominated the immediate international horizon in 1933. One was the economic crisis which, from its inception in 1929, had spread until it had engulfed the whole world. The impact of this crisis on Germany had indeed been one of the major reasons for the appeal of the National Socialists until they had achieved the largest representation of any party in the Reichstag. The other was the Disarmament Conference which, after long preliminaries, had finally begun its sessions in Geneva at the beginning of 1932. The endless Franco-British debate over the issue of security versus disarmament had never really got beyond the stage of debate; the attempt to find, through arbitration, a meeting ground for the two fundamentally irreconcilable positions had likewise yielded no concrete results. The participation of Germany had given the discussion a somewhat different turn; for Germany took the simple and, from the standpoint of argument, effective position that she was primarily interested in equality rather than in any particular level of armament or disarmament. The validity of that claim had in fact been recognized, but the recognition was academic since it was recognition in principle, the realization of which remained in an indefinite future. Meanwhile Germany was subject to the restrictions imposed upon her at Versailles, and those more freely accepted at Locarno. Even Weimar Germany had been growing increasingly restless

¹ Despite the fact that they suffered a setback in the election of November, 1932.

at the unending delays and there was little reason to expect that the Nazis would prove more patient than preceding governments. Hence the issue was raised of possible unilateral action on their part.

Another element should be added to the two just mentioned, distinct from but closely related to the disarmament problem, namely the central issue of the powers, not to mention the fate, of the League of Nations. Ever since the birth of the League, in fact during the very process of drafting the Covenant in the spring of 1919, that issue had been paramount. Here also the discussion had been largely an Anglo-French debate; France, obsessed with security, being generally in favor of clarifying and extending the coercive powers of the League; Britain, likewise influenced by her tradition of isolation and non-entanglement, reluctant to undertake additional commitments.²

In these circumstances, little remained in 1933 of the so-called spirit of Locarno which, in the middle and late twenties, seemed to hold the promise of a return to confidence and normalcy in international relations. As Mussolini put it, "the label on the bottle remains, but the contents have evaporated." Under the pressure of economic distress, the various nations offered the spectacle of a general sauve qui peut, indulging in varying degrees of economic nationalism, breeder of irritations and distrust, which in turn led to more economic restrictions; a vicious circle, perceived and understood, but which could only be broken by the general concurrence in common action.³ Perhaps the only positive achievement of this period was the final abolition of reparations. But even this achievement, qualified as it was by the clumsy handling of the Hoover moratorium and by the injection of, or refusal to acknowledge the connection with, the broader issue of war debts, was not the unmixed blessing that it might have been.

After the shelving of the plan presented to the Disarmament Conference by the French in November, 1932, the British in turn came forward with a plan of their own. In March, 1933, the British Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, went to Geneva with his foreign minister, Sir John Simon, in connection with the discussion of this British plan. While in Geneva,

² There were even those, Canada for example, who favored a curtailment of their existing obligations under the Covenant. Perhaps mention should also be made of the British dislike of and opposition to the so-called French "hegemony" on the continent of Europe.

³ With this end in view, a monetary and economic conference met in London in June, 1933. The result, however, was unfortunate, for under the pressure of the domestic situation in the United States, President Roosevelt, by announcing freedom of action in regard to the future of the dollar while the meeting was in session, largely nullified its purpose.

they were invited to visit Rome for the purpose of considering a proposal which Mussolini wished to put forward. Mussolini's interest was not primarily in disarmament, but in the wider issue created by the accession of the Nazis to power in Germany.

It was perhaps natural that the initiative in such a matter should be of Italian origin. There was, for one thing, the ideological link between Fascism and Nazism, even though the Italian interest was not wholly sentimental. Mussolini could well feel pleased at having an imitator in so important a country as Germany; the obverse of this was the fact that, with Germany's potential power at their command, the Nazis might graduate from the rôle of pupils and imitators to a position of leadership and initiative. Mussolini could contemplate with equanimity the return of Germany to a position of equality among the powers or Europe, for it was the irony of having been one of the victors that Italy should find herself robbed, through this very victory, of her best card in the game of power politics: the possibility of throwing her weight to one or the other side of two fairly evenly balanced powers or groups of powers, a position which had been hers before the war and had enabled her to command a fair price for her intervention in 1915.4 With the defeat of Germany, the dominance of French power proved irksome to Italian prestige and ambitions, all the more so since French power was enhanced and bolstered by its alliance with most of the successor states of central and eastern Europe: with France these powers had in common an interest in the preservation of the status quo; from Italy, some of them at least, had cause to fear designs of political domination and even territorial encroachment.⁵ Thus, Italy, while a beneficiary of the peace settlements, had shown increasing sympathy with the defeated nations, and, from 1930 on, had openly espoused the cause of revisionism.

There was another consideration. Smallest of the great powers, on the borderline, in fact, between great and smaller powers, Italy was acutely sensitive on the score of prestige. In addition, Fascism, wedded as it was to the worship of power, made Italy inimical to the fundamental idea of the League of Nations, the recognition, in theory at least, of the equality

⁴ We must differ in this with the interpretation according to which Italy, in 1933, feared the resumption of Franco-German rivalry which would relegate her to the position of a dependent forced to attach herself to one or other power (see Survey of International Affairs, 1933, p. 208). It was the very existence of the balance which enhanced her importance beyond her intrinsic power; in accordance with this, for a long time her policy had been to maintain a fence-sitting position with commitments to both sides.

⁵ There was in addition the issue of rivalry in the Mediterranean and the related one of the colonial claims against France growing out of the war-time agreement.

of sovereign states, great or small. If a directorate of great powers could be established, in which both Italy and Germany would hold seats, would not that enhance the position of Italy whose support would be courted by both Germany and France—for a price? Germany had little to offer, but the threat of siding with her against France might serve to extract certain concessions from the latter. If, on the other hand, Germany should prove over ambitious and present a threat to Italy, as indeed she could should she revive such an issue as the *Anschluss*, then she in turn could be put in a minority within the inner group. Neat calculations, without a doubt, and it should be added that, from the broader standpoint of the preservation of European peace in general, such a scheme might be more effective in bringing back Germany into the family of nations while retaining some control over her, than the French policy of keeping her impotent while making piecemeal concessions that merely served to create a demand for more.

There was little reason to expect that calculations of this nature would appeal to France. But it was otherwise with Britain, whose European policy was in some respects not unlike the Italian.⁶ It was therefore natural that Mussolini should invite the British Ministers to Rome in order to broach to them some of the considerations which have just been outlined. Such is the origin of Mussolini's Four Power Pact.

As it turned out, this Pact was virtually stillborn by the time it saw the light of day; consequently, it did not become an important instrument in the subsequent course of the affairs of Europe. There would be little point in going into a mere post mortem at this stage. But it may be of interest to examine certain aspects of this attempt of 1933 with an eye to the present, when we hear and read a great deal about schemes for the future organization of the world and of peace, schemes based to a large extent on a four power combination. To be sure, there are great differences between the circumstances of 1933 and those of 1945, and it is the purpose of the present discussion to examine the nature and extent of the differences as well as of the similarities, if any, between the two combinations and sets of circumstances. In the spirit of Carl Becker's provocative title to his recent book, How New Will the Better World Be?. a glance at the recent past may throw some useful light on the near future.

* * * *

⁶ For different reasons from those which motivated Italy, Britain too was antagonistic to the preponderance of French power on the continent. In the game of balance of power, Britain had in fact tended to use Italy as a check on France in the Mediterranean.

As diplomatic negotiations go, those surrounding the Four Power Pact were unusually expeditious. The original proposal was handed to the British ministers at the time of their visit to Rome on March 18; by June 7 the final instrument was initialed in Rome. There is no point in rehearsing the details of these negotiations, the history of which is well known. It will suffice to recall that the British reacted favorably to the suggestion to which they proposed certain modifications. On their way home, they submitted the proposal to the French government. But the Little Entente which had just strengthened its bonds7 reacted most unfavorably to the scheme and, on March 25, its Permanent Council issued in Geneva a statement voicing their misgivings in no uncertain terms. The British produced a new draft at the beginning of April, which was soon followed by a French draft, drawn up under the influence of France's own reaction, plus the reaction of the Little Entente and a Belgian memorandum to the same general effect. This French draft became the basis of discussion; there followed a period of hesitancy caused in part by the uncertain trend of German policy, but a moderate speech of Hitler's on May 17 allayed fears. On May 30, the Little Entente, declaring itself satisfied with France's explanations and interpretations, accepted the French draft, which, with minor changes, became the final Treaty signed in June.

It is worth comparing the original Italian proposal with the final text and analyzing the real significance of the two versions and the reasons that were responsible for the changes.⁸ Articles 1 to 4 are the only ones that need be considered for this purpose.⁹

Article 1 which, in the Italian draft of March 18, read:

The four western powers, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, undertake to carry out between them an effective policy of cooperation, in order to ensure the maintenance of peace in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact and of the 'no resort to force pact', and undertake to follow such course of action as to induce, if necessary, third parties, as far as Europe is concerned, to adopt the same policy of peace.

became in the final version:

⁷ The Pact of organization of the Little Entente, signed on February 16, 1933, set up a Permanent Council of Foreign Ministers with a view to coordinating the foreign policy of the three countries. This in itself caused Italy to take umbrage lest the Little Entente, acting as a unit, should achieve the position of a major power.

⁸ We need not consider the British draft since it did not become the basis of discussion. This draft contained some articles emphasizing economic provisions which, for the most part, did not find their way into the final instrument.

⁹ For the texts of the various drafts, see Documents on International Affairs, 1933, pp. 240-49.

The High Contracting Parties will consult together as regards all questions which appertain to them. They undertake to make every effort to pursue, within the framework of the League of Nations, a policy of effective cooperation between all powers with a veiw to the maintenance of peace. 10

Before discussing the significance of the differences between these two versions, we must consider article 2 which clarifies the meaning of the first article. The Italian version which read:

The Four Powers confirm the principle of the revision of treaties, in accordance with the clauses of the Covenant of the League of Nations, in cases in which there is a possibility that they will lead to conflict among the states. They declare at the same time that the principle of revision cannot be applied except within the framework of the League and in a spirit of mutual understanding and solidarity of reciprocal interests.

It was changed to the following:

In respect of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and particularly articles 10, 16, and 19, the High Contracting Parties decide to examine between themselves, and without prejudice to decisions which can only be taken by the regular organs of the League of Nations, all proposals relating to methods and procedures calculated to give due effect to these articles.

Taken together, these two articles reveal, in their original form, the true intent and spirit of the Pact. This was no less than an attempt at setting up a directorate of the four great powers of Europe. ¹¹ If the Pact had any meaning, this lay in the emphasis which it put on treaty revision, a revision which would be effected through the four powers acting in accord to exert joint pressure, if necessary, on third parties. The homage paid to the League was in the nature of sugar coating. Now, the peace treaties had already undergone considerable revisions, of which reparations was the outstanding illustration. If the principle were to be extended and emphasized, treaty revision could only point to territorial readjustment. No wonder that, cutting through diplomatic verbiage, the Little Entente stated that

The states of the Little Entente cannot recognize that the cause of good relations among states is served by agreements whose aim it would be to dispose of the rights of third parties¹²

No doubt, on various occasions since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the concert of Europe had been able to maintain the peace among

1933. Documents on International Affairs, 1933, p. 252.

¹⁰ Parts of the original article 1 found their way into the preamble of the final treaty.

11 On the reasons for and the significance of the exclusion of Russia, see below p. 27.

12 Communiqué issued by the Permanent Council of the Little Entente, March 23,

its members and to enforce certain settlements (e. g., Congress of Berlin of 1878, of London of 1913, both dealing with Balkan affairs), but the League represented a departure from this conception by providing the smaller powers with a forum where their voice could be heard and by introducing the notion of collective action by all members. The issue was therefore clearly joined with the League idea. There is no denying also the problem of the responsibility of power; in other words, the force that would enforce any collective security could only be supplied by the large powers who, under the League system, did not, or at least might not, have the controlling voice in directing the use of this force.

It was therefore only to be expected that the reaction of the small powers should be inimical to the central concept of the Four Power Pact and that France should be the agent through which their objections should be registered. The French position was delicate. In view of the new turn of events in Germany, France was anxious to secure the support of Italy, or at least not to antagonize her. She was equally anxious to retain her connection with her smaller allies, and she herself stood to pay some, at least, of the price of any joint four power policy. The result was the final version of articles 1 and 2 which has been quoted. Without rejecting the idea of concerted action, the emphasis was shifted from treaty revision to treaty enforcement by mentioning articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant along with article 19.13

Articles 3 and 4 of the original proposal of Mussolini may be described as implementing the concept of the four power directorate suggested in the first two articles. Article 3 was especially designed for Germany's benefit for it provided that, in the event of failure of the Disarmament Conference, the principle of German equality of rights, so far recognized only in the abstract, should be given "practical value"; in other words, Germany would be allowed to rearm. In return for this recognition, she in turn would undertake to reach equality in stages only and not at once. As pointed out before, there was a strong case for keeping German rearmament within some framework of legality and order rather than letting Germany take matters into her own hands, if she were going to rearm in any case. However, here also the decision was to rest with the Four rather

¹³ While article 19 stated that the Assembly of the League might "advise the reconsideration . . . of treaties which have become inapplicable," article 10 stressed the preservation of the "territorial integrity and political independence of all members" and article 16 made the resort to war by a member in disregard of its obligations under the Covenant "an act of war against all other members."

than with the League. But the original article 3 was watered down into the pious but largely meaningless statement that

The High Contracting Parties undertake to make every effort to ensure the success of the Disarmament Conference, and, should questions which particularly concern them remain in suspense on the conclusion of that Conference, they reserve the right to reexamine these questions between themselves in pursuance of the present agreement with a view to ensuring their solution through the appropriate channels.

Finally, the fourth article stated at first that

In all political and non-political questions, whether European or extra-European, as well as in the colonial domain, the four powers undertake to adopt, as far as possible, a common line of conduct.

Taken in conjunction with the first version of article 2, this emphasized the revisionist tendency of the Pact, applied to colonial matters, in which Italy, as well as Germany, could enter certain claims. This article was completely eliminated in the final version of the Pact, where it was replaced by the following:

The High Contracting Parties affirm their determination to consult among themselves on all questions of an economic nature which present a common interest for Europe and especially for her economic restoration with a view to a settlement to be sought within the framework of the League of Nations.

It is clear, from a consideration of the texts which have been cited and from the foregoing discussion, that the final form of the Pact bore no resemblance to the original. For reasons of prestige and in deference to Italian sensibilities a Pact was signed, but this was done at the cost of voiding it of all real meaning. The final platitudinous text contains no more than had been embodied in many previous treaties, in the Covenant itself for that matter. It was indeed no accident that the framework of the League was repeatedly referred to. The reassertion may seem superfluous; what it actually meant was the denial of the attempt to set up a four power directorate for Europe. All the niceties of diplomatic language could not hide this fact and, as a result, the final signature of the Pact in June was looked upon as a mild accretion of Italian prestige, but of no real significance for the future of international relations. The League idea had thus triumphed in this test of strength. All that remained was a warning that the League idea had been challenged.

But the challenge itself was important, defeated though it had been, for it meant that if the League was to be an effective instrument for the preservation of peace it could not survive merely on the strength of a

policy of indefinitely continued negation. Either it would have to show itself capable of handling coming readjustments within its framework, or it would have to provide itself with sufficient effective force to prevent change. A repetition of the Manchurian episode might easily prove fatal. And if the League was unable to cope with its responsibilities, then rather than a complete return to unrestricted anarchy, a good deal could be said in favor of a return to a concert of the great powers, however objectionable that proposal might be on other scores.

* * * *

Mussolini's Four Power Pact, then, was a failure. Especially after 1935, when he decided to try more direct methods of satisfying his ambitions, Europe and the world drifted at an accelerated pace into the chaos that led in 1939 to the logical conclusion of war. After five long years, the end of that war appears to be within sight and, with the coming end, the hitherto unresolved problem of organization to preserve peace is again paramount. War itself is an essentially negative enterprise. We have successfully defeated the attempt to organize the world according to the wishes of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo triangle; the problem still remains, however, of providing an alternative solution. But, before entering into a discussion of this aspect of the matter, something should be said of the aftermath of Mussolini's Four Power Pact, for that too is enlightening.

If Mussolini's pact was stillborn, the spirit of it was not. So much so that within five years the scheme was actually put into effect—with a vengeance. The occasion was none other than the Munich agreement of 1938. The history of that sorry episode is known even better than that of the Four Power Pact and need not be retold. What interests us here is the relationship between the two events.

By 1938 the League was but a sad remnant of its former self. Badly shaken by the Manchurian affair and the Japanese withdrawal, followed by that of Germany a little later, Mussolini's Ethiopian adventure gave it the coup de grâce. Russia's admission in the interval had been some compensation for its losses, but the negative and supine behavior of Britain and France during the Spanish Civil War was tantamount to a final abdication of leadership on their part. Emboldened by his unexpected successes and losing all sense of measure, Mussolini had decided to gamble for high stakes and had securely tied Italy to the German chariot. The Rome-Berlin Axis, engineered in 1936, represented a power combination, ruthless, vigorous, and reckless, wholly independent of the League, which played with notions of world reorganization under its own control. To be sure,

Mussolini's position within the combination turned increasingly from that of partner to that of prisoner: in 1938 he had no choice but to pretend to accept with good grace the abandonment of the first commandment of Italian foreign policy, the prevention of the Austrian Anschluss, which he had taken the leadership in opposing four years earlier. The European situation in 1938 was very different from that of 1933. Much that the League should have prevented from happening, or that the Four Power Pact, had it become an effective instrument, might conceivably have held under some sort of check, had actually come to pass. But it had taken place in unregulated fashion, as an assertion of brute power, and in defiance of treaty obligations.

Encouraged by an uninterrupted series of successes, Germany, in the summer of 1938, gave unmistakable signs of intending to proceed with the second step in her program of territorial expansion: the elimination of the Czechoslovak bulwark. By September, the atmosphere was one of imminent crisis and there was little time to waste if either war or an abject acquiescence in another German fait accompli was to be avoided. The initiative came this time from Britain in the form of Mr. Chamberlain's dramatic trip to Berchtesgaden. Mussolini, committed as he was to Berlin, put on an act of supporting his partner. Actually, he was not overanxious for too great a German success and at the eleventh hour he threw his influence on the side of a negotiated agreement. The result was the notorious settlement of Munich.

In effect, Munich represented a resounding enough success for the Nazis and an abject surrender on the part of Britain and France, for all of Mr. Chamberlain's triumphant waving of the peace-in-our-time scrap of paper which he brought home with him. As an ethnic issue, the Sudetenland was a small enough matter that did not warrant a European war; as to the manner in which its surrender had been arranged, however flimsy the pretense in reality, it could be said that the forms at least of negotiation and agreement had been preserved.

But the real significance of the performance was that it represented in effect the acceptance, on the part of the four powers who signed the agreement, of the concept embodied in the original version of the Four Power Pact of 1933. That is, the League was short-circuited and the four powers took it upon themselves to contrive a settlement and to enforce it upon a third party. How justified the premonitions and the objections of the Little Entente in March 1933 were could be seen in the first instance of treaty revision under the auspices of the four powers acting in accord "to induce

. . . third parties . . . to adopt the same policy of peace" as interpreted by themselves.

The consequence was not far to seek. Munich was the final and inescapable declaration of incapacity of the League of Nations. This collapse took the more concrete form of the collapse of the French system of alliances on the continent. Czechoslovakia, most effective member of the Little Entente, was eliminated as a military factor, and with her elimination the Little Entente lost all weight and coherence. There began to take place a mad scramble, a general sauve qui peut on the part of the small powers in an effort to come to terms with the rising power of Germany. The floodgates of revisionism were thrown wide open from which, besides Germany, Hungary was the chief beneficiary at the time, at the expense of Czechoslovakia first, then of Rumania later. 14 Equally important, Russia which had been brought within the League system and had returned to the French alliance of pre-1914, essentially for the same reasons as before 1914, was not present at Munich. With understandable disgust and suspicion, she withdrew into herself and began to look to her own security unassisted. 15 Whatever may be said of French "hegemony" in Europe—and it may indeed well be criticized as a poor second best by comparison with a really successful League—it was in the last analysis a system essentially devoted to the preservation of peace; whatever its shortcomings, it was infinitely preferable either to outright Axis domination or even to the sort of power combination that could produce such fruits as a Munich settlement.

* * * *

Here, then, was the the idea of the Four Power Pact at work. Again, the conditions of 1945 are very different from those of 1933 or 1938. Instead of seeking to insure the continuation of peace we are trying to liquidate a war. The burden of this war is carried in the main by four, or at least three, powers. It is inevitable that the initiative in dictating the terms for the cessation of hostilities as well as in charting the immediate future should be in the hands of those contributing the bulk of the

14 She received part of Slovakia in connection with the Munich settlement, Subcarpathian Ruthenia the following March, and the Vienna award of September, 1940 gave her a large section of Transylvania.

¹⁵ The fact that Russian policy, especially the mystifying events within Russia, makes understandable suspicion and distrust of her on the part of the western powers, explains but does not justify the blunders committed. It was the real tragedy of the situation that Britain, France, and Russia should have so contrived things as to act at cross purposes, for the greater benefit and glory of Nazidom, when their fundamental interests were really identical. The fitting climax of the tragedy was the conclusion of the Russo-German Pact in August, 1939, the green light for Germany to go to war.

war effort. The question is, to what extent will these same powers retain or surrender their dominant position in the setting up of a permanent

organization, if such there is to be?

It is therefore important, when making comparisons with the abortive attempt of twelve years ago, to examine with care the similarities as well as the differences. To begin with, there may be point in stopping to consider who are these four powers. It will appear at the outset that there are enormous differences in the range of power of the United States, Russia, Britain, and China.

Among them, the first two are in a category by themselves. Even they will face great problems of their own which may well affect their external effectiveness for a time. We do not know how successful the task of readjustment will be in the United States; the problems of employment and finance, for example can doubtless be handled with success, but that does not necessarily mean that they will be. Likewise, the Soviet Union has not been sufficiently tested in its ability for long term organization. Russia has given the lie to the fanciful pictures of incompetence and ineffectiveness that were current until she showed herself capable of bearing virtually single-handed the whole burden of German attack. 16 But if we consider the colossal extent of Russian resources in territory, manpower, and natural wealth, then Russia, like ourselves, ought to be able to afford a vast amount of waste and inefficiency and still enjoy a huge margin of power over Germany. Unlike ours, the Russian organization is largely new; unlike us, also, Russia will have a huge task of physical reconstruction to perform. We do not know how efficient the Russian system will prove in the long run. However, granting all this, both the United States and the Soviet Union, barring a conceivable but unlikely catastrophic mismanagement of their affairs, will, on the basis of their intrinsic resources, be the two great powers of the near future.

Britain presents greater uncertainties. Her power derives from her position at the head of a large empire. Much depends therefore on the future of this empire, a question that holds many unknowns. Taken by themselves, the component parts of the Commonwealth and Empire are units of the second or third rank. Britain is aware of the uncertainties and is making a gallant fight to maintain her position.¹⁷ She has no intention

¹⁶ Britain was of course, at war, but her contribution to land warfare was, for a long time, negligible, and the same applies to America for a time after her entry into the war. Germany was thus able to throw the bulk of her land power, backed in addition by the resources of the conquered continent, against Russia.

¹⁷ Marshal Smuts' speech of November 25, 1943 is a good illustration of the British awareness of the problem and indicates one particular line of approach of British thinking.

of abdicating, as Mr. Churchill has forcefully said on more than one occasion, but the chief difference between the United States and Russia on the one hand and Britain on the other is that, in the case of Britain, many of the factors that will determine the extent of British power are beyond British control. The range within which British power may vary is therefore very great: it may be anywhere between the power of, say, France, at one extreme, and the United States at the other. In any case, the decline of British power, however great or small, is apt to occur over a period of time, so that Britain definitely appears as power number three in the world that will emerge from the war.

China is an altogether different story. Her physical resources, savein manpower and territory, are not too great for her size. She has undoubtedly the makings of a great power, but, at the very best, the effective organization of that power (even if we leave out of account the very great losses incurred in the war) is apt to take a considerable period of time. A violent revolution like the Russian might conceivably wipe out the past and accomplish for China the sort of economic building up that we have witnessed in the Soviet Union. But Russian revolutions are rare occurrences: the present leadership of China, even if it maintains itself, is not likely to perform such a task. One can envision the future development of China offering a closer parallel to Mexico than to Russia. No one would cavil with the sympathy that China's sufferings have earned her; but power does not grow out of sympathy or charity. Nor is there any question of China returning to a semi-colonial status under foreign exploitation. The simple truth of the matter is that China is not at present a great power. The British appraisal of her is probably nearer the mark on this score than the American, colored in its popular aspects by unrealistic sentimentality. 18

In the hierarchy of powers, the position next to America, Russia, and Britain is occupied by France.¹⁹ In this war, France has been the object of the same sort of misconceptions, only in reverse, that were current about Russia. Her performance in 1940 led many to accept Marshal Smuts' view that "France is gone in our day and perhaps for many a day." The course of events in France since June, 1944, both military and political, has once more tended to reverse the picture and has caused many to hold

¹⁸ The Russian view of China is clouded with uncertainty. At the moment, Russo-Chinese relations are, at best, correct.

^{19.} This is predicated on the assumption that, for some appreciable time, German power will be destroyed. For the longer future, German power will also have to be taken into account, nothwithstanding some of the fanciful day-dreaming indulged in at present on that subject.

what may prove to be unwarranted expectations. Both views have in common the quality of being essentially uncritical: the earlier based on incorrect analysis, the later on insufficient evidence. That France has suffered greatly from the war is beyond debate, despite some foolish reports of superficial observers. However, when the final reckoning is made, it is quite conceivable that Germany and Italy will turn out to have suffered greater injury than France, with the result that the position of France in terms of relative power may actually be enhanced in Europe as a consequence of the war. But, obviously, much of this is speculation. France's injury cannot yet be estimated with accuracy and much will depend upon the powers of recovery that the country will show, powers which are themselves affected by the extent of this injury. Like that of Britain, the future of France therefore presents a great question mark, but, in any event, in the immediate future, France is likely to be the major unit of the continent outside of Russia.

Summing up, to talk about the Big Four is inaccurate. There are at present only three powers of the first rank. We should even venture the prediction that, if a fourth power is to be effectively associated with them, it probably should be, and likely will be, France rather than China²⁰ In this respect, the 1933 proposal was nearer reality, for it did include the four major powers of Europe. If that proposal could be criticized on the score of lack of realism, it was for its exclusion of Russia.

And this last consideration points to a fundamental difference between the schemes of 1933 and those of the present time. A case may no doubt be made for considering the continent of Europe, exclusive of Russia, as a unit; the fact cannot be overlooked that Russia, like Britain, has vital connections with the rest of the continent. But the exclusion of Russia in 1933, as in 1938, was deliberate and purposeful. For (and this is the heart of the matter) if Mussolini's suggestion was intended to preserve the peace, that motive was secondary and incidental. Equally, in fact rather more, important was the desire to secure prestige and concrete advantages for Italy; as indicated before, the proposed setup would have furnished excellent opportunities for the exercise of the gentle game of blackmail, mainly at the expense of France; for the rest, the four might make agreements, satisfactory to one or more of them, at the expense of outsiders, as they did at Munich. Such an approach obviously vitiated the scheme from its incep-

²⁰ Not that China is likely to be excluded from the inner circle, but in the sense that, in terms of effective influence throughout the world, that of France is apt to be more widespread and significant than that of China.

tion and the application of it in 1938 was less a case of preserving peace than the first skirmish in a coming struggle. The motivation behind the proposal is therefore of the highest importance. Now, no one would claim that the Big Three—or Four or Five, if there are to be that many—of the present time have been mainly actuated by expansionist greed.²¹

Unfortunately that is not enough. For the fact remains that, even granting good intentions, there may well be, actually there are, conflicts of a deep-rooted nature which cannot simply be talked away. At the very least, it would be a necessary prerequisite, though by no means a sufficient condition, that the sponsors can agree among themselves and, what is more, stay agreed. To cite an illustration. It is desperately essential for Britain to restore her position in international trade. This endeavor may easily clash with certain American interests. It does not follow that we shall go to war, but in the contest that may ensue there would be an inevitable tendency to court or coerce third parties into associating themselves with one or other of the two rivals. The trade position of Argentina, for instance, immediately comes to mind.

Third parties, other countries than the Big Three or Four, are therefore naturally inclined to be antagonistic to any such combination. We need only mention the suspicious interest and the anxiety with which outside powers followed the Dumbarton Oaks discussions. They fear that if the central group agree their interests may be ignored, or worse, that agreement may be reached at their expense. Past experience justifies these fears, and certainly history cannot be said to offer many instances of lasting agreement among the major powers. In fact, at the very moment and while the war is still unfinished, differences are apparent. There is little doubt that the United States will insist on maintaining a very large navy and, in all likelihood, a substantial military establishment, plus what bases we do not yet know. This will be no doubt for defensive purposes of our own security. But the rest of the world will have its own ideas on the subject.²²

More pointed and urgent is the issue of Russia's western frontiers, particularly the frontier with Poland. The conclusion of the Russo-German Pact in August, 1939 was followed by the German attack on Poland and shortly thereafter by the fourth partition of that country between her two

been) that we had designs on Dakar may be cited as an illustration.

²¹ If it turns out, as will probably be the case, that some of the United Nations emerge from the war with territorial acquisitions, the fact remains that their position has been an essentially defensive one, that they were anxious to avoid war, and that the initiative of aggression came from Germany.

22 The reaction produced by the mere suggestion (however unfounded it may have

chief neighbors. Whether Russia's action was wise, even from the limited standpoint of military strategy, is a debatable question. In any case, the German attack on Russia in June, 1941 invalidated the earlier agreement between the two countries and, for a time, Russia and Poland, as represented by her Government in exile in London, were allied against Germany. But relations deteriorated subsequently and Russia withdrew recognition from the Polish government in London. The differences were given concrete shape through the Russian demand for a new frontier between herself and Poland, approximating what is generally known as the Curzon Line.²³ A request for territorial cessions, especially in the circumstances of a government in exile, is obviously not easy to meet. At the very least a concession of this sort on the part of the Polish government must be accompanied by some face-saving device. Whether the Poles have shown themselves unduly intransigent, or whether they have been confronted with a blunt request to sign on the dotted line, is a question on which adequate and reliable information is lacking at the present time. The search for a solution has not been simplified by Moscow's recognition of the puppet Lublin régime.

The issue should be made easier, but actually it is rendered more complex, by the fact that opinion, official as well as popular, in the United States and Britain is generally favorable to the Russian claim but balks at the prospect of an enforced unilateral arrangement. From the level of a specific territorial dispute, the question finds itself thus raised to the broader plane of principle. Mr. Churchill, in a recent speech,²⁴ seemed to indicate that his support of the Polish group in London might not last much longer. The simplest explanation of his statement is that (reluctantly perhaps) he was merely delivering to Moscow the price of continued Anglo-Russian agreement. The Yalta meeting seemed to hold a promise of preserving the forms at least of compromise, even though the meaning of the word was being stretched to a dangerous extent. As this is being written, no results have yet appeared and one cannot help wondering whether there was a real meeting of minds on the meaning of compromise.

²³ Much misconception is current about this famous Curzon Line. On its origin and significance, which it would take us too far afield to discuss here, we may refer to the treatment in vol. VIII of H. W. V. Temperley's A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (London, 1924) and in addition to Harold Nicolson's Curzon: the Last Phase 1919-1925 (Boston & New York, 1934, pp. 202-208), and to a recent article by Witold Sworakowski, "An Error Regarding Eastern Galicia in Curzon's Note to the Soviet Government," which appeared in the April, 1944 issue of this Journal, among a growing mass of literature on the subject.

²⁴ Speech in Commons of December 16, 1944.

That Russia has a perfect right to Russian territory²⁵ and to her own security is a truism that no one will argue. But to assert that 'the borders of the Soviet Union can no more be questions for discussion than can the frontiers of the United States or the status of California''26 is merely to give a display of ignorance, whether genuine or pretended. For it is a simple fact that the United States does not present the picture of distinct nationalities associated with distinct sections of territory that is offered by Europe. If Russia insists on taking the position suggested in the above quotation, if the frontiers that she demands include territory which is either non-Russian or ethnically debatable, and if we acquiesce in this position on the plea that Russia must at all costs be brought into the future security system, however sound the Russian position may be from the standpoint of defense or economics, and however successful she may be in having her way, then obviously we are at the very start falling into the same kind of error that vitiated the Munich settlement of 1938. In that event, all our professed good intentions cannot but sound fraudulent to those outside of the inner power group.

Consider another point. A parallel may be drawn between the position of the present Big Three with respect to the world as a whole and the position of the four signatories of the 1933 Pact with respect to Europe. But there are also important differences. The four powers of 1933 were all within Europe and between them held the overwhelming portion of the power that was in Europe. The three powers of 1945, while two of them as pointed out before are in part at least European, would exclude any purely continental power. However much the continental powers of Europe may be weakened at the moment, it would be utopian to expect Europe as a whole to remain amenable to dictation from the outside for any length of time. For reasons of relative power, it would be fallacious to draw, between Europe as a whole and the pre-1914 Balkans, the analogy which is implied in the talk of the balkanization of Europe. It would be possible, easy in fact, to keep Europe divided by emphasizing its national differences; that would be an excellent guarantee of future conflicts which it would be far more difficult to localize than former Balkan disputes. We

²⁵ On the facts of the complex ethnic situation in the case of Poland, as well as for the other countries bordering Russia in the west, we may refer to Bernard Newman's The New Europe (New York, 1943). One cannot overemphasize the frequent lack of clarity in the ethnic situation of Eastern Europe, nor the backwardness of much of the populations involved, which facts would often deprive of much of their significance such apparently simple and fair devices as plebiscites in these regions.

26 Quotation from Pravda, as reported by C. L. Sulzberger, "What Russia Is—What Russia Wants," New York Times Magazine, January 28, 1945.

may assume that an attempt of this sort will not be made deliberately, although such may well be the result of failure of the Three to produce agreement among themselves.

In this connection, we might mention the unreality of much of the discussion relating to the immediate disposition of Germany. A tripartite occupation of Germany to the exclusion of other European powers is not likely to last for long in the form suggested at present. It is already generally understood that France will be associated in the arrangement. France, is of course, the first and chief objector to exclusion, and in so doing she is acting not only in her own behalf but also as the spokesman of a goodly part of Europe. It would seem the part of tactfulness, not to say elementary wisdom, to associate France, not only in schemes of occupation, but in the discussion of other future arrangements as well. Since French power in Europe is bound to be an important factor in any event, it would be politic, if nothing else, not to give color to the charge that the restoration of this power has taken place in spite of our activities. For the present the issue is in large measure psychological, but the importance of psychological factors should not be underrated. Actually, with deft handling, it ought not to prove beyond our ability to cope with; for in effect we (the Big Three) have the overwhelming preponderance of power, and our views, if we can agree, are bound to prevail. But the matter of form and procedure is all important. This is true in the case of France, it is true in the case of Poland, two prime test cases of our (the Three's) intentions and of our ability to provide an acceptable leadership for the world that will emerge from the present conflict.

Moreover, the mere association of France with the present Big Three (or Four)—and France has been mentioned because she is the most likely candidate—will not solve the problem of reconciling the possession of power with the constitution of the organ that shall direct the use of that power. As far as America is concerned, opinion is generally ready to admit that the old isolation is gone, but the implications of this fact in terms of sovereignty, when it comes to setting up some sort of world organization—League of Nations or what you will—have not been clearly faced. We are not likely, for instance, to find Russia in 1945 as amenable as the rest of the world in 1920 to our participation under a status of privilege.²⁷

²⁷ In deference to the feelings of the Senate, President Wilson had secured in 1919 the incorporation into the Covenant of such clauses as recognition of the Montoe Doctrine. There is reason to believe that even the Lodge reservations of 1920 would have been no insuperable obstacle to our participation as far as the other members were concerned.

A three or four power directorate will serve to win the war and to organize some sort of order in the immediate aftermath; as a lasting solution it is an illusory, if attractive, short-cut that is likely to result in failure.

An interesting and somewhat unexpected proposal has recently been made by Senator Vandenberg.²⁸ The sponsorship of the suggestion as well as its nature give it unusual significance. Not so much perhaps because of the specific things said about the German problem (great as it is, that problem is but one of many, one moreover that may loom less important in the future than it has in the past), but because of the radical departure which it suggests from the traditional position of this country. As a result of her power and circumstances, America, now as in 1919, enjoys a unique position and opportunity among nations. Whether we call it American idealism, to use the phrase popular twenty-five years ago, or whether, with the cynicism of presumed greater wisdom, we prefer to think of it as the shield of enlightened self-interest, the fact remains that American opinion at large stands, more than any other, for a settlement based on justice and fairness to all participants.

If we assume that an attempt will be made at creating some sort of world organization for the general purpose of adjusting future differences by means other than the unregulated use of force, two prime considerations must be borne in mind. One, the importance of the machinery that is devised for the purpose; on this score the failure of the League holds useful lessons. The other, related but distinct and even more important, that there can be no substitute for the willingness of the greater powers to accept the consequences of their submission to the rule of law. Of these two capital issues, neither at this writing has been resolved.²⁹

QUEENS COLLEGE

²⁸ Speech in the Senate, January 10, 1945.
29 By the time this appears in print, the San Francisco conference will have met. One can only wish that it may succeed in resolving the difficulties which have been pointed out in the foregoing discussion.

THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE 1944 WARSAW UPRISING

by Julian Hochfeld

VICTORIOUS insurrection does not require justification. An insurrection that has failed always becomes the subject of passionate discussion immediately afterwards and of historical evaluation in the future. One of the usual arguments raised by critics is that the Warsaw insurrection was premature. With equal regularity, the advocates of the insurrection assert that its outbreak was inevitable. Both may at the same time be right and wrong. Our method of investigation and evaluation of social phenomena is still considerably lacking in precision. It is difficult for us to go beyond the mere analysis of facts. Our judgments are still to a great extent irrational and depend on our ideological approach and our political program, which—despite illusions to the contrary—shape themselves in the sphere of the emotions rather than that of the mind.

There is a tendency to look for the sources of social phenomena in current events. This is only partially correct, since at the origin of nearly every social phenomenon lie many elements of the past, including the very important one of historical traditions, which by their very nature, constitute—as one of the elements of human behavior—an irrational factor.

This factor operates in nearly every geographical latitude; it is far from being limited to "romantic" Poles. Under certain circumstances, even the wise British are subject to its influence, the British who can be no less romantic against the background of Kiplingesque reality than the Poles are against the background of their century and a half struggle for their very existence.

That is why, in analyzing the social aspects of the Warsaw uprising of 1944, we shall, to begin with, turn our attention not to current events only but to two important traditions.

The first is the traditional role of Warsaw in the struggle for national independence. Although the Warsaw insurrection of 1794 was not the opening act in the Kościuszko Insurrection, and although at first it broke out independently of the national uprising, it was nevertheless of vital and decisive significance. This significance lay in the fact that it was essentially the expression of the revolutionary aspirations of the alliance between the lower strata of the Warsaw craftsmen and the Jacobin military intelligentsia.

The Warsaw insurrection of 1830 was the outgrowth of a similar alliance, with the difference that the somewhat anachronistic Jacobinism of the military intelligentsia gave place to other interests and aims. Later,

under the conditions of emerging capitalism, social relations began to change. Led by the Polish Socialist Party, the Warsaw proletariat, in alliance with an important part of the intelligentsia (some of which later "got off at the Independence Station" to become the contemporary equivalent of the old military intelligentsia), played a decisive role in the revolutionary struggle of 1904-1907. The role of the workers in the defense of Warsaw in September, 1939, the role of the Socialist Labor Movement in the defense of the Warsaw ghetto in 1943, the role of the Polish Socialist Party in the Warsaw uprising of 1944—all these directly follow the same line of historical tradition.

Indissolubly linked with this is the other major tradition in Poland's struggle for freedom—the close connection between the fight for national independence and the spirit of social revolution, a connection developed and maintained throughout the last 150 years of Polish history.

This connection is neither an accident nor the product of deliberate policy, but has deep roots in the specific conditions of Poland's social development. At the end of the eighteenth century, the nascent patriotism of the Polish "Third Estate" was directed against three reactionary powers, Russia, Prussia and Austria. The Polish aristocracy, together with a part of the Polish gentry motivated by their class interests, supported the dominant régimes; on the other side of the barricade were the middle class, the craftsmen, the military intelligentsia descended from the gentry, and certain patriotic elements of the ruling classes.

Capitalism was unable to develop normally in dismembered Poland, especially because the continuous wars that swept over Poland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries delayed and hampered her economic development. The "Third Estate" never achieved its proper role in partitioned Poland, and where it succeeded in developing, it adopted the defensive policy of compromising with the invaders. Therefore, by 1905, Polish Nationalism, which in 1794 had been revolutionary and Jacobin, already bore the stigma of collaboration with the reactionary invading powers. It thus became not only anti-revolutionary, but also essentially anti-patriotic.

The traditions of Jacobin patriotism were taken over by the movement for democratic revolution, and later by the Socialist revolutionary

2 To be understood as the French "Tiers Etat."

¹ Famous words of Piłsudski, who, after leaving the Polish Socialist Party, said that he had been traveling in a "Socialist street-car", but got off at the "Independence Station", while the others are continuing their journey.

forces. Poles fought on all the barricades of Europe. The Polish proletariat undertook the mission that the Polish bourgeoisie could not or did not want to fulfill. As a result of this development, the cause of Poland's national independence became indissolubly bound up with the cause of progress and democracy throughout the world. The situation in which Poland found herself after 1918 as a relatively small country squeezed between two expansionist powers evolving in an anti-democratic direction, made her entirely dependent upon the victory of democratic forces which were free from the spirit of conquest and imperialist aspirations.

The Polish revolutionary struggles thus wove themselves quite naturally into the chain whose other links were the barricades of the "Spring of the Peoples" of 1848, the social upheavals of the post-war years, the Vienna insurrection of 1934 and the heroic defense of Madrid of 1937.

The consciousness of the people of Warsaw is deeply steeped in these two traditions, which, without any doubt, are the basis of their uncompromising attitude and "irrational" heroism. To illustrate this it is necessary to cite some further facts.

The Socialist proletariat of Warsaw assumed the initiative in the defense of Warsaw in September 1939. The military intelligentsia was at that time far from its early Jacobinism. But changed conditions again gave rise to an alliance between the two groups, for it immediately became clear that only the Socialist Labor Movement and its forces could save Poland. On September 14, the military officer in charge of the Warsaw radio declared in a conversation:

"I have the feeling that the workers' action in the defense of Warsaw smacks of a socialist revolution. So be it, then, so long as we save Poland."

What a far cry this is from Weygand's decision in 1940 in response to the problem of whether to arm the people and entrust them with the defense of Paris or to let the Germans in. General Weygand answered, in effect:

"Arm the workers? Never! Better deliver Paris to the Germans!" In its issue of September 9, 1943, the "Information Bulletin", underground organ of the Polish Home Army, carried an article entitled: "What Kind of Poland Are We Fighting For?" This article clearly stated that a future Poland must have "freedom of speech, freedom of opinion, freedom of association; it will be a Poland of social justice and welfare for the wide masses, liberated from capitalistic chaos; a Poland which will nationalize its great factories and plants; a Poland which will fundamentally transform its agrarian régime, modernize its system of distributing goods, expand its

network of cooperatives and industrialize the country." These goals are vital because the nation is fighting for a "Poland of political democracy and for democratization of both economic life and culture."

The decrees of August 18, 1944, establishing employee participation in the management of factories and introducing agrarian reform, were broadcast over the waves of the free radio-station of Fighting Warsaw. These decrees were the beginning of the practical realization of the above principles, a beginning that did not even wait for the end of the struggle in the capital.

Finally, no one can overlook the significance of the fact that the Warsaw section of the Home Army, which provided the very basis for the Warsaw uprising, was composed of the following three infantry divisions: the 8th, bearing the name of Romuald Traugutt,³ the 10th, named for Maciej Rataj,⁴ and the 28th, bearing the name of Stefan Okrzeja.⁵ The Okrzeja Division—or rather what remained of it—was the last to lay down its arms.

The social goals and traditions of this truly people's army explain why its commander, General Bór, insistently urged the Government in London to hasten and complete the decrees regarding agrarian reform and the socialization of the key branches of production.

Such is the path followed by red Warsaw, and that is why the hearts of the fighters on the Warsaw barricades "beat in unison."

The People Who Fought.

Against the background of these traditions, the alliance of the army and the people—the alliance between the Home Army and the working masses active in the underground movement of resistance and in the Warsaw uprising—takes on its proper significance.

What is the Home Army? We are not, for the present, interested in its technical organization, its equipment and training, its methods of fighting. We are interested in its social character, its weight as an independent and, undoubtedly, definite factor in the social strength of the underground movement.

The nucleus of the underground army began to form immediately

³ Leader of the Polish insurrection in 1863 against Czarist Russia.

⁴ Prominent Polish Peasant leader, former speaker of the Polish Diet (1922-1928) member of the Warsaw Defense Committee in 1939, subsequently executed by the Nazis in 1939.

⁵ Labor hero in the revolutionary year 1905, he was hanged in Warsaw by the Czarist Russian authorities.

after the September campaign of 1939. At the same time, however, the various political parties formed their own fighting or military detachments, which attracted young elements inspired by the highest ideological aims. In 1942 closer collaboration was established at home between the parties represented in the Polish Government. Simultaneously, the military effort was unified and the several military organizations were placed under unified leadership, under the control of the central political factor—the underground state.

Three factors have contributed to the character of the Home Army. Of first importance is the fact that the Home Army is composed of active and reserve forces developed under the control of political organizations, and educated by these organizations. They are thus connected directly with the people and are free from the cult of external military accessories and the military caste ideology. The training of officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers took place in quite another mental atmosphere: "group privileges," drill, marches, stars, number of stripes, the manner of wearing the military uniforms, etc., were of no interest to anyone involved. Entirely different criteria decided the selection of officers and non-commissioned officers, who came from the same ideological and social environment as those whom they were to lead. And though an important proportion of the soldiers of the Home Army came from the younger intelligentsia, these young men had all the necessary qualities and prerequisites for becoming patriotic in the Jacobin tradition.

Second, the Polish Socialist Party which had behind it the tradition and the experience of many years of fighting and activity, showed from the very first a deep understanding of the meaning and importance of continuing these activities under the new conditions.

The military formations of the Polish Socialist Party entered the Home Army in compact ranks as active units and as units of reserve forces and militia, and in a number of industrial centers, particularly in Warsaw, they gave the Home Army its specific character. At the same time, the control over all the military activities, carefully and wisely exercised by the Polish Socialist Party as one of the parties of the National Coalition had positive results. The role which the P.P.S (Polish Socialist Party) played in relation to the Home Army can only be compared with the role and activities of the Spanish Left in relation to the Spanish Republican Army.

Thirdly, it was fortunate that the extremely nationalistic elements did not enter the Home Army (Armia Krajowa), but organized the so-called Nationalist Armed Forces (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne). This undoubtedly

contributed to clarify the atmosphere and made the Home Army truly the military arm of the nation fighting for democracy in alliance with the other democratic countries.

Under these circumstances, the officers of the Home Army had very little resemblance to the old Polish officers, whose attitude was strongly objected to by Western public opinion. The new officers were mostly new men, with very few professional officers among them. As many interesting underground publications testify, these officers sought to develop a new attitude towards their subordinates, towards the people and towards duty, and evolved unequivocally in the direction of Jacobin patriotism.

These leading elements of the Home Army, the elements which we call the new military intelligentsia, have again played the role of their predecessors in the Kościuszko Insurrection, in Dombrowski's Legions, in the 1830 Insurrection, the 1863 Insurrection, the European revolutions of the nineteenth century, and the Legions of 1914 during World War I. This role has traditionally been played by the military intelligentsia in the history of Poland in association with the working people of the cities.

It would be an unpardonable error to overlook the role of the socalled Peasants' Battalions, the underground military formations of the Polish Peasant Party, which also entered the Home Army in compact ranks. In the discussion of the Warsaw uprising, however, we are concerned primarily with the armed units which emerged from urban communities and whose activities were carried on in the city proper.

In the Warsaw uprising of 1944 the hearts of the fighters beat in unison; as they fought on the barricades, there was not a single crack in the solid ranks of the National Coalition. This Coalition was led by the working people. Without a single dissenting note, the fighters sang the Marseillaise and the Warszawianka; and the words of Dombrowski's Mazurek sounded forth not as a nationalistic demonstration, but as the expression of "citizens fighting for the freedom of all peoples."

Such is the logic of events, such is the line of their development, and such is the social alignment in the current history of Poland.

Strategy and Politics

Was the Warsaw uprising premature? There were many attempts, and there will be many others, to answer

⁶ Old Polish revolutionary song of Warsaw revolutionaries.
7 Polish National Anthem; at first a song of the Polish Legions of Gen. Dombrowski
(Dabrowski), who fought in Italy in 1796-1799.

this question. Both those who uphold and those who reject the view that the uprising was premature, try and will continue to try to use all available documents, in order to judge the problem from the point of view of the standard criteria of military science, with sober efforts to evaluate strategy, while overlooking the political factors which played such an important part in the entire situation.

These efforts, although invaluable as factual and historical material, reflect in only a limited degree the deciding factors involved in the problem.

The logic of social events has nothing in common with the classical categories of an individual's logical thinking. Social and group action is largely influenced by tradition, material and moral interests, ideology, the interweaving of current events, etc.

Purely in the light of strategy, the question of the Warsaw uprising might be viewed as follows:

On the Eastern front, the progress of the Red Army must, it should be assumed, be constantly coordinated with the organized activities of the partisans in the rear of the German troops. This requires constant and systematic coordination, and not merely occasional accord effective only in cases of emergency. The leadership of the partisan army (in this case—the Polish Home Army) should be informed about all the projected methods of forcing a crossing of the Vistula river, as well as the plans for conquering Warsaw. The leadership would then attempt to canalize the natural flow of the uprising and curb moves which were not directly planned to contribute to the effectiveness of the activities of the Red Army in a given sector, activities of whose objectives, range and possibilities the partisan leadership would be closely informed.

Moreover, the partisans would know that they would not be arrested or suppressed after the liberators entered the land; that both their strategic and political objectives fully coincided with those of the liberating armies.

To close our eyes to the fact that none of the above conditions was fully in force in the case of Warsaw is, of course, an insuperable obstacle to the understanding of the strategy and policy of the Warsaw uprising.

Some elements of the Polish Home Army collaborated with the Red Army despite all difficulties and obstacles, setting up emergency liaison, and in many cases deciding to fight on given sectors of the front. Wilno, Lwów, Pińsk, Kowel, Lublin and many other cities were in fact liberated by the Polish Home Army, leading the uprising of the local populations. But there are also other facts that must be remembered: first, that the contacts between some of the Poles and the Red Army were established in

cases of emergency; second, that the participation of the Poles was never officially acknowledged by the Soviet authorities; third, that the political objectives of the military action conducted jointly by the Poles and Russians were not the same; fourth, that the reward for participation in military activities was often arrest or deportation.

Facts and documents testify to the maximum efforts made by the Poles since the outbreak of the uprising to establish and maintain contact with the Russian command and political leadership.³ But it also remains true that at the moment when the uprising broke out coordination between the Polish and Russian policies had not yet been achieved. Speculations as to whose fault it was are vain and sterile. The problem itself, however, is clear enough.

On the other hand, it is of the utmost importance to know that under the given historical and political conditions and at the moment when the Russians were approaching the capital of Poland, a spontaneous revolutionary movement of the working masses of Warsaw arose, striving to achieve liberation with its own hands and to show that it was the master in its own land. It is important to understand that this effort directly followed the ideological line of the traditional alliance between the proletariat and the intelligentsia, whose children now became the Warsaw fighters of the Home Army; last, but not least, it is essential that we realize that this move was also justified militarily, since the establishment of a bridgehead on the left bank of the Vistula river, where Warsaw lies, could have decided the destiny of this sector of the Eastern front in a manner catastrophic to the Germans.

The attitude of the Russians towards the Warsaw uprising only served to confirm the moral right of the Poles to have taken such a decision. Against this background, the German attitude towards the Warsaw uprising, their all-out effort to prevent the Poles from holding Warsaw at any cost, amply proved that when the Soviet leadership faces a conflict between strategic and political factors, Soviet strategy is shaped primarily by political factors.

And that is to be regretted. Because, had the Soviets in this case given precedence to strategical factors, the political consequences would have changed as well in the most favorable direction. In view of both historical traditions and current social reality, the emotional attitude of the leading

[§] Capt. Kalugin, a Red Army Liaison officer, dropped by parachute into Warsaw, tried vainly to communicate with Moscow and finally, on August 5, 1944, sent a message to Marshal Staliń via London, but received no answer.

elements in the uprising (which were also the leaders of the entire country in its underground fight) was such, that whole-hearted assistance, and its political consequences, could have guaranteed to Russia on the part of Poland something that no pupper committee can ever guarantee: collaboration based on honest confidence, on good experience, and on faith in friendly intentions.

In conclusion, it must be emphasized that in the question of the relation between strategy and politics in Polish life, tradition and current reality always have and always will determine the social aspect of the nation's struggles for freedom and independence. This is fittingly expressed in the words spoken by the prominent Polish Labor leader; Mieczysław Niedziałkowski, in September, 1939: "THE WORKERS DO NOT SURRENDER. THE WORKERS CONTINUE TO FIGHT."

THE PROBLEM OF POST-WAR GERMANY

by Francis C. Balling

ITH the war in Europe progressing, the question "what to do with Germany" attracts increasing attention. It is very unfortunate that the discussion of this problem takes place in an atmosphere filled with high tension. Too many emotional, as well as practical, interests are involved to permit that objectivity and technical sobriety which are indispensable if the best possible solution is to be found. As it is usually posed, the problem consists in preventing Germany from ever again rearming. In addition, it must be postulated that the means employed be restricted to a minimum, that they be most effectual, that they be easy to-apply and not harmful to other countries.

Such means can be of a military, political, and economic nature. Military occupation of Germany is the necessary last phase of the war, and will have to be extended until Germany is completely disarmed and pacified, and a trustworthy government can be established. Occupation may, therefore, be prolonged for a considerable period of time. But it cannot be considered as a permanent measure. This does not mean, of course, that military force will be dispensed with, once the period of occupation has ended. On the contrary, any plan adopted as a permanent settlement of the question is bound to fail unless it can be enforced by adequate military power ready for immediate action. Therefore, as a first step, it was the correct procedure to attack the problem of an international body with military forces at its disposal. The adoption of the recommendations of the conference at Dumbarton Oaks (though perhaps with some modifications, which, however, must not interfere with the basic principle) is the prerequisite for any further planning and action.

Among political means, the sponsoring of a democratic form of government and the splitting of Germany into various independent states have frequently been suggested. However, the democratic form of government certainly does not render a nation impotent to wage war, nor does it subvert the spirit of aggression. As long as the latter is alive in the population, the form of government matters little and is no guarantee of peaceful conduct. Unfortunately, even the most optimistic views agree that much time must pass, perhaps generations, before the spiritual legacy of Nazism is eradicated, itself the integral of expression-seeking forces which have been fostered in the German nation for a very long time.

The plan of splitting Germany into a number of independent states

has been devised for the purpose of isolating the Prussian element and separating it from the rest of the German population. This plan appeals to many who still cherish the belief that it was only a minority of Prussian Junkers and perhaps a few industrialists who imposed their will on the whole nation. Hence, the argument which is most frequently advanced in support of this idea assumes that, once Prussia is isolated, the other German states will more readily abandon the militaristic and imperialistic attitude commonly attributed to Prussian influence and predominance.

This assumption is not borne out by the facts. The German people of today is a homogeneous whole, thoroughly permeated by what was once properly called "the Prussian spirit", but which now more adequately should be called "the German spirit". The process of amalgamation has been going on for a long time, and through the systematic efforts of the Nazi régime, almost perfect uniformity of thinking and conduct has been achieved.

The ideas of national and individual superiority, of Germany's vocation to world domination, and of reliance on crude power to attain this end, which were once identified with Prussia, have now been enthusiastically adopted by Nazism and are presented as part of its own program. Consequently, those ideas have—for Germans living in Germany— completely lost their peculiar Prussian flavor and have become a common possession of the German people.3. Therefore, separatist movements which may occur in the future should be met with reserve. Even if hermetic isolation of Prussia could be effected, which still remains very doubtful, the ideas and programs for which Prussia stands would live on in the other parts of Germany. Allegedly repentant sinners may well put forward demands for separation and independence from Prussia, as a preconceived plan designed to obtain lenient treatment and, if possible, freedom from control. Hence, they may pretend to turn away from Prussia, the "sole" instigator of German aggression; but one in spirit and purpose, they will unite when in their opinion the time has come to take up arms again. For these reasons,

¹ Cf. F. W. Foerster, Europe and the German Question, Sheed & Ward, New York, 1940, who quotes Bismarck in the Publizist, 1865: "There is no German people. Our policy is the absorption of Germany into Prussia and thereby the transformation of Prussia into Germany.", and Gneisenau: "What Prussia has been to Germany, Germany must be to the whole of Europe. Some day, Prussia must rule the greater part of Europe."

² Cf. the programmatic slogan: "One people—one Reich—one leader."

³ None of these statements applies to the Austrian people, whose national character exhibits essentially different traits. Throughout this study it is assumed that Austria will regain her independence from Germany in accordance with the Moscow declaration.

one cannot see much advantage in the plan to isolate Prussia by dividing Germany into several formally independent states.

A number of proposals have been made for preventing by economic measures the rearmament of Germany; all of these aim to make her unable to produce weapons and other technical means indispensable to modern warfare. The great variety of plans, which range from the mere elimination of a few raw materials or, key industries to the transformation of Germany into an agrarian state, indicate wide differences of opinion.

At the outset it must be emphasized that any such plan is distinct from the well-known economic sanctions of the League of Nations. They were designed for application *post festum*, i.e., when an armed conflict had already started or was imminent. The present plan is to provide economic arrangements which would make Germany *ab initio* unable to undertake armed action or even to prepare for it.

The procedure followed in this study is: first, to establish what can be considered as the optimum among the possible solutions; and then to inquire whether the solution is feasible, perhaps with certain modifications.

According to the postulates established at the beginning, the greatest possible effect must be accomplished with a minimum of effort, and must not be harmful to other countries. This end will be best attained by an economic structure of Germany which is based predominantly on agriculture. The reasons are:

- (1) Because of the technical requirements of modern warfare, the war potential of an agrarian nation is infinitely lower than that of an industrialized country.
- (2) In an industrial country, efforts at rearmament and technical military training have a fair chance to remain undetected, particularly in crowded industrial centers; while in an agricultural country such activities soon become apparent.
- (3) Consequently, the control exercised over an industrial country has to be extremely strict and absorbs large numbers of highly trained personnel, who are thus withdrawn from more productive occupations. Such tight control, the effectiveness of which is still doubtful, will create not only bitterness among the controlled, but also resentment by the people and organs of the controlling powers, once sufficient time has elapsed. Because of this, a dangerous relaxation in handling the control measures will result.
- (4) Besides the technical requirements, organization and psychological preparedness are essential to rearmament and warfare. In an industrialized

Germany it would be comparatively easy for members of the Nazi party and its affiliates to continue their propagandistic and organizational activities underground, while such continuation would be difficult in an agricultural community; for industrial centers, with their accumulation of people, provide countless convenient hiding places—a fact which is well known to criminals and political agitators throughout the world. Moreover, the very concentration of people in a relatively narrow locality greatly facilitates activities of a propagandistic and organizational nature, since easy communication from mouth to mouth makes detection and control extremely difficult. For this reason, the control would have to be tightened still more. Indeed, a widespread spy system would become inevitable, into which again large numbers of the ablest personnel would be absorbed. In contrast, the decentralization inherent in an economic structure predominantly agricultural is in itself a considerable obstacle to hidden activities of propaganda and organization. Hence, in an agricultural Germany, control measures on a moderate scale would prove sufficiently effective.

(5) Agriculture is not only a way of making a living; it is also a way of life. With their emphasis on the family and individual responsibility, rather than on nation-wide political organizations and irresponsible mass action, rural life and a bucolic environment may favorably influence the character of the German people and thus prepare the way for spiritual regeneration.

Some advocates of an industrialized Germany offer variations of the plan to restore Germany's industry. They usually propose a "selective restriction" by eliminating specified key industries or restricting production, import or use of electricity, of certain materials, particularly metals of strategic importance. According to these suggestions, Germany would remain a basically industrial country; and the statements made above (sub 1-5) apply without qualification. It can perhaps be pointed out that Germany's war potential will be diminished considerably by such selective restrictions. However, proponents of plans of this kind wholly disregard the rapid technical progress which develops almost daily new technical processes, new weapons, new materials, or new uses of known materials. Consequently, an industry which produces apparently harmless civilian goods may overnight become a key war-industry. Should such change be detected at all, the industry concerned would have to be eliminated; and Germany's industrial set-up would have to undergo changes whenever the classification of an industry had to be changed—a procedure which, in view of the highly dynamic character of technological development, would have to be repeated

frequently. This would involve grave disturbances in the economic structure of Germany and in that of other countries as well. Neither can it be expected that the elimination or restricted use of a few materials or sources of power will reduce Germany's war potential permanently, since she has sufficiently demonstrated her ability to find substitutes (Ersatz) for what she lacks. Finally, Germany has already exhibited considerable skill in concealing under the guise of production of civilian goods her output of war material.

In summary it can be said that Germany's war potential (i.e., her technical, organizational, and psychological preparedness), as well as the scope and costliness of control measures, will increase proportionately with the restoration of her industrial system; at the same time and in the same degree, the effectivenes of control is bound to decline. Therefore, it is evident that the plan to transform Germany into an agricultural state very definitely deserves preference over any plan which envisages the restoration of Germany's industrial structure, either as a whole or in part. In view of the undeniable superiority of the agricultural plan, one may wonder why it is so frequently and often violently opposed. First of all, there are Germanophiles who, though without any justification, feel that Germany would be "degraded" by the loss of her industry. Then there are persons who, having formerly worked in German industry, commerce, and banking, wish to resume their activities as soon as possible. There are also those who possess claims against Germany and think her solvency would be jeopardized if she were deprived of her industrial system. Finally, there are strong business ties and affiliations at work; people eager to resume relations and partnerships with Germany's powerful industry. All these various advocates of a revival of Germany's industry have one thing in common they represent special groups who are willing to sacrifice to their own interests national and international security, and protection against future German aggression.

Some argue that German industries should be used for the production of material needed in our war against Japan, and in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Europe.⁴ It may be objected that the war with Japan will most likely be over before German industries can be put to use for that purpose; and that the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Europe's devastated countries cannot be deferred until German industries are re-established. Moreover, this plan at best would justify the re-industrialization of Germany as a temporary measure only; and it implies that priority be given to

⁴ See, for instance, "The Great Powers and Europe" by Peter F. Drucker in Harper's, October, 1944.

Germany's reconstruction since otherwise she would not be able to assist in the reconstruction of other countries. In other words, Germany's industrial supremacy would be restored—and that at the expense of other countries—and thus the foundations be laid for a rebirth of her political and military supremacy. It may be questioned whether this procedure would meet with the approval of the countries which suffered under German occupation. Furthermore, Germany's participation in the work of reconstructing Europe does not require a revival of German industry, since much of the industrial equipment, or what will be left of it, can be transported elsewhere and still serve the indicated purpose. Indeed, most of the reconstruction work will by its very nature (e.g. rebuilding of destroyed cities) have to be done outside Germany.

Frequently people ignorant of actual conditions oppose for humanitarian reasons the plan of creating an agrarian Germany. They think that large numbers of the German people would be exposed to starvation. How unfounded their concern for Germany's future is, will become evident in the course of the following analysis.

Others advance the same argument and maintain that a Germany rendered incapable of self-support by de-industrialization would be compelled to undertake further acts of aggression for the sake of self-preservation. In addition, it is claimed that the economic equilibrium of Europe -indeed, perhaps of the whole world-would be adversely affected by the elimination of Germany's industry, and that disastrous consequences would necessarily ensue. The weight of these arguments should not be overrated. For even if the statements were correct, the achievement of a lasting peace is of such paramount importance that it would pay to support Germany permanently should she be unable to support herself as a predominantly agricultural country; and to suffer dislocation of the economic equilibrium, should this be the inevitable consequence of the de-industrialization of Germany. But even such sacrifices—insignificant when compared with the advantage to be gained—are by no means necessary. For, notwithstanding the allegation frequently heard that Germany's area can hardly support half the present population,⁵ it can be demonstrated that Germany can support herself very well on an essentially agricultural basis; and the myth of a disturbed economic equilibrium of other countries can likewise be easily refuted.

⁵ This opinion is, for instance, upheld by Harold G. Moulton and Luis Marlio in The Control of Germany and Japan, Brookings Institution (Washington, D. C., 1944). The authors fail to offen any proof for their sweeping statement.

As to the problem of Germany's ability to support herself on an agricultural basis, reliable sources⁶ estimate food production and consumption in 1934-1935 as amounting to a product value of 10,900 million RM and 11,700 million RM respectively. On a value basis, the foodstuff deficit was therefore 800 million RM or 7.36% of the food production. This deficit corresponds to the net imports of foodstuffs and increases to about 10.1% when the imports of fodder are taken into account. A quantitative determination of the food deficit encounters considerable difficulties, particularly when the calorie is chosen as the unit of measurement. A caloric deficit of 20%⁷ is certainly a very liberal estimate and contains a large margin for possible errors. Nevertheless it may be accepted and serve as the basis for further inquiries. Thus the problem is reduced to the question whether Germany's agricultural production as of 1934/1935 can be increased by about 20%.

The indications are that this can be achieved. Indeed much progress has already been made since 1935. Under National Socialism great efforts were made to increase the output of those agricultural products which were considered particularly desirable—in the first place, potatoes,8 sugar beets, and fodder beets. During the years from 1931 to 1934 the average yield of potatoes was 15.8 metric tons per ha, and of sugar beets 28.86 metric tons per ha.7 By improved methods of cultivation, it was possible by 1937 to increase the potato crop to 18.84 metric tons per ha (i.e., by 19.5%), and to increase the sugar beet crop to 33.69 metric tons per ha (i.e., by 16.7%). Since not only methods were improved but also larger areas taken under cultivation, the total potato crop increased from 1934/1935 to 1937 by 29%, the sugar beet crop 50%, and the fodder beet crop 18%. The increased output of fodder beets and potatoes is indicative of a corresponding increase in livestock and dairy production. Furthermore, if one considers the fact that Germany was able to double the catch of sea-fish between 1932 and 1938, it is evident that already by 1938 she had to a considerable extent succeeded in becoming self-supporting.

Although the output of some other agricultural products, such as wheat and rye, did not increase during the period under consideration, it

⁶ The following statistical data are taken from the study "Die Nahrungsmittel-Bilanz der deutschen Wirtschaftsgebiete" by F. Gruenig, in the Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunkturforschung, Heft I. Teil B, 1936, edited by Professor Ernst Wagemann, Institut für Konjunkturforschung, published bytheHanseatischeVerlagsanstalt, Hamburg.

⁷ Gruenia at cit

⁸ Potatoes are a mainstay in the diet of the German people, but they also constitute an important stock feed and are the basis of alcohol produced in large quantities for industrial purposes.

can be demonstrated that a substantial increase in the output of these important grains is possible. For this purpose a comparison of Germany's output with the production figures of countries operating under even less favorable conditions⁹ is illuminating.

In 1932 the yields of wheat per acre were as follows:

The Netherlands46.7	bushels
Belgium38.6	bushels
Germany32.6	bushels10

The conclusion can be drawn that the possible increase in Germany's wheat production lies between 18.4% and 43.2%, and that this can be achieved solely by intensification of cultivation.

Similar figures are available for the production of rye, the most important small grain in Germany. In 1932 the yields of rye per acre were as follows:

Belgium35.0	bushels
Sweden 33.8	bushels
The Netherlands33.6	bushels
Germany 29.9	bushels10

The possible increase in Germany's rye production lies, therefore, within the margin from 12.3% to 17%.

Already in this stage of the analysis of Germany's agricultural potential it becomes clear that this country can very well exist on an agricultural basis. Even more optimistic expectations of an agricultural surplus are fully justified. It is almost certain that new and more efficient methods of cultivation will be found when the best brains, at present engaged in the invention of deadly weapons, will turn to perfecting the peaceful art of agronomy. In addition, the area now available for agricultural purposes can be enlarged by the reclamation of swamps and wasteland, and by the reconversion of property at present used for industrial sites, or occupied by barracks, monstrous public buildings, and amphitheaters for mass meetings. The increasing tendency to keep cattle indoors throughout the year will make large tracts of pasture land available for crop raising. A similar effect will be achieved by a further motorization of Germany's agriculture. In 1934/1935, about 13% of the total area available for agriculture was required for the production of fodder for horses.¹¹

⁹ This is especially true of length of growing season, availability of cheap fertilizers, and soil quality.

¹⁰ U. S. Department of Commerce figures.11 F. Gruenig, op cit.

But most important, Germany's conversion into an agricultural state will release the amount of labor necessary for intensive cultivation. Ever since Germany embarked on a policy of industrialization and militarism, German agriculture was handicapped by labor shortage. Not only did the artificially fostered industry absorb the major part of the force, 12 but large portions of the population were also engaged in unproductive occupations, such as war production, military service, an oversized civil service, and—under Nazi rule—service in the various formations of the Nazi party. Furthermore, in the past city life proved so attractive that in 1934 the government was compelled to take stern measures to bring people back to rural communities. In fact, at no time since the foundation of the German Reich has the labor-capital-land ratio in agriculture been allowed to approach an optimum.

Of course, a predominantly agricultural economy will have to be supplemented by various types of modernized handicraft that the people may be provided with adequate clothing and shelter. Furthermore, it will appear advisable to keep some service industries and public utilities functioning, either properly supervised or directly operated by an international agency or corporation. Machinery needed for that purpose (e.g. railroad equipment, motor cars, electrical machinery, etc.), other manufactured products, and various raw materials will have to be acquired from outside sources. To finance these imports, equivalent exports have to be furnished. Should the agricultural and handicraft surplus not suffice, which is to be expected, particularly when reparations are to be included in the exportsthen certain extracting industries will have to be reactivated. This cannot be considered as enhancing Germany's war potential as long as manufacturing industries are excluded. It stands to reason that Germany's international trade as part of her intercourse with other countries will be placed under control.

Many Americans who like to think in terms of a super-industrialized future are apt to see in any plan which reduces Germany's industries to a minimum a severe penalty rather than a merely protective measure. However, the masses of the German people will look very differently upon such a transformation of their economic system. Even before Nazism occupied their thinking, the advisability of pushing industrialization any further was seriously questioned. Sociologists pointed to the evil effects of industrial

^{12 41%} of total gainfully occupied in 1939, as compared with 18% engaged in agriculture, according to Maxine Y. Sweezy, The Structure Of The Nazi Economy, (Harvard University Press, 1941), p. 207.

congestion; economists, to the instability of a highly industrialized economy. And then Nazism expounded the philosophy of salvation by union with the soil, thus placing agriculture in an exalted position, even attributing some of the prerogatives of nobility to farmers who qualified under the Inheritance Farmstead Law (Erbhofgesetz). Thus prepared, the Germans themselves will hardly feel as "degraded" as their many uninformed sympathizers predict.

A sober, objective, and comprehensive analysis of a Germany organized on a predominantly agricultural basis reveals that Germany's position may still appear enviable to many countries less richly endowed. Not only does the whole territory of Germany lie within the climatic optimum, but she also enjoys an unsurpassed favorable location in the center of Europe which makes her the most important link between East and West, North and South, and renders the European countries tributary to her transportation system. Besides these priceless assets, she has excellent natural drainage, an elaborate network of inland waterways, large forests and mineral deposits, and ample waterpower—all of which add up to an imposing amount of economic activa which, when used for peaceful pursuits, cannot fail to lead Germany to new peaks of prosperity.

The fact that large portions of the population will acquire property interests and that an economy as outlined above is of a labor-intensive type, which practically absorbs any available amount of labor, will contribute to make Germany a stabilizing factor in central Europe. Measured by any objective standard, it is obvious that this kind of a new order in Germany implies no element of a punitive character.

Whether the economic equilibrium of other countries would seriously be affected by a de-industrialization of Germany remains to be discussed. Such an opinion logically presupposes that an equilibrium does exist today or did exist in the not too distant past. But there neither is, nor has been for a long time, anything resembling even remotely an economic equilibrium. The convulsions which have shaken Europe and the world for the last decades can hardly be interpreted as characteristic of stable economic conditions. Europe's economic structure was already badly out of balance when Germany set out to conquer the world; and since that time it has been disrupted thoroughly, indeed beyond the possibility of repair, by the introduction of Hitler's "new order". This "new order", established on principles contrary to the fundamentals of economic thought, could be maintained only by force; it is bound to disintegrate by itself when the means of enforcement are destroyed. However, this does not mean that

the old economic order should be restored. Indeed, it would be absurd to insist on the restoration of a pattern which has led to destruction and chaos. What Europe needs is a new economic set-up, which must be built from the bottom. This allows for taking into account the changes implied in the proposed conversion plan for Germany and its reaction on other countries. To mutual benefit, national economies will be founded on sounder bases than force, tariffs, and monopolistic combinations. In this connection it is important to note that by nature Germany is not especially predestined or equipped for an industrial career; nor as explained above, does she need to rely on industry for her support. She lacks, at least in sufficient quantities, metals, petroleum, and many other raw materials, particularly also those needed in the textile industry. As a consequence, Germany's industry has been built up only with the help of towering tariff walls. Even at a time when her industry had attained maturity, it had to rely heavily on tariff protection and monopolistic combinations, in order to balance comparative natural disadvantages. To buttress further this utterly artificial structure, a movement to combine and monopolize on an international scale was initiated, thus reducing abundance to scarcity for the sake of high prices which were necessitated by high production costs. With Germany eliminated as the leader of international monopoly, sounder conditions will return to international economic relations. It is no accident that the cartel originated in Germany.

Finally, there are those who claim that the whole world would suffer should Germany be deprived of her industries, since the total industrial output would decline. They forget that it was the colossus of industrial Germany, wielding its power relentlessly and compromising only with equally strong or superior rivals, which prevented many other countries from using their industrial potential to the full or at all. Such countries were then stigmatized as "backward". Indeed, when Hitler proclaimed, as the core of his "new order", Germany's industrial monopoly, with the subdued countries supplying labor, raw materials, and agricultural products, he only finished what Germany's industries had planned and begun long ago. Those "backward" countries will now be given a fair chance to develop their natural resources and thus to contribute to a world economy which can vigorously expand once it is freed from artificial barriers and restrictions.

NEW YORK CITY

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

On January 30, 1945, the Czechoslovak Government in London unanimously recognized the Provisional Polish Government then established in Warsaw, and decided to enter into diplomatic relations with it. There was no further official statement issued, but it was explained in a press interview that several elements entered into the decision. There were known to be several hundred thousand Czechs and Slovaks in Poland, deported thence by the Germans to work in industrial areas. The Czechoslovak Government felt that they would have to have some de facto relations with the Polish authorities functioning in the area where Czechoslovak nationals were in order to arrange for their transferral to their homeland. The second element in the decision was the fact that the Czechoslovak Government expected to move its seat of action from London to Czechoslovak territory, and it was necessary to have correct relations with the authorities ruling the territory adjoining on the north. Relations with the Polish Government in London were not mentioned in the communiqué.

On February 2, 1945, the Polish Government in London issued the following communiqué:

"The official communiqué of the Czechoslovak Government in London broadcast on January 31, 1945, announced that that Government had decided to 'recognize the Provisional Polish Government in Lublin and to enter into diplomatic relations with it.'

"The Polish Government has long realized that the Czechoslovak Government in London is not independent in its decisions and therefore the above mentioned communiqué did not come as a surprise to the Polish Government.

"The Polish Government decided to recall its representative accredited to the Czechoslovak Government in London.

"While severing diplomatic relations with the Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Government does not in any way change its attitude towards the Czech and Slovak people and will not give up the efforts made so far to establish a close collaboration and lasting union between the Polish nation and the Czech and Slovak nations."

No official reply was made to this severance of diplomatic relations by the Czechoslovak Government. But the Czechoslovak Press Bureau in New York, in its February 12, 1945, release, made this additional statement:

"The Czechoslovak Government, and the Czechoslovak people recognize that Beck's attacks against Czechoslovakia and the subsequent German Pact are only explicable by the opposition against the Czechoslovak policy of collaboration and friendship with the Soviet Union. Therefore the Czechs and Slovaks are deeply hurt that the Polish Government even after the experiences of 1939 did not repudiate publicly and solemnly the fatal policy of Beck during the Munich crisis. . . .

"The Czechoslovak Government made it clearly known that it does not recognize any frontier changes made during Munich and after. The Czecho-

slovak Government firmly asserts the policy of the frontiers of 1938 as they were before the aggression of Nazi Germany and those assisting. This is a straightforward policy enabling the friendly development of Czechoslovak-Polish collaboration."

The Crimea Conference

A detailed statement was issued from the White House on February 12, 1945, in which the conclusions reached at the Crimea Conference were given to the American public. A part of the statement was concerned with Poland, and a shorter section related to Yugoslavia. The whole statement has been printed in a number of places, but as the sections on Poland and Yugoslavia are of such a nature as to be of historical and diplomatic interest for some time to come, they are reproduced here (from *The Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 18, 1945, p. 215f.)

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish provisional government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The provisional government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present provisional government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present provisional government of Poland, and the government of the United Kingdom and the government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose reports the respective governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three heads of government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and

that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.

YUGOSLAVIA

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic that the agreement between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new agreement should be formed on the basis of that agreement.

We also recommend that as soon as the new government has been formed

it should declare that:

(1) The anti-Fascist assembly of National Liberation (Avnoj) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupschina) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament; and

(2) Legislative acts passed by the anti-Fascist Assembly of National Libera-

tion will be subject to subsequent ratification by a constituent assembly.

There was also a general review of other Balkan questions.

After returning to the United States President Roosevelt made a report to the Congress on March 1, 1945. A section of this report may be read as a commentary upon the previously published statement of the three heads of government. Future historians of these negotiations may have more documents on which to base their judgments, but much information may be gleaned from a careful reading of the text of the President's speech, which is in some respects more revealing than the corresponding speech of Prime Minister Churchill before Parliament on Feb. 27, 1945. We publish relevant portions of Mr. Roosevelt's address.

One outstanding example of joint action by the three major allies in the liberated areas was the solution reached on Poland. The whole Polish question was a potential source of trouble in post-war Europe, and we came to the conference determined to find a common ground for its solution. We did.

Our objective was to help create a strong, independent and prosperous nation. That's the thing we must always remember, those words, agreed to by Russia, by Britain and by me, the objective of making Poland a strong, independent and prosperous nation, with a government ultimately to be selected by

the Polish people themselves.

To achieve this objective it was necessary to provide for the formation of a new government much more representative than had been possible while Poland was enslaved. Accordingly, steps were taken at Yalta to reorganize the existing provisional government in Poland on a broader democratic basis, so as to include democratic leaders now in Poland and those abroad. This new, reorganized government will be recognized by all of us as the temporary government of Poland.

However, the new Polish provisional government of national unity will be pledged to holding a free election as soon as possible on the basis of universal

suffrage and a secret ballot.

Throughout history Poland has been the corridor through which attacks on

Russia have been made. Twice in this generation Germany has struck at Russia through this corridor. To insure European security and world peace, a strong

and independent Poland is necessary.

The decision with respect to the boundaries of Poland was quite a compromise; I didn't quite agree with all of it, by any means, but we could go as far as Britain wanted in certain areas, go as far as Russia wanted in certain areas and we could go as far as I wanted in certain areas—it was a compromise.

The decision was a compromise under which the Poles will receive compensation in territory in the north and west in exchange for what they lose by the Curzon line in the east. The limits of the western border will be permanently fixed in the final conference. We know roughly that it will include quite a slice of what is now called Germany. And it was agreed also that the new Poland will have a large and long coast line and many a new harbor, also that East Prussia, most of it, will go to Poland and the corner of it will go to Russia. Also—what shall I call it, that "amanuensis" of the Free State of Danzig—I think Danzig would be a lot better if it were Polish.

It is well known that the people east of the Curzon line are predominantly White Russian and Ukrainian; and that the people west of the line are predominantly Polish. As far back as 1919 the representatives of the Allies agreed that the Curzon line represented a fair boundary between the two peoples.

I am convinced that the agreement on Poland, under the circumstances, is the most hopeful agreement possible for a free, independent and prosperous

Polish state.

The reference to Allied judgment in 1919 of what constituted a fair boundary is apparently to the December 8, 1919 "Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers relating to the provisional eastern frontiers of Poland". An examination of the text of the Declaration does not, however, indicate that the Allies regarded the line so carefully delineated as a definitive boundary line. It might be useful to have the complete text before us:

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers, recognising that it is important as soon as possible to put a stop to the existing conditions of political uncertainty, in which the Polish nation is placed, and without prejudging the provisions which must in the future define the eastern frontiers of Poland; hereby declare that they recognize the right of the Polish Government to proceed, according to the conditions previously provided by the Treaty with Poland of June 28, 1919, to reorganise a regular administration of the territories of the former Russian Empire situated to the West of the line described below (See Map):

From the point where the old frontier between Russia and Austria-Hungary meets the river Bug to the point where it is cut by the administrative boundary between the districts of Byelsk and Brest-Litowsk,

the course of the Bug downstream; . . . etc.

The boundary thus described was taken without any variation from Report No. 2 of the Commission on Polish Affairs, which consisted originally of General Le Rond (France), Chairman, Dr. R. H. Lord (United States of America), Mr.

H. J. Paton (British Empire) and Marquis della Torretta (Italy), which after six fact-finding sessions held on March 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, and April 7, and a seventh meeting to hear Paderewski on April 14, reported finally on April 22, 1919. The text of their report is printed as Document No. 845, in D. H. Miller, My Diary at the Peace Conference of Paris, IX, pp. 14-24. In its final form the report was signed by Jules Cambon, R. H. Lord, William Tyrrell, Marquis della Torretta, and K. Otchiai. There is an amusing difference between the delineation of the line in the two documents. The report begins the tracing of the line from the north, at the East Prussian frontier. Perhaps in order to be original, the Declaration of the Supreme Council begins from the south, at the point of juncture of the old Austro-Hungarian-Russian frontiers. But the wording is frequently identical, and the maps appended to the two documents are also completely identical.

It would perhaps be ungracious at this late date to examine too closely the Report of the Committee of experts. They based their conclusions as to population realities in these borderlands upon the Imperial Russian Census of 1897. A footnote on p. 18, remarks: "The Commission, however, are of the opinion that the nationality figures are affected by a strong pro-Russian and anti-Polish bias." Deductions were made for the Russian garrisons. Nothing is said about Russian officialdom, nor about Russianization of the Polish population in any form during the preceding 120 years. Any accurate figures concerning such factors

would of course have been difficult to collect in Paris.

Seven months after the Declaration of the Supreme Council was published the need arose for Allied mediation in the Bolshevik-Polish War. It was then that the famous Curzon note was sent off (July 11, 1920)—a note with whose composition Lord Curzon had almost nothing to do. The line suggested in this note was apparently not intended to be a boundary. The Russian armies were to "stand" at a line 50 kilometers east of "the line provisionally laid down by the Peace Conference of December 8, 1919." The rights of Poland to land east of this provisional line had been expressly reserved in the December 8, 1919, Declaration. It may be profitably repeated (see the Journal, April 1944, pp. 1-26 for details) that the note in the form in which Lord Curzon sent it was not the form in which it was agreed to by Poland and the Allied Powers at Spa on the preceding day, July 10, 1920. The original provisional line, to which Poland agreed, under some duress, stopped at the Galician frontier. Curzon's note extended the line southward through Galicia to the Carpathians-an extension for which he had no mandate from anybody. To speak of the "Curzon Line", therefore, as the boundary line adjudged fair and proper by the Allies in 1919, as is commonly done, does not completely correspond to the situation as the makers of the peace understood it. Harold Nicolson's references to the negotiations in his several books make this quite clear. Furthermore, both parties to the dispute rejected it immediately, and, if we may judge from Chicherin's note of July 18, 1920, for the same reason: Russia agreed with Poland that the Polish frontier should be much farther east.

The reactions to the Yalta decisions in informed circles in America have been somewhat varied. Mr. Walter Lippmann, who had some active part in President Woodrow Wilson's campaign for a League of Nations founded on the Fourteen Points, immediately gave his enthusiastic support to this most recent attempt to settle a nettlesome territorial dispute between two European nations. Dr. Robert H. Lord, who was a member of the Paris Peace Conference Commission on Polish Affairs, has been quoted (New York Times, March 19, 1945) as of the opinion that the Polish decision was unjust and unfortunate. On another plane of analysis Professor Giuseppe A. Borgese, now of the University of Chicago, formerly professor at the universities of Rome and Milan and for many years (1912-1931) literary and foreign editor of the Corriere Della Sera, is distinctly pessimistic as to the moral justification for any feeling of satisfaction on the part of the American public at the manner and substance of the decisions. As this viewpoint appears to be gaining ground among thoughtful American students of history and international affairs, we reproduce here a relevant section of a recent article of Professor Borgese in Life (March 12, 1945), with the kind permission of the publishers.

The fruits of "realism"

As long as Asia is in a haze, those fruits are more clearly knowable in Europe. The most conspicuous is Poland. In her case the tragic is highlighted

by the grotesque.

For it is tragically grotesque that the European war, having started officially for the sake of Poland, ends—victoriously—with the surrender of Poland. England that had gone as far as Munich and even, more reluctantly, as far as Prague, stopped at Danzig and Pomorze; stood up for the treaties and the sovereignty of a nation: drew her sword; lost; rose again. Poland fought and fights on her side, and ours. We win. As a net result, the Hitler-Stalin pact that partitioned Poland is scrapped. Stalin gets all he wants. He first took it on his armies' way to Berlin—which was a blessing. But what his advancing forces had taken in behalf of the United Nations he now has received for himself from Britain and America. That is a tragedy.

The issue at stake here is not whether Russian protectorate is preferable to Nazi domination—which it certainly is. It is not whether the sovietization of Poland will bring forth social and economic advancement for peasant and Jew—which it very probably will. Neither is it whether Lwów and Wilno should go to Russia or Poland. The issue is that there is no issue. There are stark facts. Wilno and Lwów will go to Russia because go they must. We are allaying Hitler while validating what he stood for. Might is right.

Little men, what now? What now, great nation?

Now we shall see what we shall see. For instance: the fated frustration of Mr. Harriman. As U. S. Ambassador to Moscow he might be primarily concerned with courting our mighty ally and yet, as U. S. delegate to the Big Three's advisory commission on Poland he is expected to stand up for traditional American concepts of Poland's independence. Or is he? Is he really expected to balance the overwhelmingly practical fact that Poland remains

under airtight military control, executed not by the United Nations but by the purposeful Russian army, that matchless instrument of political warfare? Could he possibly apply more pressure than that needed to put the American seal on

the Russian intent?

If we stated that we cannot do anything about it; that we are sorry; that we have neither the will nor the power for intervening in Poland; that it would be insanity and crime to declare or prepare World War III against Russia—we would be honest. The evil starts when we try to talk ourselves into believing that the letter, let alone the spirit, of the Atlantic Charter is not being violated in Poland. And this is precisely what we have done in Yalta.

There is no moral indignity in recognizing necessity. There is demoralization

and disorder when necessity is camouflaged under sophistry.

* * * *

The Polish Government in London, the day after receiving the text of the Yalta agreement, issued the following statement (February 13, 1945):

On February 12 at 7:30 p. m. the British Foreign Office handed to the Polish Ambassador in London the text of the resolutions concerning Poland adopted by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin at the

Yalta Conference between February 4 and 11.

Before the Conference began the Polish Government handed to the Governments of Great Britain and the United States a memorandum in which the hope was expressed that these Governments would not be a party to any decision regarding the allied Polish State without previous consultation and without the consent of the Polish Government.

At the same time, the Polish Government declared itself willing to seek the solution of the dispute initiated by Soviet Russia through normal international procedure and with due respect for the rights of the two parties

concerned.

In spite of this, the decisions of the Three-Power Conference were prepared and taken not only without the participation and authorisation of the Polish

Government but also without its knowledge.

The method adopted in the case of Poland is a contradiction of the elementary principles binding the allies and constitutes a violation of the letter and spirit of the Atlantic Charter and the right of every nation to defend its own interests.

The Polish Government declares that the decisions of the Three-Power Conference concerning Poland cannot be recognised by the Polish Government

and cannot bind the Polish nation.

The Polish Government will consider the severance of the eastern half of the territory of Poland through the imposition of a Polish-Soviet frontier along the so-called Curzon Line as a fifth partition of Poland now accomplished by her Allies.

The intention of the three Powers to create a "Provisional Polish Government of National Unity" by enlarging the foreign appointed Lublin Committee with persons vaguely described as "democratic leaders from Poland itself and Poles abroad" can only legalise Soviet interference in Polish internal affairs.

As long as the territory of Poland remains under the sole occupation of Soviet troops a Government of that kind will not safeguard to the Polish nation, even in the presence of British and American diplomatists, the unfettered

right of free expression.

The Polish Government, which is the sole legal and generally recognised Government of Poland, and which for five and a half years has directed the struggle of the Polish State and nation against the Axis countries both through the underground movement in the homeland and through the Polish armed forces in all territories of war, has expressed its readiness—in a memorandum presented to the Governments of Great Britain and the United States—to cooperate in the creation of a Government in Poland truly representative of the will of the Polish nation.

The Polish Government maintains its offer.

BOOK REVIEWS

JALLAND, T. G., The Church and the Papacy. London: S. P. C. K., 1944 (New York: Morehouse-Gorham Co.). Pp. xii, 568. 25s.

The author, an Anglican divine, some years ago brought out a valuable study of Pope Leo I and his times. The present work is described as the eighth Bampton lectures delivered at Oxford in 1942. Yet its length, its heavy style, and the uneven distribution of the subject matter, whereby approximately three-fifths of the book are devoted to the first six centuries of Christianity, show that the lectures have been greatly enlarged for publication. The result is unsatisfactory because the published book is neither a set of lectures in the true sense nor yet a well-balanced historical study of the entire period. Eight lectures published more or less as delivered, two being assigned to the early centuries, three to the Middle Ages, and three to the period from the Reformation to modern times, might have been a suggestive and stimulating introduction to the subject. Only the most important developments and changes could have been treated, but a well-proportioned presentation would have been attainable. Instead, the chapters dealing with the period down to Gregory the Great has been disproportionately enlarged in the text and for them there is also an abundance of additional matter in the footnotes, because Dr. Jalland's own deep interest in these early centuries has overmastered his better judgment.

Less disturbing, but important for an understanding of the author's point of view, is his hope at some future time for the reunification of all Christian denominations into one Christian fellowship. He has striven valiantly to make his study as impartial and uncontroversial as possible; that he has not always succeeded is not his fault, but lies in the nature of the subject. The "Petrine tradition", for example, and the history of the Church before Constantine are topics that bristle with difficulties, and controversial issues are to be found on nearly every page in the early chapters of the book. It is inevitable too that the author's predilections or the opposite should sometimes come to the surface. Thus, to the reviewer at least, Dr. Jalland's estimate of Athanasius seems less than just, while his treatment of the Conciliar Movement is neither clear nor free from bias. The later chapters in any case suffer from undue compression; a reader who is not already very familiar with European history from the beginning of the sixteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century will sometimes have difficulty in following the argument of chapters VII and VIII. This part of the book would have gained in clearness if the author had concentrated on his chief topic and avoided digressions. Why insert a paragraph on the origin of the Jesuit Order or sketch the history of Jansenism or devote a page to the Sixtine and Clementine revisions of the Vulgate? The only effect of these and similar unessential passages is to distract the reader from the main theme.

On the other hand, there are topics to which, owing to their intrinsic importance and relevance to the chief subject, some allusion was to be expected. One misses, for instance, all reference to the relations between the Papacy and

Visigothic Spain. Although there is no adequate proof that the Spanish Church in that period was ever in danger of becoming independent of Rome, some of its prelates, like some Visigothic rulers, were noticeably nationalist in their communication with the Popes. Arnold of Brescia is not even mentioned; and indeed Dr. Jalland has little to say about national Italian aspirations until he comes to the nineteenth century. In view of the bitterness of the struggle and the violent partisanship that it engendered, a clearer and fuller discussion of the long contest between the Emperor Frederick II and the Papacy was surely needed. Dr. Jalland gives much attention to the relations between the Popes and the Eastern Churches; yet, save for a passing allusion to the Council of Lyons in 1274, nothing is said about the temporary reunion of the Roman and Greek Churches during the reign of Michael VIII Palaeologus.

If Dr. Jalland's judgment in the disposition of his materials and in the distribution of emphasis had been as good as his scholarship and factual accuracy, the result would have been a really notable book. Even as it is, a reader who is already somewhat familiar with the subject will find much that is valuable in the fully documented chapters II to V, as well as many thought-provoking judgments and interpretations throughout the book.

Cornell University

M. L. W. LAISTNER

MANNING, CLARENCE A., Ukrainian Literature. Studies of the Leading Authors. Jersey City, Ukrainian National Association, 1944. Pp. 126. \$1.50.

"We are often inclined to believe that a literature which is little known can have little value in it," writes Prof. Manning in the introduction to his new work. "The permanent worth and the greatness of an author are not immediately visible in the sale of his works and in the number of translations that are made of them."

Primarily, in the author's opinion, this must be stated of Ukrainian literature, which, although little known in the Anglo-Saxon world, actually possesses such uplifters of the spirit as Shevchenko and Franko, masters of the pen equal to any others in the world. Ukrainian literature is worthy of recognition if only because of the fact that it is the most accessible to an understanding of the spirit of the real life and aspirations of a nation of 45 million people, which the famous American journalist, William Henry Chamberlin, has characterized as a "submerged nation." No other literature in the world portrays so faithfully the realism of its people; no other literature is so truly expressive of the idea of practical democracy and consideration of the common man as Ukrainian literature.

Prof. Manning set before himself the task of revealing this little-known literature to the American world. He does not offer us a pragmatic history of Ukrainian literature, but only places before our eyes eleven of its outstanding representatives. These chosen personages are: Ivan Kotlyarevsky, Hrihori Kvitka, Taras Shevchenko, Pantaleimon Kulish, Marko Vovchok, Ivan Levitsky-Nechuy, Ivan Franke, Lesya Ukraina, Mikhaylo Kotsyubinsky, Vasil Stefanyk and Oles. These eleven representatives of Ukrainian literature are used by Prof. Manning

as the pillars of a unique structure. The spans of the structure are given by the author only when they are absolutely necessary, while he instructs his reader to complete the construction of his conception of Ukrainian literature with his own intuition.

The question arises as to whether or not Professor Manning actually chose the personalities most representative of Ukrainian literary creativeness. It is doubtful that a Ukrainian historian of his native literature could have selected more representative figures in the literature of his people. This is proof that Prof. Manning is excellently oriented in this subject. For instance, some of the sketches of the father of Ukrainian literature, Kjtlyarevsky, or of the greatest Ukrainian poet Shevchenko, or Ivan Franko and Lesia Ukraina are painted with several bold strokes of the brush which give an extraordinarily clear picture of the creativeness of the respective writers.

Professor Manning begins his handbook of Ukrainian literature with a section which portrays to us the background from which has flowered the spirit of Ukrainian national creativeness for thousands of years. The author does well his silhouette of the Ukrainian philosopher, Hrihori Skovoroda, the forerunner of Ukrainian national revival and twelfth personality of his handbook.

Professor Manning concludes his study of Ukrainian literature with a short chapter treating Ukrainian literature after the lost struggle for freedom by the Ukrainian people after 1918. Here he emphasizes the great difficulties encountered by Ukrainian literature under the Soviet regime. 'The language in Soviet Ukraine was allowed to exist', remarks the author. 'No one ventured to repeat the words of Valuyeve in the sixties that there never was, is not, and never will be a Ukrainian language. It was clear however, that there never was, is not, and never will be a Ukrainian culture distinct from the general Soviet culture within the Soviet Union.' At the end, the author lists several titles in Ukrainian literature translated into English.

Professor Manning's book is written simply and comprehensively; therefore it is a short but excellent handbook of Ukrainian literature which may be used either for self study or in colleges. It is astonishing that an Anglo-Saxon who has never seen Ukraine, through his own fundamental studies, has been able to understand so clearly the spirit of this distinct Slavonic people, whose political situation in eastern Europe has thus far prevented its emergence as an independent nation. Mahwah, N. J.

NICHOLAS D. CZUBATYJ

LEDNICKI, WACLAW, Life and Culture of Poland as reflected in Polish Literature. New York: Roy Publishers, 1944. Pp. 329. \$3.50.

Poland has been perhaps more fortunate than some others of the Central European nations in the literary and artistic reception she has met in the West. Henryk Siękiewicz, Frédéric Chopin, Madame Modjeska, Joseph Conrad, Ignace Paderewski, Józef Hoffman, have been household names in Western Europe and America for several generations. Somewhat belatedly Adam Mickiewicz and

Władysław Reymont have assumed their proper proportions. Słowacki and Krasiński are still virtually unknown. Giants of Polish culture have rarely been looked upon as Poles, but rather as great Europeans. We have been charitably inclined to forgive them their polonism.

In this brilliant and moving essay on Polish cultural history Professor Lednicki has undertaken to show how essentially Polish these and other great writers of Poland have always been. The sensitive accuracy with which they reflect the inmost yearnings of the Polish people is made transparently clear. Indeed, as Lednicki shows, the full measure in which each of them mirrors the thought, the poignant bitterness or the hopes of the Poland of his day, precisely measures the degree in which each is typically and fully European.

In developing any such thesis inevitably many currents of Polish and European culture have to be brought together, their essential elements analyzed, and due account taken of divergent external and internal influences. Poland's peculiar geo-political position, peripheral as to Western civilization and medial as between West and East, her frequently tumultuous history, at times glorious, often tragic, the literary and cultural traditions and trends in neighboring as well as in distant lands, the influences of religious devotion and controversy, the vague yet powerful undercurrents of social and economic transformation periodically enfevering the blood-stream of Europe—all these must be disentangled and then rewoven in order to make a story that carries conviction to the mind as well as to the heart. The result of Lednicki's efforts to compass these many and diverse tâches is a particularly satisfying and absorbing synthesis, casting light upon many obscure relationships of literary tradition, and showing, as has certainly never been done before in English, the spiritual unity binding Poland irrevocably to the West.

It has become a platitude outside of Poland and under the influence of German scholarship, given a certain sanction by Carlyle, to regard Polish political institutions of the pre-Partition period as on a level with opéra bouffe. It is not very difficult for Lednicki to show that these institutions were peculiar by reason of being more representative than those of any other European state of the time. It was their very representativeness that made Poland such an easy victim of the totalitarian aggression of the eighteenth century.

Lednicki is at his most illuminating when he undertakes to clarify and illustrate the withdrawal of Polish culture into itself after the sixteenth century, when Poland was the most cosmopolitan, urbane, tolerant and European of all the states of the continent. The change is described as a natural, nationalistic reaction from too much internationalism. The ultimate failure of the Polish szlachta and bourgeoisie to sense the direction of European political development may thus be traced to this self-imposed isolationism. Lednicki is much concerned with the problem of Polish post-Partition historiography—the swing from pessimism to optimism and the frequent adjustments in either attitude necessitated by

the tragedy of the Partions and their bitter aftermath, the Congress of Vienna, the 1830-31 and 1863 revolutions.

Tragic as the Partitions were for Polish life and national integrity the people did draw some lessons from their misfortunes: "the castastrophe awoke Polish consciences and opened the door to everything that was best, honest, energetic, independent." One result of this cleasing self-revaluation was the gradual rise

of the peasant from serfdom to the dignity of independence.

To the great modern spiritual leader of the nation, Adam Mickiewicz, a whole chapter (V) is devoted. The universality of his genius, the winsomeness of his person, the purity of his passion for his native land, won the love and admiration even of Pushkin, otherwise confirmed in his dislike of everything and everybody Polish. The next two chapters, VI and VII, are the most moving in the book. They treat more incisively than hitherto in English the life and yearning, the pilgrimage and travail of soul, of "The Uprooted"—the Polish emigration which had to leave the homeland after the failure of the Revolution of 1830-31. The august figure of Prince Adam Czartoryski dominates the whole movement but we meet also, in addition to Mickiewicz at the Collège de France, Chopin, Słowacki, the sensitive romanticist, Kransiński, the "Polish de Vigny", whose "Undivine Comedy", an ambitious dramatic poem in prose, was, as Lednicki says, "a drama on the uprooted—on beings who have lost their moral roots".

The book closes with an analysis of the place of the intelligentsia in Polish life which has always been an interesting social and cultural phenomenon. Lednicki shows how, though the szlachta have usually formed a large part of the Polish intelligentsia, they have by the very fact of their interest in things of the mind, declassed themselves as nobles. Thus a completely new class has been formed. The corollary of this is of course that the Polish intelligentsia draws in continually greater measure from all other classes, thus serving as a reservoir of intellectual and spiritual energy for the whole nation, regardless of social or economic origins. At the moment it would appear that Poland will have need of the resources of this new class in the arduous years ahead.

University of Colorado

S. HARRISON THOMSON

Dorosh, Harry, Russian Constitutionalism. New York: Exposition Press, 1944. Pp. 127. \$2.50.

The long and bitter struggle for representative government in Russia is a broad subject and to crowd it in between the covers of a pamphlet-size book is no mean task. Yet Dr. Dorosh has performed an admirable job, tracing the subject from medieval Kievan democracy to the year 1906, when the first Duma met marking the entrance of the nation upon a new path of political constitutionalism. It is quite natural that in undertaking such a wide field within limited space only an outline form could be expected, and certain sweeping statements and broad interpretations would be inevitable.

Dr. Dorosh begins with a brief description of the medieval Vieche which

had all the marks of an indigenous democratic institution of that time. The Vieche functioned in Pskov and Novgorod longest, until 1510, when it was overshadowed by the growing Muscovite autocracy. The author does not shed the usual tear over its eclipse since he soberly realizes the weaknesses of that peculiar democratic institution. He rightly points out the cause of its decline which were not due to deliberately wicked policies of Moscow, as some writers are apt to interpret, but because of deeper historical implications: the Tartar invasion, Byzantine influence with its monarchical philosophy, and, finally, the necessity of strong centralized government to overcome foreign problems, which the Vieche could not establish.

"The Russian popular mind," says Dr. Dorosh, "seems to have been stricken with a curse of utter sterility in the domain of politics (p. 13). Then further on he says again (p. 34): "The untimely death of Peter II, in 1730, was signalized by an attempt at the first liberal constitution that had ever been tried in Russia, proving that the vitality of the constitutional ideas remained alive." There is an obvious contradiction in these assumptions.

The second chapter dealing with Muscovite Parliamentary Period is weak and confusing, but that is not entirely the author's fault; it is chiefly because of the complicated era which he is trying to describe within such limited space. The Time of Troubles is a period of most intricate, interwoven political, economic and social affairs in Russian history, which Professor Platonov has revealed with such brilliant skill. Any attempt to condense this period into a few pages and particularly for a foreign reader, is more than reckless daring. The result is a confusing list of names with equally confusing programs and ambitions, altogether leaving the reader little versed in Russian history absolutely aghast.

Dr. Dorosh is more at ease when he comes to the eighteenth century. But here too he makes a few careless references such as this. Referring to the constitutional fiasco in 1730, he explains this failure by stating that "the action of the Council met with little sympathy from the intelligentsia." The intelligentsia is a social phenomenon of a much later date and one can hardly speak of such a class in 1730. Furthermore to say that the reason for this fiasco is that "the national masses did not sympathize with the nobility's pretensions" is to confuse the course of history. To what national masses does the author refer? Did these masses even remotely suspect these so-called "pretensions?" The interpretation has a definitely nineteenth-century flavor.

Dr. Dorosh gives an excellent graphic portrait of Paul (pp. 46-48) which in my estimation is a true picture of that unhappy commoner in purple. He was "physically, mentally, and spiritually a broken man." But while referring to the court plot why does the author hesitate to state that Paul was assassinated? He ends the chapter with a cryptic note saying that "the plot to remove [Paul] from power was foiled by his death." The reader little versed in Russian "constitutionalism" may never gather from this sentence that Paul was strangled by the noble plotters.

The chapter on the Decembrists contains a number of errors which require notice. When the author says that the Decembrists were preparing "for an imminent upheaval" he is basically wrong and completely misses the sense of Decembrism. One of the paramount hopes of the leaders was to forestall any mass movement, for the Decembrists feared the masses as did their contemporaries in western Europe. Most of them tried to imitate the revolution abroad, notably in Spain, where a handful of officers brought about a constitutional government without disturbing the masses.

The program of Muraviev as presented by Dr. Dorosh (pp. 67-68) is equally distorted and oversimplified. To say that Muraviev was in faor of an aristocracy to be created by the Emperor through a partition of crown lands among eminent families and that these should form a House of Peers, is to do injustice to that keen even though not too advanced thinker. I am however grateful to Dr. Dorosh for refraining from citation of the ancient and unauthenticated joke about the soldiers crying on the Senate Square "Long Live Constantine and His Wife Constitution!" The majority of writers simply will not overlook it.

The author refers to Alexander II as "King" which is incorrect, since the Russian Tsar never was King of Russia. Not that it matters in days of royal disrepute, but since the book deals with Russian constitutionalism the Emperor might be referred to correctly. But if the title is misquoted the characterization of Alexander is correct and interesting (pp. 83-84).

In pointing out some of the errors I do not wish to depreciate the general value of the book for it presents on the whole a well balanced narrative of the protracted struggle for constitutional government in a country usually associated with political sterility and dark oppression. In no country was the fight for democratization of government so sharp and so continuous as in Russia and to impress this upon the foreign student of Russian history this book will well serve the purpose.

University of Nevada

ANATOLE 'G. MAZOUR

LIPTZIN, SOLOMON, Germany's Stepchildren. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1944. Pp. 291. \$3.00.

The "stepchildren" in this title refers to the literary Jews in Germany ca. 1800 - 1933. Jews active in the plastic arts, the sciences, political writing, and academic profession were largely omitted by Professor Liptzin because he is obviously a conscientious scholar and to have included too great an area of study would have resulted in superficiality. The work as it stands is clearly the result of a long and intimate preoccupation with German literature and particularly the Jews' part in it. There is nothing tendenziös about the selection of the subjects used or their treatment. The book would have had a place in cultural history even if anti-Semitism of the Nazi brand had never emerged in Germany. The many men and two women who are here under scrutiny would prove of interest

to all who are Jew-conscious: those Jews who need a little aid in bolstering their morale in the face of ubiquitous questionings and those Jew-conscious Gentiles who manage to find in Jewish writers all that is evil and only that which is evil—e.g., among the Germans, Adolf Bartels, the proto-Nazi literary "historian."

The literary work of approximately twenty characters is extensively analyzed by the author. Of these, the majority is known to those who have only a cursory acquaintanceship with German literature: Rahel (Levin) Varnhagen, Bőrne, Heine, Auerbach, Schnitzler, Wassermann, Werfel, and the Zweigs. The Zionist Herzl and the statesman Rathenau are of course familiar names. On the other hand, Henriette Herz, Dorothea Schlegel, the Veits, Karl Beck, F. C. Jacoby, D. F. Koreff, Moses Hess, Gustav Landauer, Otto Weininger, and Theodor Lessing would be familiar to the specialist in German-Jewish life only.

The author seems to desire to point out two eras in the "dualism" of the Jew in Germany: (1) Up to the period of Herzl's nationalism, when Jews were prevented from completely assimilating because of social, economic or religious chasms, such as Rahel Varnhagen, Bőrne, Heine, Auerbach and Koreff were unable to bridge; (2) the era which spans the turn of the century to the ascendancy of ethnic disabilities—such as Schnitzler was unable to transcend. The inadequacy of such neat cataloguing becomes clear when we try to pigeonhole Rathenau into some such arbitrary scheme. He persisted in considering himself German and decilned to descend into the arena to combat anti-Semitism publicly because it would be "undignified and unnecessary" (p. 149).

The extension quotations and paraphrases are not marred by a superfluity of citations in the text. However, the reader is often forced to reread passages in order to disentangle Professor Liptzin's interpolations from his expository material, so that it requires close reading to realize that the fine page of prose on Hellas and Judaea (p. 225) is not a paraphrase of Stefan Zweig. The extensive treatment of Nietzsche and the lengthy quotation from his *Morgenröte* seem superfluous, unless they are intended to show that after all Nietzsche's comments on the Jews would be unpalatable to Nazi racialism. The last three pages of peroration seem to be an unwarranted intrusion on the part of the author who might have let the writers speak for themselves. If the author had preserved a more historical perspective to the end, he would have realized that the current anachronistic status of the Jews is ephemeral and that the individual Jew will persist in desiring "emancipation."

University of Houston

Louis Kestenberg

MUNCY, LYSBETH W., The Junker in the Prussian Administration under William II, 1888-1914, Brown University Studies vol. IX. Providence: Brown University, 1944. Pp. 236. \$3.00.

Who are the Junkers? What are their antecedents? How did they succeed n gaining a considerable degree of influence in the military and bureaucratic

hierarchy of the kingdom of Prussia? To these and many another timely question Dr. Lysbeth Walker Muncy, instructor in history and government at Sweet Briar College, gives careful and balanced answers in the present volume.

Originally western German knights, the Junkers begin in the 12th century to settle in East Elbia, then a land of pagan and Slavonic peasants. It is in this quasi-colonial atmosphere that they demonstrate, practice and perpetuate the notion of personal local supremacy based upon inherited nobility and territorial overlordship. Like other colonizers the Junkers become in a measure blended with the local Slavonid population notwithstanding their marked Germanic preference. Independence from central authority and domination over the people of their region remain their characteristic traits in the prolonged period of the Staendestaat. The Hohenzollern electors-newcomers according to the uradligen families, since the Hohenzollerns arrived as late as the 13th century—find it difficult to cope with the entrenched local nobility. There are differences as to regions. Frederick William I, who ought to know, complains in his political testament of the spirit of Junker subordination in East Prussia and the Altmark while he finds conciliatory words for the aristocrats of the Neumark and particularly of Pomerania. By the time of Frederick the Great it becomes socially desirable to wear des Koenigs Rock, as it was called. Yet even after the final establishment of royal absolutism the Junkers retain, to a degree, a spirit of local independence that expresses itself in their dominance over the region of their estate, the Gutsbezirk, which persists down to the end of the Prussian monarchy.

The author makes the examination of the Junkers' influence during the Wilhelmenian era prior to the outbreak of the first world war her main topic. In this period she concentrates upon their influence in the civilian administration. One may regret these limitations as to time and functions although otherwise the investigation could scarcely have been as exhaustive and scholarly as it actually is. Within her thus circumscribed theme the author leaves no stone unturned in order to analyse the proportion, the contents, and the significance of Junker influence in the Prussian administration. She discusses the various branches and layers of government, paying particular attention to the Landrat and his office, the lowest administrative unit of the central authority. Here the Junker is in his field, attempting to reconcile royal demands with local agricultural interests as the exponent and protagonist of which he feels entitled to appear. We are told how many Junkers are promoted, how many appear in leading positions of either the state or the Protestant church, whether there exists a relation between land tenure and office holding, how many Junkers marry the right type of girls, and how far the feudalizing influence is maintained within the families. The author thinks, and rightly so, that bureaucratic service, particularly if coupled with separation from the estate, has a bureaucratizing influence upon Junkerdom, whereas bourgeois and more recently ennobled estate holders show a habit of

becoming feudalized. In the western provinces Junker influence never amounted to much, but in East Elbia "the relatively high concentration of Junker officials in one area put them in a position of dominance in that part of Prussia. . . and it also tended to check the bureaucratizing effect of officeholding by fostering the 'feudal' atmosphere there."

Backed up by a wealth of statistical material—more interesting to the specialist than to the general reader—Dr. Muncy, for the period under discussion, comes to the conclusion that "the number of Junkers in the administration were slowly but definitely declining"—not, incidentally, as a result of the policies of the Prussian government but as a result of a changing era that needed more technicians than nobles and in which an increasing pressure of the bourgeois made itself felt. The decline of Junker influence coupled with a persistent distress of the eastern German agriculture leads, however, to an appreciable political radicalization of Junkerdom. It is strange to see conservative officials in the Wilhelmenian era assisting the demagogic and rabble rousing actics of the Agrarian League to the point even of defying the royal government. Here clearly are beginning of a trend indicating a general decay of conservatism that was to become so strong—and so fateful—in years to come.

The author has gone over the field with remarkable diligence and excellent coverage. Her style is concise and her conclusions are convincing. In spite of an abundance of German quotations in the footnotes, few typographical errors can be discovered. (In footnote 3, p. 45 it should be "politischen" instead of "politisches" and in footnote 53, p. 105 it should be "Korpsbruedern" instead of "Korpsbruedern,") The author deserves credit for a scholarly study on an important subject.

Michigan State College

HANS L. LEONHARDT

GRONICKA, ANDREE VON, Henry von Heiseler, a Russo-German Writer. New York: King's Crown Press. 1944. Pp. 220. \$2.75.

In this treatise Gronicka pursues a twofold purpose: (1) to offer a complete biography of Heiseler; (2) to show that Heiseler's work presents a synthesis of German and Russian cultural life. Gronicka has acquitted himself well of the first task. Since the numerous literary sources, however, have not been critically sifted their practical value is relatively small. As for the second point, sufficiently convincing arguments are entirely missing.

We may see in Heiseler the true Russian who only writes in German. He has not created a single typical German character. He could have done this in Der junge Parzival and in Die jungen Ritter vor Sempach, but we simply do not find in these works such a character. Everywhere we are confronted, almost exclusively, with Russian subject matter. It would, indeed, be unnatural were it not so. Heiseler writes in the Marginalien: "Poets and writers have no luck in presenting foreign types. A poet can bring forth only such creations which are most intimately connected with his inmost personal life, and this life is

evidently inseparable from nationality". Each Russian national will recognize in Peter (Peter und Alexei) the true Russian whose thoughts and actions would appear to have a western tinge. Why does Gronicka not mention the "Alte"

in this play who shows more western traits than any other character?

Czar Ivan (Die magische Laterne), Boris, Gricha, Kyrill (Der Begleiter), and Wava are thoroughly Russian characters, and also in Heiseler's lyrical productions: Die drei Engel, Einzelreden, and Die Lengenden der Seele which, besides, are of minor importance, Russian life prevails. Grischa and Lisaweta are certainly not peasant types. In Kyrill Heiseler does not present a "universal human problem" but rather a very specific and indeed strange case, not necessarily typical for the Russians only.

The scene in *Die Kinder Godunojs* where the father mistakes his daughter for the spectre of murdered Dmitri is not Heiseler's "most powerful creation" because it is unmotivated and unconvincing. There are too many unproven generalizations in Gronicka's book, especially where he speaks about the illiteracy

of Russia and the style and form of the individual works.

How could Gronicka ever call Die jungen Ritter vor Sempach "balladesque poetry" or Grischa a "dramatic ballad"! Why did Gronicka not clear up the terms: "Western", "German", "Germanic" which he uses interchangeably? He has failed entirely to point to the many russicisms in Heiseler's writings. Heiseler's work is not a synthesis of two cultural worlds, and he himself can not be rated as one of the great modern dramatists because the range of his ideas is too limited, nor as a translator can he be compared with B. A. Zhukovskii.

University of Virginia

M. H. VOLM

PILSUDSKI, JOZEF, Wybór pism [Selected Writings], edited by Wacław Jedrzejewicz. New York: Józef Piłsudski Institute of America for Research in Modern Polish History, 1944. Pp. xv, 368. \$4.50.

The rôle of Joseph Piłsudski in Polish life has not yet been objectively established. There are many reasons for it. His time is relatively too close to us and we cannot have access to all the pertinent documents concerning his activity. He aroused very different and passionate reactions in Polish society which, although now somewhat calmed, have not entirely disappeared. Finally, his activities fall into at least three different periods: as a socialist leader, as the provisional head of the state, and as semi-dictator, he almost becomes three different personages, all very difficult to reconcile with each other and to treat as the manifestation of the same basic personality.

Nevertheless, there is no reason for not trying to indicate generally what might be attempted in the way of an objective appreciation. After all, we are in possession of certain indubitable and unchangeable facts which are open to interpretation from the point of view of political, social and cultural values and

which form a foundation for unprejudiced judgment.

On some points we can even count upon a more or less general agreement in Polish public opinion. So, for instance, Pilsudski's activity as one of the most prominent leaders of the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.) until the first World War is generally approved, as is the struggle of the Party for national and social liberation, even by opponents of socialism. In his mind the national aims had a prior claim over the social ones. He was the creator of the idea of armed resistance to the Czarist authorities which caused a split in the Party. The Polish Legions formed by him in the Austrian army at the beginning of the first World War were, in principle, a continuation of the former fight, now not underground but in the open and in military formation. Military formation does not mean militaristic ideology. On the contrary, the Legions were composed of radical democratic and progressive youths, among them many socialists and members of the Peasant Party, whose aim was not only the liberation of Poland, but also the creation of a new, truly democratic Poland.

Much was told and written both in Poland and abroad about the "collaboration" of Piłsudski with Austria. But for the Poles it was the only reasonable and realistic policy for that time. Any collaboration with Czarist Russia was impossible, and Austria was the only one of the partitioning states in which the Poles enjoyed civic liberties and were permitted to develop their political and cultural life. Moreover, Austria, as a state composed of various nations, offered, in case of victory for the "Central States", more possibility of a great degree of autonomy or even a tripartite (Austro-Hungarian-Polish) state than could Russia. Of course there were some "shameful points" in this "Austrian orientation" such as the fate of the province of Poznań under German rule and the necessity of fighting indirectly on the side of Germany against France and England, Russia's allies. But this alliance was considered rather a temporary mésalliance for practical purposes. Apart from it, Piłsudski never bound himself for life and death with the Central Powers; on the contrary, he scrupulously guarded the Polish character of the Legions and of their aims, counting upon a change in the international situation, when he might break off with Austria, and finally resigned as commander of the Legions when the German-Austrian policy showed a tendency to disregard Poland's interests.

The very fact of organizing the nucleus of the future Polish army must be considered as one of Piłsudski's important achievements. One can easily imagine what would have happened to the young Polish state in 1918-1920 if it had been deprived of this army. This must be kept in mind if we want to avoid injustice in speaking about Piłsudski's Legions. They were a symbol of the will of liberty and independence, and this symbol will forever be identified with his name.

The circumstances and conditions under which Poland was restored posed for Piłsudski an immense and extremely difficult task. In November, 1918, Poland's frontiers were undefined, she was at war with the Ukrainians and Russians, her relations with Germany were unsettled and, in addition, her internal

condition was chaotic. There was a Council of Regents in Warsaw, a National Committee in Paris, local Committees in Cracow and Poznań, but no genuine government. Each of these numerous problems demanded an immediate solution. It was necessary to form a government with power over all the committees, to convene a Parliament to form a legal basis for the existence of the state, to conclude hostilities with the Ukrainians and Russians, to organize a Polish administration, and to unify the three separate parts of Poland into a homogeneous state organism. There is no wonder, then, that not everything should have gone smoothly, that there were conflicts, mistakes, misunderstandings, and errors. One of the errors was undoubtedly the expedition against Kiev in 1920, the result of which was the advance of Soviet troops to the very walls of Warsaw. The political aim pursued by Piłsudski in the Ukraine, the formation of a national Ukrainian state, can be judged from various points of view. But one thing seems certain, namely that Poland at that time was primarily in need of peace and at least a temporary understanding with Russia, and not of a new war, even with such transient martial displays as the capture of Kiev.

As to internal affairs, one must state objectively that Piłsudski's policy in the first period of restored Poland was marked by moderation and consideration for public opinion. When the attempt to set up a Socialist régime failed, Piłsudski appointted the cabinet of Paderewski, and then, for several years, as official Head of the State, tried to fill his office in a loyal manner. He did not participate in party struggles or even use his influence for the formation of a parliamentary majority enabling the creation of a more reliable government. This "abstinence" was certainly going too far. Piłsudski's merits and moral prestige would have made possible for him relative consolidation of political conditions and pacification of those party quarrels in Parliament which brought the very principles of parliamentarism into disrepute with the mass of the people. This popular attitude was dangerous for the future and should, therefore, have been avoided in handling the factionalism of Parliament and its inability of form a majority, however much these may have resulted from an understandable lack of political experience rather than from a basic weakness of the democratic-parliamentary system. Unfortunately, Piłsudski became with time more and more inclined toward the latter opinion, which finally led to the coup d'état of May, 1926. The direct cause of the coup was a unsavory pact between a part of the Peasant Party and the nationalists, but indirectly a considerable rôle was certainly played by Piłsudski's anti-parliamentarian and "anti-party" attitude and perhaps also by certain dictatorial inclinations which were later to show themselves very clearly. Hopes nourished by Polish democratic circles that the coup d'état would mark the beginning of a real "cure" of internal conditions unfortunately failed entirely. Instead Poland became the scene of a very demoralizing struggle between Piłsudski and Parliament, a struggle conducted by Piłsudski with ever growing ruthlessness. At the same time Parliament could not function normally, was frequently dissolved and each new election was more efficiently "organized" for the purpose of producing a governmental majority.

So the rule of Poland became an unofficial dictatorship of Piłsudski with an external appearance of parliamentary polity—a combination difficult to understand in Western Europe and presenting an obstacle to a sincere and efficient collaboration with the Western democracies. This dictatorship could not be justified at that time by the impossibility of forming a parliamentary majority, because all the democratic parties, from Socialists and Populists to Christian Democrats, reached an agreement and demanded at their meeting in Cracow, June 1930, a radical change in the existing system. Arrest of the leaders was the answer. Piłsudski thus lost the support of all the main political parties from left to right, and virtually of the overwhelming majority of the people. Rule by the "colonels" and bureaucracy came into being with all the sinister ramifications of such a system.

Piłsudski did not see, or did not want to see, all this. He claimed to be uninterested in internal affairs, being occupied only with the army and foreign policy. Neverthless he cannot be freed from responsibility for what was going on in Poland. Hence the justifiable bitterness against him even among many of his former adherents.

In spite, however, of all that happened at that time and later, Piłsudski's merits in creating the Polish army and stabilizing the Polish state under extremely difficult conditions, and in the victorious campaign of 1920, are indisputable. Unfortunately, with this his historical rôle came to an end. He was a wholehearted soldier, a soldier "by birth", predilection, and gift, renewing by this as well as by his appearance the better traditions of the old Polish gentry. He was an eminent personality surpassing by far his surroundings in intelligence, intuition, force of will, and—last but not least—a personal charm which explains the blind attachment of his collaborators. But he was not a statesman whom restored Poland needed in her main task of reaching as soon as possible the level of Western European civilization rather than of waging war. Defining his attitude towards socialism in the words: "I got out at the station: Independence"-he quickly ceased to take an interest in the kind of independence this ought to be in order to gather all the living forces of the nation in creative work. His tendency towards strengthening the executive power was, in principle, right, especially in view of Poland's historic experiences; but he "strengthened" it to such a degree that he almost entirely destroyed the legislative power, depriving himself and his governments of the benefits of that public control and criticism indispensable in every normal state. He had no definite social program because the idea of a "strong state", of a "great and powerful Poland" can mean little unless it contains a specific concept as to what is to be understood by force and greatness: bureaucracy or civilization, army or culture, long boundaries or extension of spiritual human values, number of inhabitants or number of creative minds in all fields. In the vision of Piłsudski himself, new Poland had probably

to unite all these traits, but the way he chose by no means led to the use of the best powers of the people. As to his successors, they had no vision at all.

But Piłsudski had no concrete program concerning the national minorities in Poland. After the failure to create an independent, national Ukraine headed by the "hetman" Petlura, which, however, was not to include the Polish Ukrainians, he abandoned completely the problem of the latter. Nothing or very little was done to solve it on the basis of autonomy and federation. Neverthless, it would be unjust to omit the positive results of both the earlier and later period of Piłsudski's rule. They were numerous in such various fields as administration, finance, industry, commerce (the new Baltic port Gdynia), reconstruction, communication, education (five universities, a new network of elementary and secondary schools), legislation, and so on. The Polish Constitution of March, 1921, although not ideal, was one of the most democratic and progressive in Europe Much was also done in social legislation. Although not all this work was carried out during the dictatorship of Piłsudski (and so much the less during the time of his successors), at any rate it was accomplished while he was the Head of the State.

Finally, it must be stressed, especially for those "liberals" who are speaking and writing about "feudal" Poland and "democratic" Soviet Russia, that Pilsudski's system was not a full, integral totalitarianism, or a dictatorship of the kind of Mussolini, Hitler or Stalin. There was in Poland no one-party system; on the contrary, there existed legally various political parties (except the communist) which were in strong opposition to the government. There was no "monodoctrine" system, like fascism, nazism, or communism. Political opponents were not murdered as they are in all totalitarian states. There existed a freedom of the press, although moderately limited by censorship; the same was true of the condition of freedom of association. All these freedoms were guaranteed by the Constitution, but in practice often exposed to the "whims" of the bureaucracy. Piłsudski himself can by no means be compared with the psychic types of the contemporary dictators. Such traits as cheap theatrical postures, as catching popularity by any means, as hypocrisy and falsehood were completely contrary to his nature—not to speak of the great qualities of his mind, character, and heart.

The "Selected Writings" edited by Mr. Wacław Jędrzejewicz, former Minister of Education and close collaborator of the late Marshal—do not reflect all the phases of his activity summarized above. The editor apparently avoids anything that might cast a shadow on the person of his beloved hero, or perhaps he believes that these shadows are of no great importance for the general picture. If the did indeed believe so, he does not agree with either the Polish democratic opinion or the goal of an objective historian. Moreover, in proceeding in this way, Mr. Jędrzejewicz deprives the personality of Piłsudski of many picturesque, striking and human traits which are well known by all his contemporaries and form an integral part of the whole man. Instead we have in this book a some-

what rigid figure, something like a bronze statue. There seem to be historians and journalists who believe that that is the right way to present national heroes to the public. But in reality it is the best method of making a prominent character alien to his contemporaries and to posterity, of awakening indifference rather than lively interest and attachment.

I do not mean by this that the compilation of Mr. Jedrzejewicz—especially in the first part of the book—does not contain many important writings and speeches characteristic of Piłsudski's mind and style. But the general tendency is undoubtedly that of "casting in bronze", of omitting sharp and crass utterances, of concealing passions and hates, ruthlessness and oversimplification in judging men and events, a distinct inclination to megalomania and despotic behavior, a "Schadenfreude" towards political opponents, and the trait common to all dictatorial types, that is, an assumption that they know better than the people themselves what the wishes and needs of the people are.

All these characteristics of Piłsudski's personality are, if not lost, at any rate considerably minimized in this publication. Especially is this true of the period between July 1923 (his retirement from the government) and May, 1926 (the coup d' état), when from his modest country cottage near Warsaw he waged a sharp and ruthless campaign against the government and Parliament, and especially against the hated Representatives. This period, a preparation for the coup d'état, is somewhat neglected in the "Selected Writings" as is the whole period after May, 1926, in so far as political enunciation is concerned. The material is here, in general, limited to historical, cultural, or military articles and speeches. The bulk of the book and indeed its most interesting part is devoted to the period between 1903 (the famous article: "How I became a socialist") and 1926.

The editorial work concerning comments, footnotes and so on is based on the 10 volume Warsaw edition of Piłsudski's works (1937) and, in general, is done in a satisfactory manner. The two prefaces, one by the present editor, the other by the late W. Sławek, are conceived as apologies, especially the second. The numerous errors in printing are somewhat distracting to the reader.

Smith College

MANFRED KRIDL

DURANTY, WALTER, USSR.—The Story of Soviet Russia. New York: Lippincott, 1944. Pp. 293. \$3.00.

Walter Duranty's new book is based upon his "twenty years' experience in Russia". Mr. Duranty was one of the first foreign correspondents who succeeded in finding favor in the eyes of the Soviets. He represented the New York Times in Moscow for many years and so became one of the most authoritative informants of American public opinion on Soviet Russian politics.

The merits as well as the demerits of the book have their sources in this privileged position of its author. Mr. Duranty's acquaintance with Russian affairs

is much closer than that of the majority of foreign authors writing on Russia. Unfortunately, Mr. Duranty continues "to write as he pleases", i.e. highly arbitrarily and tendenciously.

The Tsarist autocracy deserves, of course, a severe condemnation. It is nevertheless illogical and unfair to blame it for the same deeds for which the present régime is praised. So, e.g., (p. 233), Mr. Duranty blames Tsarist Russia for having put the women in the hard situation in which "the function of women was to care for husband and children and in the ranks of peasants and workers who formed eighty percent of the population, to share man's physical toil". At the same time he approvingly describes the new educational policy of the Soviets which, by establishing separate schools for boys and girls, directs the women "towards such feminine vocations as housekeeping, cooking, sewing and the care of children".

Mr. Walter Duranty's book is not a historical study. It is rather a series of articles on different topics, often without even a chronological connection. The hero of the book is not the Russian people but the Bolshevik Revolution with its principal leaders and victors—Lenin and Stalin. As far as the chief actor in the Revolution is concerned, Mr. Duranty does not conceal his disdain and dislike for him and the Russian people are treated in the book with arrogance and scorn. "The peasants as a mass were still (in 1921) backward, dirty, ignorant, superstitious, conservative in the sense of hating the new and wanting to hold what they had got, and intensely individualistic" (p. 132), an "ignorant bewildered Russia" (p. 153), "the most ignorant and backward of all white nations" (p. 279), etc.

According to Mr. Duranty patriotism had never existed in Russia, and the Russians had been a kind of sub-human species until the Bolsheviks came to power. Writes Mr. Duranty: "Man's function in the modern world can be defined as follows: to protect and provide for his wife and family, to defend and fight for his country, and, last but not least, to have a voice in his country's government. That voice was denied to Russian men by the Tsarist system. Politically they were impotent". Mr. Duranty forgets completely that the patriotic warfare of our day had been preceded—this is admitted now even by the Bolsheviks—by the *first* patriotic war of 1812, and he tries to convince his readers that Russian patriotism was born only in 1934-1935 after it had been "inoculated" by the Bolsheviks (p. 253).

When one reads Mr. Duranty's book it is possible to understand why a deep feeling of distrust towards foreigners is so widespread in Russia. Besides the systematic government propaganda assuring the Russian population for more than 25 years that Russia is encircled by "capitalists", "Trotskyists" and other enemies whose only aim is Russia's enslavement, this distrust was also provoked by the approach of foreign writers to the Russian-Soviet problem. Those who oppose Stalin and his régime seem to believe that the best method of exposing his dictatorship lies in depicting unfavorably the whole of Russian life, the Russian

people and Russian history. On the other hand the same is done—with other aims—by those who sympathize with the Soviet dictatorship; in order to emphasize the commendable features of the present régime and the unsurpassed achievement of the "leaders" they strive to soil the Russian past and the Russian masses. Mr. Duranty is one of those informers whose writings provoke an inimical attitude on the part of native Russians towards foreigners in their land. The harm which Duranty thus accomplishes is not balanced by the profit which foreign readers may gain from his information.

We will not stress here the numerous errors which can be found in Mr. Duranty's book. He writes, for instance, that Matsesta is situated in Georgia; that the pen-name "Lenin" was assumed by its bearer in order to commemorate a massacre of workers in the Lena Goldfields (Duranty apparently is not aware that the massacre took place in 1911 while Lenin was using this "pen-name" a decade before that event); that Stalin has chosen his pseudonym "because he had worked in a steel plant or something (?) of the kind" (in reality Stalin never worked in a plant); that in Lenin's opinion "the Mir system of Russia provided a better basis for Communism" (Lenin was of a quite opposite opinion); that Tomsky, the head of the Soviet trade-unions died a natural death (he committed suicide); that the name of Mr. Molotov's wife—he repeats it twice—is "Madame Zhemchukina"; that the Russians "had never known self-government in any form" before the Bolshevik revolution which gave them a voice in the government (p. 276), etc.

There are also in Mr. Duranty's book some important omissions. So, for instance, while asserting that "Stalin had long ago decided that Nazi Germany was his enemy", Mr. Duranty forgets to mention Stalin's attitude of distrust towards the State Department's repeated warnings concerning Hitler's forthcoming attack on Russia (Memorandum of Mr. Sumner Welles of March 20, 1941 in the White Book published on October 7, 1943).

All this might be considered relatively unimportant. Of more importance is Mr. Duranty's approach to the facts related in his book. He is convinced that, according to the Russian saying, "there is no trial for victors" and that if nevertheless a trial takes place it is absolutely necessary to find for them "attenuating circumstances". If the French say: to understand all means to pardon all, it could be said regarding Mr. Duranty, that he proceeds in percisely the opposite direction: he pardons the Bolsheviks before understanding them and the aim of his writings is to explain why the Bolshevik government, and especially Lenin, deserves not only pardon but glorification despite their cruelty and insidiousness.

The defense and the praise of the Bolshevik leaders by Mr. Duranty takes the form of polemics against American and European "experts" on Soviet affairs—"bewildered by Soviet policy", "Soviet infamy", "Soviet ignominy" etc., and who therefore are frequently erroneous in their descriptions and appreciations. These attacks on other writers are accompanied by allusions pointing out Mr. Duranty's own clear-sightedness proved by extracts from his telegrams sent to the

New York Times. Mr. Duranty usually accepts the official Soviet interpretation of events although occasionally he uses other versions too,—for instance, the explanation of the famous 'trials' given by Mr. Joseph Davies.

In his own interpretation Mr. Duranty often makes curious and paradoxical assertions. As an example I will mention only his explanation concerning the compulsory collectivization of the peasants and the hunger of 1932-1933 which cost Russia 4 to 5 million human lives. The Soviet government, explains Mr. Duranty, was compelled by the financial crash in the United States to replace the failing American credits by an increasing pressure on the Russian peasantry. On the other hand, the Soviet government was also compelled to confiscate grain and seeds in the Caucasus, in the Ukraine and on the Volga in order to store up food supplies in the event of a conflict with Japan. The government preferred to conceal the fact that this had been done as a preparation for war and, therefore, presented it as a result of "socialist enthusiasm". Mr. Duranty himself adds: "Stalin had won his game against terrific odds, but Russia had paid in lives as heavily as for war" (p. 193).

If there are only a few new facts in Mr. Duranty's book, one of these is quite sensational. Speaking of Marshal Tukhachevsky's treason Mr. Duranty asserts that it was revealed to Mr. Stalin by Mr. Beneš who at that time was Minister of Foreign Affairs in Czechoslovakia. Tukhachevsky, according to Mr. Duranty's version, met Beneš in Praha, after which he went to Berlin. Here he came in touch with German military circles. The Czechoslovak intelligence service transmitted to Mr. Beneš a report containing an account of these conversations. In the account some details concerning Tukhachevsky's conversations with Mr. Beneš were mentioned. Mr. Beneš came to the conclusion that only Tukhachevsky could reveal these details to the Germans and promptly transmitted his information on this subject to Moscow. Tukhachevsky's arrest and death, and that of his fellows, marshals and generals, was immediately ordered (p. 222).

It will be equally of interest for a foreign reader to become aquainted with Mr Duranty's summary of the facts of the "Great Purge" of 1937-38. "It is known that from two-thirds to three-fourths of the leading personalities in Soviet Russia were "purged", that is, expelled from the Party and in many cases executed . . Two-thirds of the Soviet dipolmatic corps—ambassadors, ministers, and counselors of embassy or legation—were "liquidated", that is their execution was announced, or they simply disappeared . . . Of the Council of Commissars, numbering twenty-one at the end of 1936, only five were left two years later. One, Orjonikidze, died, and the rest were shot or disappeared" (pp. 227-28).

Mr. Duranty's attitude towards the "Great Purge" is also of interest. He finds in it a justification for the whole internal and external policy of Stalin, including the Hitler-Stalin alliance of 1939-1941. In Mr. Duranty's opinion, this alliance was provoked by the "Munich" policy of Chamberlain and Daladier which awakened natural doubts and fears in Stalin's mind. At the same time

Mr. Duranty considers that "it can truthfully be said that the Purge prepared the way for the Anglo-French surrender at Munich" (p. 231). According to Mr. Duranty, while the purge strengthened the Soviet government it also rendered a great service to Hitler and to the Nazi and Fascist sympathizers. "Their purpose of weakening, dividing and disunifying the democratic peoples of the world was much aided by the split in the Bolshevik party at home and abroad and the effects of the Purge in Russia" (p. 227).

It should be stressed that Mr. Duranty himself has no sympathy for Communism. He is, on the contarry, a strong defender of "the three great fundamentals: Home and the Family, Religion and the Church, Money and Property". He welcomes the transformation of Bolshevik policy of internationalism into nationalism and the reestablishment of home and family, religion and church, money and property. It is difficult to understand why he speaks with equal enthusiasm of the Bolshevism of the previous period when the Bolsheviks themselves radically denied all that is accepted by them now. Mr. Duranty thus finds himself in the unenviable situation of a disinterested Pangloss who under all circumstances is convinced that everything is always getting better and better in the Soviet world—the best of all worlds.

MARK V.

KORMOS, C., Rumania, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; New York: Macmillan; 1944. Pp. 122. \$1.00. Vol. II of British Survey Handbooks.

As the end of the war approaches, handbooks on the various countries of the world to guide the public through the ins and outs of peacemaking may be expected in ever-increasing numbers. Such a handbook generally represents an attempt to combine a streamlined Baedeker, an encyclopedia of facts and figures, and an analytical interpretation of a country's history and "problems"; most of them never succeed but, if rarely readable, they are at least sometimes useful. This little book, published under the auspices of the British Society for International Understanding and intended for the general reading public, is both readable and useful as a reference. While it lays no claim to encyclopedic exposition or to brilliant analysis, it is remarkably accurate in its factual presentation and balanced in its judgments. If Mr. Kormos has left out much of the description data which the business man or the student of Rumania's economic and social problems would like to have included, he has nevertheless made good use of his limited number of pages.

In the chapters on the various Rumanian provinces Mr. Kormos has confined himself to a recital of the salient facts and thus has not allowed himself much chance for error. The same is true of his description of the economic resources of the country although here he is occasionally inaccurate, as in his statement that before the war the British held in their hands nine-tenths of the oil industry, and his tendency to over-estimate the mineral wealth of the territory Rumania acquired from Hungary in 1920. In the chapter on Rumanian history

prior to the first World War Mr. Kormos is brief and conventional. In his treatment of more recent events, however, he has chosen to be more expansive and provocative. He proceeds from his main contention, which not many students of the subject would contradict—that the Rumanian people have had little to say about their destiny, in the twentieth no more than in former centuries—to a refreshing if over-simplified interpretation of the country's experience under the dictatorial regimes of Ion I. C. Bratianu, Carol II, and Ion Antonescu.

Mr. Kormos sees some hope for democracy in Rumania and for a "healthy" national development if the "dormant force" lying within the people, specifically among the peasantry, is liberated, and if the material resources are properly exploited. But the keys to Rumanian history have ever been found outside the country. Few will quarrel with the author's conclusion that the realization of Rumania's hopes for the future "now depends mainly upon the policy which the Government of the U.S.S.R. adopts toward Rumania, when Russia replaces Germany as the dominant power in Eastern Europe."

Washington, D. C.

JOHN C. CAMPBELL

Davis, Harriet Eager, ed., Pioneers in World Order, An American Appraisal of the League of Nations. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944. Pp. x, 272. \$2.75.

This is an important book. Within its two hundred and seventy pages are seventeen essays by specialists on League of Nations affairs, essays analyzing in incisive fashion the machinery of the Geneva organization. Pioneers in World Order is of, for and by Americans. During the two decades of the League, almost three hundred Americans participated in one phase or another of its work. A number of the most prominent have contributed to this study. Mrs. Malcolm W. Davis, the editor, was closely associated with the League during its most critical years; Manley O. Hudson serves as judge on the World Court bench; the name of Professor James T. Shotwell of Columbia University is a byword to anyone with even a passing interest in foreign relations and Sara Wambaugh has an international reputation as an expert on plebiscites. Each of these and a dozen writers of similar merit discuss their own fields.

The emphasis, interestingly enough, is on the technical and humanitarian activities of the League about which there can be little argument. The brilliant record of the world organization in controlling dangerous drugs, handling mandates, encouraging international intellectual co-operation, and in improving public health, is for once given the attention deserved. This is not to imply that such topics as security and disarmament are neglected. Dr. Shotwell, in a particularly able examination of the quest for security between two wars, shows that peace collapsed not because of a reluctance on the part of the Powers to use those instruments. He states categorically, "We may conclude that collective security did not fail but that it was never tried." Arthur Sweetser, former director of the Information Section of the League Secretariat, in his chapter on the "Frame-

work of Peace," discusses the questions approached at Dumbarton Oaks. He suggests that there are four possible types of international organizations: a strengthened League of Nations, an expanded United Nations, a new agency combinating the best features of both, or two groupings of states, the one to provide security and the other to handle all remaining problems. Sweetser does not urge a specific plan; he does indicate, however, that some family of nations is clearly necessary, and that, in projecting it, the experience of 1919-39 should be remembered.

Like many co-operative works, the volume lacks a certain cohesion between essays, and some readers may not regard it as an organic work. There are several pertinent topics which might have been included. For example, a section of the Secretariat was devoted to transit; this subject is given scarcely any attention. Legal questions are only touched on in connection with the Permanent Court of International Justice, and minorities do not merit comment until they become refugees. Furthermore, the special relations of the League to such regional understandings as the Monroe Doctrine should be amplified.

Pioneers in World Order is in no sense an apology for Geneva. Rather it offers, as a guide for the future, a valid estimation of the best experience of the past in international co-operation.

University of Missouri

DUANE KOENIG

MARX, Hugo, The Case of the German Jews vs. Germany. New York: Egmont Press, 1944. Pp. 124. \$1.75.

When this little book was published early in 1944, the Nazi occupied countries were all still under the Nazi heel and no precedent had yet been set for dealing with this situation.

Even the general intentions of the Allies for handling Germany were not known and, with the exception of North Africa, there was as yet no instance in which anti-Jewish legislation had been abolished.

Now the situation is somewhat changed. Anti-Jewish legislation has been officially abrogated in North Africa, Italy, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Rumania and Bulgaria, and in most of these countries decrees concerning the return of Jewish property have also been issued. We now also have General Eisenhower's proclamation on the abrogation of Nazi laws in the regions occupied by the Allies. The question of German indemnities for injuries inflicted upon the Jews may very soon become acute. In the other liberated countries the mere abolition of the laws has proven inadequate and acts to materialize the return of their property to the Jews are necessary, while in Germany a legal problem will probably arise since the anti-Jewish legislation in that country was enacted not by a foreign government but by a German one.

Jewish organizations, such as the World Jewish Congress, are urging that a special legal decree be passed for handling this problem since the situation is a new one which has never before arisen in the history of international relations.

Our author, however, seeks legal grounds for suing Germany on the strength of "actual existing" or "positive law," as a basis for compelling her to make good the damages suffered by Jews. Since "positive International Law compels recognition of the validity of German legislation against the Jews as national law" the author tries to construct a legal foundation for reparations by showing that "the Jews in Germany represented a minority . . . Germany was bound by the obligation of a universally recognized international law to respect the existence of minorities." Foreign states are therefore "entitled to present the claim resulting from the violation by another state of its duty to respect the rights of minorities." Some of these states may do so also because they consider the refugees as their nationals. The attempt is made to base these points on existing law and legal practices in Europe and America.

It is regrettable that the book should treat such a vital and timely topic so inadequately, and should so confuse general points as well as the legal implications.

In the first place, such a study must clarify the character of the hypothetical post-war German government with which it is concerned. A democratic, anti-Nazi government would surely repudiate the Nazi legislation generally including the anti-Jewish provisions (this would probably have already been accomplished by the occupation authorities), and in all likelihood with retroactive force. Such a government would probably return with compensation the property confiscated from the trade unions and other organizations, such as those of the socialists, communists, and other anti-Nazis. Jewish individuals might use such legislation and practices as a legal basis for claims.

Marx seems, however, to take for granted a German government that will follow in the footsteps of the Nazis, just as he is influenced by the Nazis' assurances of the validity of their legislation and the abrogation of the Weimar constitution. He even takes at face value and as legal foundation the utterances of Hitler and other Nazis. He brushes aside all too easily opinion on the unconstitutionality of the Nazi régime based on the Enabling Act of the Reichspraesident, provisions which were made only for temporary needs, and the resolutions of the Rumpfreichstag (after the communists had been expelled and some other members jailed). As a matter of fact the Weimar constitution which guaranteed equality, was not abrogated; and the constitutionality of the Law for Securing the Unity of Party and State of December 1, 1933, which makes the Nazi party bearer of the State-idea and its attitudes those of the government, is highly questionable.

The section dealing with the legal procedure of individuals claiming indemnification is inadequate. But even the author's confusing construction of the legal basis for Jews as an organized minority group in Germany is misleading. He confuses the sociological fact of being a minority with the legal implications of an obligation to respect such an organized group. Germany did not sign the so-called minority treaties and Jews in Germany did not fall in the category of

such a group. His thesis that the Jews in Germany constituted a minority in the legal sense and "that the right to present their claim belongs exclusively to the states with which Germany was bound to respect the rights of her minorities" has no basis whatsoever.

There never was any such thing as "a universally recognized" obligation to respect the existence of minorities as a group. Certain states did sign treaties to this end and these states alone were obliged to live up to them. Germany was involved in such an agreement in Upper Silesia by the convention of May 15, 1922 with Poland, which was brought out, insofar as Jews were concerned, by the famous Bernheim petition. But these obligations clearly concerned Upper Silesia only, not the whole of Germany. Moreover, pre-Hitler Germany stressed that she was not obliged to respect the rights of her minorities in the manner of the states bound by special treaties. "It (Germany) rejects any attempt to transfer from their proper place the principles of law laid down in existing treaties and to bring before the League Council matters over which it has no jurisdiction." And this attitude was recognized as satisfactory by the League Council (pp. 65-66). Marx dismisses this attitude of the League of Nations as representing an "appeasement policy" and not the law; but he interprets as the expression of the "law" the opinion of a few delegates at a League Assembly to the effect that the Jews of Germany are a minority. (Even this does not mean that they are a protected minority with obligations on the part of Germany. The entire construction of a legally non-existent entity, an organized and recognized Jewish minority with the right to titles belonging to Jewish individuals, is full of pitfalls likely to ruin the whole structure.

Finally, the author's conception of Jewish emancipation and of the aims and intentions of the minority rights, is superficial and historically untrue. So, too, his statement "It was the intention of the peacemakers (Versailles) that the minorities should be absorbed by the majority of the population and should disappear" (p. 75) is not only contrary to historical truth, but also to the very minority rights which were designed to give the minorities a possibility of pursuing their own cultural and religious development by the side of the majority.

To sum up: Marx's book fails to fill the need for a cogent and well-founded presentation of the case of the Jews against Germany. This timely problem has still to be dealt with.

New York City

BERNARD D. WEINRYB

DALLIN, DAVID J., The Real Soviet Russia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944. Pp. 260. \$3.50.

"In Russia foreign and internal policies are more closely allied than in any other country. Only by studying the general concepts dominating Soviet activity at home, the established social relations, the direction of internal political development, is it possible to comprehend and to foresee the evolution of Soviet foreign

policy and to avoid the naive and dangerous mistakes so frequent during the past decade," (Preface, p. VII).

It is for this reason that after having written two very valuable books on Soviet Russia's foreign policy (Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942 and Russia and Postwar Europe, both published by Yale University Press) David J. Dallin in his new book has undertaken to present a comprehensive survey of the general concepts and their application in the practices of the Soviet régime. In such a survey foreign policy becomes one of many aspects of Communist policy; "The Soviet Concept of Foreign Policy" is one of fourteen chapters of the book.

The book abounds in descriptive material, which alone satisfies very well the purpose of the survey: "to serve as an introduction to the study of the real Soviet Russia" (p. VIII). But Dallin attempts successfully to give something more. In his view Russian Communist policy is a comprehensive whole, which was inaugurated by Lenin in 1917 and has not ceased to exist in spite of all changes, deviations and adaptations. Of course, today this policy is not precisely the same as it was in 1917, in 1927 or even in 1929, but it is always at any given time more or less a phase in the evolution of the same policy. Dallin does not accept what he calls "the 'Thermidorian' interpretation of the Russian revolution" (p. 15). In his opinion, "the revolutionary process has not yet been concluded in Russia; the 'ascending line of the revolution' continues" (p. 16). Recent development does not appear as a reaction, a return to the pre-revolutionary past or a movement towards the western "capitalistic" forms of society, but rather as a modification of the original methods designed to build up and to strengthen the Communist régime, the fundamentals of which have remained intact. These fundamentals are a comprehensive system of state economy, as well as a complete state control of all social activities, the dictatorship of one party, and the hierarchical principle of social organization with the positions at the top occupied by 30 to 40 thousand "generals and commanders" of the Communist Party and its leader, whose "scope of power is unlimited" (p. 228).

Two-thirds of the book is dedicated to a very elaborate and abundantly documented description of the new social structure corresponding to these fundamentals of the Soviet régime. It is in the social structure that the most drastic deviation from original Communist ideology has occurred, a deviation which is not of a temporary but of a final nature. This is the change from the principle of equality: "The differentiation of the new Soviet society into classes, contrary to the principles of a classless society" (p. 87). In addition to the Communist Party, the governing elements of which form a genuine ruling class of the country, there are "new upper classes" (Chapters VII and VIII), the working class (Chapter IX), the peasantry (Chapter X) and forced labor (Chapter XI). Dallin realizes that some readers might be utterly surprised by the existence of the latter class. "It is," he wrote, 'indeed extraordinary that one should feel obliged to begin a chapter about a numerous social class of a great country by demonstrating that it exists and constitutes one of the most important factors in

the development of a nation's economy in general and of its industry in particular" (p. 186). In this demonstration Dallin has completely succeeded. The chapter on forced labor (pp. 186-213) is not only striking, but also exceedingly convincing. The evidence collected by the author is so ample and the sources so diverse (including Russian official statements and statistics) that there cannot be the slightest doubt that there are in Soviet Russia several million people forming a class of forced labor, clearly distinct from other social groups.

At present, the Soviet régime appears to be a firmly established system. "Soviet policy in the war period represents a harmonious whole. It reflects a unity of military policy, internal and external" (p. 245). But what about the future? Dallin does not make any concrete predictions. But he stresses the tremendous sacrifice and losses, "unheard-of privations inflicted upon the population" during the war, and the inescapable consequences. The picture of the immediate future appears very dark. This does not constitute in itself "a guarantee of a wise foreign policy, of abandonment of expansionism" any more than it is a guarantee of necessary internal reforms. Nonetheless, in the opinion of the author, "the course of the war, the price of victory, and the postwar situation in Russia constitute the prologue to great internal changes, greater changes than some are inclined to expect" (p. 249). This statement, which concludes the competent and brilliant study also indicates the problems to which this study points.

New York City

GEORGE DENICKE

TABORSKY, EDUARD, The Czechoslovak Cause. London: H. F. and G. Witherby Ltd., 1944. Pp. 158. 12s. 6d.

The significance of Mr. Táborský's book goes beyond the limits suggested by the title. Primarily concerned with proving documentarily the thesis of the legal continuity of the Czechoslovak state throughout the political changes of the last five years, this volume of factual information reveals, at the same time, some of the most important problems of international law. Among these the non-validity of territorial cessions without the consent of the people, the termination of international treaties through inapplication or violation by one of the parties concerned, the recognition of governments as distinct from the recognition of states, and the jurisdictional problems involved in the status of a government-in-exile deserve a particular notice.

The author is a young Czechoslovak lawyer, now in London, belonging to the school of modern legal thought which promises to raise international law from its antiquated rigidity to the place it should occupy in the changed political and social conditions. He does not hide himself behind the sterile screen of formality but takes fully into account the living facts of politics. The aims of World War II have been defined eloquently by many of the United Nations' statesman. Táborský's book is a powerful argument in support of those who regard the re-instalment of the rule of law as one of the foremost war aims and

the foundation of a better peace. By re-examining calmly and without recriminations the recent breaches of international treaties by some of the great powers, the author clearly shows the path that led to the war. The selection of Czechoslovakia as a test case for the doctrine of legal continuity is very appropriate, for perhaps no other state has in the juridical sense survived so many political changes and defied such a complex series of adversities.

The books falls into eight chapters, each of which represents a significant stage in the juridical development of the Czechoslovak state. Politically, the failure of the Munich method of appeasement or "peaceful change", to use the prewar jargon of some confused international relationists, has since become obvious even to political infants. Juridically, the deal involved incompetence, compulsion, illegality of object, nonfulfilment of a promise of guarantee and the violation of a valid treaty by brute force. Mr. Táborský deals with these aspects of Munich in the first chapter. In the second chapter he submits to an analysis the illegality of the German-Hungarian invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and creation of the puppet state of Slovakia and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The detailed juridical description of the Czech-gold versus the Bank for International Settlements incident should be of absorbing interest to lawyers. To the reviewer's knowledge, this is the first time that the incident has been treated in this manner. The third chapter follows up the Czechoslovak struggle for liberation from the outbreak of the war to the recognition of the National Committee. The fourth, fifth and sixth chapters trace the evolution of the struggle in the light of the successive documents of international law related to the recognition of the Czechoslovak Government in London. The sub-division referring to the constitutionality of President Benes' government should especially be noted. Táborský's clarification of this point is of inestimable value to the study of international law quite apart from its political importance. The seventh chapter deals with the legal problems facing a government-in-exile. For the sake of its novelty it offers a valuable contribution to our legal knowledge. This chapter includes the treatment of the legal aspect of the State Council and the Juridical Council, as well as a comparative analysis of the Czechoslovak military courts in Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Finally, the eighth chapter cites the texts of the bilateral and multilateral treaties to which the government in London is a party. These include, as the last document quoted, the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, mutual assistance and postwar cooperation signed on December 12, 1943.

The author sets his task to prove that from the legal aspect the cause of Czechoslovakia rests on a firm and safe basis. "Scarcely ever in the course of modern history have a state and people been able to stand before public opinion and the international forum with such firmly grounded and legally indisputable claims as those which will be advanced by the Czechoslovak state and nation at the coming peace conference". To this concluding passage the quotation might be added from René Cassin's preface to the book that "over and above the

paragraphs of the law and the vicissitudes of circumstances, the principle of the free self-disposal of peoples, the will to live and suffer together, possess a power that cannot be coerced."

New York City

JOSEF HANC

JACOBY, GERARD, Racial State. New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs of the American Jewish Congress, 1944. Pp. xii, 355.

It was characteristic of the Nazis to use the form of scientific doctrines and legal norms for achieving their political aims of annihilation and conquest. The results of the Germanization of a whole continent will not be undone for a long time by the victory of the United Nations. It is even doubtful whether the Nazi network of systematically woven relationships between the Reich and subject Europe will ever be basically dissolved.

The Nazis did their most subtle work in Czechoslovakia. By creating the "Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia" they set up a demonstration model of their Big Space Order that was proudly announced as an "independent product of National Socialist thought." The subjection was accompished, step by step, by way of law and decree. If, as Carl Schmitt explains, "'Legal' means what is formally correct," everything that was done to the Czech people was quite legal.

Jacoby's able study shows how the legislation, by which the Nazis ruled, was built up. It describes how "by legal means" the Nazi Reich tried to open new "living space" for Germans. The work opens with a description of the theories of *Lebensraum*, the steps which led to the creation of the Protectorate and its government. The subsequent sections deal with the methods of segregation, assimilation and depopulation.

In general, Jacoby has succeeded in providing us with the most lucid, comprehensive and up-to-date survey of the Nazi policies in the Protectorate that has so far appeared, at least in English. He observes with keen eyes and writes with distinction and thoughtfulness. In fact, this is a volume which will also remain the best reference work and handbook pertaining to the years when the Nazi raped the Protectorate.

But our enthusiasm over the volume should not prevent us from being upset

by two specific features of the treatment.

In the first place, Jacoby seems to be going out of his way to make the use of his references as difficult as possible. In the "Introduction", the footnotes appear at the bottom of the respective pages. But for example, footnote 3 is of interest to the reviewer. In order to discover its contents, one must first look for the number of the respective chapter, and then look for the "Footnotes" near the end of the volume, sandwiched in between "Abbreviations" and "Appendices". After locating the respective chapter's footnotes, much to one's chagrin it appears that this footnote advises: "See Appendix I, table 3." Or, where is any logic pertaining to footnote 32 of chapter VII, which advises the reader, "See Chapter V, footnote 33"?

Secondly, not only has Jacoby evolved a very needlessly complicated system of footnotes, but he also has some mysterious reason for using Winkler's Statistisches Handbuch des gesamtem Deutschtums as the official source of the Czechoslovak school system, 1923-1934. The Czechoslovak official censuses certainly were the reliable source to be used. Or, are Winkler's figures supposed to be an

improvement over the Czechoslovak official figures?

When the Institute of Jewish Affairs gives up its mysterious ways of citing references, and its fondness of relying on German sources when there seems no particular need for doing so (a tendency already noted when we reviewed its Were the Minorities Treaties A Failure? in this periodical)—it will then produce publications of superior quality and value which will remain most authoritative introductions to the various ramifications of the burning minorities problem of Europe.

Hofstra College

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

NATHAN, OTTO, The Nazi Economic System. Durham: Duke University Press, 1944, Pp. viii, 378. \$.50.

The present study represents an attempt "to describe the organizational machinery and the system of controls developed by Nazi Germany for the conduct of economic affairs." The author has fulfilled his objective as well as is possible for a scholar who has not lived in Germany during the described period and who, therefore, cannot draw upon personal experience. He has the great advantage of a thorough knowledge of the economy of pre-Nazi Germany, where he was prominently active. He himself states that only after the war, when the German archives will be open to public scrutiny, and when it will be possible to interview some of those who have lived through and participated in the Nazi economy, will a more exhaustive and substantial analysis of the structure and development of the Nazi economy be possible. The author has used all accessible German sources—laws and rules, official statements, magazines, reviews, and books—while, perhaps purposely, he has not given much attention to studies on the Nazi economic system published here or in England.

In his scholarly-written and generally well-documented work, Mr. Nathan deals first with the agencies regulating industry and the institutions controlling agriculture. A special chapter is devoted to the use of cartels as agencies of control. One wishes that the author had discussed here the rôle of international cartels in the German economic policy, which would be especially desirable in

view of current heated discussion concerning this problem.

The book contains a very thorough chapter on control of money and banking; the analysis of Schacht's credit policy is illuminating. The chapter on control of labor gives a creditable picture of the way in which freedom of labor was curtailed step by step. In the section pertaining to control of prices, the author illustrates how this regulation, as a part of the slowly emerging planned economy, has become one of the basic instruments of total economic control. Finally, the

chapter devoted to Public Revenue offers an excellent survey of all instruments of the Nazi financial policy, which can be characterized by boldness and inventiveness.

Thus the author leads us through the whole Nazi economic system—from the measures to organize and control production, regulate prices, and regiment labor, to the work of the fiscal policy—presenting an enormous amount of decrees issued and steps taken by the German government. It is surprising that Mr. Nathan has given so little attention to the foreign trade control policy, although this segment of the Nazi economy was merely a supplement to the total structure.

The survey of all German measures over a number of years shows instructively that the Nazis have not instituted their régime with a pre-conceived plan of economic and social policy. Their economic system resulted from a successive flexible development, which followed the foremost objective: to achieve an economic war-preparedness within the shortest possible period. The author is indeed correct when he maintains that the system of production, distribution, and consumption erected by the Nazis, defies classification in any of the usual categories. It is not capitalism in the traditional sense; it is not state capitalism. A comprehensive planning mechanism has been imposed upon an economy formally maintaining private property, but completely dominated by a ruthless political dictatorship.

Mr. Nathan does not attempt to evaluate the results of the German economic system; his chapter "Effects of Military Economy" is devoted chiefly to estimating the effects of rearmament upon consumption. The author realizes the difficulties of any estimate based upon such documents as are available now. According to the published statistics the real national income in Germany in 1938 was almost 30 percent higher than in 1929. The author calculates that wage and salary earners, including those who were unemployed and pensioned, did not receive as large a share of the national product in 1938 as they did in 1929, though the real income and consumption of the masses reached approximately the level of 1929 (the highest before the crisis). While the share of income of these groups declined by 3.1 percent, and the profits of agriculture remained unchanged, the share of the profits of industry and trade in total national income increased by 3.1 percent. It would require a more detailed analysis to discover how far these figures are borne out by the actual development. On the basis of personal experience this reviewer would say that the author, following the official figures, is over-optimistic as to the rise of the level of consumption in Germany. It would be necessary to analyze the quality of the goods in order to compare the level with that of 1929.

There is no doubt that the Nazi economic system has proved to be efficient in spite of the enormous amount of controlling machinery, bureaucratic interference, and commandeering. The Russian economic system also has shown great efficiency, especially in wartime, and the efficiency of the American democratic system as adapted to war economy can certainly not be questioned. All three

economic systems were geared to war and performed their functions well. We know what the democratic system can achieve in times of peace; we do not know yet, however, how any totalitarian economic system would work, if devoted purely to peacetime objectives and deprived of the unifying idea of preparing for defense or aggression.

Dr. Nathan's book is a valuable addition to the studies of the development of Nazi economy. A final analysis and the eventual appraisal, of course, must

be postponed until more complete documentation is available.

Columbia University

ANTONIN BASCH

RIESS, KURT, The Nazis Go Underground. New York: Doubleday Doran, 1944. Pp. xi, 210. \$2.50.

Under this sensational title Mr. Riess has presented his views on the problem of liquidating the Nazi menace once the fighting is over. Against the background of a brief review of the record of German industrialists and Army officers in the Nazi rise to power and a summary indictment of our record in dealing with defeated fascists in North Africa and Italy (which he feels offers the Nazis a hope for the future), Mr. Riess gives a simple and specific description of the plan which Herr Himmler's organization has perfected for the continuation, after military defeat, of the Nazi struggle for world domination. In the last section of the book he discusses the implications of such a program for the Spanish world and this country. The book is well written and on the whole well informed, but its pretense to omniscience creates an effect of lack of substance which is only heightened by a facile shifting from topic to topic, and even more, by a complete absence of documentation.

To demand the customary academic apparatus in a study of this nature, would be both unfair and unimaginative. For that reason, however, Mr. Riess, was under special obligations to tax his readers' credulity as little as possible. To begin a book with the statement that "The Nazis went underground on May 16, 1943", is to arouse, beyond hope of remedy, the suspicions of all intelligent and critical readers. This is at once unfortunate and unnecessary, since there is nothing essentially untenable in Mr. Riess's thesis that the Nazis, having decided the war could not be won and therefore would probably be lost, have set about making plans for continuing their self-appointed task after the military defeat of Germany. It would even be a plausible guess that the basic pattern of these plans would be to provide protective coloration for a large number of trusty, but relatively unknown, party members, and at the same time to expose, to the rôle of present scapegoat and future martyr, an even larger number of unimportant Nazis. But it is not easy to believe that even the Nazis themselves know, with the precision of this presentation, exactly what their plans will be at some definite date in the future. Presented as fiction, this hypothesis might have earned for its author a reputation of a flair for shrewd analysis, supplemented by "inside" information, rather than that of a weakness for unnecessary pretension. The section of the book most worthy of serious consideration would seem to be that dealing with American and British policy in North Afirca and Italy. Mr. Riess has presented very little material on this subject which could not be found elsewhere, but his succinct statement of the case proves, if not his indictments, at least the necessity of real investigations of the facts. His discussion of Nazi activity in South and North America, on the other hand, is a brief summary of more or less standard—and on the whole, unanswerable—charges, which raises the question of the practical value of the mere repetition of such warnings.

By way of conclusion, Mr. Riess asserts that "Nazism or Fascism is by no means an Italian or German specialty." The Nazis came to power, he believes, "not because there was something wrong with Germany, but because there was something wrong with the world." And, he warns, "the Nazis will come to power again if that something which is wrong is not remedied. If we can make our world a better world, the Nazis will disappear into the abyss of history." Whatever the merits of this proposition may be, it is in no sense a necessary conclusion to his argument and by presenting it as such, Mr. Riess has maintained, to the last page, the impression that his work is unsubstantial.

Harvard University

EDWARD WHITING FOX

Wriston, Henry M., Strategy of Peace. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1944. Pp. vii, 159. \$1.00.

Hope has been defined as the golden mean between the opposite errors of presumption and despair. President Wriston of Brown keeps to the middle way in a manner worthy of an Aristotle or an Aquinas. He begins his interesting and useful study of current problems by analyzing the nature of peace and war. Neither is ever quite absolute. War may be defined as a legal state of belligerency; as a political period of strain and hostility; or as the actual conduct of military operations. These overlap rather than coincide. Force always stands in the background of even the most pacific government, but force alone cannot solve anything, nor even bring victory, since it is only the instrument of national policy and any policy unguided by reason leads to speedy frustration. Neither the "Blitzkrieg" nor "total war" is really a novelty, instances of both reach far back into history; and, while it is true that modern armaments have become far more destructive than the old sword and rifle, science enables us to rebuild rapidly what war has destroyed. "Once a sacked city was a perpetual ruin. . Today the work of reconstruction is begun before destruction has ceased" (p. 64).

The second part of the book takes up American diplomatic tradition. In the main, we have handled our foreign, affairs as well as any other nation. The Monroe Doctrine, for instance, has been attacked as unsound from the standpoint of geopolitics; actually, however, it has worked very well, so that the real error lies rather in the abstractions of geopolitical theorists. In the words of Justice Holmes "a page of history is worth a volume of logic" (p. 87). Our isolationism,

which was never absolute, had a sound basis in the conditions of the early nineteenth century; our only fault was a certain slowness in recognizing that times

had changed and policies must change with them.

The final section of the book is an outline for a possible peace with Germany, as a part of a wider settlement of world affairs. Doubtless it would have been differently phrased after Dumbarton Oaks, and military events may render some of its stipulations antiquated in the near future. President Wriston proposes the total disarmament of Germany; the restoration of the European frontiers of 1933 without any dismemberment of Germany (though with voluntary exchanges of population to correspond to the 1933 frontiers); moderate reparations; punishment of war criminals, and the insistence that the terms of surrender "should bear the signature of Adolf Hitler and the Chief of the German General Staff" (p. 142) so that the German people would associate defeat and humiliation with the war régime and not—as in 1919—with a liberal successor government. One difficulty in this theoretically excellent plan, apparently overlooked by the author, is that the Nazi leaders are practically all war criminals also, and one would hardly consent to sign his own death warrant!

University of Michigan

PRESTON SLOSSON

GIBSON, HUGH, The Road to Foreign Policy. A new approach to our future problems. New York: Doubleday, Doran. Pp. 252. \$2.50.

This book by a professional diplomatist is written with great frankness, almost undiplomatically so. Perhaps this makes for easier reading and should assure the book wide-spread attention. If it falls short of its aim—to be a pointer toward the principles of American foreign policy—it contains enough of the author's favorite schemes to make it arresting throughout. Mr. Gibson's main thesis is so sound that it is meeting with increasing approval in all democracies: what Sir Victor Wellesley in his Diplomacy in Fetters has been doing for the British Foreign Office, Hugh Gibson is doing for the Department of State. Both former members of the foreign service of their country ask for a strengthening of the central organization which executes foreign policy; both ask for a better informed public, for keener popular interest in foreign affairs. These demands can easily be seen in their correct light if we remember the road to ruin in 1939 or 1941.

The chapters on the working of the diplomatic service show Hugh Gibson at his best, and they will be read with much profit by all those who still think that diplomacy is just another word for social glamor and entertainment: "There is a hell of a lot of difference between Paris and Trenton—and you notice it more in Paris than you do in Trenton." Gibson pleads for better training, for a sound knowledge of modern history without which no diplomat can hope to serve his country. He points to the fact that the pay for American diplomats was fixed in 1855 so that, as a result, the British Ambassador in Washington can draw five times as much as his American colleague in London. "Diplomacy,"

Mr. Gibson sighs, "has not failed. It hasn't even been given a chance to fail."

There are numbers of illustrations of the many issues raised by the author which will startle the reader—and this is all to the good in a book addressed to the 'layman' in foreign affairs. "Suddenly, in the midst of war," Mr. Gibson remarks, "there are signs of change (in Britain's attitude). Germany is pushed aside as the strongest power and Russia emerges in that rôle. Not in the sense of military victory over Germany, but rather as a power which arrogates to itself the right to decide with indifference the disappearance of the countries that maintain the European balance of power." There is a great deal of plain speaking about Russia's Drang nach Westen and the case of Russia's western neighbors is dealt with in some detail. Much of this is not only shrewd but has the authentic ring of the voice of a former American Minister to Poland, Belgium and Switzerland. Foreign policy, our author knows, is not all Big Power talk—the Small Nations have their own important niche in the story of expanding democratic faith

My principal quarrel with the author focuses upon sentences like these. "We free societies have always had to live in a world that was half slave and half free". This sounds so much like pre-1939 talk in Europe, so much like the well-worn apologies for Fascist slave systems, that one rubs one's eyes seeing them repeated toward the end of the present war in Europe. Already Chatham knew that a slave nation, anywhere, will infest the free world and will be ready to turn the free into slaves. In that faith the great Chatham took his stand for American liberty and against his own government. I fear that unless we return to that spirit we shall find no liberty abroad, no freedom at home. Mr. Gibson is equally wrong when he speaks of the "luxury of self-expression", of hurtful public clamor. On what else can governments of the free world act if not on public opinion? Perhaps the author has been confused rather than wrong. Perhaps he objected to uninformed clamor only (with the diplomat's dislike of publicity). Let us follow him then in his plea for better knowledge and greater attention to foreign affairs.

"Conditions", says Mr. Gibson, "are not going to be more favorable to peace after this war. They will be less favorable. The earth will be swept by waves of nationalism like none we have known before." I am sure he is right. The more urgent, therefore, is his plea for keen public participation in all things pertaining to international affairs. Hugh Gibson's book helps us to travel the right road.

Elizabeth College, Buxton, England

F. W. PICK

MOULTON, H. G. & MARLIO, LOUIS, The Control of Germany and Japan. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1944. Pp. xi, 116. \$2.00.

Written by an economist and an engineer, this book is an attempt to present an outline for the postwar economic control of Germany and Japan. The authors

base their proposals on the thesis that only devices which do not "throttle the economic life of the country against which they are imposed" are realistic and beneficial for the world at large. This view is based upon the recognition of the international propagation of economic depressions from any major country to the rest of the world and on the economic and political repercussions which economic maladjustments in any country have on its neighbors and on all those which maintain exchange relationships with the affected country. Arguing from a practical point of view, the authors contend that whatever economic steps are taken to control the axis countries in order to prevent their future rearmament, such steps must be relatively easy to enforce in order to be administratively feasible. For these reasons they dismiss as administratively unfeasible but also as having disastrous effects on third countries such radical measures as: the partition of Germany into a number of small states, the erection of an independent Rhineland, the isolation of Prussia, the reduction of Germany to an agricultural state, the weakening of Germany's position in regard to foodstuffs, the financial control over German industry by foreign consortiums, and the complete abolition of German heavy industry.

The authors confine their positive proposals, in the case of Germany, to a control of certain key industries, chiefly the production of steel alloys, aluminum ingots, the nitrogen and hydrogenation industries in the chemical field, the synthetic oil and rubber industry, the production and operation of civilian airplanes, and the production of electric power for industrial purposes. Germany should not be totally deprived of these commodities; their production should be prohibited, but the importation of these commodities should be allowed. The authors show that stockpiling would be difficult, and that few. if any, opportunities would exist for smuggling sizeable quantities of these strategic materials into Germany. In addition to economic measures they advocate political controls and active prevention of German rearmament.

An analysis of the specific proposals of the authors would show that from an economic and technical standpoint they would meet with almost as many difficulties as the more ambitious schemes of total de-industrialization of Germany. A case in point is the prohibition of nitrogen production in Germany. Modern chemical production cannot be carried on successfully and cheaply on a large scale, unless a widespread variety of processes is combined by which by-products of one process can be used in other processes, and vice versa. A prohibition of nitrogen and hydrogenation plants in Germany would burden the organic-chemical industry with such heavy costs and such waste of effort and materials that it would severely impair, if not completely destroy, all chemical production in Germany. Similar arguments could be put forward in the case of certain steel alloys, synthetics and other commodities.

¹ For the focal place of nitrogen in organic-chemical production of all kinds see "Nitrogen: Competition or Not," *Fortune*, February 1944, p. 129 and esp. the chart on p. 128.

A problem which is left entirely untouched by the authors is the question of how Germany is to pay for all the commodities she will be allowed to import but not produce domestically, even though Germany may have a high comparative advantage in their production. If it is assumed that Germany will have to pay reparations to countries devasted by German armies, that she will be forced to abolish or vastly reduce her agricultural tariffs, and that she may be allowed to rebuild some of her destroyed plants and equipment for purposes of nonmilitary production, her balance of payments will be strained to the utmost. Germany will have no gold, no income from services, not even foreign assets which she could sell. If, therefore, Germany has to import sizeable quantities of raw materials and power she will only be able to pay if real incomes are vastly reduced; if foreign nations impose heavy trade restrictions, hardly any conceivable reductions of real incomes and the standard of living in Germany will suffice to make up for the deficiencies. Germany will consequently be in a permanent state of economic depression, because, even though she will be allowed to import all the raw materials with which to make the commodities which her people demand, she will not have the wherewithal to pay for them.2

The book has the merit of emphazising that an economically healthy Germany is the prerequisite for an economically healthy Europe, but it does not give sufficient weight to the proposition that there is a very close correlation between the absence of foreign economic restrictions which are felt to be oppressive, and a politically stable Germany. The controls proposed by Moulton and Marlio, even though they require a minimum of administrative interference and even though they are alleged to cause only small displacements, will be severely resented by the German people and any German government which will attempt to adhere to these controls will be in permanent danger of suffering the same fate as the Weimar régime. This does not mean that Germany should go unpunished, nor that another war would be inevitable, but it does mean that central Europe would be permanently infected with the sore of resurgent German nationalism and irridentism. The achievement of lasting peace in Europe is not possible by means of external economic controls; a lasting peace must be founded upon popular democracy in Germany. The very controls suggested in this book are impediments to this aim. By omitting a discussion of the potential sources of political friction provided by their plan the authors have failed to consider the most important problem of the future control of Germany.

In spite of these criticisms the book is stimulating reading and discusses, unfortunately, sometimes at insufficient length and with inadequate depth, some

² Mr. Moulton's and Mr. Marlio's plan was discussed on the University of Chicago Round Table on October 22, 1944. The participants, besides Mr. Moulton were Professor Quincy Wright and Professor Frank Graham. What is surprising is not that Mr. Moulton succeeded in defending his plan as workable and plausible, but that such an astute economist as Professor Graham did not point out the fallacies of the plan.

of the most focal points in the postwar treatment of Germany and Japan. It is fortunate that it enjoys the widespread circulation which it receives as a Book-of-the-Month Club selection.

University of Chicago

BERT F. HOSELITZ

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Antononi, Luigi, "The Italy of Today". Intern. Postwar Prob., Jan. 1945, 35-44. "Armistice Terms for Hungary". Dept. of State Bull., Jan. 21, 1945, 83-86.

Baird, Alexander, "The Future of the Jews in Eastern Europe", Contemp. Jewish Record, Feb. 1945, 3-14.

Balk, Theodore, "Tito's Great Task". Tomorrow, March 1945, 53-56.

Ballhausen, Friedrich von, "Die Alldeutsche Gefahr". Deutsche Blätter, No. 8, 1944, 12-14.

Bátor, Victor, "Tibor Eckhardt — Portrait of a Statesman". Amer. Hungarian Obs. Jan. 28, 1845, 3-6.

Bellini, Mario, "Legitimacy in Government". Tomorrow, Feb. 1944, 35-37.

Betts, R. R., "The European Satellite States". Intern. Affairs, Jan. 1945, 15-29. Beuer, Gustav, "Der einzige Ausweg". Einheit, Feb. 10, 1945, 16-22.

Bielecki, Tadeusz, "Pierwszy Krok", Myśl Polska, Dec. 1-14, 1944, 1105 f.

Biheller, Frico, "A New Charter in Hungarian History". Cent. Eur. Obs., Jan. 12,

194 5, 1 f.

Braithwaite, Charles, "The Grecian Tragedy". Free Europe, Dec. 15, 1944, 179 f. Brandt, Karl, "The Reconstruction of European Agriculture". Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1945, 284-294.

Braun, Charlotte E., "Hungary — Last of Satellites". Current Hist., Dec. 1944,

490-494.

Braun, Charlotte E., "Modern Greek Tragedy". Current Hist., Feb. 1945, 139-143. "Bulgaria Accepts Armistice Terms", Document. Current Hist., Dec. 1944, 509-512.

"A Charter of Civil Liberties — Polish Government Proposals". *Polish Fortnightly Rev.*, Dec. 1, 1944, 1-8.

Dallin, D. J., "Soviet Russia and the Peace with Germany". Intern. Postwar Prob., Jan. 1945, 61-77.

Debicka, E. J., "The Music of Wanda Landowska". Polish Rev., March 1, 1945, 8, 9, 15.

"The Developments in Greece". Bull. of Intern. News, Jan. 6, 1945, 16-24.

"Dei Arbeit der Tschechoslowakischen Auslandsbewegung". Einheit, Dec. 16, 1944, 6-8.

"Die Deutschen der ČSR auf dem Scheidewege". Einheit, Dec. 2, 1944, 9-11. Documents: "Armistice Terms for Rumania", "Armistice Terms for Finland",

Documents: "Armistice Terms for Rumania", "Armistice Terms for Finland", "Armistice Terms for Bulgaria". Amer. Review of the Soviet Union, Feb. 1945, 62-74.

"Electoral Reforms — Polish Government Proposals". Polish Fortnightly Rev., Dec. 15, 1944, 1-8.

Fay, S. B. "Conflict in Poland." Current Hist., Dec. 1944, 453-459.

Ferenczi, Imre, "Relocation of Europeans." Annals of Amer. Acad. of Poli. and Soc. Sci., Jan. 1945, 172-181.

Fisher, Hilda, "The Allies Blunder in Italy". Current Hist., Jan. 1945, 52-56.

"Franco-Russian Pact", Document. Current Hist., Feb. 1945, 156 f.

"Freiheitsfront bildet Landeskomitee für Kärnten - Steiermark". Zeitspiegel, Jan. 6, 1945, 1 f.

Freund, Ludwig von, "Das Slawentum im Jahre 1970". Einheit, Dec. 30, 1944, 7-9. Fry, Varian, "The Little War Before the Last: A 'Realistic' Appraisal of Dumbarton Oaks". New Europe, Feb.-March, 1945, 4-7.

Gaeverbutz, Ruth, "Fates and Faults of the Western Germans". Free Europe,

Nov. 17, 1944, 149 f.

Gordon, M. K., "Russia's Growing Population". Annals of Amer. Acad. of Poli. and Soc. Sc., Jan. 1945, 57-63. Górka, Olgierd, "Poland's Policy Towards Her Jewish Citizens in Principle and

Practice". Polish Rev., Dec. 21, 1944, 3, 4, 10. Gould, S. W., "Austria's Economic Future". South Atlantic Qy., Jan. 1945, 2-12. Grass, Joseph, "Libraries in Old Poland". Polish Rev., Jan. 18, 1945, 8, 9, 14.

Gurian, Waldemar, "On the Future of Germany". Rev. of Politics, Jan. 1945, 3-14. Haussmann, Frederick von, "Europäische Schicksalsgemeinschaft". Deutsche Blätter, No. 8, 1944, 3-8.

Hirsch, F. E., "The Portent of Stresemann". Commonweal, March 2, 1945, 486-490.

Jakobson, Roman, "The Beginnings of National Self-Determination in Europe". Rev. of Politics, Jan. 1945, 16-29.

Karbach, Oscar, "The Founder of Political Anti-Semitism: Georg von Schoenerer". Jewish Soc. Studies, Jan. 1945, 3-30.

Kazakévich, Emily Grace, "The Study of Ancient History in the Soviet Union". Amer. Rev. on the Soviet Union, Feb. 1945, 39-58.

Kirk, Dudley, "Population Trends in Postwar Europe". Annals of Amer. Acad. of Poli. and Soc. Sci., Jan. 1945, 45-56.

Koehler, Fritz von, "Ernaehrungsprobleme der Befreiten Heimat". Einheit, Dec. 2, 1944, 21-23.

Koenig, Duane, "Life in Papal Rome in the Late Eighteenth Century". Soc. Studies, Jan. 1945, 10-15.

Kosidowski, Zenon, "How Poland Modernized Upper Silesia". Polish Rev., Feb. 8, 1945, 4, 5, 14.

Kozák, J. B., "Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R.". Bull. of the Masaryk Inst., Nov. 1944, 1-6.

Kreibich, Karl von, "Ein Jahr Pakt mit der Sowjetunion". Einheit, Dec. 16, 1944,

Kuczynski, J., "Productivity and Exploitation under German Capitalism". Science and Society, Winter, 1945, 55-66.

Lakhover, Fishel, "Warsaw: Metropolis of Polish Jewry". Jewish Frontier, Feb. 1945, 11-13.

Lamont, Thomas, "The Problem of Germany". Intern. Conciliation, Jan. 1945,

"Latvia under Bolshevik Rule". Latvian Inf. Bull., Nov. 1944.

Legowski, W., "Gospodarcze Rozbrojenie Niemiec". Myśl Polska, Dec. 24, 1944, 1118-1120.

Lengyel, Emil, "Shall Hungary Turn East?". New Europe, Dec. 1944, 17 f.

Lenk, Josef von, "Die Auslandsdeutschen - ein Werkzeug Deutscher Kriegspolitik". Einheit, Nov. 18, 1944, 8-11.

Levine, Isaac, "The Bitter Fruits of Teheran". Econ Record, Jan. 1945, 37-41.

"Liberation and After". Round Table, Dec. 1944, 51-55.

Mann, F. C., "The Socialization of Risks". Rev. of Politics, Jan. 1945, 43-57. Manning, C. A., "The Menace of Linguistic Nationalism". South Atlantic Qy., Jan. 1945, 13-22.

May, A. J., "Crete and the United States - 1866-1869". Jl. of Modern Hist.,

Dec. 1944, 286-293.

McGill, V. J., "Cartels and the Settlement with Germany". Science and Society, Winter 1945, 23-54.

Winter 1945, 23-54.

Menne, Bernard, "How Germany Used Her Foreign Loans". Cent. Eur. Obs., Nov. 24, 1944, 363 f.

Morgenthau, Henry, "Bretton Woods and International Cooperation". Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1945, 182-194.

Menczer, Béla, "The Hungarian Cauldron". Free Europe, Nov. 17, 1944, 152.

Nadanyi, Paul, "Why Hungary's Attempted Surrender Failed". Amer. Hungarian Obs., Dec. 17, 1944, 3, 9.

'Nadler, Marcus, "Financing the Industrialization of Eastern Europe". New Europe, Dec. 1944, 21-23.

Nenni, Pietro, ''Italy's Anti-Fascists Fight for a New Deal''. Free World, Feb. 1945, 23-36.

"The New Polish Government". Poland Fights, Jan. 20, 1945, 3-5.

Novy, Vilem von, "Der Sendung der Slawen in Krieg und Frieden". Einheit, Jan. 27, 1945, 709.

Odell, Clarence and Billigneier Robert, "Aliens in Germany, 1939". Dept. of State Bull., Feb. 4, 1945, 164-169.

Odložilík, Otakar, "Tři Státi o České Otázce" Parts I-IV. Čechoslovák, Nov. 10, 1944, 9; Nov. 17, 1944, 7; Dec. 1, 1944, 7; Dec. 8, 1944, 7.

"Oesterreichisches Bataillon in Slowenischer Volksarmee". Zeitspiegel, Dec. 9, 1944, 1 f.

"On Restoration of Liberties to Greece". Dept. of State Bull., Jan. 21, 1945, 91 f. "An Ostensible Inconsistency". Free Europe, Feb. 9, 1945, 33 f.

Pakstas, Kazys, "The Problem of Lithuanian Boundaries". Lithuanian Bull., Jan. Feb. 1945, 4-8.

"Państwo — Rząd — Opozycja". Myśl Polska, Jan. 20, 1945, 1129-1131.

Papánek, Jan, "Czechoslovakia — a Working Democracy". Free World, Jan. 1945, 63-66.

Parkes, James, "The Jewish World Since 1939"; Simpson, Sir John, "A Comment on Dr. James Parkes' Paper". Intern. Affairs, Jan. 1945, 87-105.

Pavel, Pavel, "Rumania Tomorrow". New Europe, Dec. 1944, 24-26.

Pinson, Keppel S., "On the Future of Germany". Menorah Jl., Autumn, 1944, 125-160.

"Poktosie Debaty w Izbie Gmin". Myśl Polska, Jan. 20, 1945, 1132 f.

"Poland, Russia and America". New Republic, Jan. 8, 35-37.

"Polish Oil". Polish Fortnightly Rev., Nov. 15, 1944, 1.8.

"Polish Peasant Party, Headed by Former Premier S. Mikolajczyk, Denounces Lublin 'Provisional Government'". Polish Rev., Jan. 25, 1945,3-12.

"The Polish Problem", Text of Speech by Winston Churchill to House of Commons, Dec. 15, 1944. Current Hist., Feb. 1945, 157-166.

Politis, M. J., "Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean". New Europe, Dec. 1944,

Polodna, Josef, "The Economic Future of Czechoslovakia". Cent. Eur. Obs., Nov. 24, 1944, 366.

Poznański, Czesław, "The War-Guilt Lie". New Europe, Feb.-March 1945, 20-23. Ralton, G. I., "Jewish Fighters for Poland's Freedom in the Revolutionary Movement of 1860-63". Polish Rev., Feb. 1, 1945, 4, 5, 14.

"The Real Issue in the Polish-Soviet Dispute". Free Europe, Jan. 5, 1945, 1 f. Reimann, Paul von, "Um die Einheit der Arbeiterbewegung". Einheit, Dec. 16,

1944, 3-6.

Roucek, Joseph, "The Legal Aspects of Sovereignty over the Dodecanese". Amer. Il. of Intern. Law, Oct. 1944, 701-706.

Senior, Clarence, "TVA on the Danube". New Europe, Dec. 1944, 14-17. Shuster, George, "The Problem of Germany". Intern. Postwar Prob., Jan. 1945, 45-60.

Skomorovsky, Boris, "The Coming Power of the Soviet Union". Protestant, Jan. 1945, 37-42.

Simon, Yves, "Secret Struggle of the Success of the Racist Ideology". Rev. of Politics, Jan. 1945, 74-105.

"The Situation in Greece - the Political Background, Feb.-Dec., 1944". Bull. of

Intern. News, Jan. 20, 1945, 47-54.

Skulshin, D. and Kuprin, V., "Southern Hungary". U.S.S.R. Inf. Bull., Dec. 7, 1944, 1 f.

Smogorzewski, Casimir, "Polish-Russian Deadlock - Five Unsuccessful Attempts to Find a Way Out". Free Europe, Dec. 15, 1944, 184 f.

Sollman, William, "Essentials for a Democratic Germany". Freedom, Feb.-April, 1945, 448-453.

Sollman, William, "Germany's Crime and Salvation". New Europe, Feb.-March, 1945, 17-20.

"Soviet Russian Methods and Procedure", Lithuanian Bull., Jan.-Feb. 1945, 1-4. "Statement of Extraordinary State Committee: on Crimes Committed by the German-fascist Invaders on the Territory of Lvov Region, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic". U.S.S.R. Inf. Bull., Jan. 18, 1945, 1-7.

Sturmthal, Adolf, "How Much Can Germany Pay?". Current Hist., Dec. 1945, 447-452.

Sturmthal, Adolf, "Reparations: Political Aspect". Current Hist., Jan. 1945, 14-19. Sturzo, Luigi, "The Vatican's Position in Europe". Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1945, Táborský, Eduard, "Czechoslovak Local Government", Parts I & II. Cent. Eur. Obs., Jan. 12, 1945, 9; Jan. 26, 1945, 30 f.

Taubenschlag, R., "The Plea for Superior Orders". New Europe, Feb.-March

1945, 23-25.

Tetens, T. H., "The Riddle of the Twentieth of July". New Europe, Feb.-March, 1945, 26-28.

Thorne, C. B., "The War in Eastern Europe". Free Europe, Dec. 1, 1944, 169 f. Todoroff, Kosta, "The Case of Bulgaria". New Europe, Dec. 1944, 19-21.

Tosević, Dimitri, "The Dardanelles and the New Europe", New Europe, Dec. 1944, 29 f.

Undset, Sigrid, "On Re-educating the Germans". Free Europe, Dec. 15, 1944, 181, 188.

Viertel, Berthold, "Austria Rediviva." Austro-Amer. Tribune, Jan. 1945, 7 f. Visson, André, "Why England Is Wooing Russia". Amer. Mercury, Jan. 1945, 44-52.

Vrábský, H., "Exit the German Minority Problem". Cent. Eur. Obs., Dec. 8, 1944, 380 f.

Walford, E. O., 'Soviet Courts and Constitutional Rights'. Quarterly Rev., Jan. 1945, 85-96.

"What about Bulgaria?". Cent. Eur. Obs., Dec. 22, 1944, 398-399.

Winiewicz, Józef, "Granica Polsko-Niemiecka". Polska Walcząca, Jan. 20, 1945, 1. Winternitz, J. von, "Der preussisch-deutsche Nationalismus in der Arbeiterbewegung", Einheit, Jan. 13, 1945, 7-10.

Winternitz, J. von, "Die Grossdeutsche, einst und jetzt", Einheit, Jan. 27, 1945,

9-12.

Wojtkiewicz, Stanislaw, "Polish Army in the West", Polish Fortnightly Rev., Jan. 1, 1945, 1-7.

Zinner, Josef, "Der Kampf um die Befreiung der Republik und die Deutsche Arbeiterbewegung der ČSR". Einheit, Feb. 10, 1945, 9-15.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean: Discussion of a Peasant Problem. New York: Chatham House, 1944, \$1.00.

Beuer, Gustav, Berlin or Prague? The Germans of Czechoslovakia at the Cross-roads. London: Lofox, 1944, 2s. 6d.

Bilmanis, Alfred, The Baltic States in Postwar Europe. Washington, D. C.: Latvian Legation, 1944.

Bilmanis, Alfred, Baltic Essays. Washington, D. C.: Latvian Legation, 1945. Pp. 267.

Bloch, J., Social Legislation in Europe. London: Polish Lawyers Assoc., 1944. Boswell, A. B., The Eastern Boundaries of Poland. Birkenhead, England: Polish Publications Comm., 1944.

Condition of the Jews in Greece. New York: World Jewish Congress, 1944. Corrigan, J. M. and O'Toole, B. G., Race: Nation: Person. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1945, \$3.75.

Czechoslovakia in Maps and Statistics. London: Čechoslovák, 1944, 6s. 6d.

Ensor, R. C. K., A Miniature History of the War. New York: Oxford, 1945, \$1.50. Grabowski, Zbigniew, Fear of Security. London: MaxLove, 1945, 5s.

Guérard, Albert, Europe Free and United. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1945, \$2.50.

Harris, Wilson, *Problems of the Peace*. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1944, \$1.25.

Hirst, Francis W., Principles of Prosperity. London: Hollis and Carter, 1944, 8s. 6d.

Huot, Louis, Guns for Tito. New York: L. B. Fischer, 1945, \$2.75.

Kohut, K., Memorandum on the Question of the Western Ukraine. Maidenhead, England, 1944.

Konovalov, Serge, Russo-Polish Relations. London: Cresset, 1945, 4s.

Kunoši, Alexander, The Basis of Czechoslovak Unity. London: Andrew Daker's, 1944, 3s. 6d.

Kuncewiczowa, Maria, Modern Polish Prose. Birkenhead: Polish Publications Comm., 1945, 1 s.

Lybyer, A. H., Macedonia at the Paris Conference. Indianapolis: Macedonian Political Organization, 1944.

Macedonia, Photo-Album. Indianapolis: Macedonian Political Organization, 1944. Memorandum to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States. Indianapolis: Macedonian Political Organization, 1944.

Momtchiloff, N., Ten Years of Controlled Trade. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1944, \$1.75.

The Problem of Statelessness, London: World Jewish Congress, 1944, 2s.

Protection against Group Defamation. London: World Jewish Congress, 1944, 2s. Rose, W. J. Polish Literature. London: Polish Publications Comm., 1944.

Schmitt, Bernadotte, *Poland*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945, \$5.00. Sholakhov, Mikhail, *et. al.*, *Russians Tell the Story*. London: Hutchinson, 1944, 10s. 6d.

Stronski, Stanislaw, The Atlantic Charter. London: Hutchinson, 1944, 6d. Sulkowski, Joseph, Dumbarton Oaks. New York: Polish Catholic Press Agency,

JOURNAL of CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

VOLUME FIVE

JULY, 1945

NUMBER TWO

IS AUSTRIA "LEBENSFÄHIG"?* by Alfred Werner

The ancient historian, Plutarch, once complained about the geographers, crowding into the edges of their maps parts of the world which they do not know about and adding notes in the margin to the effect that beyond this lies nothing but sandy deserts full of wild beasts and unapproachable bogs. Strangely enough, Austria has remained terra incognita to many foreigners, including writers on political affairs, to this very day, although she is situated in the heart of Europe. In 1938, the men on Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay probably figured that it wouldn't change the balance of power in Europe very much if they would let Hitler have a few million harmless "gemütlich" Austrians, who drink wine or dance, unless they are busy shooting chamois in the Alps. When the little country turned out to be the powder keg of Europe, it was too late for action. Will the Allies, lulled into sleep by dangerous half-truths, be late again in nineteen-forty-odd?

Chamberlain once referred to Czechoslovakia as a remote land "of which we know so little." There are reasons to believe that the Western World did not study Austrian geography, history, and, above all, mentality, either. On the occasion of an American air raid on Wiener Neustadt, Allied news dispatches referred to that industrial and railroad hub as a "Danube River city," although it is situated more than thirty miles south of the Danube. This was a minor mistake, of course. Less harmless are the frequent references to the late Chancellor Dollfuss as a "national hero" of Austria, though he was probably as much hated by the bulk of the population as was his spiritual ancestor, Metternich, in the days of the Holy Alliance. Even more serious blunders were committed by some unsuspecting Congressmen, such as Harrison, Eberharter and Shanley, who spoke in favor of Otto of Hapsburg, or by Secretary of War Stimson, when he permitted the formation of an "Austrian Battalion" in this country—and when no more

^{*} This article was written shortly before Austria's liberation.

than twenty-nine Austrians volunteered, Poles, Czechs, Italians and Yugoslavs were forced into it, until fair-minded Americans laughed that nuisance out of court.

There is again much talk about the restoration of Austria, now that Austria will soon be free again. But which Austria is going to be restored? The revolutionary republic of 1919? A Heimwehr Austria, as it was conceived by Prince Starhemberg, one-time admirer of Hitler and Mussolini, now a refugee in Argentina? Or a Ständestaat (corporative state) à la Dollfuss and Schuschnigg? Or will, perhaps, Otto, now biding his time in Lisbon, be given a chance?

The best we can do is to guess. We know the wishes, often contradictory, of individual Allied statesmen—they may change while the Russians cross Austria's frontier. We know very little about the actual situation in Austria. While the various exiled groups, from the extreme left to the extreme right, try to convince public opinion that a great deal of revolt and sabotage is going on in Austria, neutral travelers assert that the Austrian underground is rather weak, and that any change of heart that may have occurred among the population would be anti-Nazi, but not necessarily pro-democratic.

There are certain facts, however, that will have to be taken into consideration, regardless of the military developments. One is the decision reached at the Moscow Conference of November, 1943, when Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States agreed that "Austria, the first free country to fall a victim of Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination." While Germany will be split into spheres of interest, the plan envisaged by the European Advisory Commission calls for the policing of Austria as a whole by a mixed Allied force; it is assured that the period of occupation will be far briefer than that of Germany. It remains to be seen to what extent the Big Three will stick, or be able to stick, to their decision.

The other factor, less contingent than international agreements, is Austria herself, the geographical, historical, and ethnical features that shape a nation's face. Yet, peculiarly enough, from the inception of the Austrian republic in November, 1918, to this very day, the existence of Austria, or more precisely, her raison d'être, was doubted. There were the Pan-Germans and their successors, the Nazis, who backed their claims with irrational arguments. Wrote their most famous spokesman: "German-Austria must return to the great German mother country, and not because of any economic considerations. No, and again no: even if such a union were unim-

portant from an economic point of view; yes, even if it were harmful, it must nevertheless take place. One blood demands one Reich." But the members of Austria's Provisional Government of 1918 were no bloodmystics, no hematologists, and yet the second paragraph of the constitutional law they promulgated reads as follows: 'German-Austria is a component part of the German republic." The Allies, for political and strategical reasons, did not permit the Anschluss, and the country that was shaped by the Treaty of Saint Germain (September 10, 1919), comprising an area of a little more than 32,000 square miles (slightly larger than that of South Carolina) and a population of six and a half million people, had to abandon the prefix "German."

Nevertheless, large sections of the Austrian population continued to clamor for union with the Reich, not because they loved the Germansactually, the majority of Austrians resented the haughty and rude "Piefkes" ("boches")—but because they felt that they belonged to Germany economically. As late as 1931 Chancellor Schober formally announced a Customs Union with Germany although Allied pressure forced him to renounce it. Even people who admitted that Austria's background and civilization were different from, and in some respects even diametrically opposed to, that of the Reich, doubted Austria's "Lebensfähigkeit" (fitness to live) and favored a union with Germany. In the crucial weeks preceding the Nazi invasion, the issue of Austria's "Lebensfähigkeit" played a major part in the radio speeches of the two chancellors. Hitler denied it categorically, while Schuschnigg quoted statistics to prove that Austria did not fare so badly alone. Apparently Hitler was not convinced.

Regrettably, even today the idea that Austria cannot exist alone has not died out completely, and Anschluss propaganda may do a great deal of harm in the task of reconstructing Europe. Politics make strange bedfellows. linking, as it were, crypto-Pan-Germans with their sworn enemies, the Social Democrats. While many of the Austrian Socialists in exile seem to have discarded the Anschluss idea, there are at least two exiled German Social Democrats who constantly talk of "eighty million Germans" and who strangely assert that Austria was an "economically impossible country."2 Bernard Newman, the British world-traveler and author, also thinks that "an entirely independent Austria is an anachronism, if only from the economic point of view. The Austria of 1919-38 can scarcely be revived: or, if she were revived, could not exist."3

Hitler, Mein Kampf. Italics are mine.
G. H. Seger, and S. K. Marck, Germany To Be or Not To Be.

³ B. Newman, The New Europe (New York, 1943).

These Cassandras have recently gained valuable support from an outstanding American publicist. In an article, "Will Austria live?" (Catholic World, January, 1945) Francis Stuart Campbell asserts that the Austrians must be convinced by now "that the dwarfed Austria of 1919 with only 13% of its original population—a sort of Vienna with suburbs—is unable to prosper or even to survive. Such a hydrocephalic state is not only an economic impossibility but a psychological incongruity as well. Austria is never going to be a caricature of Switzerland, a kind of yodeling democracy with tourists, cheese exports, Red Cross offices and finishing schools. The economic misery of a revived dwarfed Austria alone would drive the country into a new political extremism leading to dynamic explosions, thus precipitating a third World War."

If the above-quoted pessimists are right, the Allies blundered terribly when, disregarding economic considerations, they forbade the Anschluss after the first World War, and the Moscow decision of 1943 would cause the rise of irredentism and catastrophes again. But are these Cassandras right? Is it not possible that the idea of Austria's unfitness to live independently was just another of the propaganda weapons of the Pan-Germans since 1918, like the "Dolchstosslegende" (the story according to which the defeat of the Central Powers was caused by the "stab in the back," committed by the revolting workers) or the hysterical wailings over the "cruelty" of the Versailles Treaty?

It is true that in the first post-war years the Austrian scene was far from cheerful. Half-starved mobs stormed the shops and markets, plundering whatever food was left, the currency grew more and more worthless, and the industrial and agricultural output was insufficient. This was not the fault of the coalition government, dominated by the strongest party, the Social Democrats, which tried hard to overcome the difficulties. It was simply impossible to go back to "normalcy" quickly after the physical and moral devastation caused by the war. Moreover, Austria had to learn to stand on her own feet. For centuries, Vienna had been the vast monarchy's mercantile and banking center, while mining and manufacturing had been centered in Bohemia, and agriculture in Hungary. The alpine provinces that had served chiefly as hunting-grounds for the Emperor and the nobility, were now given the heavy task of growing food for themselves and the two million Viennese.

It was clear from the beginning that the Federal Republic needed help from abroad to accomplish her transformation. Help came, but "too little and too late." Hoover's agency, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, and other charitable organizations did excellent work, but they only mitigated the ravaging famine. Austria appealed to the League of Nations for aid, but the loan she received in 1921 served only as a palliative.

What the progressive government failed to obtain, was given, at least in part, to the Christian Socialists who drove the Socialists out of their position as Austria's strongest party. Chancellor Seipel, the astute Jesuit, whom both Dollfuss and Schuschnigg were to consider as their teacher, got his loans through a sort of blackmail. To the Allied statesmen, who were afraid of both Anschluss and Bolshevism he could say: "You need us as much as we need you, if you don't help us, we shall throw ourselves into the arms of Berlin—but we may also have a Communist revolution." He was, perhaps, talking nonsense, but the nervous Allied statesmen yielded to his threats. Another spokesman of reaction, Chancellor Schober, succeeded in having Austrian reparations instalments postponed until 1943, and he also secured an Italian loan.

By the mid-twenties Austria was back on the road to normalcy, the stable silver schilling, replacing the unstable paper krone, had become the unit of currency, and Schlagobers (whipped cream), that symbol of Austrian happiness, was again available in the cafés. But there were dismal byproducts of that "Austrian miracle," which the foreign visitor failed to notice. The price paid for the so-called prosperity was great. It was Austria's independence, her moral integrity, and political progress. "Kuhhandel"—a term inadequately translated as "logrolling"—was the driving force in Austria's domestic and foreign policy. It became particularly dangerous in the sphere of foreign relations. Austria developed into a ball, first thrown into the lap of the Western capitalist world, then caught by Mussolini, and finally by Hitler. If Seipel was able to get loans by assuring the foreign bankers that he would curb the Socialist activities, Fulvio Suvich, Mussolini's emissary (jailed at the end of 1944 in liberated Italy) demanded of Dollfuss that he should crush the workers by force if he wished Fascist Italy's protection against Germany. But in March, 1938, when Schuschnigg turned to Il Duce for help—the man who, ten years earlier, had called Austria a "miserable spitoon"—he could not be reached by telephone.

The Allies missed the chance of turning Austria into a reliable and strong friend. They could have made her a powerful ally against Germany, like Czechoslovakia, by developing the country's resources to such an extent that she would be able to stand on her own feet. They could have backed the progressive, liberal and social democratic forces, thus preventing the rise of Prince Starhemberg's fascist Heimwehr and of Austro-Nazism. By

holding Austria, they would also have won the other Danube countries for the democratic cause.

Because of the lack of capital, and because of the never-ending internal party strife, only a fraction of Austria's natural resources was tapped. Nevertheless she was hardly the "beggar state," the "Cinderella" many foreigners believed her to be. Around Eisenerz in Upper Styria lies one of Europe's largest deposits of iron ore; its annual output exceeded a million metric tons in 1937. While the yield of the coal mines is not sufficient, Austria does have considerable amounts of lignite, and oil was discovered near Zistersdorf, the field yielding 33,000 tons in 1937. More important is the fact that the country could boast of vast water resources which could generate enough electricity to overcome the lack of coal. An expert, Clarence Senior, recently pointed out that Austria, in 1935, actually generated more water power than Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria together. Austria's potential and total generated horsepower have been estimated as follows (in 1,000's of H.P.):

Potential at	Potential at	Installed
Minimum Flow	Medium Flow	(1935)
1,660	6,000	900

From that table, contained in the article "TVA On The Danube" (New Europe, December, 1944) one can gather that only a fraction of Austria's "white coal" was exploited, which would mean more to her than to Czechoslovakia which is rich in coal mines, or to an agricultural state like Hungary.

Austria's forests covered about 38% of her total area or about 48% of her productive area. Among European countries that figure is exceeded only in Finland and Sweden. Hence her production of timber could have been infinitely larger than it actually was. The same holds true of paper, cardboard, and cellulose. It is true that Austria had to import large quantities of foodstuffs, especially bread-flours and cereals, but this she had in common with most other European countries. While the arable area in mountainous Austria is comparatively small, between 1918 and 1938 notable efforts were made to put more and more land under the plough.

The republic's manufacture was below the pre-war level, one of the reasons for which was the destruction of the Empire and its economic consequences. Nevertheless Austria produced a great variety of finished goods including metal wares (cutlery, firearms, needles, screws, bicycles, motor cars, locomotives, machines for agricultural and industrial purposes); surgical

and optical instruments, musical instruments, textiles, fashion articles for ladies and motion pictures. In 1929, just before the depression struck, like other countries, Austria was able to export raw materials amounting to 500 million schillings, and finished goods to the value of 1,625 million schillings. The export decreased to a mere 818 million in 1933, but slowly recovered, and reached the figure of 1230 million, in 1937, as Chancellor Schuschnigg reported in his historic speech of February 25, 1938, in which he challenged Hitler. The tourist traffic also netted some handsome amounts of lire, francs, dollars, and pounds sterling, especially after the establishment of the annual Salzburg festivals, although the political unrest in the later years of the republic kept many cautious foreigners away from the country. It is significant that the National Bank of the "beggar state" was able to increase its gold deposits even during the depression.

If Austria's economic and social organization was, in spite of all this, far from satisfactory, it was largely the fault of her governments, especially in the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg era, and also, to a certain degree, owing to Europe's game of political intrigues, to which we have referred above. Austria's greatest problem was that of large-scale unemployment, particularly since 1929. The Christian Socialist governments could have eased it, at the expense of certain wealthy circles, for instance by the redistribution of land. Prince Starhemberg owned thirteen castles and palaces, and was the lord of 35,000 acres of arable land, of forests and lakes. He mortgaged his property in order to found a party army of his own, the fascist Heimwehr, through which he gained power. In the mid-thirties, when the unemployed flocked into the "outlawed" Nazi party, the government found it advisable to return the vast real estate, confiscated from the Hapsburgs during the revolution, to its original owners.

There is a good reason why many Austrians hailed Hitler as a new Messiah when he occupied Austria. They had noticed a rapid drop of unemployment in the Third Reich. That it was achieved by putting the country on a war-economy, disregarding boldly the laws of orthodox economics, was another story which they did not know. In any event, the "miracle" Hitler performed in Austria exceeded by far the achievements of the 'Twenties. Some money was gained by the expropriation of the holdings of the Jews, the church, and the Hapsburgs. Moreover, the country's resources were exploited ruthlessly: the German term for it would be "Raubbau." Large forests were cut down, the extraction of iron was hastened, and the timber and iron were used at the Hermann Goering plants, established at Linz, Upper Austria—"Upper Danube" in the Nazi vocabulary—for the

production of war material. Even idle mines of gold, silver, lead, and antimony began to work again, for labor was plentiful and cheap in the Third Reich.

The Austrians slowly awoke from their dreams when they felt the whip of the Nazi overseers. By the end of 1938 Nazi Commissioner Buerckel claimed that 650,000 unemployed Austrians had been put back to work, the skilled in munition factories, and the unskilled at building motor highways, bridges, streets and water-ways, which, a year later, helped carry the German armies eastward. But the individual Austrian worker was not particularly fond of the idea of toiling, for instance, at the defense of the Siegfried line, for low wages, at the ferocious Prussian speed. He became frantic when his wife's letters informed him of the acute food shortage in the liberated "Ostmark," where not only whipped cream, but also milk, butter, eggs, and meat were soon unobtainable. His impotent wrath would have increased, unquestionably, had he also known that the Nazis "transferred" some 60 million in gold, belonging to the Austrian National Bank, to the Reich.

In 1924, as a prisoner in the fortress of Landsberg, Hitler had admitted that Austria's union with the Reich might be harmful for the former. However, the Anschluss tremendously aided Germany politically as well as economically. Austria had had the highest per capita export quota among the Danube States, but only one fifth of its exports went to Germany, its principal markets being the Danube and Balkan countries. Now Hitler not only got hold of Austria's considerable resources, but he also eliminated a dangerous competitor; now he could use the economic weapon to subject Southeastern Europe to his political purposes.

Talking about today's Austria, we should remember the changes that occurred in her social and economic life in the past seven years. "Vast prison camp," "reluctant air raid shelter of Germany," "center of unrest and sabotage," "smoking volcano of the Third Reich," are just a few of the significant terms used by foreign correspondents to describe present-day Austria. Before 1938, agriculture played a considerable rôle in the country. But the Nazis "persuaded" large numbers of farmers to abandon their lands and settle in some conquered areas in the East. Every available Austrian was put to work in factories. When the war broke out, large numbers of Austrians were drafted. It is safe to estimate that up to a million men were forced into the army, and Austrian divisions are known to have suffered heavily on the Eastern front and elsewhere. The more the war developed in the West, the more important Austria became as an arsenal,

since it seemed safe from air raids, and the aircraft factories in Wiener Neustadt worked ceaselessly until they were exposed to air raids, made by Italy-stationed Allied bombers. Last fall, when the Red army reached Slovakia and Hungary on its eastward drive, the Nazi leaders drafted all available civilians, men and women from 16 to 65, to build a "defensive belt on our southeastern flanks on which the enemy's onslaught will break its teeth." While these Austrians, together with imported foreign workers, were toiling for the Hitlerites, the families of Nazi officials, Prussian "carpetbaggers," and, above all, Gestapo units were crowding the hotels and private homes of the Austrian cities.

Liberated Austria is likely to be a heap of ruins. The Nazis are known to have removed all factory equipment from Austria to the Reich. It will take quite some time to recover the stolen property, ranging from the Hapsburg crown jewels to microscopes, from the Rubens paintings in the State Museum in Vienna to ladies' fur coats. Yet, stripped of its belongings, famished and confused as post-war Austria must almost certainly be, it should be guarded against taking rash steps. This writer would be against the Anschluss, even to a democratic Germany, for reasons known to every student of history and economics. The formation of a Danube Federation would not be, practically, a wise step, either. It would be frustrated by the deep-seated inveterate suspicions of the nations involved, and Soviet Russia would, rightly or wrongly, resent the new entity as a buffer state, a cordon sanitaire, directed against the U.S.S.R.

Austria should exist independently, though cordially cooperating with all other nations. She will be fit to live if the Allies will help her efficiently to stand on her own feet. For that reason this writer welcomes the new plan, which foresees the establishment of the permanent secretariat of the proposed United Nations security organization in Vienna, on the excellent grounds that the fact of making Vienna the headquarters of the new League would provide Austria with a sense of security that would encourage the Austrians to develop their independence, and which would also increase the country's economic stability. The Russians are in favor of that plan. Among its sponsors is a prominent Austrian Social Democrat, Julius Deutsch, whereas another exiled Socialist leader, Friedrich Adler, opposes it, fearing that the internationalization of Vienna might impede the social and political freedom and independence of Austria and its working classes.

In addition, a re-distribution of the lands should be beneficial to the small farmers, the technical education of the rural population should be improved, and co-operative methods of farming should be adopted on a larger scale. Through the generation of more water power the industrial output could be increased, and through a revised and improved mass education the mental poison of Nazism eliminated. Peaceful use could be made of the fact that Austria is a natural highway to the East.

Perhaps Mr. Campbell's sneer at a comparison of Austria and Switzerland is not entirely justified, after all. Several years before the Anschluss two experts claimed that Switzerland was less favored by nature than Austria:

"In proportion to its population its cultivated area is smaller and its dependence upon foreign food supplies is greater than is the case with Austria. It possesses no coal resources; whereas Austria supplies nearly one-quarter of her requirements from her own mines. While Austria is self-supporting in iron ore, Switzerland depends entirely for its supply upon foreign sources. As regards water power, nature's most generous gift to Switzerland, Austria is almost as well equipped as that country and better than most other countries in Europe. The urban population of Switzerland is a larger percentage of the total population than is the case in Austria. The foreign assets of Austria are probably not lower per head than are those of Switzerland. Even the tourist earnings do not suffice to restore the balance for the latter constitute less than 7% of the national income of the country."

Yet little Switzerland has been for a long time one of the richest and happiest countries of Europe. Why should not Austria be able to become as free, democratic and self-sufficient a state as the Helvetian Republic?

NEW YORK CITY

THE STRUGGLE FOR DOMINATION OF THE BALTIC

An Historical Aspect of the Baltic Problem

by Alfred Bilmanis

INCE the beginning of the twentieth century two great powers adjacent to the Baltic Sea—Germany and Russia—have contended for supremacy in the Baltic. This struggle is not a new one. Its origins date back to the sixteenth century, the period of the decline of the Hanseatic League, when more riparian Baltic countries were involved in the contest.

There was in the first place Poland, since 1569 in a real union with Lithuania, White-Ruthenia and Ukraine, an empire whose borders reached to about ninety miles from Moscow. Poland had defeated the "High Protector" of the Hansa, the Order of the Teutonic Knights, which secularized itself, became a Duchy and submitted to Polish suzerainty. Poland intended to become a Baltic sea-power and vigorously followed this policy.

The next contestant of rising importance was Sweden, a country of freedom-loving people, which under the leadership of the Vasas achieved its emancipation from Danish-Hanseatic overlordship in 1523 and thereafter aspired to a leading role in the Baltic. Its particular aim was to assure free shipping and trade in the Baltic and through the Danish straits. The Hanseatic League, naturally, tried to uphold its status, but would have preferred as the new master in the Baltic its old ally, Denmark, which had Baltic traditions and, until the ascendance of the Hansa, was the uncontested master of the Baltic itself. Thus Denmark endeavored to re-establish its primacy.

And, finally, there should be mentioned a complete newcomer to the Baltic, Muscovy, which also desired to share in the Hanseatic heritage. Muscovy had conquered the Slavic merchant republics of Novgorod and Pskov and was ready not only to take over the business of these republics, but also to seize a port on the Baltic, Narva, for direct trade with its

customers, thus avoiding dependence upon middlemen.

When the decline of the Hanseatic power in the Baltic gained momentum, all these states considered it their duty to accelerate their Baltic

programs.

The downfall of the Hansa did not come suddenly, it was essentially the fault of the Hansa itself. Despite the defeat of the Teutonic Order in 1410 by the united Poles, Lithuanians, White-Ruthenians, Ukrainians, and even Czechs, the Hanseatic policy continued to be aggressive. The

Hanseatic League still had as its backer the Order of the Teutonic Knights, which had gained new strength and in 1446 was able to defeat the Polish army. In 1447 the Hansa, its vigor revived, again dared to proclaim a trade monopoly in the Baltic but was rebuked by England and the Netherlands, who closed the Hanseatic comptors in their countries. The Hansa had to give in, regardless of the aid obtained from Spain, at that time an enemy of England, and the merchants of the low countries. In 1453 the East Prussian Hanseatic cities, including Danzig, submitted to Polish sovereignty. Thus the rich Vistula trade was lost. In addition, in 1466 the Order of Teutonic Knights was defeated by Poland, this time finally. In 1494 the Muscovite trade was lost after the Hanseatic comptors of Novgorod and Pskov were closed by the Czar.

The most severe blow was received by the Hansa when in 1523 Sweden seceded from the Union with Denmark, and in 1525 the Grand Master of the Order of Teutonic Knights secularized the Order and submitted to the Polish King. The last hope of the Hanseatics was gone when in 1562 the Livonian Order, the ruler of Livonia, as the united territory of Latvia and Estonia was then called, also submitted to Poland.

The contestants which now appeared for Baltic supremacy were Poland, Sweden, Denmark and Muscovy. Denmark, entangled in a war with Sweden, soon had to give up, despite the help extended by moribund Hanseatic Lübeck and even Spain. Muscovy was weak and had no navy. Thus, although Sweden was supported by England and the Netherlands and emerged victor over Denmark, Poland as the greatest Baltic continental power at that time had the greatest chance of ultimate victory in the contest. The official aim of both Poland and Sweden, who soon made common cause against Muscovy, was to secure the freedom of the Baltic Sea, but their real purpose was to obtain domination in the Baltic (dominium Baltici). In order to achieve it, in the first place, Livonia, with the important seaports of Riga, Reval and Narva, had to be absorbed. Only then could the larger program be realized

But the problem of the Baltic Dominium was not just a local affair of Poland, Sweden, Denmark and Muscovy. England and the Netherlands were also economically interested in the Baltic Sea. The business boom in Western Europe after the discovery of America fostered urban industries and shipbuilding. Raw materials and foodstuffs were needed. The countries on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea were an inexhaustible source of these most needed foodstuffs (smoked meats, bacon, cheese, honey, rye, etc.), and raw materials (flax, hemp, sailcloth, rope, hides, tar,

wax, timber for ships and ships themselves). Baltic red clover and linseed were imported by Spain, Portugal, France, the Netherlands, and England. Also Baltic and Eastern European furs and various luxuries from the Orient, which passed through Baltic ports, were in great demand. On the other hand, the Baltic and Eastern European countries were a good market for Western European goods. A piece of English cloth costing £7 in London could be sold for £17 in Novgorod. The Hanseatic comptors in London, Bruges and even in Spain and Portugal were no longer in operation. The Danish straits after the defeat of the Hansa by England and the Netherlands had been proclaimed by Denmark free to all ships. A lively contest for business began. No European country would thereafter tolerate the creation of a new superpower in the Baltic in place of the eliminated Hansa. Sweden, Poland and Muscovy, the nearest to Livonia, were mutually distrustful. The Baltic problem thus became economically and politically complicated.

Furthermore, purely political and even religious issues were instrumental in drawing Western Europe and the Baltic powers closer together. The Netherlands tried to emancipate themselves from Spanish-Austrian overlordship and looked for help to England and Sweden. France became conscious of the value of cooperation with Poland and the Scandinavian states against the German Empire, united with Spain and Austria, which tried to establish supremacy on the European continent. She even tried to plant in Poland a French dynasty, and to make Livonia a kingdom with a French prince as king. In the same way Spain supported Denmark and the Hansa against the Netherlands and England, and therefore intensified Denmark's ambitions, which at the same time lacked any material base. Later in the seventeenth century Spain sided with the Catholic group on the Baltic, Poland-Lithuania, against Protestant Sweden. Last, but not least, the German Emperor wanted to have the Baltic coast for himself as the heir of the German Hansa. Thus the Baltic Sea became internationally important, and already in the sixteenth century was involved in Western European politics. The aspirants to the Baltic Dominium had to reckon with these complications and walk very softly in their diplomacy.

Ascendant Muscovy was another important figure in Baltic politics. The rôle Muscovy played in the period of struggle over the Baltic Dominium in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is both interesting and conspicuous. Muscovy signed and broke alliances. The Czar backed Denmark against Sweden, and vice versa. He tried to create anarchy in the Baltic by intriguing with a shadow king of Livonia. Muscovy sought to seduce Sweden into an alliance against Poland, and vice versa. It was

indeed a strange situation, a sort of bellum omnium contra omnes or a primitive anarchy that Muscovy tried to create among the Baltic powers in order to become the ruler in the Baltic region. This policy was also typical of Muscovy in the seventeenth century: the same methods, the same aims.

It became increasingly clear that only a country with a navy and strong land forces could be the winner of the Baltic contest. Neither Poland nor Muscovy nor Denmark fully met this requirement. Only Sweden had equally strong naval and land forces, like the Hansa, whose land forces were supplied by the Hanseatic cities, German mercenaries and the Teutonic and Livonian Orders, and also a strong convoy navy in the Baltic with Den-

mark's participation.

However, before Sweden could assume the leading rôle, Poland actually achieved a preponderant status in Livonia, but had no navy to hold the Baltic Sea in its sway. A close Polish-Swedish union was the sole answer to the problem, for even Muscovy could never have outweighed Sweden allied with Poland. But Poland, owing to blunders in domestic and foreign politics, deviated from the alliance with Sweden, thus losing its preponderance in the Baltic to Sweden, and in White Ruthenia and Ukraine to Muscovy. Poland then made the great mistake of helping Muscovy to fight Sweden, so that when all Baltic parties were weakened, Muscovy prevailed and swallowed even the biggest part of Poland.

And yet, without acquiring a strong and firm hold on Livonia and particularly Riga, neither Poland, Sweden nor Muscovy could have achieved domination in the Baltic. Livonia, i.e. Latvia and Estonia, always were the key points of the Baltic equilibrium, and are such even now in the epoch of modern air warfare. Their geographical position is so important that it opens to the ruler of Latvia and Estonia the domination of all the Baltic. As long as Livonia could maintain its sovereignty and avoid entanglements with alien politics it could subsist. As Livonia in 1541 sided with Lübeck in the boycott of Muscovy, and in 1557 signed with Poland the treaty of Posvol by which it almost gave up its sovereignty, it was on the way to decline. The unwillingness of the Germans, its sole rightful citizens (incolae Livoniae fere omnes sunt origine Germani, as stated in the diploma of Livonia's union with Lithuania in 1566), to be ready to sacrifice everything for their adopted country, added to a shortsighted foreign policy, and brought Livonia to its dismemberment.

From the ruins in 1562 emerged the Duchy of Kurland and Semi-gallia, which in the seventeenth century achieved a high economic and

political standing. The wise international policy of Duke Jacob of Kurland (1639-1682) during the Polish-Swedish struggles preserved Kurland's independence. Its prestige was enhanced so that in 1694 William Penn considered Kurland eligible to participate as an independent country in the "Estates of Europe" projected by him. It is interesting to note that in Penn's scheme Kurland ranked nineteenth among the eligible twenty-four European states (as Latvia today ranks nineteenth among thirty-five states). Kurland even preserved its status during the turbulent Great Northern War and all through the eighteenth century. But again, as in 1561, the nobility of Kurland in 1795 betrayed their country to a foreign power for the bribe of the preservation of their privileges.

In the nineteenth century all Livonia was under Russian rule. As long as there was no contestant, Russia dominated the Baltic provinces (as Latvia and Estonia then were called); but the real masters were the German squires. Russia made no attempt to attract the majority of the Baltic population to its side. The German landed nobility created no close political ties with Russia and sided with Germany. Germany lost the war in 1918 while revolutionary Russia, deviating from its path to democracy, lost all sympathies of the Baltic peoples, who preferred independence to becoming experiment stations for the Bolsheviks. Thus the Baltic Sea for almost the first time in history became a truly free sea, owing to the fact that the natural guardians of the freedom of the Baltic Sea, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, also became free. The renewed policy of power politics in the Baltic by Germany and Russia soon restored the old lamentable situation, and the struggle over the Baltic was renewed in 1941.

* * *

Decline of Livonia. Of particular interest is the rôle which Livonia played directly in the struggle for the Baltic Domination. Terra Mariana or vulgo, Livonia, a principality within the Holy Roman Empire since 1207, comprising present day Latvia and Estonia, began to decline in the middle of the sixteenth century partly because of the weakening of the power of the Holy See, but principally because of corruption of the Livonian Order and its vassals. There were in Livonia actually two ruling powers: the Prince-Archbishop of the Terra Mariana and the Master of the Livonian Order. Each of them had large landed possessions, fortified castles, vassals and an administrative system. Unavoidably, jealousies appeared, followed by rivalry and eventually a clash, even civil war. This situation prevailed in Livonia—Riga, Wenden, Volmar, Reval, Dorpat, and others aspired to greater inde-

pendence from the Order. The struggle between the Archbishop and the Grand Masters of the Livonian Order was directly political: the Masters of the Livonian Order sought to obtain suzerainty over the Prince-Archbishop. Another struggle went on over economic preponderance, the Livonian Order trying to share in the profits of the Hanseatic trade like the Teutonic Knights in Prussia, who even established a grain monopoly.¹

Sometimes civil war resulted between the burghers of Riga and the Livonian Order, as in 1482-1492. The burghers even demolished the castle of the Order in Riga. But eventually they were defeated and were obliged to rebuild the castle. The opponents of the Livonian Order, the Archbishop and the burghers of the City of Riga and Reval (Tallinn) were militarily the weaker, though politically the stronger. The Archbishop was a Prince of the Holy Roman Empire and, besides, enjoyed the protection of the Pope. The Livonian Order theoretically was subject to the Prince-Archbishop, but the Master of the Order had the right to appeal directly to the Pope. The Pope, as the supreme master of all military orders, could even disband the Livonian Order, but actually the might of the Popes in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was already an illusory one.

The Livonian cities were members of the Hanseatic League, which still had some power. The burghers of Riga were rich. At the beginning of the sixteenth century they adopted Lutheranism, and the Master of the Order was forced to acquiesce, as did the Archbishop. Not only the burghers, but also many vassals of the Order became Lutheran. Thus the religious division aggravated the situation. Besides, the corporation of the Livonian nobles was not cohesive, the knights and the vassals preferring a feudal partitionalism. Every seigneur had his own vassals, every province its own particular privileges—there was little unity or patriotism.² The German seigneurs considered the Latvian and Estonian majority population a class of tenants and farm-hands at their mercy. Only the Germans were citizens of the Livonian State; they were the "nation" with which later Prince Radziwiłł, the representative of Polish King Sigismund II, dealt exclusively in Riga (August 24, 1561), as did the representative of King Eric XIV of Sweden, Count Horn, at Reval in September, 1561. In both cases the deal was made with the German squires, not with Latvians or Estonians.

Although quarrelling among themselves, the Livonian estates, the

A. Švabe, "Sigismunda Augusta Livonijas Politika" (in Latvian), Latvijas Vestures Instituta Žurnals, (Journal of the Latvian Historical Institute) (Riga, 1937), V I, 71.
 C. Schirren, Charaktere und Menschheitsprobleme (Kiel, 1912), p. 131.

clergy, the nobility and the burghers, all of the German race, convened in their Diet established in the fifteenth century, after the defeat of the Teutonic Knights at Grünwald. The Diet was the instrument by which the arbitrary acts of the seigneurs were legalized. It passed laws, almost exclusively concerned with greater possibilities of exploiting the majority population, of establishing new burdens, aggravating leases of tenants, etc. In 1559 it proclaimed the mobilization of the peasants to defend the status of the nobles. The dominating force in this Diet was the oligarchic minority of the knights and vassals, both of whom at that time were practically a landed nobility; the knights also were active in trade and were more like servants of Mammon than servants of the Church, as the Riga burghers often complained to the Pope.

This Livonian merry-go-round could continue as long as the international situation permitted. And indeed, for almost half of the sixteenth century, Livonia enjoyed peace.

The last war was fought with Muscovy in 1502 and resulted in victory. A long-term peace treaty was signed and after its expiration was renewed. Muscovy itself was still under Tartar pressure, and had yet to conquer the Slavic principalities neighboring it, to subjugate the merchant republics of Novgorod and Pskov, and to liberate itself from the Tartars before it could renew its push to the Baltic. Thanks to the victory over Muscovy in 1502 at Lake Smolina, the Livonian Order was growing in prestige. The victorious Master of the Livonian Order, Walter von Plettenberg, as a reward, was personally elevated by the German Emperor to the rank of Prince of the Holy Roman Empire. The favorable situation of the Livonian Order was further enhanced after the dissolution of the Order of the Teutonic Knights in 1525. Von Plettenburg became Grand Master of the Livonian Order. He immediately took advantage of the situation to try to acquire suzerainty over the Prince-Archbishop. In 1526 the Bishop of Livonia, and reluctantly also the Archbishop and the cities, recognized the Grand Master of the Livonian Order as their ruler. Plettenberg was a diplomat: he wisely supported Lutheranism in Riga in order to split the solidarity of the burghers and the Archbishop.

But prelate Thomas Schöning, (the scion of a Riga burgher family and son of Johann Schöning, the intransigent mayor of Riga), who became Archbishop in 1528, was also a schemer and shrewd opponent. In 1529 he appointed as his coadjutor and successor Margrave William of Brandenburg (1498-1563), the brother of Duke Albrecht of Prussia who was the last Grand Master of the Order of Teutonic Knights and in 1525

had secularized the lands of the Order, and taken the title of Duke of Prussia under Polish suzerainty. Several German historians have disliked Margrave William on account of his alleged pro-Polish sympathies. Fr. Bienemann calls him "the curse of Livonia"3; L. Arbusov considers him a "miser",4 etc. However, it is probable that Archbishop Schöning, in view of the visible and imminent decline of the Livonian Order, had a secret wish to establish in Livonia a German ruler of the Hohenzollern dynasty that ruled Prussia. The conditions for such a move were seemingly favorable. Margrave William was also a cousin of the mighty Polish King Sigismund I. But the realization of the plan had to be postponed, since, in 1530, the Grand Master of the Livonian Order was officially accepted among the ruling Princes of the Holy Roman Empire, ranking forty-fourth. In 1531 he succeeded in renewing the peace treaty with Muscovy for another twenty years. That was at the same time the indirect cause for the Livonian Order eventually becoming corrupt as a military power; the assured prolonged peace affected its military alertness. No preparations of a military character which would have cost money, were voted by the Diet. There was no standing professional army. The knights more and more became simple land holders, as did also the vassals, who were supposed to serve in the army of the Order. The border fortresses, ungarrisoned, almost fell into ruins.

Already in 1502 Plettenberg had to mobilize Latvian militia in his army. This fact is verified by Baron K. Blomberg in his Account of Livonia, published in English in 1701 in London. Blomberg also testifies that the Latvian troops fought bravely under the flag of Terra Mariana, which bore the image of the Virgin Mary. However, the oppression of the Latvians continued. In 1532 the Landtag forbade Latvians to participate in commerce; they could not trade even among themselves. A German trade monoply was actually realized. This did not warm the hearts of Latvians or encourage them to fight for their oppressors. From the point of view of the Master of the Livonian Order, a standing army of Latvians would have been helpful; but this did not please the landed nobility, which was afraid of an armed Latvian force, and preferred that the Latvians should work for them. Besides, armed Latvian peasants were already in some places taking the law into their own hands and opposing the so-called "Hofleute", landless nobles, who actually became the plague of Livonia, openly ravaging peasant farms, engaging in robbery and other predatory acts.

3 F. Bienemann, Aus Baltischer Vorzeit (Leipzig, 1870), p. 96.

⁴ L. Arbusov, Grundriss der Geschichte Liv-, Est- und Kurlands (Riga, 1918), p. 163.

Even the pro-German historian, E. Seraphim, castigates the "Hofleute" with the strongest expressions, calling them "highway robbers," "brutal gangsters," etc.⁵ The kin of these "robber-barons," however, accused not them, but the Latvian and Estonian peasants, who acted in self-defense. Naturally, the Livonian nobles preferred German mercenaries (*Lansknechte*), but they were unwilling to furnish funds to hire them. The situation actually became hopeless.

In 1539 Plettenberg died and von Galen became Grand Master of the Order and a strong opponent of the Archbishop, who also died in 1539, being succeeded by Margrave William. Galen, a staunch supporter of the dying Hanseatic League, did what Plettenberg probably would not have done: in 1541 he joined the blockade proclaimed against Muscovy by Lübeck and particularly enraged Muscovy by forbidding transit through Livonia for her different specialists engaged in Europe for industrialization purposes. This was not forgotten nor forgiven by Muscovy, and when in 1555 the peace treaty had to be extended, the Muscovites renewed it reluctantly only for fifteen years and with the humiliating stipulation that Livonia should promise not to sign any alliance with Poland. Besides, the Livonian ambassadors had to promise Czar Ivan IV to pay some old forgotten lease for beehives, agreed upon more than 300 years before with Pskov, which later, owing to friendly relations with Livonia, forgave this debt. Czar Ivan IV, however, insisted on the payment of the tribute, which in 1555 represented a considerable sum, so that the Livonian ambassador had to beg for a postponement of the payment. The postponement was granted, but the Livonian promise again was not fulfilled in time. Dark clouds appeared on the Livonian horizon, particularly from the East.

Galen now sought support in Germany. In order to create a friendlier atmosphere, he ordered his ambassador in 1555 to sign the peace of Augsburg, reaffirming toleration of Lutherans. But from Germany—Roman Catholic or Lutheran—neither promises nor military commitments were obtained to help Livonia in her distress. Livonia, unpopular in Germany, was considered a land where poor noblemen of Saxony and Westphalia went in order to better their situation. A contemporary writer, Staphylus, in 1561 called Livonia "des Sächsischen Adels Hospital" (or poor-house for the nobles of Saxony).6

The counter-move of Archbishop William of Brandenburg against Galen's diplomacy vis à vis the Holy Roman Empire was to appoint as

⁵ E. Seraphim, Klaus Kursell und seine Zeit (Reval, 1897), p. 49.
6 E. Seraphim, Grundriss der Baltischen Geschichte. Reval, 1908, p. 94.

his coadjutor in 1556 Prince Christopher of Mecklenburg (1537-1592), an eighteen year old youth of Lutheran faith, which he quickly exchanged for Roman Catholicism. Archbishop William's personal ambition, though concealed, remained the same. Prince Christopher was the brother of the reigning Duke of Mecklenburg, John Albrecht, who in 1555 had married the daughter of Duke Albrecht of Prussia, Princess Anna, the niece of Archbishop William. In case of the success of the projected coup, Prince Christopher would be the heir of the childless Margrave William, and the latter would gain combined support of Brandenburg, Prussia and Mecklenburg. Poland was evidently informed of William's plans, because, as later appeared, it supported Archbishop William and Prince Christopher in the conflict which arose with the Livonian Order and the burghers of Riga.

The truth is that there was strong opposition to Margrave William, Riga refusing to recognize him until 1546. That same year the Livonian Diet adopted a law that in the future no foreign Prince could be Archbishop or coadjutor of the Archbishop in Livonia. Archbishop William had promised to respect the law in the future, but tried now somehow to circumvent it. In order to obtain the necessary agreement for the appointment of Prince Christopher, Archbishop William even called upon King Sigismund II, who sent a special delegation which appeared on January 28, 1556 before the Landtag or Diet of the vassals, and warmly recommended Prince Christopher. The envoys of Prussia and Mecklenburg also supported the case. Consequently a favorable decision was reached and Archbishop William had his way.⁷

Grand Master Galen and his small body of knights-electors were well aware of the menacing project of Archbishop William to establish Prince Christopher as the eventual ruler of Livonia, which would have meant the end of their privileged position. They also felt that Polish influence in Livonia was growing. The Comtur of Daugavpils, Kettler, was immediately sent to Germany to engage mercenaries for any eventuality. But King Sigismund, well informed as to everything that went on, encouraged William to maintain his position and even promised military help. On May 28, 1556, Archbishop William was accused of treason, unanimously declared an enemy by the Diet and at the end of June imprisoned, together with Prince Christopher.8

The Polish King, Sigismund II, feeling offended as a relative of Margrave William and, on the other hand, grasping the great opportunity

A. Bergengrün, Herzog Christoph von Mecklenburg (Reval, 1898), p. 47.
 A. Bergengrün, op. cit., p. 61.

to obtain more influence in Livonia, on August 19, 1557, in an ultimatum demanded the liberation of the Prince-Archbishop as the head of a state friendly to Poland. Sigismund still considered the Archbishop as the ruler of Livonia, although actually the Grand Master had been that since 1530. In August, 1557 Sigismund's troops (80,000 men) stood at Posvol, near Livonia's frontier, ready to attack the army of Fürstenberg, who became Grand Master after the death of Galen on May 30, 1557. Fürstenberg's forces were composed of 7000 German knights, six companies of German mercenary Lansknechts and several thousand mobilized Latvian militia. This so-called army was no match for the overwhelming Polish forces.

Thus the Livonian Order had prepared a trap for itself. Now, as had been the case with regard to Muscovy, the Order had to accept dictated conditions. King Sigismund ordered the immediate release of the Archbishop and his coadjutor. In addition, on September 14, 1557, Fürstenberg in Posvol had to sign a treaty with the King of Poland as Grand Duke of Lithuania, by which the Livonian Order signed a military alliance with Lithuania, and promised not to sign any treaty with Muscovy without the consent of the Grand Duke of Lithuania.

Poland's situation was secure because not long before it had obtained a peace treaty with Czar Ivan IV, but the position of Livonia became very weak with respect to Muscovy. Although the treaty of Posvol would have taken effect only after the expiration of Livonia's treaty with Muscovy (signed in 1555 for fifteen years), Czar Ivan considered the treaty of Posval a breach of Livonia's promise not to sign an alliance with Poland (i.e., in this case Lithuania).

The question arises as to why King Sigismund did not occupy all of Livonia at that time. Apparently his father-in-law, Emperor Ferdinand I, had counselled Sigismund to be lenient. At all events, the treaty of Posvol is to be considered as the beginning of the end of the Livonian principality as a sovereign state.

Soon Czar Ivan IV struck. On January 22, 1558, after fifty-six years of peace, Muscovite troops invaded Estonia and in May occupied the eastermost fortress of the Livonian Order and a Hanseatic center, Narva, the coveted outlet on the Finnish Gulf. Already at the end of the fifteenth century (1492) the Musovites had constructed their fortress of Ivangorod opposite Narva; but Narva secured for them an outlet in the Baltic and the waterway over the Narva river down Lake Peipus to Pskov, and opened

⁹ Fr. K. Gadebusch, Livländische Jahrbücher, I (Riga, 1780), p. 500.

trade possibilities for Muscovy with England. English traders immediately appeared with supplies for Czar Ivan's army.

The occupation of Narva and the growing might of Muscovy's army, which signalized a danger not only to Livonia, but also to Poland, made King Sigismund apprehensive. In January, 1559 Muscovite troops devastated Livonia proper and even appeared before Riga, but were repulsed. In great despair the Landtag or Diet on July 25, 1559, decided to mobilize a Latvian militia. Every third Latvian was to become a soldier of the Livonian Order, which meant that about thirty per cent of the male population was mobilized. The Latvian companies were trained and commanded by non-commissioned officers of the German mercenary Lansknechts. Thus compulsory military service was introduced in Livonia to defend the oligarchic squirearchy.¹⁰

The Grand Master of Livonia, Fürstenberg, again appealed to the German Emperor, but again without result. This time also the Dukes of Prussia and Mecklenburg became alert. The Emperor displayed some diplomatic activity in trying to create a coalition, but no German prince was willing to fight for the Germans in Livonia. However, diplomatic correspondence concerning the Baltic question, particularly the freedom of the Baltic Sea, was in course. The problem became international. On December 6, 1559, King Sigismund wrote a personal letter to Queen Elizabeth of England, imploring her to stop the traffic of arms in English ships to Narva, but to no avail. Sea battles even took place between the armed English cargo boats and the Polish navy, which at that time was too weak to stop the trade. Finally Emperor Ferdinand I, under pressure from the Kings of Poland and Sweden and the Dukes of Prussia and Mecklenburg, issued in Vienna on November 26, 1560, a manifesto forbidding traffic of arms through the Baltic to Narva-but the manifesto had no effect. Some Hanseatid cities (Reval, Danzig) were eager to share in the English business with Muscovy, and disregarded the manifesto by sending goods destined for Narva by way of Viborg. Soon even Ferdinand modified the too strict decree concerning the blockade of Narva. He still had in mind the project of an alliance with Muscovy against the Turks, always remembering that the Turks in 1529 besieged Vienna. In effect, the diplomatic move to stop business with Narva was a complete failure. Besides, the Emperor had no navy in the Baltic which could enforce his proclaimed blockade. The Hansa, which was directly interested in the success of the blockade, was in a state of decomposition: its mighty navy was gone. Denmark prepared

¹⁰ Fr. Bienemann, Briefe und Urkunden. Vol. II, Document No. 472.

for a decisive struggle with Sweden. Livonia was in the worst possible situation being under the direct menace of Muscovy, with no help in sight. Cold shouldered by the Emperor in 1557 (before the affair of Posvol), Fürstenberg had approached ascendant Sweden, hoping to gain some support there, since Sweden enjoyed the sympathies of Livonia in view of its Protestant religion. Livonia would have been willing to accept Sweden's suzerainty, but the latter was too cautious to involve itself in a war with Muscovy, in view of Denmark's attitude. In despair, Fürstenberg in 1558 abdicated and his coadjutor Gothard Kettler became Grand Master.

Partitioning of Livonia. Sweden, reluctant to take all Livonia, eventually accepted the submission of Estonia. It is interesting to note that the coadjutor of the Archbishop of Riga, Prince Christopher of Mecklenburg, in October, 1561 officially released Estonia from the Archbishop's sovereignty for the benefit of Sweden, but this seemingly revolutionary act was effected by Prince Christopher after King Eric XIV of Sweden, on August 2, 1561, had ratified the submission of the Estonian German squires.¹¹ Even before this questionable act (from the point of view of international law), Bishop Johann von Münchhausen in 1559 had sold his Bishoprics, Piltene in Kurland and Ösel in Estonia, to Denmark. Poland was also busy trying to take a share of Livonia. Most helpful was the new Grand Master, Gothard Kettler, who became active in organizing the submission of Livonia to Poland. He had his own ambitious plans and he received promises for their realization. Kettler is not popular with German historians. C. Schirren presents him as "subservient to the Polish King", 12 Fr. Bienemann calls him an "unscrupulous adventurer". 13 However, it is to be conceded that Kettler was a realist and ready for compromises. Such were also the knights and vassals of the Livonian Order, who were won over to the side of Poland with promises to respect their privileges and landed possessions, which was all important to them.

It was more difficult for the Poles to gain the support of the important City of Riga, an Imperial City with strong pro-Swedish sympathies. Riga was the object of special attention by the Envoy of King Sigismund II, Prince Radziwiłł (incidentally, a Calvinist), who on August 24, 1561, arrived in Riga and personally made the most alluring promises to the Council of Riga. The Riga burghers were the only ones in Livonia who understood what was going on. Riga was a fortress and an outlet to the

¹¹ C. Schirren. Quellen. Vol. VII, No. 952.
12 C. Schirren. Charactere and Menschheitsprobleme (Kiel, 1912), p. 138.

¹³ Fr. Bienemann. Riga's Stellung bei der Auflösung des Livlandischen Ordensstaates (Petersburg, 1877), pp. 390-391.

Baltic. If the Rigensers did not feel directly menaced by Muscovy, at least they felt safe behind their ramparts. It is of interest to note that Polish diplomacy gained its successes with the German squires by profiting from the fear the Livonians felt for Muscovy. On August 31, 1559, Grand Master Gothard Kettler accepted the protection of Poland, and signed two treaties to this effect.14 Thus the Livonian Order became a "client" of the King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania. For this promised protection Kettler (and also the Archbishop) had to pawn to Poland almost one sixth of Livonia's territory. Important castles in Selonia, in Latgale or Lettia already dependent upon Poland, were taken possession of by Polish garrisons. The most marked success was achieved by Polish diplomacy on November 28, 1561, in Wilno, when Gothard Kettler, and simultaneously also representatives of the vassals of the Livonian Order and of some cities (Wenden, Wolmar, who were induced by the Poles to do so), swore fealty in written form to the King of Poland. 15 This meant that there was no more unity in Livonia: the formula sauve qui peut replaced patriotism. It happened in the following way.

On November 27, 1561 the Livonian squires were served by the secretary of the King's representative, Prince Radziwiłł, with a virtual twenty-four hour ultimatum. In Intimidated, they signed on November 28 the pact of submission without obtaining the much talked about *Privilegium Sigismundi*, which would have recognized all their rights, privileges and possessions. This document was signed by the King neither on November 26, 1561, nor at any later date. It was left in the stage of a draft with no legal validity. However, the King, on November 28, 1561, swore to recognize and respect all legally acquired privileges, rights and liberties of the Livonian nobles and estates. The principle of legality included in the formula is an important condition, which later was used by the Polish administration of Livonia against the Livonian landed magnates.

Archbishop William, as well as Prince Christopher of Mecklenburg. saw the frustration of all their hopes at Wilno.

Polish diplomacy preferred to make a deal with Gothard Kettler, not of princely origin, who had no influential relatives and ties with reigning houses; Kettler was a *homo novus* and would be more compliant. Polish diplomacy handled him in a masterly fashion leading him to believe, in order to feed his ambitions, that the future status of Livonia would be

17 Dogiel, op. cit., Vol. V, No. 250.

See text: Dogiel, Codex diplomaticus Regni Poloniae, etc., Vol. V, Nos. 130, 133.
 Dogiel, op. cit., Vol. V, No. 249.

¹⁶ Bienemann, Briefe und Urkunden. V, 305-308.

similar to that of Prussia. Gothard Kettler dreamed of becoming Duke of Livonia with Riga as its capital, 18 but, in spite of an alleged secret agreement, 19 he was granted as patrimony only the provinces of Kurland and Semigallia, south of Daugava river (about forty-two per cent of Latvia). He was to become Duke of these two provinces "in Livonia" but not Duke "of Livonia." Moreover at the last moment the Poles tried to change the form of submission. It was suddenly urged that Kettler and the Archbishop should address their letters of submission not to the King of Poland, as was agreed upon, but to the Grand Duke of Lithuania, who was also King Sigismund II. Kettler refused categorically to submit to the Grand Duke of Lithuania as his future suzerain. Archbishop Margrave William of Brandenburg also refused to sign his submission in such a form. They both insisted on submitting only to the King of Poland. This firm attitude had as its effect the restitution of the previously agreed upon formula. There is one important consideration which played a decisive role in the Grand Master's and the Archbishop's firm attitude. The submission, if made to the Grand Duke of Lithuania, would have meant that henceforth Livonia became a province of Lithuania. In case of the incorporation of Lithuania into Poland, which was projected by King Sigismund, Livonia would follow its suzerain. On the other hand, the King of Poland not being party to the deal, Livonia could eventually be dropped by Poland in case of complications. The Poles gave in and thus the submission on November 28, 1561, in Wilno was made to the King of Poland. But Kettler's hope for the preservation of a united Livonia was shattered by the no less firm attitude of Polish diplomacy in having Livonia divided in order better to rule it. The fact is that the Archbishop and the Grand Master in submitting had relinquished their rights over Livonia, 20 but the Livonian vassals signed anything that was asked of them.

Not even all of Kurland was given to Kettler. The Bishopric of Piltene, situated in northern Kurland, which in 1559 was acquired by Denmark in a rather questionable way, was left in Danish possession, because at that time Poland tried to be friendly with Denmark in order to bring pressure on Sweden. Also Grobini, bordering Prussia, continued to be held as a pawn by the Duke of Prussia, from whom Kettler had in 1559 managed to obtain a loan of 7000 marks silver. The province north of the Daugava river, Livonia, was divided between Poland and Sweden. The northernmost province of Livonia, Estonia, became Swedish, but Livonia proper

¹⁸ Fr. Bienemann. Briefe und Urkunden, IV, 311.

¹⁹ A. Bergengrün, op. cit., pp. 126-129. 20 Fr. Bienemann, op. cit., V, 877.

was made a Polish dependency, under the name Ducatus Ultradunensis. Latgale, the southeastern province of Latvia, as already pointed out, was at the time of Livonia's partitioning already incorporated into the Polish Commonwealth and subject to the administration of the Wojewod of Wilno, and henceforth became known as Polish Livonia. The final act of the submission of Kettler took place on March 5, 1562, in Riga. He resigned officially the rank of Grand Master and simultaneously became Duke of Kurland and Semigallia. Again papers were signed, but no obligations were assumed by the Polish crown to recognize the privileges and landed properties of the German squires.

As promised by the King, the *Ducatus Ultradunensis* was left temporarily under the administration of the Duke of Kurland, evidently until the clarification of the military situation. Two years later, in 1564, Poland in two battles defeated the Muscovites, and in the same year the *Ducatus Ultradunensis* became incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Livonian German squires naturally agreed to everything.

Only Riga, which in 1552 became completely Lutheran, continued to preserve its semi-independent status as a City of the Holy Roman Empire, from which the Polish king did not obtain its necessary release. In the castle of Riga, menaced by Muscovite troops, in 1559 by demand of Kettler was placed a garrison of 200 Lithuanian soldiers, as if to secure the castle from Muscovites: they never were moved out. Riga itself continued to enjoy its almost complete independence until 1582, when again Muscovy was defeated. As in 1564, this time again Poland; capitalized on the situation and simply occupied Riga.

Still another interesting fact appears from the Wilno dealings. Gothard Kettler obtained Kurland and Semigallia only as an hereditary Duchy. The moment Kettler's dynasty ended, Kurland and Semigallia were to become Poland's dependencies. This rider soon became apparent. Duke Gothard, who reigned from 1562-1587, left Kurland to his elder son Frederick, who was without an heir, and Semigallia to William, who had a son (Jacob). In 1616 William, because of his harsh dealing with the rebellious noblemen, the brothers Nolde, was dethroned by the Polish Diet, and his son was deprived of the rights of succession. That fitted perfectly with the long-run plans of Polish diplomacy. If Frederick died, Kurland and Semigallia could be incorporated into Poland. However, William's son, Jacob, thanks to England, regained his duchy.

The same situation arose when in 1737 the last of the Kettlers, the Regent-Duke Ferdinand, died. Then also the Polish crown tried to incor-

porate Kurland and Semigallia. But this time Czarina Anna of Russia, the dowager Duchess of Kurland, insisted that her favorite, Duke Peter Biron, of obscure origin, ascend the Ducal throne.

The Rôle of Denmark. Denmark, with the help of the Hanseatic League, was preparing for a war against Sweden, and was engaged in weakening the Swedish crown wherever possible. To this end, King Frederick of Denmark, for 30,000 silver Thalers, bought on September 26. 1559, from Bishop Johann von Münchhausen the Bishopric of Piltene in Northern Kurland and the Bishopric of Ösel, the largest of the Estonian Islands. By what right the good Bishop sold his bishoprics is not known; but in 1561 the deal was recognized by the King of Poland, and evidently also by the Grand Master of the Livonian Order and the Prince-Archbishop, since, during the submission conferences at Wilno, no protests were filed. Neither did Duke Magnus, the new Lord of Piltene, show any interest in approaching Poland. This apparently shrewd policy of Poland was shaped with a view to hamper Sweden from expanding into Estonia. King Frederick bestowed the newly-acquired bishoprics upon his brother, Duke Magnus, in compensation for the Duchy of Schleswig-Holstein, which the King retained for himself. Bishop Johann von Münchhausen's brother, Christian—a vassal of the Livonian Order—was elevated by the King of Denmark to the post of viceroy in Estonia in gratitude for his brother's deal in bishoprics, as well as in order to instigate unrest in that province, already incorporated into Sweden in 1560.

The relations between Denmark and Sweden eventually became so tense that in 1562 a war broke out between them, which in history is known as the "War over the Three Crowns". Denmark insisted that only she had the right to use the disputed three crowns in her coat-of-arms, owing to the supremacy obtained by the treaty of the Union of Calmar signed between Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 1397. Sweden resented that explanation, and continued to use the three crowns in its own coat-of-arms, which according to the Swedish point of view, symbolized equality of the three Scandinavian states: Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Actually the problem of the three crowns was only an excuse for Denmark to attack Sweden, which in 1523 had successfully emancipated itself from Danish overlordship. The war over the three crowns lasted seven years. The Danish King Frederick failed to obtain the promised support both from Poland and from Muscovy; he fought alone and eventually lost.

Meanwhile King Sigismund II of Poland, taking advantage of the tense Danish-Swedish relations, in a treaty, signed in Kowno, on September

12, 1562, recognized as hereditary Duke of Finland and Estonia the brother of the Swedish King and Viceroy of Finland, Duke Johan, who was engaged in a feud against his own brother, King Eric of Sweden, hostile to Poland. To strengthen the treaty, Duke Johan married King Sigismund's sister, Catherine Jagellonica. But the newly created Duke of United Finland and Estonia was hardly fortunate, for after his return to Finland, he was apprehended by King Eric of Sweden at Abo (or Turku), charged with high treason and thrown into prison.

Denmark, which began the war against Sweden almost cheerfully slowly came to understand the changing realities; and after seven years of supreme effort, without any outside help, was nearly exhausted; while victorious Sweden, at the end of the war was even stronger than seven years before. It still had a well disciplined, patriotic army, supplied with artillery and a good heavy cavalry. Sweden was then considered one of the strongest military powers of Europe. In the imminent war with Muscovy the high morale of the army was of great importance. At the end of the war King Eric XIV, who had gradually become insane, was persuaded to abdicate, and Johan left his prison to ascend legally the vacant throne in 1568 under the title Johan III.

The Baltic situation changed once more and King Sigismund II hurried to incorporate into Poland as a dependency the hitherto autonomous Grand Duchy of Lithuania, despite the protests of Lithuanian nobles. Livonia also expected complete incorporation into Poland and a radical change of régime. Already in the Grodno Sejm, in 1564, Polish noblemen shouted to the Livonian-German deputies to go back whence they came: overseas! In the same year a Polish Wojewod took over Livonia proper from Gothard Kettler. Soon Poland would begin an investigation of the titles of the German noble landholders, whom she had despised since their treacherous activities and egotistic subservience in 1561. But first she must create friendly relations with Sweden, in which the German nobles now put their hopes. Poland's Swedish program was realized satisfactorily.

King Johan was a close friend and brother-in-law of Sigismund II, and the obsolcte treaty of Kowno of 1562 was transformed without difficulties into a close alliance between Poland and Sweden, based on common interests in regard to Muscovy. The Swedish possession of Estonia, naturally, was no longer contested by Poland. Similarly Sweden did not question Polish acquisitions. It was agreed upon to accept for Livonia the formula uti possidetis.

But the menace of Moscow still remained.

Duke Magnus Puppet King of Livonia. Ivan IV had not renounced his intentions to conquer, or at least to bring under his domination the coveted province of Livonia. After having offered in vain an alliance to Sweden against Denmark in exchange for Livonia, and a treaty of commerce in exchange for the Polish wife of the imprisoned Duke Johan, the Czar in 1567 signed a peace treaty with Sweden, renouncing Estonia but keeping Narva. The shrewd Czar now secretly approached Duke Gothard of Kurland and offered him the royal crown of Livonia. The condition stipulated by the Czar was, as can be imagined, that Duke Gothard should break with Poland and become the ally of this new prospective suzerain, the Czar. Gothard refused categorically.

Ivan's next move was to seek the consent of King Frederick of Denmark to the proclamation of his brother, Duke Magnus, then ruler of Piltene and the Estonian Island Ösel, as King of Livonia, under the suzerainty of Muscovy. The ambitious Magnus was ready and willing. Frederick's answer though evasive, was not actually negative. But this seemed sufficient.

In 1570 Duke Magnus went to Moscow and was crowned King of Livonia. Following the precedent set earlier by Duke Johan, Magnus had to strengthen the treaty by marrying a niece of the Czar, the Grand Duchess Euphemia, a daughter of Grand Prince Vladimir, whom Ivan had ordered killed a year before. Magnus' title became: Magnus, King of Livonia, Sovereign of Latvians and Estonians, Crown Prince of Norway, Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, Stotmar and Dittmar, Count of Oldenburg and Elmenhurst, etc., etc. It sounded magnificent, but it complicated his position enormously. Like Alexander the Great, he still had to conquer his realm. And he was no Alexander.

At that time Muscovy's sole foothold in Livonia was still the fortress of Narva, on the Gulf of Finland, at the mouth of the Narva river. The inhabitants of Livonia hated and feared Muscovy on account of the robberies and brutalities committed by the Muscovite troops, which were in reality armed hordes of Asiatic nomads. The neighboring states, particularly Poland and Sweden, feared the powerful competition of Muscovy for the Baltic dominion, and naturally frowned on King Magnus. King Magnus could not expect help from the Duke of Kurland, who was an ally and vassal of the Polish king. As was previously mentioned, the Principality of Latgale or Polish Livonia likewise was in Poland's possession, and Estonia was a Swedish dependency. At one sweep, therefore, the entire region became alive with enemies of King Magnus, the shadow king of Livonia.

His brother, Frederick II of Denmark, had just finished the exhaust-

ing seven years' war with Sweden, and Denmark was not ready for new sacrifices. King Magnus had neither an army of his own nor gold enough to hire one. His theoretical subjects, the Latvians and the Estonians, had never seen his face, and he lost no time in becoming highly unpopular with them, moving into Estonia with troops borrowed from Muscovy, consisting mostly of half-wild and brutal Tartars, Kalmuks, Mongols and other Asiatic tribesmen. The Livonian nobles were appalled at the prospect of becoming dependents of Muscovy and of being eventually subjected to the same oppression and indignity as the boyars of Muscovy.

The enterprise of King Magnus was a dismal failure. In 1571 Grand Duchess Euphemia died and Magnus by order of Czar Ivan IV in 1573 had to marry her sister, Princess Maria—still a child. However, this did not enhance King Magnus' chances.

French Diplomacy. Meanwhile great changes had taken place in the international situation. King Sigismund II of Poland died in 1572, leaving vacant the Polish throne, since he was the last of the Jagellon dynasty founded by Władisław II Jagello two centuries earlier. A new King of Poland had to be elected.

Many great princes, made determined bids for the succession. The Czar of Muscovy, Ivan IV, was among the unsuccessful candidates. He promised Poland protection in case of his election, but demanded the cession of Livonia to Muscovy. In spite of all promises, Ivan could not gain a following among the Polish electorate, which hated Muscovite rule.

It was the French Prince, Henry of Anjou who, with the promise to build a navy for Poland in 1573, won the election. That represented a great success of French diplomacy, and France's prestige was considerably heightened. France at that time was particularly interested in creating friendly relations with Northern European states and in stabilizing the situation in Northern Europe. Thus she was very active in settling the Danish-Swedish dispute and bringing Sweden closer to Poland. It should be kept in mind that France was then in the ascendant and the election of Henry of Anjou meant the weakening of Polish-Austrian relations, the King of Austria, Maximilian II, being the Titular Emperor of Germany. French diplomacy also promoted the project of creating a Livonian Kingdom friendly to France, Poland and Sweden and simultaneously equilibrating the situation in the Baltic.²¹ The brother of King Henry of Poland, François, Duc d'Alençon, was chosen to be the King of Livonia. He was

²¹ A. Richard, Charles de Dançay. Ambassadeur de France en Danemark (Poitiers, 1910), p. 119.

In this way the interest of both Poland and Sweden would have been balanced. Weakened Denmark could not possibly interfere. The unsuccessful Magnus would resign for some compensation, and Muscovy, although supported by English interests, had neither a navy nor was it strong enough to conquer Livonia for Magnus, particularly if opposed by such a strong bloc as the one projected under France's auspices.

But all the plans of French diplomacy were shattered by an unpredictable move of the Polish King Henry, who in 1574 hurriedly left Poland to ascend the throne of France as Henry III.

Poland Shares Livonia With Sweden. The Polish throne again became vacant, but the international situation had not changed. Now the German Emperor Maximilian II, in order to isolate Poland from France, tried to get himself elected King of Poland, but did not succeed because of his military weakness. The Poles at that time needed a king with an army to meet the imminent conflict with Muscovy.

Eventually, in 1575 the Polish throne fell to the mighty warlord of Transylvania, Stephen Báthory, who after his election married the other sister of Sigismund II, Anna, thus becoming a brother-in-law of the King of Sweden. In consequence of this relationship and common political interests vis à vis Muscovy, Poland's friendship with Sweden grew very close, even growing into military alliance. Czar Ivan's Livonian plans were frustrated. Magnus tried to emancipate himself from the Czar's overlordship, and in 1577 secretly established relations with the King of Poland. In a manifesto he openly invited the Livonian magnates to submit to his sovereignty and thus gain protection from the hordes of Ivan. The Czar, indignant over this "treachery", took the Castle of Kokenhusen, belonging to one of the Livonian squires who submitted to Magnus, by assault; and also attacked Wenden, where Magnus had found a temporary refuge. Magnus, wishing to spare the city of Wenden from the revenge of Ivan, delivered himself into the hands of the Czar, but to no avail since Wenden was nevertheless burned and sacked. After brutal humiliation on August 31, 1577, Magnus was imprisoned. However, the fortress of Wenden refused to surrender and on September 1, 1577, the commander of the fortress, Jan Boismann, blew up the castle with its garrison and refugees. Profiting by the tumult Magnus somehow freed himself and escaped. During a short stay in Bauska, in Kurland, Magnus, in 1578, abdicated the throne of Livonia and retired to his Bishopric of Piltene. In 1589 the King of Denmark for 30,000 Thalers sold the Bishopric of Piltene to the King of

Poland. The sum, however, was loaned to the King of Poland by the Margrave Frederick of Brandenburg, and Piltene had to be pawned to Brandenburg. Until 1661 no king of Poland repaid the Margrave the loan. Eventually, Duke Jacob of Kurland paid this sum and incorporated Piltene as an autonomous district into the Duchy of Kurland.

In 1582 Báthory defeated the Czar decisively in battle, pushing him out of Livonia. In the same year he entered Riga without any agreements and published the *Constitutiones Livoniae*, practically providing the restitution of the Roman Catholic Church. Cardinal Radziwiłł became Governor of Riga. The German nobles faced hard times when asked by the Polish crown to produce the title papers to their holdings. With Muscovy defeated, and Sweden as her friend, Poland now became the dominant power in the Baltic region; albeit only for a short period.

Sweden also gained a decisive success in its war with Muscovy. In 1593 it retook Narva, and Ingria, and regained its natural ethnographical frontiers with the Slavs. Everything promised a bright future for both Sweden and Poland, as long as they remained friends.

Polish-Swedish Rivalry Strengthens Muscovy. But at the end of the sixteenth century the friendly understanding between Sweden and Poland vanished because of religious differences, and the possibility of a dynastic union (the King of Poland, Sigismund III Vasa, being the heir of Sweden), became more remote than ever. The shores of the Baltic Sea were once again in flames.

By the beginning of the seventeenth century Sweden, after the conquest of Riga in 1621 by Gustav Adolf, had established herself as the preponderant power on the Baltic. This could not be tolerated by Sweden's rivals. Eventually in 1699, Czar Peter, August II of Saxony (who was also King of Poland), and Frederick IV of Denmark made common cause against Sweden. Again the Baltic lands became the battlefield for foreign interests, and the privileges of the German squires. The latter, at first, sincerely backed Saxony, hoping that Livonia eventually would become a dependency of the King of Saxony, which was the original plan of Patkul, the representative of the Livonian nobility in 1699. He appeared before Peter as the Ambassador of the King of Saxony. Saxon troops, however, were defeated before Riga by the Swedes. The Muscovites themselves were defeated by the Swedes at Narva. Peter demanded the addition of Poland to the coalition and sent Patkul back. Eventually, in 1703 the coalition with Poland was achieved. Nevertheless the struggle was a long one. Only in 1710 did Peter succeed in conquering Riga, and in order to secure the support of the Livonian nobles his chief commander, Scheremetyev, inserted in the so-called Riga capitulation pact the apocryphic Privilegium Sigismundi, which thus became a document accepted by Peter.

Peter Proposes Partitioning of Livonia. Strangely enough Peter spared Kurland. In 1710 he even concluded an alliance with Duke Frederick William, who married his niece, Grand Duchess Anna, daughter of Peter's late brother Ivan. His aim was to get Kurland under Russian control and at the same time not to spoil relations with the King of Prussia, who was the uncle of Duke Frederick William. Peter also tried, but unsuccessfully, to reach an understanding with King Charles XII of Sweden. The basis of a peace treaty would have been the partitioning of Livonia between Sweden and Russia. Estonia would become Russian, also Ingria and Southern Finland, with Viborg. Livonia proper with Riga could be kept by Sweden. But Charles XII of Sweden stubbornly refused to listen to these proposals. It is interesting to note that already in 1699 Peter had published a pamphlet about his historical rights to Livonia. But that did not convince Charles XII, who swore not to renounce either Livonia or any other part of his realm. Eventually Charles XII died in 1718 before the war was ended. One can imagine how devastated Livonia was after this "Great Northern War" from 1699 till 1721.

Russian domination. As the final winner in the formidable struggle for the Dominium Maris Baltici, however, Russia alone emerged. In 1721 Peter the Great obtained by the peace treaty of Nystad a foothold in Southern Finland by annexing Viborg, Ingria around the mouth of the Neva, all Estonia, and Livonia proper (thirty-five percent of Latvia's territory).

As could be expected, after the war Russia's relations with Poland cooled. The old problems of White-Russia and Ukraine, the bone of contention between Russia and Poland since the seventeenth century, were revived. The Greek-Orthodox clergy proved to be very helpful agents of Russian imperialism. But the most helpful factor was the domestic situation in Poland, which Sigismund III had tried to reform; but the Polish squirearchy, like the Livonian, preferred to deal with Russia. The patriotic outburst in 1791, with the constitution of May 3rd, came too late. In 1773, after the first partitioning of Poland, Polish Livonia, or twenty-three per cent of Latvia's area, was annexed by Russia, followed in 1795 by the annexation of the Duchy of Kurland, which represented forty-two per cent of Latvian territory.

These Russian Baltic conquests were effected with the consent and help of Austria and Prussia, the latter having proclaimed itself a Kingdom

in 1701, during the Polish-Russian-Swedish wars, and having become a great power at the expense of Poland by the end of the eighteenth century.

By the end of the nineteenth century, a new and most formidable competitor for Russia's Baltic dominion arose: the German Empire, created by Prussia and continuing in the traditions of the Hanseatic League, which tended toward the domination of the Baltic.

The Baltic problem. Twice already in the course of the present century great wars have been waged on Baltic territories, soaking them with blood, though the peoples living there want to be dominated by neither of the two protagonists, and yearn for peace.

It is evident that the only solution of the international problem posed by the rivalries for the domination of the Baltic is the re-establishment in their full rights of the Baltic peoples, natural guardians of the freedom of the Baltic Sea. The Baltic nations, who throughout the last three hundred years have been considered as mere pawns in the play for power of their vastly stronger neighbors, must at last be allowed to live and develop undisturbed and unmolested. They are a menace to none; and their lands cannot constitute an asset to any conqueror, peopled as they are by nations passionately devoted to democracy, freedom and independence, and provedly economically self-supporting.

The Baltic peoples, who do not seek aggrandizement (territorial or other) hope that the principles of the Atlantic Charter, presenting the most justifiable solution for the Baltic problem, will be fully applied to them.

Washington, D. C.

POLAND AND RUSSIA IN THE PAST AND IN THE FUTURE

by Manfred Kridl

T CAN be assumed as axiomatic that the organization of post-war Europe and of a lasting peace depends to a great extent on the attitude of Soviet Russia and her future rôle in the world. If that is more or less so for all the United Nations, it is much more so for Poland, which has with Russia a common frontier extending more than 800 miles.

Russia was always a mystery under the Czars and has become an even greater one under the rule of Stalin. After a victorious war, we can, in principle, expect from her almost anything in both internal and external policy. There are, however, some basic assumptions which we may posit.

As to internal conditions we may suppose: (a) either a preservation of the status quo, that is a consolidation of the Soviet communist state and a continuation of political, social, and intellectual totalitarianism, or (b) an evolution towards a reasonable and more humanitarian communism (socialism) in which a great part may be played by the new Soviet intelligentsia emerging from the peasants and now forming the majority of the Soviet officers corps. People coming from Russia report the growing influence of the army and especially of the young officers; a victorious war may, of course, strengthen this influence. It is, therefore, not impossible that Stalin permitted himself to be appointed Marshal in order to strengthen his hold on the army for future events.

As to external policy: (a) the internal status quo implies the continuation, of course, on a much larger scale, of the communist "penetration" of Europe and afterwards of other parts of the world; (b) an evolution towards Western socialism may bring with it the abandonment of a crass communist propaganda and a rapprochement with the Western democracies.

Which of the two possibilities is more probable? In the light of our knowledge of Russia's history in the last 27 years and the experiences of Poles and the Baltic nations under Soviet occupation, we should rather assume the victory of the two respective first (a) conceptions. Such an assumption is necessary for practical reasons also, because it implies the necessity of preparations on the side of the United Nations. We must take into account the actual state of the problem and not the possibility of a change. And the actual state of affairs is that Russia, apart from her distrust of capitalistic western Europe and America, has frankly and officially declared

her primary war aims to be the acquisition of Bessarabia, Bukovina, the Baltic States, parts of Poland, Finland, and Czechoslovakia, and the extension of her sphere of influence throughout the Balkans and Austria. In defining these aims Soviet Russia certainly does not seem to take into account the idealistic dreams for a new world, where all the nations shall live in peace and brotherhood, and where armaments and wars shall be for ever banned and where the cooperation of states will replace nationalistic competition. Russia's demands are quite in keeping with the spirit of the older diplomacy. They are based on strategic reasons. Perhaps Russia is more realistic than some of us are and does not believe in a new world where "strategic frontiers" will not exist. Or it may be that she fears a crusade of capitalistic Europe and America against the communist state in spite of all the solemn assurances of responsible leaders of the main United Nations that such intentions do not exist, that, on the contrary, these nations wish to maintain friendly relations and even collaborate with Russia despite all the differences existing between capitalism and communism.

The case of Poland in the Soviet demands is a special one and therefore deserves special attention.

This is by no means the first time in history that Russia has wanted to annex the Eastern provinces of Poland and has represented herself as their protector. This was the traditional policy of Czarist Russia from the fifteenth century on. Even the arguments have not changed much. To acquire an historical insight into this problem, one must realize that what is now called Eastern Poland is composed of territories which were joined to Poland in different eras and by different means. The northern part of them, the district of Wilno-Grodno, and the provinces of Polesia and Volhynia were formerly a part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. When Poland formed a union with Lithuania at the end of the fourteenth century, these provinces became, of course, a part of the new Polish-Lithuanian state. In that period of history it was nowhere customary to hold plebiscites. All over the world such problems were decided by the kings and their advisers. At any rate, these provinces were incorporated into Poland not as a result of an imperialistic war, but of a more or less voluntary union between two nations and two states.

The southern part of Poland's Eastern provinces, the so-called Red Ruthenia, afterwards Eastern Galicia, has belonged to her since the tenth century. It enjoyed in the following centuries a sort of independence under various princes and was finally brought under the reign of the Polish king,

Casimir the Great (1333-1370), who was one of the legal claimants to this land.

These two parts of Poland, then, became a bone of contention between Russia and Poland and Lithuania for several centuries. There were many wars, there were periods of peace, but finally not only eastern Poland, but a part of central Poland and the whole Grand Duchy of Lithuania fell into the hands of Russia after the partitioning of Poland among Russia, Prussia, and Austria in 1772, 1793, and 1795.

These are historical facts. Their explanation is simple from the objective and historical point of view. Russia, whose immense empire was built mostly by military conquest and enslavement of conquered peoples. was always willing to extend her conquests not only to the north and east but also to the west, especially since the population of Eastern Poland was partly of Eastern Slavic extraction, and in part belonged to the official Russian Orthodox faith. During these periods of history it was quite natural that imperialistic tendencies should prevail in the policy of all states. There was, however, a basic difference between the peaceful and voluntary union of Poland and Lithuania, although imperialistic and dynastic tendencies may have played their part in it, and the military imperialism of Russia. Moreover, it must be recalled that the dismemberment of Poland was condemned as a crime by the whole civilized world through the utterances of prominent statesmen, historians, and writers, and by the people of Europe in so far as their voices could be heard. The partition was later considered by all objective and farsighted historians as a bad policy engendering rivalry among the partitioning states, causing insurrections, revolutions, and future wars. In the first half of the nineteenth century the "Polish question" was perhaps the most widely discussed question. The restoration of Poland at that time meant, of course, the restoration of the whole commonwealth which had been divided among Russia, Prussia, and Austria.1

But times have changed. With passing years and decades the "Polish question" ceased to be of primary political importance for the western European governments and ceased to arouse emotion among most European peoples. The last Polish uprising against Czarist Russia in 1863 was ignored by the Western powers in the same manner as was that of 1830-1831.

¹ In this connection it would be interesting, perhaps, to remember that the Soviet government as early as August 29, 1918, issued a decree cancelling all treaties concerning the partition of Poland. It states clearly that these treaties have been "contrary to the principles of self-determination of nations as well as to the revolutionary attitude of the Russian people who acknowledge the unquestionable right of the Polish people to be united." This decree was signed by Lenin, Karakhan, and others.

It was only during the first World War that this problem again came to the fore, thanks to the Legions of Piłsudski, the activity of Polish patriots in France and America such as Paderewski, and the humanitarian and farsighted attitude of President Wilson. The boundaries of restored Poland were settled legally with the acknowledgement of all interested governments in the Treaties of Versailles and Riga. Although her territory embraced a little more than half the former Polish Commonwealth (285,937 square miles in 1772 and 149,600 in 1918), it was accepted by the Poles in view of the entirely changed conditions and of the undeniable rights to independence of the small nations, such as Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, Polish troops even gave considerable help to the Latvians fighting for their liberty against Soviet Russia.

In this "Versailles Poland" remained part of the former population living in her eastern provinces but not belonging ethnographically to the Polish nation. There were Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Jews, a small number of Lithuanians, and others. But the existence of "national minorities" within national states was at that time by no means true only of Poland. Such minorities existed in several Central and South European states and were considered a natural consequence of the mixed population of that part of Europe. Czechoslovakia had her Germans, Slovaks, Poles, and Ruthenians; Hungary had Rumanians and Ruthenians; Rumania, Ruthenians and Russians; Italy, Slovenes; and so on. But the state having the largest minorities was Russia with her millions of Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Poles, and innumerable Mongol tribes in the North and in the South. All these minorities possessed international guarantees of national autonomy within the states where they lived. But since the League of Nations, the official protector of the minorities, did not possess any executive power and, to tell the truth, did not care much for its "wards", the problem of "autonomy" was left to the good will of the governments. As a result not one of them fully carried out its obligations toward national minorities. Poland was among the states which neglected to solve the minority problem. This neglect was undoubtedly one of her greatest errors. Notwithstanding the fact that even full autonomy would not have satisfied some of her minorities (for instance the Ukrainians), had Poland granted it, her conscience would now be clear.

After the outbreak of the Russo-German war in June, 1941, the Polish government in London, following the example of Great Britain, concluded a pact with Soviet Russia. It was by no means an easy decision or an easy task. To appreciate fully this sacrifice for the common cause of the United

Nations, one must bear in mind the relations between Poland and Russia from 1795 to 1918 and later. For 123 years Russian rule in Poland was a period of almost uninterrupted persecution of the Polish nation by the Czarist absolutism. It is no wonder that generations of Poles grew up without friendly feelings toward Russia. Then came the year 1920. The Soviet-Polish war was due not only to the unfortunate and unreasonable expedition of Piłsudski against the Ukraine, but also to the old Russian designs on the eastern Polish provinces and to her new design of establishing a communist Poland, the government of which was prepared in advance by Moscow at the time when Soviet troops were approaching Warsaw.

This Russian dream did not materialize because of the Soviet defeat, and a period of peace with Russia followed. Unfortunately the Polish government failed to use this period to improve her relations with Russia. Mutual distrust existed between the two countries in spite of the nonaggression pact concluded in 1935. This was another error for Poland's rulers, who believed that Poland could exist between Germany and Russia without a close understanding with either of these powers or that she could be on good terms formally with both of them. The result is known: Poland was isolated in spite of her alliance with France and Great Britain, and invaded by both Germany and Soviet Russia. This last invasion was, of course, a result of the Soviet-German agreement of 1939. Now it is semi-officially explained as having been a strategic step for acquiring a better position in the future war with Germany. It is quite possible that the rulers of Russia had, even in 1939, a prophetic vision of the future development of Soviet-German relations; but it is quite possible also that in pursuing a "realistic" policy, they assumed the rôle of observers of the mutual slaying of capitalistic powers in order to profit afterwards from their exhaustion. At any rate, the occupation of Eastern Poland showed quite clearly old and traditional designs. Russian proclamations issued on September 17, 1939 and transmitted all over Europe stated that Soviet troops had crossed the Polish border to prevent anarchy in the neighboring country deprived of government and to release the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian people from the yoke of Polish landlords. We must believe this was the first and principal aim and that the "strategic reasons" were invented later, after the fact. Moreover, we know that the Russians were thrown back from these "better positions" in two days!

After the invasion of Poland there began a not very understandable but at any rate ruthless policy of arrests, deportations and death sentences. What was the goal of this policy? From the Soviet point of view one might

understand the extermination of Polish anti-communist elements, of Polish landowners, Polish bourgeoisie, and especially the Polish socialists as the most dangerous foes of communism. But what can be said of the deportation of Polish peasants, of whole Polish villages, of artisans and workers? What ideology could justify such steps? There was perhaps, only one, that is a forced diminution of the Polish element in the areas of mixed nationalities for the purpose of creating there a more homogeneous population. This may be contested by the fact that not only Polish but also Ukrainian and White Ruthenian peasants and workers, as well as Jews, were deported, but the Russian policy is full of such apparent contradictions, or rather of the mixing of social and national purposes.

Official Polish sources estimate that some one-and-a-half to two million Polish citizens were deported to various parts of Soviet Russia for forced labor and imprisonment. Exact figures are, of course, not available. Even if only half this number is correct, we have a picture of hardship and tortures surpassed only by Hitler's hangmen. Moreover this is attested by tens of thousands of Polish citizens enlisted in the Polish army formed in Russia after the agreement of July, 1941, and by hundreds of thousands shifted from Russia to such places as Iran, Palestine, and Africa. The Soviet government during two years deported or killed perhaps as many Poles as did the Czarist government in more than a century.

And yet, in spite of this, Poland concluded an agreement with Soviet Russia one month after she was attacked by Germany. Even if one cannot admire the Polish government at that time, one must still acknowledge that in this case Poland served the cause of the United Nations and gave proof of sacrificing national sentiment for a higher goal. She not only forgot the hardships experienced as a result of Soviet treatment, but also trusted that the agreement would be a sincere one, marking a new epoch in Soviet-Polish relations. The first article of the agreement reads that Russia thereby cancels the pact with Germany of 1939 concerning territorial changes in Poland. This article was generally regarded, and not only by the Polish government, as renouncing the occupation of Eastern Poland. But the interpretation of the Soviet authorities was quite different, and it came out gradually through months of "normal diplomatic relations". There were, first of all, difficulties concerning another point of the pact, namely the release of Polish war prisoners, civil prisoners, and deported people. Only a small part of them was really released; the fate of the majority is unknown, or rather well known in view of the conditions under which they lived in concentration camps, as woodcutters and miners. Then misunderstandings arose with the Polish army which previously had to be organized under supreme Russian command to fight together with the Russians. This plan was finally abandoned by the Soviet government, as is now known beyond any doubt. The Polish soldiers were transferred to Persia, and afterwards to Italy. Again, Polish citizens living formerly in Eastern Poland were deprived of Polish passports and declared to have obtained Soviet citizenship. Next came speeches and proclamations of Stalin telling about liberation of Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, and so on. How many Poles died in the meantime or were sentenced to death will probably never be known. It is known, however, that the death of two Polish-Jewish socialist leaders, Victor Alter and Henry Ehrlich, was the result of the accusation that they had acted on the Soviet territory for a separate peace with Hitler. Jews and socialists known all over the world in the international worker movement were represented as agents of Hitler.

The further development of Soviet-Polish relations is well known: the declaration of the Polish National Council (a sort of parliament in exile) and the Polish government affirming their insistence on the Russo-Polish frontier status as of September 1, 1939; the statement of the Soviet official news agency, Tass, explaining Russia's attitude towards this problem; then the tragic and mysterious affair of the murder of approximately 10,000 Polish officers near Smolensk, which event was exploited by the Soviet government as the reason for breaking off diplomatic relations with the Polish government in London; a long period of unsuccessful attempts on the part of England, the United States, and Poland itself to come to an agreement with Russia on the Polish problem; finally the establishment of the Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin, which eventually proclaimed itself as the "Provisional Government" of Poland. Then came the ominous conferences at Teheran and Yalta.

The above mentioned statement of "Tass" is such an interesting and characteristic example of the working of the Soviet mind, that it is worth while to analyse it further.

Here are Tass' main arguments:

- (1) Poland, in insisting on her pre-war frontiers, "does not wish to recognize the *historical rights* of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian peoples to be united with their national states" and with their "blood brothers".
- (2) Poland ignores "the fact, already accomplished and universally known, of the *union already effected* of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian peoples within the boundaries of their own states."

(3) "Polish governing circles have learned nothing if they have designs on the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian territories . . ."

The above statement may reflect the sincere convictions of many Russians, but this conviction cannot be shared by any Central- or Western-European or American, at least in consideration of the two first points. It cannot be shared because to such terms as state, nation, national state, rights and historical rights, union, plebiscite, freedom, are attached meanings in the European and American minds entirely different from those of the Soviet mind. The interpretation in Soviet Russia of these terms is completely new and directly opposed to the centuries-old traditions of Europe and America. It depends upon devotion to the ideas of communism, the communist state and the communist leaders; nevertheless, it remains difficult to understand. The following summary may thus be accepted as a reasonable statement of the facts. As we understand them there exists in the Soviet Union nothing that might be called national states. The Union is divided into a number of Soviet-Socialist Republics, which are not national but communist states. The national life of the peoples in these states is limited to the cultivation of their language and to some extent of their culture; to some extent, because in reality there exists a levelling of all national cultures within an all-embracing Soviet-communist culture. The idea of state implies, besides territory and a population speaking the same language, a national ruling, legislative and executive power deriving from the people in one way or another. It is a known fact that all the Soviet Republics are ruled only in theory by their national governments. In reality they are ruled by representatives of the Communist Party. Although the representatives may even be of the nationality of the given country; nevertheless, they are first of all representatives of the party ruled by Moscow and subject to it. Such is the case also with the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian Republics. It cannot be otherwise in a country where there exists a one-party system. Thus in the Ukrainian government not only nationalists, but even democrats, radicals or socialists are not represented. They do not exist at all in Soviet territory, having been "liquidated" early in the game. This is the case of such leaders representing different Ukrainian parties as Professor Hrushewsky, an outstanding historian, formerly professor at the University of Lwów; Holubowitch, Yefremov, Petrula, the brothers Krushelnitsky, Vladimir Starosolsky, the prominent writer, Nicolas Khvylovy, and even old distinguished Ukrainian communists, like Skrypnyk and Lubtchenko. Such leaders were and still are being replaced by figures entirely unknown to cultivated Ukrainian society for the simple reason that they are just figures of Moscow and that no independent Ukrainian politician can attempt either to work in the Soviet Ukraine or even to live there. Very characteristic of the "national character" of the Soviet Ukraine is the fact that the former secretary of the Ukrainian Communist party was a Russian (i.e. Great Russian), Krushchev, and the present secretary is a leader of the Comintern, Manuilsky. A similar situation exists in White Ruthenia.

Moscow states that Ukrainians and White Ruthenians living in Polish territory have the historical right to be united with their blood brothers. This is true; but do they desire to be united with them under Soviet rule and to share their fate? We must recall that a major division of the territory of the former Polish commonwealth inhabited by the Ukrainian population formed a part of the Austrian Empire from 1772, the first partition of Poland, until 1918. Up to the end of the nineteenth century the national consciousness of these people was very weak. A national regeneration began when political parties representing various ideals and various social classes were formed. The Ukrainians then began to take part in the political life of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and in that of the "Crownland", Galicia. They had representatives both in the Austrian Parliament and in the autonomous Galician "Sejm." They grew up politically under more or less normal constitutional parliamentary conditions with universal suffrage, freedom of speech, religion and association, and parliamentary control of the government and so on; their mind was modeled on a more or less West-European pattern. They were divided, like other European nations into such parties as nationalists, radical peasants, democrats, and socialists. The influence of the Greek-Catholic (not Russian-Orthodox) clergy on the masses was very strong.

Another part of the Ukrainian population, living since 1772 in Volhynia and Polesia under the Czarist rule, did not develop politically in the same way as the "Austrian" Ukrainians did. They were a rather passive mass differing from their brothers in religion (Russian-Orthodox) and culture. The former "Austrian" Ukrainians remained, therefore, the decisive political force.

In 1918 the former "Austrian" Ukrainians and some of the former "Russian" Ukrainians became citizens of the Polish Republic after an unsuccessful struggle with both Russians and Poles for their independence. Their principal goal remained complete political independence and the union of all Ukrainians within a national state. The proof that they did not want to organize such a state in collaboration with the Soviet Union is the fact that they fought against it and even succeeded in building in Russian Ukraine a state which,

though ephemeral, was independent from Soviet Russia. This attitude did not change in any way during the period from 1918 to 1939. The Ukrainians were opposed to Polish rule, but they were perhaps even more opposed to Soviet rule. The occupation of Eastern Poland in 1939 gave them a foretaste of what would be their fate if they were to join their blood brothers in their "own national state". A year and a half of Soviet occupation was sufficient to annihilate almost entirely Ukrainian national life in this territory. Thousands of Ukrainians were deported to Siberia, Turkestan, and the terrible Solovki Islands; hundreds of young peasants, workers and intellectuals were shot; the Ukrainian Catholic church was destroyed.

It is, therefore, hard to imagine that the Ukrainians could long for a union with the Soviet Ukraine after the war, especially with the present Ukraine. Their hatred of Soviet Russia was driving a considerable number of them into collaboration with the Germans, a collaboration which, however, does not reflect the attitude of the majority of the people. Still others were fighting the Germans in a brotherhood of arms with the Poles. The entire Ukrainian-American press, independent of political and social opinions, is against the conception of a Soviet Ukraine. This is undoubtedly the attitude of the Ukrainian majority especially since it consists of peasants. Because peasants all over the world are attached to private land, they are not enthusiastic over collective farms. There are, however, some small groups which would accept incorporation in the Soviet Ukraine: the Ukrainian Communists; the "country proletariat", lacking any property and hoping for an improvement under Soviet rule; and finally some non-communist leaders who, rather than have their nation divided into two states, would prefer it to be united under the Soviets in order to gain more strength for the future struggle for complete independence. But all these groups are small and unrepresentative.

The situation of the White Ruthenians was, and still is, different. This very sympathetic and hard-working people is little cultivated, possesses a rather weak national consciousness and a small number of intellectual leaders. This is no wonder, if we remember that under the Czarist régime after the partition of Poland, they were neglected by the Czarist governments, which did not acknowledge them as a separate nation. They were neglected also by the rulers of Poland. They suffered equally under Soviet occupation although not to such a degree as did the Poles and the Ukrainians. As simple religious peasants, they are by nature opposed to all "kolhozes" and "sovhozes". Their leaders are decidedly anti-Soviet.

We come to the second argument of Moscow's statement, namely

that the union of all Ukrainians and White Ruthenians has already been effected. Evidently the reference here is to the elections and "plebiscites" arranged by the Soviet authorities in Eastern Poland, Lithuania, and other Baltic states during the summer of 1940. Apart from the fact that the organization of such elections is contrary to international law and to the Hague Convention, in this case Russian and Polish communists can scarcely believe these elections to have been the expression of the real will of the population. Witnesses in Wilno describe it as an operatic performance, a fantastic and gloomy joke, a mockery of common sense. Briefly, this performance was organized in Poland, as well as in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia as follows: To give it an appearance of legality, they arranged "elections" to new parliaments in these countries. The elections were carried out, not on the basis of the constitutions of the countries involved, but in a special "Soviet" manner. That means that no candidates for election were admitted besides members of the Communist Party. There was only one list of candidates who differed merely in name. The voters were allowed to choose from this list-but only from it. The population was deprived of the right to manifest its real attitude by abstaining from voting. An order was issued that all the voters, without exception, were obliged to carry out this high duty and to have on their passports an official confirmation of it. One can easily imagine what would result from the lack of such confirmation. In spite of this order, many inhabitants of Wilno intended not to take part in the "elections". But the ingenuity and energy of the Soviet bureaucracy are even greater than those of a capitalistic one. On the evening of the election day special automobiles were sent all over the town to bring to the election offices all absentees who could be found and picked up. An official announcement stated afterwards that 98% of the population of Wilno took part in the elections.

This was the first act of the performance. The second soon followed when the "parliament" so elected voted unanimously, with enthusiasm and expressions of devoted love for Stalin, to ask him to accept the incorporation of the country into the Soviet Union.

We can be sure that all this was carried out in almost the same manner in all the occupied countries because the elections were arranged by the same types of men. Here are some facts concerning the Baltic states: On the same day, September 28, 1939, that Mr. Molotov and von Ribbentrop signed in the Kremlin the pact of "Soviet-German friendship", the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Selter, was compelled to permit Russian troops to be garrisoned in Estonia. One week later, on October 6, an

analogous "pact" was made with Latvia, and on October 10, with Lithuania. Soviet troops marched into these countries, and their independence virtually ceased to exist. On October 31, Mr. Molotov announced publicly in his speech before the Supreme Soviet Council that the recent pacts concluded with the Baltic States did not signify any Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and that the "idiotic gossip about the Sovietization of the Baltic States are useful only for our common foes and for provocateurs of a different sort". Then, on May 28, 1940 Mr. Molotov delivered to the Lithuanian envoy a note accusing the Lithuanians of "kidnapping" and "torturing" Soviet soldiers. On June 15, 1940 the Tass Agency accused Lithuania of having concluded years ago a military agreement with Estonia and Latvia, an agreement "dangerous" for Russia. Moscow, therefore, required the formation of a "new, honest Lithuanian government". On the afternoon of the same day that Lithuania accepted this ultimatum, Soviet troops occupied the whole country and in the evening the Vice Minister of Soviet Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dekanozov, arrived by airplane in Kaunas, the capital of Lithuania, to help form this new honest Lithuanian government. On June 16, the same procedure was repeated in Tallin and Riga. It was then that the elections already described were organized.

The total population of Poland in 1939 might be estimated at about thirty-five million. In this number are included among other national minorities, some four to five million Ukrainians, and one to one and a half million White Ruthenians. We have then altogether, roughly, five and a half, perhaps six million Ukrainians and White Ruthenians demanded by Moscow (the 120,00 to 150,000 Russians living in Poland do not change the whole picture, especially when we assume the highest possible figures.) ²

These are bare figures. But in speaking of Ukrainian and White Ruthenian territory, we must also take into account other nationalities and especially Poles living there, and the numerical relation among them. Generally speaking, the territories in question are by no means ethnographically homogeneous, that is purely Ukrainian or purely White Ruthenian. On the contrary, they are inhabited by a mixed population where the

² Because of the great divergence between official Polish and Ukrainain, as well as Soviet figures concerning the number of Ukrainians and White Ruthenians in Poland, and because of the fact that absolutely exact figures would hardly be available for the large number of Polonized Ruthenians and Ruthenized Poles, of mixed marriages, of those using both languages and so on—I am taking data lying somewhere in the middle, closer, however, to the Polish census than to the Soviet claims which are too fantastic even for Polish communists, and moreover based on no statistical investigation.

absolute but not overwhelming majority is indeed formed by Ukrainians and White Ruthenians, but where the Poles are strongly represented, not to speak of a great percentage of Jews, a smaller one of Lithuanians, Germans, Czechs, and others. Proceeding very cautiously, we may state that in the area occupied by Soviet Russia in 1939 there lived at that time more than four million Poles, more than one million Jews, about 90,000 Germans, about 80,000 Lithuanians, 30,000 to 35,000 Czechs—altogether about 5,300,000 of other nationalities, among which the Poles formed a distinct majority. Now if we take the figure: 5,300,000 and compare it with the highest possible number of Ukrainians and White Ruthenians, that is six million, we see that the majority of the latter does not exceed 500,000 to 700,000. In reality the number is probably smaller,

It must be added that the figures above concern the Polish territory occupied by Soviet Russia in 1939 on the ground of the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement and include districts where Poles are in the majority or even alone as for instance on the river Narev, west of the town of Białystok. The so-called Curzon line would leave Białystok and the area around it to Poland. Therefore, the number of Poles in the territory claimed by Russia would, of course, be decreased by several hundred thousand. But it would hardly change the whole picture.

Another fact to be taken into account is the distribution of nationalities in this area. Everyone who knows the country, even foreigners, realize that its towns and cities, without exception, are Polish and inhabited by an overwhelming majority of Poles with a large percentage of Jews. This is particularly characteristic of larger cities. Lwów with a population of 318,000 had about 35,000 Ukrainians and 75,000 Jews; Wilno with 200,000, about 2,000 White Ruthenians, 7,000 Russians, 55,000 Jews, and fewer than 2,000 Lithuanians (which may be remembered in view of the Lithuanian design on this city). In smaller towns the percentage of Jewish population even increases, but generally not that of other nationalities. Almost every town is surrounded by largely Polish villages. The farther from a town, the more the villages become Ukrainian or White Ruthenian, but this is by no means a general rule; even far from towns one can easily find Polish villages among Ukrainian and White Ruthenian. Still more characteristic of the ethnographic situation are villages of mixed population. This mixture sometimes even runs through huts and families where the father belongs to one nationality and the mother to another. Centuries of history and common life have formed this country and influenced its population, and history cannot be turned back. We can only accept this situation created by history and draw conclusions from it. We shall try to do so later. At present one question must be asked: How would it be possible to trace in an honest and just manner an ethnographical demarcation line between Poles, Ukrainians, and White Ruthenians in this area, eliminating Polish towns from foreign surroundings, Polish villages from foreign surroundings, Polish villages from foreign villages, and dividing villages and families? It would be as impossible as to try to separate American citizens into states according to their national origins.

The Soviet propaganda, continually speaking of "Polish landlords" in this territory, suggests that they form a numerous and powerful class. The truth is that the overwhelming majority of Poles in this area is made up of peasants, workers, artisans, and working intelligentsia, while the "landlords" can be estimated at one to two per cent of the Polish population.

Since Moscow speaks of the historical rights of Ukrainians and White Ruthenians, may we say a few words about the historical rights of Poles. They can be neither denied nor neglected by anyone who knows the meaning of historical tradition. We must realize that all the cultural works in this territory were created by the Poles and by no one else. Libraries and museums (among them the famous "Ossolineum" and the University Library in Lwów), architectural monuments, old churches and castles coming down from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, universities and schools, public buildings, as well as factories, mines, oil-production; in a word, all that constitutes a civilized and cultivated land, are the work of Polish mind and Polish labor. The Ukrainians have contributed to this culture only to a very small degree (and that has been since the end of the nineteenth century); the White Ruthenians, almost not at all. Where could any nation be found which would willingly renounce such cultural and spiritual treasures? No cultivated man can fail to take into consideration the emotional attitude of the Poles (apart from some communists) toward this territory. It is the birthplace of the two greatest Polish poets, Adam Mickiewicz and Julius Słowacki, of the American-Polish heroes Kościuszko and Pułaski, of the statesman, soldier and educator of the sixteenth century, John Zamoyski, of the savior of Vienna, King John Sobieski, of the leader of the Polish insurrection in 1863-1864, Romuald Traugutt, the prominent novelist, Ignace Kraszewski, of Ignace Paderewski, and many others. There are preserved the houses where they were born, the schools and universities where they studied, villages and towns where they lived—dear to every Pole. How then can he be required to give over this land into the hands of a foreign people, emotionally cold to the spirit of this country sprinkled

with the blood of so many Polish generations in their fight for freedom and independence? On what basis can the right of Poland to this country be denied when at the same time no one denies the right of the Czechs to the integrity of the "Crown of Saint Vaclav", although Bohemia owed much more to German culture than Poland to that of Ukraine and White Ruthenia (apart from the question of larger national minorities in modern Czechoslovakia); when, moreover, no one denies the rights of France and England to their commonwealths?

* * *

These are questions expressing the sentiments of a whole nation. But sentiments are not arguments for new-fashioned Soviet and old-fashioned European statesmen. What, then, can be the issue of a situation where two contrary concepts confront each other? The new-fashioned gentlemen of the Soviet type intend to solve the problem by a victorious war; the old-fashioned diplomats, who at present have some rather uncomfortable pacts with Poland, would probably like to apply a compromise by which—as a Polish proverb has it—both the wolf would be satisfied and the sheep be saved. Is such a compromise possible?

If we could really organize a postwar world based on the brother-hood of all nations or, at least, on real, sincere federations of groups of nations, the problems of territories and frontiers would certainly lose its importance. If, for instance, Poland, Russia, and Czechoslovakia could form such a federation—provided that the three countries had the same democratic polity and would abandon all imperialistic, nationalistic or communistic aims—there would be, in principle, no difference for a Pole, a Russian, a Ukrainian, or a Czech living in a Polish, a Russian, Ukrainian, or a Czech "state". The word "state" would have another meaning, perhaps something close to that of the United States. Every citizen, independent of his nationality, would be able to preserve his culture, to participate in the life of his nation, as well as in the life of his own state or in that of his federated brothers. The frontiers would not remain barriers between nations but become, in the expression of a contemporary Polish poet, Antoni Słonimski, "guide-posts".

Such a world organization could be the result only of far-reaching social and moral revolutions in all countries, including Soviet Russia itself, revolutions which would bring to the surface new social and moral forces and a new type of man. It is by no means impossible that such revolutions will break out in Europe after the defeat of Germany, destroying all the

plans of the three or four great powers. In that case there would arise both before the Polish and the Russian peoples the basic problem, whether the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians have the same right as all other nations to independence and to their own national states. The simplest way to solve it would be to create an independent Ukraine and White Ruthenia consisting of territories belonging before the war to both Poland and Russia where these nationalities form a distinct majority. This should be a real independence with full sovereignty and without any Soviet or Polish "protecorate". It would be simple and humane and just. But at the same time these peoples, and especially the Ukrainians, would have to realize that their historical life has been for centuries bound with that of Poland and Russia and that a complete separation from these two nations is impossible. If in Poland the Ukrainians are mixed with Poles and other nationalities, they are, in the same way, mixed in Russia, with Russians and others. Moreover, Kiev is not only the capital of "Great Ukraine" but also the cradle of Russian culture. "Rus" in old Russian means both Russia ("Great Russia") and "Little Russia" now called the Ukraine.3 Both Eastern and Western Ukraine are, therefore, the fatherland not only of Ukrainians but also of Russians and Poles. This fact must be taken into consideration, of course, in settling the Ukrainian problem. Consequently, truly democratic Ukrainian and White Ruthenian states could exist only in a close federation with a truly democratic Poland and Russia, not only entirely preserving the rights of Poles, Russians, and other minorities but carrying out a fully fraternal collaboration among all these nations, a collaboration in the development of their own national cultures and in the creation of universal cultural values.

That is a program for the future, a future more or less distant perhaps, and dependent upon the ability of the peoples concerned to undergo a deep social and moral revolution. Such a program might certainly at present, in an epoch of spheres of influence and material interests, be described as an attempt to "dismember" Russia and, accordingly, "to play into the hands of fascism." An imperialistic Russia, no matter whether Czarist or Communist, would never consent to give up one of her richest territories. As for the Poles, they are not yet prepared psychologically for such an idea; and even if they were, they could not, of course, play the rôle of a democratic

³ The terms "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian", which mean "borderland", as national and political names appear only in the second half of the nineteenth century; before that, the Russian part of the present Ukraine was called "Little Russia", and the Ukrainians "Little Russians" (or by a pejorative word: "khokhly"). Concerning the Polish part one spoke of "Red Ruthenia" and "Ruthenians".

sheep in the face of a nationalistic and imperialistic wolf. This solution must, therefore, be postponed to a happier time, when the idea of federation, solidarity, equality, and brotherhood will have penetrated all the four interested nations.

A solution more appropriate to the present situation would be a plebiscite of the population of Eastern Poland, under the control of American authorities, giving the best guaranties of impartiality and justice. This would be possible in theory, but very difficult in practice. First the consent of both the Soviet and Polish governments would hardly be obtainable. The former would issue its permanent argument that a plebiscite had already been accomplished in 1940; the latter would insist on the observance of international treaties, pacts, agreements, laws, and on the sovereignty of Poland. If even these obstacles were overcome, new complications would certainly arise. A just plebiscite should be organized only on the basis of the real status of the population in 1939. But how could this status be restored in view of the integral changes in number and numerical relation of the population owing to the policy of both Germany and Russia during the war? We know that an unbelievable number of inhabitants of this region were either killed or deported to Germany and Russia. Those who survived might come back. But when and to what extent? After the defeat of Germany, it would be relatively easy to bring back all the still living people who were deported to Germany, but the repatriation of all those from Russia would certainly be difficult, if not impossible. The Soviet government would, without doubt, make every effort to retain as many people as possible, especially all the "suspicious" ones who might vote against Russia. And almost all the deported people will be "suspicious", otherwise why were they deported? How, then, is Russia to be compelled to deliver them? I see no way of solving this question. Then there arises the problem of the dead. A grave and tragic problem. All these dead, Poles, Ukrainians, White Ruthenians and Jews have already voted by their deaths for their countries, for their national ideas. An expressive, unique, unprecedented vote, but, of course, it could not and would not be counted in a postwar plebiscite. Thus, such a plebiscite could hardly be a just expression of the will of the whole population. From a knowledge of Ukrainian and White Ruthenian leaders, one may say that the majority of these people, faced with the alternative of Russia or Poland, would choose neither the first nor the second, but vote for their own national states. The plebiscite would be a demonstration of their deepest wishes and their political programs known and formulated long ago. Hence new complications and troubles. How many of the Ukrainians would vote for the Soviet Union? According to the statement of an American-Ukrainian paper, certainly no more than ten per cent.

A third solution might be the preservation of the status quo ante, that is of the prewar frontiers between Russia and Poland. Although it may seem opportunistic or even imperialistic, there are many reasons to believe that it would solve the problem temporarily and avoid most of the difficulties which other solutions would bring in their train. The delivery of Eastern Poland to Russia would satisfy the latter exclusively; to Poles, and supposedly, to Ukrainians and White Ruthenians it would be a great hardship with consequences which cannot be foreseen. At any rate it would endanger lasting peace in this part of Europe. Adherents to the opinion that everything is good which serves the interests of peace should take into consideration not only the appeasement of Soviet Russia at any price, but also the satisfaction of the peoples involved. For the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians it would be only a partial satisfaction to remain within the frontiers of Poland, but they would, in their own opinion, have chosen the lesser of two evils, especially if a new, democratic Poland assured them full territorial, political and cultural autonomy. Under normal West-European conditions, to which they are accustomed, they would be more able to prepare themselves for the national future.

However, the preservation of the status quo ante was made impossible, at least temporarily, by the Teheran and Yalta conferences. Apart from any moral objections one may have to this act, a truly unbelievable picture of arbitrary bargaining with living nations—no wonder the late President Roosevelt declared publicly he was not satisfied with it—it was an example of a very unrealistic policy, since true realism must be concerned with the distant future and not with temporary acquisitions and appeasements. But the paradox of the situation created by Yalta consists in the fact that even the pretended gains of the Western democracies in the political field have all the appearance of being so far a pure illusion. Soviet Russia is not hurrying at all to carry out the Yalta decisions in regard not only to Poland but to all the other countries she has occupied. Hence, the necessity of new "diplomatic activity" which brings, in the main, new disappointments and gives rise to new wishful thinking.

Although the Yalta decision cannot be considered as irrevocable and forever binding on all the nations concerned, and although new, and unforeseen changes in international policy cannot be excluded in advance, nevertheless, it is hard to believe in any considerable deviation from the general

"Yalta Line" once the principles of postponement of boundary settlements until after the war and of peoples' self-determination have been abandoned.

What is and what ought to be the attitude of the Polish people and their government in London in view of this state of affairs? Because of the uncertainty of the international situation and the possibility that any concrete project may be made obsolete by decisions which can be reached at any time with or without Polish consent, we have to limit ourselves to general remarks only. It becomes more and more obvious to every unprejudiced observer that what is now at stake is not so much the question of boundaries between Poland and Russia, which presumably have already been determined, as the real independence of Poland. This main goal is uniting all Poles irrespective of their political opinions, both adherents and opponents of the Polish government, except, of course, those who are inspired and directed by Moscow. Differences are rather of a tactical nature, being concerned with the means by which independence can be most effectively attained and preserved. Another bond is the belief that an understanding and agreement with Russia is an inevitable necessity in view of the simple fact that Poland cannot allow herself the luxury of having two foes, one in the West, the other in the East. Since any understanding with Germany is, in principle, impossible, her geographical situation and historical evolution compel Poland to a peaceful coexistence with Russia. Polish democracy, however, adheres to the basic tenet of its spiritual father of the early nineteenth century: "Let free men live with free men and equal men with equal men". This principle must, of course, be equally valid with reference to Polish-Soviet relations. An understanding cannot mean that one party, viz. Russia, is to dictate conditions and the other party, Poland, is to accept them without discussion. This would be tantamount to demanding "unconditional surrender" of a member of the United Nations. No self-respecting nation will ever agree to such a demand. That must be left to political satellites and servile "governments" like that established by Soviet Russia in Lublin. So far the Soviet government has been willing to ignore the principles of liberty and equality, to wrest half of Poland's territory away from her by force and to assume the right to decide who does or does not represent the Polish nation, its majority and its popular will. By sponsoring the "Lublin Poles" it authorizes a group of obscure men to commit crass illegalities like arrests, deportations and executions of political opponents or to carry out a land reform (a bluff which can be taken seriously only by some naive Allied correspondents) without any legal legislative act. These methods of the Soviet government in dealing with the Polish people (the unwillingness

to get rid of the "Lublin patriots" and to acknowledge Polish leaders from abroad and from the "underground" and, more than that, the arrests of the latter under a pretext which calls to mind the accusation and execution of Ehrlich and Alter) are certainly not the right way to acquire their friendship. It looks strange to objective observers that Russia, possessing in her hands all the means of attracting the Poles in spite of all the past and present difficulties should not make use of them. And the Western democraties look on quietly and with tolerance.

It must be stated frankly that whatsover decision is reached on the Soviet-Polish controversy, one thing is sure, now and forever: if Russia intends to have a really friendly Poland in the future, she must change her policy from its very foundation. What has been true of it so far, can create among the Polish people only unfriendly feelings and handicap the work of those who desire to reach an agreement with Russia. To be sure, policy is based not on sentiment, but on interests, especially policy as pursued at present by the so-called great powers. It must be stressed, however, that correct relations between the two countries are not only to the interest of Poland, but also to that of Russia. Even the most "realistic" policy cannot afford to disregard the wounded feelings of a whole nation with which it intends to maintain such relations.

The crux of the matter is how to compel a victorious Russia to change her policy? Should the United States, England and other United Nations, after having defeated Germany and Japan, start a new war with Soviet Russia for the sake of the "small nations"? A new war instead of lasting peace? That is unimaginable for an American citizen.

American statesmen surely realize the danger of the situation although they do not express their opinions publicly. There can be found ways to change Russia's policy provided that the good will to do so exists.

One means might be diplomatic but sincere talks explaining the real meaning of the Atlantic Charter and the goals for which the United Nations were fighting. To the Soviet leaders can be presented the danger of being isolated in the postwar world, of being hated by their neighbors and by the peoples newly incorporated in the Soviet Union. Similar arguments should have some effect even upon the most doctrinary minds in view of the unavoidable exhaustion of Russia after the war. Russia will need no less than other countries a real and long peace for reconstruction.

Apart from these moral arguments, other more realistic and practical ones might be used. Provisions of the lend-lease bill could not be refused to Russia during the war since that would have meant a considerable weakening

of the common front against Germany or even a Russian defeat. But now that the war is over material helps should be granted only on the conditions of a frank understanding between Russia and the Western-European and American democracies, of renouncing any annexations by force, of concluding sincere agreements with all the United Nations, especially with those who are her neighbors. There need not be any element of "blackmail" in such pressure; rather it would be a duty in the interests of the entire world.

As to "strategic security", nothing would be easier for the United Nations than to give Russia full guarantees of help in case of attack which would be remote after all. They could allay her apprehension of a "cordon sanitaire" between her and Western Europe.

Such discussion with the Soviet representatives will be very difficult and their ultimate persuasion doubtful unless a firm and uncompromising attitude is taken. The present rulers of Russia understand only the arguments of force and not of ideals. Any appeasement policy is considered weakness and therefore exploited. Moreover, we must realize that they are possessed by a sort of Messianic complex. Such obsessions in history have led to megalomania. Those who hold them, believe that they are in possession of truth and that everything must be sacrificed to this truth. W. H. Chamberlin calls this "political paranoia" (*The New Leader*, December 30, 1944) and writes: "The surest way to cure political paranoia is to show tactfully but firmly that it does not pay dividends."

It is important that American public opinion be frankly informed about present-day Russia and her policy in a wholly objective manner lest it become the victim of ignorant, irresponsible journalists or men in more exalted position of the same intellectual and moral level. Such an objective and honest attitude towards Russia cannot be called anti-Soviet. On the contrary, we can and do acknowledge all the work the Soviets have done in education, science, industry and the military preparation of their country. We acknowledge their military deeds not forgetting, however, that the military success of a nation by no means proves the excellence of its govern-

⁴ The San Francisco conference is not concerned with any particular political problem; but the spirit emanating from it foretells nothing very propitious for the settlement of the Soviet-Polish dispute. It is true that the "Lublin patriots" were not invited and that the arrest of the Polish leaders aroused general indignation and relatively strong speeches by Messrs. Eden and Stettinius; but on the other hand, the impossibility of receiving satisfactory explanation of this case proves once more that the Soviet government is holding to its resolution not to be moved by any diplomatic speeches and notes.

ment and policies. Russia cannot be considered beyond criticism only on the basis of defeating Germans.⁵

SMITH COLLEGE NORTHAMPTON, MASS.

⁵ At the time when this paper was already at the printers, there came from Moscow news of the formation of a new Polish government of "National Unity". This news must meet with mixed feelings. On the one hand taking part in the conference which gave the birth to this government there were respected and experienced men from Poland and abroad -Mikołajczyk, Stańczyk, Zuławski, the professors Krzyżanowski and Kutrzeba--who deserve confidence. On the other hand, however, the very composition of the government, headed by the prime minister of the former, Soviet sponsored, provisional Government, and consisting of 15 or 16 communists or fellow travelers and only five representatives of other parties is discouraging and disquieting. It is, moreover, illegal and constitutes a new violation of the Yalta agreement as interpreted by England and the United States. The "mise en scène" of the conference against the background of the unprecedented "trial" of fifteen Polish leaders is again a violent shock to Polish public opinion and cannot facilitate its agreement and approval. All in all, then, we must await the results of the new compromise-in which, as usual, Russia is the winner—as it concerns such basic conditions of any normal and independent life as the four freedoms, the cessations of persecutions, arrests, and deportations, the withdrawal of the Soviet army and political police, the access of foreign representatives and journalists, the return of Polish emigrants, and truly free and unfettered election-before we are able to form an objective opinion.

FOREIGN POLICY AND HIGH FINANCE IN THE BISMARCKIAN PERIOD

by Veit Valentin

N THE Bismarckian period, European haute finance was a financial but no longer a political power. During the years 1815-1850, the Rothschild house had maintained a certain financial monopoly which supported the Metternich peace system in foreign policy and the moderate bourgeois liberalism of the English reform period and King Louis Philippe in domestic policy. The Rothschild policy was therefore conservative and liberal at the same time. Their banking capitalism strengthened governments by loans; they mobilized private property by interesting individuals in public affairs, teaching them to identify their private interests with the interests of each government. Thus the wisely compromising Rothschild policy eschewed wars and revolutions, movements which disturbed business and prevented a further accumulation of wealth. But these natural and democratic movements proved stronger than banks and administrations, and the political influence of the Rothschilds, therefore, as far as it existed at all, was definitely waning after 1850. Younger firms destroyed the financial monopoly of the Rothschilds, who, however, remained powerful for a long time. Napoleon III tried to reconcile himself with them shortly before his collapse; Bismarck made Gerson von Bleichröder, the agent of the Rothschilds in Berlin, his banker; the British Prime Minister carried out one of the biggest coups of British modern history, the purchase of the Suez canal shares, with the help of the London Rothschild. But the initiative was on the side of the statesmen. The Rothschild houses did everything they could to prevent the outbreak of the German war of 1866. They sought to compensate the Austrian demands for the duchies by a large sum of money; they refused war credit to Bismarck. Equally vainly, the Paris Rothschild, before the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war in 1877, refused a loan to the Russians.

It would be a complete mistake to assume that the members of European high finance pursued a concrete political aim, aside from the vague principle of maintaining the existing mature capitalistic system and its type of society. Otherwise, high finance was not an international power at all. If a Rothschild would not give war credits, someone else would. The Paris Rothschild tried to threaten Prussia, just before Bismarck became Prime Minister. Annoyed by the silver purchases of the Prussian government, which were

effectuated without the participation of the Rothschild firm, he threatened to bring down Prussian securities by offering for sale at the stock exchange a huge amount which he had kept in his portfolio. The trick did not impress the Prussians. Four years later, in the spring of 1866, the Paris Rothschild was glad to get rid of his stock at a fair price, through Bleichröder's good services, a short time before the outbreak of the German war, which Bleichröder foresaw in spite of his own peace propaganda.

After 1866, French capital became more and more interested in the North Germanic Confederation, and as late as July 1, 1870, Bismarck expressed the wish that French money would seek investments not only in the Rhine country, but also in old Prussia. The financial break after the Franco-German war was one of the most lamentable results of the crisis and was never completely overcome in the history of Franco-German relations. High finance was unable to bridge it. The competition between the so-called Prussian group and the Rothschild group influenced German business and politics after 1859. Bleichröder belonged to both groups and acted accordingly.

After 1875, British high finance sold continental securities increasingly, and took a lively interest in American bonds. This sort of voluntary isolation weakened European banking in the long run, and fostered national splits. When Bleichröder threw Austrian gold rent bonds on the international market with the aim of fostering the Austrian Minister of Finance to launch his new loan with the usual support of the Rothschild group, the Austrian Minister, furious, made a show of his independence and gave the floating of the loan to another group. In a similar way, the Paris Rothschild threatened Italy and damaged Italian credit by large sales of Italian bonds. Italy, of course, was so weak that she had to make her peace with the Rothschild firm, at least for a time.

In 1891, the Paris Rothschild offered Italy a loan on the condition that Italy, while remaining a member of the Triple Alliance, should inform France about the secret conditions under which she was obliged to take part in a German war against France. This time the Italian Foreign Minister bluntly rebuffed the Rothschild agent.

In the later, more industrialized period, it became quite customary to combine loans of a political character with business interests: in other words, to supplement a rapprochement in the field of foreign policy with a profitable business transaction. When the French lent money to the Russians in 1890, they expected the Russians to order their cannons in France and not to use these good French cannons against France. Political

sympathy with little Denmark did not prevent the French government from assuming a stiff attitude when the Danes decided to increase their protective tariff on French wines. The French even threatened to ban Danish securities from the Paris Bourse.¹

On the whole, it may be stated that business profits were the paramount interest of European high finance. The governments gradually learned to play one group against another. When the Rothschilds said "no" to Bismarck, Bleichröder helped him. When the Russians could not come to terms with Bleichröder, they approached Mendelssohn; if Berlin became too difficult, Paris was prepared to do business. When the Italians resented the arrogance of the Paris Rothschild, a German group lead by Bleichröder supported them.

It is absurd to speak of the Jewish interests which high finance is supposed to have represented. The best business friends of Bleichröder were Adolf von Hansemann and Count Guido Henckel Donnersmarck. Bleichröder became more and more independent of the Rothschilds, and settled many matters which the Rothschilds did not know about or did not like. His relations with Mendelssohn and Company, with Baron Haber in Paris were cool; with S. Oppenheim of Cologne, there were serious conflicts. S. Bleichröder and the firm Alexander Meyer Cohn of Berlin seem to have ignored each other completely. The story of secret collaboration among the Jews was invented for the purposes of the anti-Semitic movement. There is no doubt that an upstart like the Deutsche Bank tried to exploit anti-Semitic feelings for business purposes, but this was not too effective in any case, and a sort of camouflage proved necessary. The political prejudices against Russia in London and Paris were supported by an increasing dislike of Russian anti-Semitism. Far more outspoken were the feelings in Vienna. The political antagonism toward Russia was emphasized by a liberal pro-Jewish point of view, and the Viennese coolness toward Russia especially impressed French banking. Bleichröder's work for Russia was inspired by the hope of helping his coreligionists, and in a more effective way than by ignoring the Russian market, as was done in London and Paris for some time. When, after all, the Paris Rothschild made up his mind to finance Russian loans, it was on the outspoken condition that a new rapprochement between France and Russia would help the unfortunate Russian Jews. The wife of Finance Minister, Witte, being a Jewess, the whole arrangement bore a pro-Jewish character. Help for the Rumanian

¹ Gerd Tacke, Kapitalausfuhr und Warenausfuhr (Jena, 1933), p. 51. The Danes, having no choice, gave in.

Jews was one of the factors which Bleichröder had to consider when he became interested in the Rumanian railway troubles.

Bismarck became a rich man through the help of his banker, Gerson von Bleichröder. The administration of Bismarck's fortune is spotless; everything was handled in a clean-cut way, according to the customs and ideas of the period. The only slight shadow thrown on Bismarck is the fact that he did some speculating in foreign bonds at a time when he had denied publicly that he owned or was at all interested in securities of that type: His reason probably was that in the interest of the German public, he had to avoid transactions of this character becoming known, since he had discouraged foreign investments, and would have stimulated a hausse in the securities which he bought and sold. Bismarck became rich as an estateowner, and always preserved his position as a country gentleman whose main interest was real estate. The administration of his fortune was strictly controlled by the Prince himself; it is incorrect to assume that Bleichröder acted freely within the general full power given to him. On the contrary, Bismarck was keen on knowing and deciding upon all details himself. There was never a clash between Bleichröder and his most famous client. The mutual respect and friendship between the two men remained unchangd in spite of so many intrigues and antagonistic feelings. Bismarck needs no defense against the suspicion of being influenced in his political work by financial interests.

On the other hand, the great German statesman knew quite well how to use the instrument of the stock exchange, and could impress high finance. The letter he sent Bleichröder from Varzin during the crisis of 1870, including an order to sell at the Berlin Bourse, became a signal for an international baisse as a prologue to the Franco-Prussian war. On November 25, 1875, Bismarck sent for Bleichröder to inform him about the Egyptian coup of the British government, giving him a chance to make use of this news at the stock exchange. A year later, the Chancellor told the banker how alarmed he was about the abundance of gold in France,—this fact, in his opinion, made her bellicose!

When Russia, after the Berlin Congress, in the spring of 1879, was about to attack Germany, Bismarck warned Bleichröder and other Berlin bankers, showing them documents which gave evidence of Russia's war aims, and asked them to refuse Russia any money; he was afraid French bankers would be prepared to help Russia and asked Bleichröder to press buttons in Paris. When the Rumanian crisis of 1872 was about to ruin some prominent members of Berlin court society, Bismarck and Emperor

William I asked Bleichröder for help in such a way that a refusal was out of the question. Important social and political interests of Germany were at stake. From a business standpoint, Bleichröder would have preferred to refuse. Instead he risked his money and prestige, and the final result was a secret alliance between Rumania and Austria-Hungary under the sponsorship of Bismarck,—in other words, a decisive position for the Reich in the Balkans. This is one of the best examples of initiative on the part of the leading statesman followed willy-nilly by high finance. The converse took place in Turkey. Bleichröder knew something about Bismarck's ideas on the Dardanelles and his appreciation of Russia's paramount interest in them. Therefore, in 1888, Bleichröder left to the Deutsche Bank the thorny business of challenging Russia in her railway policy, and limited himself to mere business transactions in secret cooperation with the later Lord d'Abernon.

The whole system of Bismarck's alliances was properly supported by Bleichröder's financial transactions. The alliance between Austria-Hungary and the German Reich, supported by a not too favorable commercial treaty, won further support through a series of German investments in the Dual Monarchy, which at least partly compensated for rising economic losses. The Triple Alliance with Italy was corroborated by German loans floated mainly by Bleichröder and culminating in the founding of a special German-Italian bank in Milan. All minor European neighbors were provided with German loans on easy conditions. A peaceful Central European system of cooperation developed, which, unfortunately, because of the increasing isolation of the German Reich, gradually shrank during the 'eighties.

The case of Russia should be studied with special interest. It shows, at its best, the interdependence of foreign policy and high finance. The Prussian-Russian rapprochement of 1868 is first signalled by Bleichröder's interest in Russian investments. Russia's alignments with Italy against Austria-Hungary, with France against Germany, soon became alarming. It was at Bismarck's special suggestion that, in 1877, Bleichröder snatched a Russian loan to the bitter disappointment of the French. The major part of Bleichröder's fortune was presumably made through Russian transactions. All his Russian plans showed a grand style. He wanted to make money in Russia, but he wanted something more. For some time he was the most influential adviser of the Russian Minister of Finance. His plans for stabilizing the ruble, for an early curb of the disastrous Russian inflation, for introduction of bimetallism in Russia, were inspired by a great political

aim—the reconciliation of Germany and Russia after all the misunder-standings of the Berlin Congress, and the establishment of permanent peace, friendship and conciliatory cooperation between the two great nations. All this was done with the full knowledge and approval of Bismarck. It belongs to the secret history of the Reassurance Treaty; Bismarck considered it an introduction to an alliance which would have opened all the markets of Asia and its resources to a working Russo-German bloc. Bismarck's last stroke, his attempt to force unreliable Panslavic Russia into friendship, was one of the most appalling failures of his career. Bleichröder, of course, as the brilliant business man he was, had opposed this step, and continued his Russian activities, cooperating now with the Paris Rothschild (1890). In later years, periods of German-Russian rapprochment were always marked by Russian loans, again financed in Germany,—in 1896, 1902, 1905, 1909. No other field shows such precise synchronization of diplomatic and financial activity.

Bleichröder became an unofficial tool of Bismarck's foreign policy. He worked in 1865 for an interview between Napoleon III and King William I of Prussia; in 1885, he offered his services to the French Foreign Minister and president of the cabinet, Jules Ferry, as an informal go-between; in 1887, he arranged a decisive interview for the French ambassador, Jules Herbette, with Bismarck; in 1881, when Greek difficulties menaced the peaceful outcome of the Congress of Berlin, Bleichröder received a letter from Sir Nathaniel Rothschild informing him about a conversation with Lord Granville and asking him to hand over the results to Prince Bismarck immediately; through Bleichröder, the French Foreign Minister, Barthélemy St. Hilaire, sent confidential messages to Prince Bismarck. Furthermore, this unusual rôle was played in innumerable conversations with ambassadors, princes, bankers, newspapermen-and always with the same tact and unselfish patriotism. Such a system worked because of the absolute discretion of the leaders of European high finance. These channels were safer than any routine avenues of the conventional diplomatic service.

For a considerable time, the Berlin banker was the unofficial head of German Bismarckian propaganda. He directed the Wolff bureau, was the inspiration behind the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, owned the Berlin Boersenkourier and was in touch with a large number of papers and journalists. Bismarck's foreign policy would have been endangered without proper handling of the internal opposition. The domestic position of the great German statesman was not good, and grew worse during the 'eighties. Without the Welfenfund, the sequestered fortune of the King

of Hanover, it would have been difficult for the chancellor to maintain his influence. Bleichröder, as a confidential administrator of the Welfenfund, spent thirty-three million marks for newspaper purposes. His information system worked admirably. The King of Bavaria, Ludwig II, received a fair share, and his master of the horse, Count Holnstein, accepted a good tip for discreet mediation; the affairs of the father-in-law of the Secretary of the Interior, Bötticher, were regulated. Other famous regulations handled by Bleichroeder were those of deputy von Kardorff and Count Paul Hatzfeldt—both of them being urgently in the public interest, since one of the chancellor's main parliamentary props and "the best horse in Bismarck's diplomatic stables" were involved. An old political rogue like Geheimrat H. Wagener had to be saved, because political scandal had to be avoided; and Bismarck, while generally a miser, personally helped this comrade of days gone by, who knew too much.

Bleichröder, as Bismarck's magician, quite naturally became the banker for many members of court society and the diplomatic corps. He helped Count Nesselrode, receiving from him information about the Empress and Queen Augusta, which was very valuable to Bismarck; he helped Count August Eulenburg, who enabled him to report to the chancellor the feeling and activities of the "Young Court", the Crown Prince and his wife, just at a time when the succession of the royal and imperial couple was to be expected. Money helped politics and vice versa. Bleichröder was extremely careful and correct. If no important political interest was at stake, he could be very negative. He did not like corruption and had a strong liking for respectability. His shrewdness, as well as his honesty, prevented him from being exploited. For valuable services he paid a fair price. On the whole, one might say that the German court society and diplomatic service of that period were more greedy in a naive way than actually corrupt.

Bimetallism was fostered by the Rothschild firms and by Bleichröder. It was not only a financial program which would have made European banking very profitable because of its elasticity and the gliding ratio of both metals, silver and gold; but a political and economic program as well. In the opinion of its sponsors, it meant a last effort to organize the European continent in a peaceful and profitable way. England was a special case; her adherence to a strict gold currency gave her a chance to become for some time the world banker and an international clearing house with an imperialistic touch. It was different with the continental powers. If Germany had in due time joined the Latin monetary union, an easier and milder form of industrialization would have followed, and an economic

rapprochement with Western Europe would have facilitated salutary political cooperation, especially if Russia had followed suit.

The European idea of a Holy Alliance had been long dead; a less idealistic European alliance under the leadership of a democratic Germany seemed a possibility. The actual development took quite another turn. Railway construction had become the biggest enterprise of the second part of the nineteenth century. It was a national matter, employing all the key industries, and furthering the transportation of goods and soldiers in the interest of the autocratic State and bourgeois business. Railway construction first gave Germany a taste for organization, huge wages, technical perfection and authoritarian leadership. There is no step more consequential than the famous transfer of the Prussian railways to public property, and the way this example was followed by minor German administrations. The alliance of the Prussian military spirit and railway industrialization gave coming developments a unique trend.

Only a small part of German soil was highly fertile; the major part of the country had to cope with mediocre agricultural conditions. Small wonder that the Germans could not resist temptations offered to them by the abundance of at least one of the world's vital resources—coal. The leading class of estate owners in Prussia had to be maintained for urgent political and social reasons. From a purely economic standpoint, the existence of this class became more and more artificial. As long as England bought the agricultural products of Eastern Germany, many of the so-called Junkers were inclined to political cooperation with their Anglo-Saxon cousins whose historical and aristocratic style of life was greatly appreciated, while black and democratic Britain was ignored. The situation changed as soon as the young British Empire preferred cheaper wheat and rye from overseas markets to imports from Prussia.

A similar experience occurred with Russia. The very Junker class which admired the Czar as a patron of European reaction was completely upset by the increasing cheap and almost ruinous agricultural exports of Russia. If Russian dumping on the world market was not prohibited, if German production was not protected, the Junker class could not avoid a collapse which would have led to a political and social catastrophe in Germany—in other words, the triumph of democracy.

Neither Bismarck nor his successor wanted a democratic Germany. The famous bloc à trois, the political program of Crown Prince Frederick and Crown Princess Victoria, of the Prince of Wales, afterwards King Edward VII, and of Lord Odo Russell (Viscount Ampthill),—the collab-

wanted to stop such extravagance and gave out its new order for the stock exchange. (1896). German banking style had to change. Banking had to concentrate on national interests; it was mercantilized. Capital had to be fixed at home and work for the common good. The private banker had been a business man who was expected to help his clientele. Modern mammoth banks killed this type; they were not so much interested in private customers as in all the industrial firms, trusts, syndicates and concerns which they financed. There were now less credit and speculation, and certainly fewer losses and profits. The huge banks became something like public institutions; their boards assumed an almost bureaucratic character; they regulated gains and losses; the public became completely dependent on the emission policy of certain groups, with a few glorious exceptions.

In 1872, Germany had 130 deposit banks; in 1914 roughly one dozen. Everywhere the government, the authorities cooperated with these giant banks. The State itself became a national banker, long before the banks were to be nationalized. The importance of the stock exchange was waning; customers and patrons no longer saw an expert who took care of individual cases by showing friendship and sympathy; they were dealt with by a new type of "Bankbeamte" (a most significant German expression!)—a stiff, dull, anonymous, authoritative fellow who worked for a humble salary and was forbidden to do private business. The best brains of German finance went abroad because of lack of opportunity. There were many Jews among them. This complete change of German banking atmosphere belongs to prewar history, 1900-1914.

The son of Julius Schwabach, Paul von Schwabach, finally the senior head of the S. Bleichröder firm, continued the political work of Gerson von Bleichröder as a benevolent, peace-loving mediator between the great nations, but the style of his work had to be completely different. What he did, had to be done behind the scenes in a very smooth and careful way. The main correspondent of Paul von Schwabach was Sir Eyre Crowe of the British Foreign Office, whose father, Sir Joseph Crowe, for a long time a British commercial attaché in Berlin, had been in close touch with Gerson von Bleichröder. For many years, Paul von Schwabach also exchanged letters with the Rothschilds.²

Not banking but industrial capitalism and chauvinism marked this new period in Germany. A spirit of autarchy, concentration, isolationism, national exclusiveness, and massive challenge prevailed. No one would be able to

² cf. Friedrich Thimme, Auswärtige Politik und Hochfinanz, Europäische Gespräche, 1929, p. 288.

oration of Britain, France and Germany, of the three leading powers of modern civilization, never materialized. Bismarck and his school would not have adopted it—chiefly because Great Britain, due to Franco-German tension, would have obtained a key position within this arrangement. There were also strong apprehensions in England against such a rôle. A more or less brilliant isolation seemed to be more attractive. Bismarck's admirable system of alliances and agreements all over Europe at the end of his career no longer sufficed, given Russia's increasing unreliability, and Britain's suspicious reserve. The patent solution would have been an entente between Germany, Great Britain and Russsia—cooperation of the hegemonial power of Europe with the two strongest world powers of the period. The Triple Alliance of 1882, many times renewed, was, after all, more a liability to the Reich than an asset. If Germany wanted to become a world power herself, she had to come to terms with the real rulers of the world overseas. Yet very few Germans judged the international position of their country from this angle.

The gold currency set Britain and Germany on an equal plane, which was a flattering challenge for many Germans but, in the long run, proved a burden and a source of illusions and mistakes. Germany was so strong and powerful that some expansion was only too natural. Bismarck never overrated the new German colonies—he took them as protectorates because he wanted to prepare something for the future, without changing the natural center of gravity of the Reich. There is no evidence that Bismarck's support of the Congo State policy of Leopold II, King of the Belgians, was inspired by any other motive than his wish to preserve a neutral and independent African zone which would be open to German business without any restrictions. Bismarck's banker, if consulted confidentially about German expansion, would have smiled and told his interviewer that in his opinion only one field of expansion was promising for Germany—Russia! This meant, of course, sheer commercial expansion and economic cooperation, leading, if possible, to a political entente.

Small German capitalists were not satisfied with their poor yields from domestic enterprise and tried to get better profits abroad where a lower economic standard, smaller wages, and cheaper raw materials attracted every gambling instinct in spite of an obviously higher risk. In the eighties a real speculation fever had afflicted all social groups for some time, and especially German court society. Then the fashionable Berlin coiffeur, Gilbert, formed a center of highly valued tips for the stock exchange. Losses, however, became more and more disastrous. The German government

give evidence of a concrete war plan, but the atmosphere became bellicose because of an increasing tension in international affairs. Germany was annoyed while feeling backward and being localized in a Central European strait-jacket. Colossal new fortunes were made abroad by the exploitation of mines, oil, rubber; the control of all the most valuable raw materials of the overseas world gave Great Britain, Russia, the United States, even France and the Netherlands, an advance which was difficult to match.

Was Germany's development also menaced by a revolutionary proletariat? This enemy, strong or weak, united or split, aggressive or defensive—an alliance was concluded against him anyway. Industrialists and agrarians made their agreement: the industrialists conceded high protective tariffs, and the agrarians, with some disgust, accepted as an inevitable evil the biggest industrial key enterprise after the railway construction, the building of a huge German navy, as a challenge to England, a symbol of decided competition, a pledge of a world position for the rising world power, Greater Germany.³

Should Germany again play Cinderella's humble role as after the Thirty Years' War? Bismarck's real successor, the Prussian Finance Minister and vice-president of the cabinet, Johannes von Miquel, tried to organize Germany's administration in order to make her fit for a coming crisis. His spirited domestic policy aimed at stabilizing the existing status of social development against proletarian and democratic demands, in other words, against any request for social and political reform. The result was a stiffening of Germany's political style, a sly rudeness in playing the busy-body all over the world, a more naive than really shrewd ambition of assuming world power status without an adequate basis. The golden days of the Rothschilds had gone long ago. But it now became clear that Bismarck belonged to the past. His loyal banker Bleichröder was lucky in many respects. He also died in time.

Washington, D. C.

³ Eckart Kehr, Schlachtflotten bau und Parteipolitik, 1894-1901, 1930, p. 262.

THE PRE-WAR UNIONIZATION OF POLISH WORKERS

A Statistical Note

by Władysław R. Malinowski

I

HE trade union movement in Poland, in spite of a belated industrial revolution and a preponderantly agricultural economy, has a tradition of more than fifty years and has played quite an important rôle in the modern life of the nation.

After 1918, in the progressive and revolutionary period of re-born Poland, the part played by the trade union movement was a significant and a direct one, raising the standard of wages throughout the country and obtaining progressive labor and social security legislation. (The autonomous character of the social security institutions was secured *de facto* by their trade union administration.) Its influence was felt indirectly by means of adequate representation, through its political arm, the Polish Socialist Party, in municipal and county governments and in the national Parliament (the Sejm). With the 1926 coup d'état of Piłsudski, the trade union movement entered into a very difficult period—the victim, at this time, of all sorts of political chicanery and even of persecution. For example, the social security institutions rid themselves of all trade union influence by replacing the democratically-elected commissions with government commissars.

As this period partially overlapped the economic depression with its attendant mass unemployment, the trade unions suffered a considerable decline in strength for a few years. The company unions, fostered by governmental privilege, however, failed to destroy the free trade union movement.

When the crisis of the economic depression was past, the trade unions began to revive and, before the outbreak of war in 1939, their influence exceeded in strength and vigor that of the pre-1926 period. At this time, its activities centered around a combination of the fight for democracy and the betterment of living conditions, wages, etc.

The real leadership of the working class passed entirely into the hands of the free trade unions under the Polish Trade Union Congress, an affiliate of the International Federation of Trade Unions and, for many years, represented at the International Labor Office.

The rôle of the trade unions in Poland's life cannot be adequately judged without full consideration of the unions' chief activities and achieve-

ments—strikes and collective agreements. The tables below present a statistical summary of these:

STRIKES

Year .	Strikes	Strikers (in thousands)	Strikes ¹ Won	Sit-Down ² Strikes	Sit-Down Strikes Won
1928	769	354	571	***	
1929	494	217		X	X
	~~ -		X	x	· X
1930	312	48	х	X	X
1931	357	107	х	x	x
1932	504	314	349	x	x
1933	631	343	х	137	108
1934	946	. 369	x	193	149
1935	1165	450	x	390	326
1936	2056	675	x	963	811
1937	2078	565	х .	1093	828
1938	1457 ·	269	998	713	508

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS

Year	Workers Covered	by Collective Agreements
	% of Total No. of Polish	% of Workers Employed In Plants of
	Workers	At Least 200 Employees
1936	56	65

The afore-mentioned figures eloquently testify to the extent of trade union activities and amply show the reasons for their expansion. For, while the activities of the unions lead to an increase in their membership, the larger membership in turn increases the union's successes.

Before we examine the strength of the unions as measured by their membership, it is necessary to discuss the sources for and the methods of computation used on these figures.

H

For many years the membership statistics of the Trade Unions in Poland were the object of considerable controversy. The discussion centered about the criterion of membership: should all workers who had registered with the unions or had otherwise voluntarily expressed their adherence to

^{1 &}quot;x" denotes that no exact figures are available.

^{2 &}quot;Sit-down" strikes did not become general in Poland until 1933. Before that year they were fairly isolated phenomena. In subsequent years, however, they constituted a considerable percentage of the total number of strikes.

them be regarded as members, irrespective of whether they paid their dues, or should the payment of dues be considered as the chief qualification for fullfledged union membership? In the latter case, should only regularly dues-paying workers be included in the membership figures, or should a single payment (including the initiation fee) be considered sufficient? If regular payment of dues was to be considered for criterion of membership (most of the union constitutions specified regular dues-payment as a pre-requisite to voting privileges), should a certain number of paid-up months be fixed as a necessary condition for inclusion in the statistical membership figures?

The possible membership groups, therefore, fell into the following

categories:

(1) Dues-paying members:

(a) Paying regularly, with a given number of fully paid-up months.

(b) Paying regularly, but without any specified number of fully paid-up months.

(c) Paying irregularly, but with at least one month's or one week's duespayment to their credit in any year.

(2) Registered members.

The classification of a worker in any one of the above categories was not a matter of his good will alone. There were also two objective conditions to be taken into consideration: unemployment and seasonal employment.

Unemployed workers obviously did not pay any dues. However, if dues-paying workers only were to be considered in the total membership figures, many convinced and devoted unionists who had lost their jobs would not be included as union members. But even if registration alone was to be regarded as a sufficient criterion of membership, those who had been unemployed for a protracted period of time risked exclusion from the membership figures, for the contact of such long-term unemployed with their unions necessarily becomes lax.

Seasonally employed workers—non-earning and therefore unable to pay dues during part of the year—presented a similar statistical problem. Most of them paid their dues irregularly, although some unions grouped the seasonal workers separately and introduced annual or seasonal dues (instead of weekly or monthly dues), making it possible for them to remain regularly paying members in good standing. This correcting factor, however, was far from general and did not lessen the problem, which was particularly important in Poland, where seasonal workers constituted a considerable

percentage of the total number of workers (including workers in building trades, in the canning industry, sugar-refinery workers, etc.).

It was therefore important to find a method which would permit the inclusion in the membership figures (even if they were, in principle, based on dues-payments) of all whose failure to pay their dues was not a result of their unwillingness to do so, but of economic and climatic conditions.

In considering membership figures of the Polish Trade Unions, it is important to note that they were compiled, up to the outbreak of the war, by the Polish Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. These figures did not enjoy especial confidence; even the Central Statistical Office of Poland had doubts and reservations regarding their reliability. However, lacking other figures, the Central Statistical Office used those compiled by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare; their doubtful reliability was denoted by the express mention of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare as their source. The mention (or "labeling") of sources was the method commonly used by the Central Statistical Office whenever it wished to disclaim responsibility for any set of figures it was obliged to publish, and was recognized as such by the readers.

Because of all the above circumstances, and particularly, because of the lack of uniformity in the method of compiling Trade Union membership statistics, it was relatively easy for the pre-war Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare to juggle and weight the figures according to the political purposes of the Administration. This implied, on one hand, the padding of membership figures of Trade Unions which were favorable to the Administration and which, therefore, enjoyed Administration support; on the other hand, it resulted in the arbitrary cutting down of membership figures of genuinely free and democratic Trade Unions. Thus, because of the political manipulations of the reactionary pre-war Polish Government, the membership figures of the various Polish Trade Union Federations are very unreliable, although they had been consistently reproduced in the publications of the Central Statistical Office of Poland.

For the years preceding the war these figures were as follows: (according to the Polish Concise Statistical Yearbooks, 1931-1939)

	Number of Members	(in thousands)
	Registered	Dues-Paying
1925	1153 ·	787
1926	937	700
1927	874	658
1928	792	594

Ir

	Number of Member.	s (in thousands)
	Registered	
1929	952	715
1930	979	731
1931	009	684
1932	913	658
1933	897	660
1934	945	706
1935	941	618
ncluding:		
Trade Union Federation		
(Polish Trade Union Congress)	284	137
Polish Trades Federation	150	121
Alliance of Trade Unions		
("Union of Trade Unions")	148	142
Christian Trade Unions	65	20
Alliance of White-Collar Workers		
and Professional Workers' Unions	39	34
Central Trade Union Federation	36	17
"Praca" Trade Union Federation	14	. 3
German Trade Unions	13	14
"Praca Polska" ("Polish Labor")		
Trades Federation	10	5
Unions of Manual Workers	648	377
Unions of Private White-Collar Workers	78	54
Unions of Gov't and Local Gov't Employ	ees 215	187

Source: Data of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare.

No official statistics concerning the Polish Trade Unions were published after 1935 by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. The Polish Statistical Yearbooks for the period of 1935-1939 merely reprinted the figures for 1935. This failure to maintain up-to-date statistical records may have been due to reluctance on the part of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare to publicize the great increase in the membership figures of the Trade Unions as well as the persistent shift of organized workers from the "Christian" Trade Unions and the so-called "neutral" Trade Unions to the "Free" Federation of Trade Unions (Polish Trade Union Congress.).3

The yearbooks of the International Federation of Trade Unions are another source of statistical data concerning Trade Unions in Poland. Unfortunately, however, even these did not give an exact picture of the

³ The terms, "Free," "Neutral," "Christian" trade unions are used in the same sense as they are used by the International Labor Office in the I.L.O. Yearbooks.

strength of the Unions. The figures published by the International Federation of Trade Unions included only Trade Union members for whom the various National Federations paid dues to the International Federation, irrespective of the actual membership figures. These two sets of figures did not always correspond, particularly in the case of poor countries, for the International Federation of Trade Unions was often unable to collect dues from the National Federations of Trade Unions in such countries. The National Federations of Trade Unions, moreover, were also frequently unable to collect their dues from the various component unions, especially in periods of depression, for at such times there was greater need for union relief expenditures which drained the union treasuries. These difficulties complicated the statistical picture even further.

There is another serious shortcoming in the statistical data published by the International Federation of Trade Unions: although more than one National Federation may exist in a given country, only one is considered, for it is a consitutional rule of the I.F.T.U. to grant membership privileges to only one National Federation in each country.

The figures for Poland, published by the International Federation of Trade Unions in its Statistical Yearbook are as follows:

	Jan. 1, 1934	Jan. 1, 1935	Jan. 1, 1936	July 1, 1939
Total Membership	214,333	244,499	282,322	301,0004
Jewish Unions ⁵	X6	22,577	27,465	\mathbf{x}^{c}

The Yearbooks of the International Labor Organization provide an additional source of trade union membership statistics. These Yearbooks contain the data gathered by correspondents of the International Labor Organization in the various countries. The methods of collecting information, however, were not uniform. In some instances, the correspondents of the I.L.O. reproduced the official data; in others, they used the figures provided by the Trade Union Federations, considering them more trustworthy. Sometimes, too, the I.L.O. correspondents, unable to make a choice between the various sets of figures, made their own estimates, placing them somewhere between the official figures and those provided by the Unions. In their choice of method in collecting data, the I.L.O. correspondents were also apt to be influenced by their own political and organi-

6 "x" denotes that no exact figures are available.

⁴ This figure was received by the I.F.T.U. shortly before the outbreak of the war and was never published. It is quoted here on the authority of Mr. Jiri Stolz, Acting Secretary-General of the I.F.T.U.

⁵ The Polish unions had separate locals for Yiddish-speaking workers, which had a large degree of autonomy within the framework of the Polish Trade Union Congress.

zational affiliations and sympathies, as well as by those of their collaborators and advisers.

It is obvious, therefore, that the correspondents of the International Labor Organization enjoyed considerable latitude in determining the figures destined for publication in the I.L.O. Yearbook; this is further evidenced by the fact that their instructions were extremely broad, merely requesting them to report figures which they regarded as corresponding to the facts. The instructions to the correspondents did not even specify whether they were to report the figures for registered members of the unions or those for duespaying members only. Lacking instructions, the correspondents were free to make their own decisions regarding this problem. It should be noted, however, that, probably because the I.L.O. correspondents were usually men who enjoyed considerable standing in labor circles and had good knowledge of labor problems, the figures compiled by the International Labor Organization were generally closer to the facts than those given by other sources.

The I.L.O. Yearbook for 1939-1940, published in Geneva in 1940, gives the following data on trade-union membership in Poland in 1939:

Trade Union Federation (Polish Trade Union Congress)	393,882
Including Jewish Unions ⁷	43,466
Polish Trades Federation	184,448
Alliance of Trade Unions ("Union of Trade Unions")	60,000
Christian Trade Union Federation	109,560
Central Trade Union Federation	35,338
Polish Federation of Trade Unions	220,016
Alliance of White Collar and Professional Workers' Unions	105,000
"Praca Polska" ("Polish Labor") Trades Federation	90,000
Various Other Unions	10,126
Thus, according to the I.L.O. figures, total union membership	in Poland
was	1,208,370
Total membership of manual workers' unions:	1,103,370
Of these:	
The "Free" Trade Union Federation had 393,882	2 members
Other Federations of "Free" tendency and	
sympathetic "neutral" unions had 315,354	4 members
The "Christian" Trade Union Federation, other	
federations of 'Christian'" tendency and	
	4 members
Total Unions of White-Collar and Professional Workers	105,000
There are two major shortcomings in this data on Poland	published

⁷ See footnote No. 5 on page 181.

by the International Labor Organization. The first consists of the omission of several important unions, such as the Teachers' Union, various Civil Service Workers' Unions and Municipal Workers' Unions. These unions were unable to join the Polish Trade Union Congress because of technical difficulties of a legal nature, but were in sympathy with it. Another, even more serious shortcoming consists in the difference of treatment accorded to the "Free" Trade Union Federation (Polish Trade Union Congress) and the other Federations. For unknown reasons, the author of these tables gave the figures for dues-paying members only for the Polish Trade Union Congress, while giving registration figures for all the other Federations.

According to corrected data (Published in the February 1, 1944 issue of the *Polish Worker In Great Britain*, Vol. 5, No. 3), the actual membership figures at the outbreak of the war were as follows:

1.6	million
1.2	million
0.6	million8
0.3	million
0.3	million
0.4	million
	1.2 0.6 0.3

III

Possessed of correct membership statistics on the Polish Trade Unions we must then obtain their relative strength.

In many statistical yearbooks, a correlation is obtained between membership statistics and those on population to determine the number of trade union members per one thousand inhabitants. Aside from the necessity of eliminating children, non-employed youngsters, the retired and the non-wage-earners, this approach is inadequate in any international comparison because of the different level of industrialization of the various countries. Statistics on membership in the trade unions of predominantly agrarian countries, cannot be properly evaluated in relation to the total population nor can they be compared with those of a highly industrial country. An attempt to compare the relative percentages would rather serve to reveal the level of industrialization in conjunction with the degree of unionization.

The only valid index of the strength of unions can be obtained by

⁸ Including Jewish Unions with a membership approaching 0.1 million.

the ratio of trade union membership to the number of wage earners in general, the number of manual workers as a whole and the number of manual workers in large and medium-sized factories.

With this in mind and basing our computations on statistics of wage-earners, industrial workers and workers employed in large and medium-sized factories (See the Polish Concise Statistical Yearbook for 1939), we arrived at the following conclusions concerning the strength of trade unions in pre-war Poland:

- 1. Out of about 4,900,000 wage-earners in Poland, about 1,600,000, or almost one-third of the total were trade-union members.
- 2. Out of about 2,000,000 industrial workers, about 1,200,000, were members of trade unions. We thus see that more than one-half of the total number of industrial workers in Poland was unionized,
- 3. Manual workers' unions of the "free" tendency had a total membership of about 900,000 of which about 600,000 were affiliated with the International Federation of Trade Unions through the Trade Union Congress. Thus, nearly one out of every three industrial workers in Poland was connected with that international mainstay of "free" trade unionism, the I.F.T.U.
- 4. The detailed membership statistics of the various trade unions and their close analysis would further show that almost all the workers employed in large and medium-sized factories were members of unions affiliated with the Trade Union Congress (an affiliate of the I.F.T.U.) comprising the full-fledged Free Trade Union Movement.

* * * *

The strength of free trade unions in pre-war Poland is an important factor—vital to an understanding of the rôle of the Underground Labor Movement in Poland during the war and one of the main reasons why the vast majority of the members of the underground were overwhelmingly democratic and progressive.⁹

NEW YORK CITY

⁹ See W. R. Malinowski, "The Polish Underground Labor Movement," *International Postwar Problems* (Quarterly Review of the American Labor Conference on International Affairs) Vol. I, No. 3, June 1944, for an analysis of the role and summary of the activities of the Polish Underground Labor Movement during this war.

NOTES

After negotiations between representatives of the various Czechoslovak political parties in Moscow, President Beneš on April 4, 1945 appointed in Košice a new provisional government, a government of National Front. The new government consists of the following members:

Premier: Zdeněk Fierlinger, Czech, Social Democrat

Vice-Premiers: Monsignor Jan Śrámek, Czech, Catholic; Jožka David, Czech, Social National; Klement Gottwald, Czech, Communist; Jan Ursíni, Slovak,

Democrat; Vilém Široký, Slovak, Communist Foreign Affairs: Jan Masaryk, Czech, non-partisan

National Defense: General Ludvík Svoboda, Czech, non-partisan

Foreign Trade: Dr. Hubert Ripka, Czech, Social National

Interior: Václav Nosek, Czech, Communist

Justice: Professor Jaroslav Stránský, Czech, Social National

Information: Dr. Václav Kopecký, Czech, Communist

Finance: Dr. Vavro Šrobár, Slovak, Democrat

Industry: Bohumil Laušman, Czech, Social Democrat

Internal Trade: Ivan Pietor, Slovak, Democrat Agriculture: Julius Duriš, Slovak, Communist Food: Václav Majer, Czech, Social Democrat

Transport: General Antonin Hasal-Nižborský, Czech, non-partisan Post, Telegraph, Telephone: Monsignor František Hála, Czech, Catholic Protection of Labor and Social Welfare: Josef Šoltéz, Slovak, Communist

Education: Professor Zdeněk Nejedlý, Čzech, non-partisan Public Health: Professor Adolf Procházka, Czech, Catholic

The Premier and the Vice-Premiers constitute an inner cabinet to co-ordinate and direct the political activities of the government.

* * *

After much criticism from the Royalist Party, the Government of General Plastiras resigned on April 7, 1945 and the Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, called upon Admiral Voulgaris to form a new government. The new Greek Government, some of whose members took the oath on April 8 and others on April 11, includes the following:

Prime Minister and Minister for all Service Ministries: Admiral Petros Voulgaris

Foreign Affairs: Ioannis Sophianopoulos

Social Welfare and Health: Tricorphos Sbarounis

Interior: Costa Tsatsos

National Economy: Grigorios Kassimatis Public Works: Anarghiros Dimitrakopoulos Merchant Marine: Rear-Admiral Spiro Matessis

Finance: Gheorghios Matsavinos Education: Dimitrios Balanos

Information: Professor Dionissios Zakyntinos

186 NOTES

Justice: Gheorghios Soliotis

Transport: Professor Trifon Karandassis

Labor: Andreas Zakkas

Agriculture: Profressor Panayotis Koutsomitopoulos

Supply: M. Paraskevopoulos

Under-Secretary of State in the Prime Minister's Office: Gheorghios Lambrin-

opoulos

* * *

Following a meeting of leaders of various Austrain political parties, there was published in Vienna on April 28, 1945 a proclamation on the formation of a Provisional Government of Austria. The new government is composed of the following:

State Chancellor and State Secretary for Foreign Affairs: Dr. Karl Renner, Social Democrat

State Secretaries without Portfolio and Members of the Political Council with the State Chancellor: Dr. Adolf Schärf, Social Democrat; Leopold Kunschak, Christian Social; Johann Koplenig, Communist

Armed Forces: Lt. Col. Dr. Franz Winterer, Social Democrat

Interior: Franz Honner, Communist Justice: Dr. Josef Gerö, non-partisan

Finance: Dr. Georg Zimmermann, non-partisan

Agriculture and Forestry: Rudolf Buchinger, Christian Social

Industry, Crafts, Commerce and Communications: Eduard Heinl, Christian Social

Creeds and Education: Ernst Fischer, Communist Public Nourishment: Andreas Korp, Social Democrat Social Welfare: Johann Böm, Social-Democrat

Public Building and Restoration: Engineer Rudolf Raab, Christian Social

* * *

The commission—composed of Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotoff, British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, and the Ambassador of the United States, Mr. W. Averell Harriman—set up at the Yalta Conference to seek a solution to the Polish problem, invited the following Polish leaders to meet in Moscow on June 15 for discussions concerning the reorganization of the Provisional Polish Government on a broader basis: Boleslaw Bierut, Edward B. Osubka-Morawski, Władysław Kowalski, and Władysław Gomulka, representatives of the Warsaw Government; Wincenty Witos, Zygmund Zuławski, Stanisław Kutrzeba, Adam Krzyzanowski, and Henry Kolodzeiski, democratic leaders from Poland; and Stanisław Mikolajczyk, Jan Stanczyk and Julian Zakowski, democratic leaders from abroad.

As a result of the conversations held between the various groups, the formation of a new Government was announced on June 23. The new government is composed of the following members:

Premier: Edward Osubka-Morawski

NOTES 187

Vice Premier: Władysław Gomulka

Second Vice Premier and Agriculture: Stanisław Mikolajczyk

War: Marshal Michal Rola-Zymierski Foreign Affairs: Wincenty Ryzymowski Public Administration: Władysław Kiernik Public Security: Stanislaw Radkiewicz Finance: Konstantin Dombrowski

Industry: Hilary Minc

Communications: Jan Rabanowski

Posts, Telephone and Telegraph: Mieczylaw Thugutt

Merchant Navy and Foreign Trade: Dr. Stefan Jedrychowski

Health: Dr. Franciszek Litwin

Labor: Jan Stanczyk Education: Czeslaw Wicek

Culture and Art: Władysław Kowalski

Justice: Henryk Swiatkowski

Reconstruction: Prof. Michal Kaczorowski

Information and Propaganda: Stefan Matuszewski Food Supplies and Trade: Dr. Jerzy Sztafel

Forestry: Stanisław Krakow

Of this group, five may be designated as democrats: Vice Premier Stanisław Mikolajczyk; Minister for Public Administration, Władysław Kiernik; Minister for Posts, Telephone and Telegraph, Mieczylaw Thugutt; Minister for Labor, Jan Stanczyk and Minister for Education, Czeslaw Wicek. The other sixteen members of the new government were closely associated with the Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin, and enjoyed the favor of the Soviet Government. The members of this latter group hase heretofore not been particularly prominent in Polish national politics.

BOOK REVIEWS

MERRIMAN, ROGER B., Suleiman the Magnificent. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944. Pp. viii, 325. \$3.25.

Suleiman the Magnificent was one of the greatest—perhaps the very greatest—of the Ottoman sultans. He was a contemporary of Henry VII and Elizabeth of England, a rival of Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire, and an ally of Francis I of France. Yet, as compared with the other monarchs of his age, Suleiman is almost singularly unknown because of the neglect of historical biographers.

The inspiration for the present biography, Professor Merriman states, and a portion of the volume, were derived from an unfinished manuscript which the late Professor Archibald Cary Coolidge wrote in 1901-02. This is especially true of Chapter I, dealing with the early origins of the Ottoman Turks; Chapters II to VI, which treat of the youth and accession of Suleiman, the siege of Belgrade and of Rhodes, the battle of Mohács, the siege of Vienna and relations with France to 1536; and Chapters IX to XI, which are concerned with the war and victories in the Mediterranean, Persia, India and Abyssinia, and the campaigns in Hungary, 1533-1564. Chapter VII, which discusses government in the period of Suleiman; Chapter VIII, which treats of the Grand Seraglio, the Harem, and the relationship between the Sultan and his subjects; and Chapter XII, which discusses Malta and Sziget and gives an estimate of the great Sultan, are wholly the product of Professor Merriman's pen.

As the author of *The Rise of the Spanish Empire* (New York, 1918-1934, four volumes), Professor Merriman is familiar with the period in which Suleiman lived. Indeed, *Suleiman the Magnificent*, in these pages, appears to us more in relation to Europe, as seen through European eyes, than he does as an Ottoman Sultan. The author makes no apology for presenting the Grand Turk as a great military man, ever on horseback, ever at war. This is in the traditional manner, of course, but it would have been well to have portrayed Sultan Suleiman in the setting of Ottoman life, with something more of the Ottoman culture of the time. The author indicates, in closing his volume (p. 292), something of the character of Suleiman by noting the "grandeur of the work he accomplished" and the "extent of his influence on the destinies of three continents", and he declares that "the longer one studies him, the greater he seems to be."

Dr. Merriman relies heavily on such standard works as those of von Hammer-Purgstall, Busbecq, Lybyer and Iorga, to mention a few, although he has failed to make use of the later works of Professor Paul Wittek (The Rise of the Ottoman Empire [London,1938]) and of Professor Mehmed Fuad Köpfülü (Les origines de l'Empire Ottoman [Paris, 1935]). The author adorns a tale with a moral for our own time. After noting the system whereby fathers could not pass their wealth on to their families, and how the rich "spent everything they had", he declares: "These facts are worthy of serious consideration by those who believe that a principal cure for the evils from which America is suffering today is to be found in the confiscation of all property once a generation," (p.

205). There is a typographical error on p. 115, and Pressburg has been misspelled on p. 269.

The work contains a very useful note on some of the portraits of Sultan Suleiman (pp. 293-300), as well as a useful bibliographical note. The primary value of this life of Suleiman is that Professor Merriman has assembled in the pages of a single volume a fair-minded evaluation of one of the great rulers of the Sixteenth Century who should be better known today both by students of history and the general reader.

Miami University

HARRY N. HOWARD

GIBBERD, KATHLEEN, (British Survey Handbooks) Greece. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1944. Pp. vi, 106. \$1.25.

This is an interesting little book which should prove useful to those who would like to know something about Greece in the briefest possible time. It consists of six chapters, the first of which is devoted to the geography of the country, the second and the third, to its history, the fourth to the daily life of the people, the fifth to the economic structure of the country, and the sixth to the effects of the enemy occupation. It concludes with an appendix which deals with the local administration and the health services of the country, and an index. A map is also included.

The book is brief but sound. Particularly charming is the chapter on the daily life of the people. The compiler reveals an intimate knowledge of the life of the Greek people and has emphasized the characteristic aspects of this life. Talking of the hard life of the Greek peasant the compiler adds: "It would be a mistake to think of the Greek peasants as depressed and weary people. Quite the contrary is true as their gallant resistance to the enemy has shown. Their houses, their way of life, have grown out of an age-long struggle with difficult conditions and their intense interest in what is happening in the world and in their own country in particular, is born and bred in the national character." The statement is sound, as some of us here in America who have been born in Greece can testify. Sound also is the statement that "the best traditional culture of Greece ... is found in the folksongs, and this heritage . . . is in danger of being lost." Through their folksongs and their stories one gets to know the Greek people better than through any other means. They depict a people, as K. M. Dawkins has said in one of his most recent publications (Byzantion XVI, p. 379), "lively and witty; sometimes rather cynical . . . sensitive to sense impressions and to beauty."

The reviewer noticed a number of errors, but these hardly affect the general soundness of the book. Justinian did not reign from 482 to 567; he was not succeeded by Heraclius (the book has Haracleisos); the revolution which brought Venizelos to Greece for the first time did not occur in 1919 (this is obviously

a misprint; it should be 1909), and the Greek claim to northern Epirus is hardly an example of Greek imperialism as the compiler seems to think.

Rutgers University

PETER CHARANIS

NEWMAN, BERNARD, Balkan Background. New York: Macmillan, 1944. Pp. 354. \$2.50.

Newman's aim is primarily informational, to "represent the minimum of what we ought to know about the Balkans, if we are to form an opinion." In keeping with this purpose, the book falls into two distinct parts: by far the greater consists of a description of background and conditions in the various Balkan countries; a concluding section, "The New Balkans," surveys the problem as a whole and discusses in some detail Newman's suggestions for its solution.

There are minor flaws. The historian may balk at meeting the Emperor (sic) Belisarius in Constantinople in 559, and any reader may wish he were informed of Mr. Newman's authority for certain statements not yet universally accepted as established fact: Germany's rôle in King Boris' death, King Carol's promise of the Southern Dobrudja to the same Boris, the precise nature of the German offers to Turkey during this war, etc. There is, too, an element of glibness which tends to give the impression that certain situations are less difficult than is actually the case. Thus, the transfer of populations may indeed be a solution for troublesome boundary problems; it is nevertheless a device that should only be used with the greatest caution and as a very last resort. The "official" British position as stated in Mr. Churchill's pronouncements is at times too readily accepted at face value. But it would be unfair to labor these points. The flaws are definitely minor and dq not detract from the value of the book. The information is sound, the presentation well organized and clear, and the general treatment is nothing if not fair minded and sane.

A very important issue is that of the strength of nationalism in the Balkans, especially in view of Newman's advocacy of federation. Balkan nationalism is strong, according to Newman, who recognizes that a Balkan federation can only have meaning if Bulgaria is part of it. But Bulgaria, of whose difficulties we are given a very understanding account, cannot join in such a federation so long as she retains substantial grievances against her neighbors. On a smaller scale, and with certain important differences, we are reminded of the problem of Germany within Europe. At the same time, we must realize that the Balkan nations, Yugoslavia especially, are nations in the making. In a position comparable to that of western European nations some centuries ago, twentieth-century Yugoslavia may turn in one direction or the other depending upon the play of circumstances and personalities. But this very fluidity may also help the Balkans, for the application of the federal principle within Yugoslavia as a solution to her own internal frictions might be the very thing which would make it possible for Bulgaria to join such a federal state, incidentally circumventing the troublesome Macedonian issue.

Newman is quite right in pointing out that the troubles of the Balkan nations have been due not only to their own internecine quarrels, but perhaps even more to the interference of greater powers who have used these nations as pawns in their game of power politics. There is no denying that modern conditions favor the existence of large political units, and the Balkan federation, some 60,000,000 strong—to say nothing of the possibility of a larger grouping reaching to the Baltic—would be an asset both to its members and to European stability in general. Such a unit would still be confronted with serious economic problems: the Balkan lands are overpopulated, and their industrialization with the assistance of outside capital would create problems of its own, internal as well as international.

Whichever way one turns, Russia looms large on the Balkan horizon. Russian influence has always been an important factor among the Slavs. Russia as a power, whether Czarist or Communist, has merely used the Balkan nations for her own ends; with a possible exception in the case of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, she has so far taken a definite stand against federations. Newman feels certain that the Balkan peoples would be as opposed to any attempted control by Russia as by Germany or anyone else. Yet we must take into account the prevailing confusion of ideas and the possibility of using the current fluid state of affairs to establish internally a control which it might prove impossible to loosen subsequently. Such a struggle for power is going on at present throughout the Balkan world. In the Balkans and in Central Europe, Russia has a unique opportunity—and a commensurate responsibility. What she does with it will be a measure of her statesmanship.

Toward the understanding of the whole complex situation—the well reasoned exposition of the Balkan outlook (pp. 307-22) is particularly worth pondering—Newman has made a valuable contribution.

Queens College

RENE ALBRECHT-CARRIE

CHAMBERLIN, WILLIAM HENRY, The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. Pp. 91. \$1.75.

The author of this book is neither an obscure writer, nor a partisan nationalist, upholding an exile's propaganda rôle on behalf of his group. He belongs to that band of American foreign correspondents who in the last twenty-five years so courageously and fearlessly have sought to discover the truth of the European situation, and in spite of censorship, diplomatic frowning, and changing moods of popular opinion have endeavored to make that truth known. His volumes on the Russian Revolution, and those on the transformation process brought about by the Five Years' Plan give him the status of historian as well as of publicist. His knowledge of the Ukraine was gained not wholly in Moscow through the study of the old standard histories and the new standard histories, or from official government reports, but was acquired also by patient and laborious travel about the Ukraine itself where he had the opportunity of talking

with the people and observing on the spot the evidences of political and social feeling. His conclusions as historian and observer are contained in this modest book which may be read comfortably in the course of a single evening.

The thesis of the book is indicated in the sub-title, "A Submerged Nation". The question of whether the Ukrainian people constitute a self-conscious and politically-minded group has passed through such a swift revolution that many historians have not caught up with recent developments. While some would-be friends and defenders of the Soviet Union are still maintaining that Ukrainian nationalism is an artificial development of anti-Russian and fascist imagination, the official Soviet view recognizes freely and fully that the Ukrainian people have their own special tradition, culture and language. In an official history of the Ukraine published in Kiev in the Ukrainan language by the Academy of Science in 1941 there is ample historical material supporting Chamberlin's views as to the distinctive character of Ukrainian tradition and history.

While there is no longer any doubt concerning the existence of a distinctive Ukrainian group the real controversial aspect of the book centers around the question of submergence. The official Soviet view is that Ukrainians have now been given ample scope for the development of their culture and that they are politically satisfied within the framework of the Soviet Union. Mr. Chamberlin has serious reservations regarding this latter view. No honest historian or responsible official should neglect to read the evidence on this point which he has assembled in this book. The present world situation is too serious to permit any aspect of the European, and particularly the Central Euorpean field, to go unstudied.

The accommodation of nationalism within a larger framework of government is undoubtedly one of the most serious problems of our age. Mr. Chamberlin maintains that the extent of self-government given to the Ukrainians is not likely to continue to satisfy this virile people of over thirty million. Herein lies the significance of the situation for European stability. He pleads, not for a break-up of the Soviet Union but for a relaxation of centralized dictatorship. "A free Ukraine, no longer subject to political dictation from Moscow, united with other peoples of the Soviet Union by voluntary bonds of mutual economic interest, is an indispensable element in a free Europe and in a free world".

It is doubtful whether this solution would satisfy the nineteenth century concept of nationalism which demanded separation and sovereign independence. We are, however, living in times of political experimentation. We have, for example, a British Commonwealth of Nations, which though a dynamic going concern, defies old-fashioned juridical definition. Rampant nationalism was bred on a long continued denial of freedom which by a strange irony sometimes manifested a like tyranny when freed. The position in Western Society which we have now reached demands a balance of freedom within the framework of world society. This book ends with the problem of freedom.

University of Saskatchewan

GEO. W. SIMPSON

COHEN, ISRAEL, Vilna. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1943. Pp. 531. \$2.50.

Vilna is devoted to "the memory of the tens of thousands of Jews of Vilna who were martyred by Nazi Barbarity 1941-1943." The book offers a comprehensive history of the Jewish community in Vilna, which as a city, as the old capital of Lithuania, and as "the Jerusalem of Lithuania", exercised a peculiar spell over every visitor. The city was renowned for the architectural beauties of the Christian section of the city, but no less interesting were the so-called Jewish streets, narrow, medieval, with many remnants of ancient times in buildings and synagogues. In Vilna was the shrine of Saint Mary of Ostrobrama, celebrated by Adam Mickiewicz in his poem, "Pan Tadeusz". Here was the Great Synagogue as a mounment of the Jewish past, the Jewish Strashun Library and the Jewish Scientific Institute (Yivo). The city was very close to the hearts of the two main nationalities living in Vilna, Poles and Jews, in spite of continuing friction between them.

The founding of Vilna is attributed to Gedymin, the Grand Duke of Lithuania, who selected it, in 1322, as the capital of Lithuania. The Lithuanians created a powerful state largely comprised of a Ruthenian population, but it was the White Russians who prevailed at the court of the Grand Dukes in Vilna before Lithuania was united with Poland. After the union with Poland the city became Polish in an increasing measure and the same was true of the Lithuanian landed gentry. In spite of the equal status of the Lithuanians in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth the country became Polish and only the peasants retained their Lithuanian language and customs. The cities and the upper classes became Polish. Then came with the partitions of Poland, Russian domination and the

ascending influence of Russian culture and language.

The Jewish community of Vilna maintained, through all these changes in the political and cultural domination, a spirit of self-preservation and self-assertion. Living along the boundary between Poles and Russians, in a capital overwhelmingly Polish, but claimed by the Lithuanians as their historical capital, surrounded by a Polish and White Russian peasantry—they created a strong community life with features of a specific nationality to a degree unknown in other parts of Poland. Yiddish was the language of the masses as well as of the professional class and middle classes. A strong national Jewish sentiment was common to the whole Jewish population of Vilna. The city was famous for its learning in old Judaistic sciences, but famous also for its free thinkers opposed to the traditional Judaism. It had its traditional Hebrew colleges, yeshibbas, but it had also its secular progressive schools, elementary as well as secondary schools, all with Yiddish as the school language. Vilna has been in the past the scene of struggles between the Jewish sects, but here also was where the first Jewish Socialist Party, the 'Bund', was founded and started its modern political life as an independent participation of the Jews in the social and political developments in Eastern Europe. Vilna acquired the name of the

'Jerusalem of Lithuania', and managed to survive under conditions always unfavorable for the Jews. Poverty and discrimination were their fate in ancient as well as in modern times. They were persecuted as Jews under the Tsarist regime, and did not enjoy equal rights under the new Polish rule in spite of constitutional and international guarantees. The Jews of Vilna developed under those adverse conditions almost incredible qualities of stubbornness and endurance.

Mr. Cohen's book is a rich source of information. The author leads us through the early history of Vilna, through the times of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the partitions of Poland, the Russian domination and then again under Polish rule. He gives also a good account of the internal organization of the Jewish Community and its religious and cultural life. But we miss an adequate description of the living conditions of the surrounding populations. Conceivably this is a shortcoming implicit in any similar monograph. But in the last analysis the life of the Jewish community was, in spite of all individual features, a part of the life of the city and of the country. The outside influence on the cultural and political trends of the Vilna Jewry seems also rather neglected. Nevertheless it is a book that one can hardly afford to overlook if interested in Jewish history in Poland and Lithuania.

According to the Polish census of 1931 Vilna had a population of 195,000, of which 54,000 was Jewish. This figure increased until 1939, and in consequence of the war thousands of Jewish refugees from other parts of Poland escaped to Vilna. The number of Jews at the time of the German invasion and occupation was estimated at 70,000-80,000. This entire number was killed by the Germans, the whole community was extirpated with a ruthlessness and cruelty unknown in the history of mankind. The author was mistaken in hoping that the figures of those slaughtered by the Germans were exaggerated. They were not. When the Russians entered the city they found 1,500 Jews, saved by the assistance of their Christian neighbors. The rest were killed. Now living in Vilna are 4,000 Jews—a mere fragment of the former community.

But it is only right and just to add that the Vilna Jews proved to the last that they were worthy of their fame. When the Germans started the liquidation of the Vilna ghetto, the Jews organized an armed resistance, and when defeated, the remnant fled to the woods and organized partisan groups which continued to resist the Germans. One can share in the author's opinion that they "will remain a source of comfort, of pride and inspiration to their people for countless generations".

New York City

IGNACY ALEKSANDROWICZ

Rose, W. J., The Rise of Polish Democracy. London: Bell & Sons, 1944. Pp. 248. 10s.

In this time of great confusion and sweeping generalizations on the Polish issue, Professor Rose's book is an important contribution to the understanding of the Polish problem. It is not an overnight book but one written by a man

of competence, based on first class sources and very carefully planned. It is the outcome of years of study. Professor Rose spent years in Poland and not only speaks the language fluently but thoroughly understands the Polish people, their literature and history; and he is a true scientist in his objectivity.

Rose begins his discussion of Polish democracy by an analysis of its background from the sixteenth century up to the present, but he does not make the mistake, so often committed, of allowing the past to overshadow the present. He devotes much more space to the important eighteenth century, and the greater part of the book to contemporary Poland so that it is well balanced and presents a clear picture of the history of Polish democracy.

After 1815 the Poles were faced by a dilemma: whether to start a new insurrection or to devote themselves to "organic" work, that is, to making the most out of a bad situation and to concentrating on the development of culture. industry, and agriculture without attempting to gain full political independence. This issue had a decisive influence upon the political life of Poland until 1918, since a section of the Poilsh People (after 1863 especially the middle and property owning classes), advocated "organic" or "positive" work and rejected the path of insurrections. The other section directed their efforts to the direct struggle for independence and rejected all compromises. The first group provided the founders of Polish industry and modern agriculture; the second, the insurrectionists and revolutionary leaders. In fact, the greater part of the Polish population has never fully accepted the compromise and has always longed for freedom and independence. The insurrectionists, unlike the "positivists", finally won the support of the popular masses who, at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, were grouped around the socialist movement (Polish Socialist Party). The creative work of the positivists should be recognized, but the insurrectionists kept alive the spirit of freedom and liberty and the democratic heritage of Poland.

In spite of the fact that Professor Rose is a good friend of Poland, he never, in his book, loses his objectivity and critical judgment, especially with regard to the inter-war period. The general situation in Poland after 1918 he summarizes as follows:

Although enjoying on paper a generous, even extreme measure of free institutions, the republic of Poland did not realise nearly all of them in practice. The chief reason for this lay in the fact that too many Poles regarded the commonwealth as a sort of Joint Stock Company, of which the majority of shares were in Polish hands. Many of them, however, were in non-Polish hands. All the shareholders profited from their dividends, but in the meetings that decided on plans and policy, only the Poles were to be allowed to play a deciding part! Put another way: the republic was a mansion, in which the Poles were the owners and masters, the non-Poles on the other hand tenants, or paying guests. It has even been charged that not all of the tenants had equal rights: Germans and Ukrainians could do things that were not permitted to Jews!

But in spite of this fact, there was democracy in Poland and even some of its features survived after 1930. And here Professor Rose enumerates the following elements, among others:

- (i) The fact that the forms of parliamentary usage were preserved, that there was thus provided a forum for the ventilation of grievances, that the Parties were not dissolved but continued (though under difficulties) to carry on their work, and that the Diet still exercised a large measure of control over the purse-strings of the nation. Where such conditions obtain, there can be no talk of totalitarianism.
- (ii) The fact that the Press, including the Party organs, was allowed a great deal of freedom for the discussion of public issues, and that this was used—in some cases even abused—to the full. It is quite true that a Censorship did exist, and that cases of unjust treatment increased as time went on: but it is also true that this Censorship was often stupid rather than stern, and that in the long run the daily and other papers did say what they wanted to.
- (v) The fact that the Trades Unions were not interfered with, even those that were Socialist in sentiment: institutions that exercised a strong influence both in town and country, and were to a large extent opposed to the policy of those in power.

In fact, since 1930, the oppression of Polish democratic parties and movements became steadily stronger, and from 1937-1938, the ruling groups also tried to follow a totalitarian pattern. What is important is the fact that the feelings of the masses against totalitarianism were so strong that although the ruling groups controlled the government, it was not easy to introduce full totalitarianism in the face of active resistance against it on the part of the peasants and workers, culminating in strikes and riots.

But Poland was not the only country in Central and Eastern Europe where democratic movements were suppressed in the thirties, and here Professor Rose states again:

Judged by the liberal standards suggested above, there was hardly a democracy in Europe when the war broke out in 1939—the more's the pity. There was a varying degree of approximations, and there were a number of States which had eschewed democracy and all that it stood for. Poland belonged emphatically among the former, rather than among the latter. There was more of the theory and practice of democracy at work than appeared on the surface, and there was a horror of totalitarianism.

In analyzing the Polish situation and Polish current history, (1918-39) a distinction should be made between the people and the government. Since 1926, the Polish government has become less and less democratic, and in the 1930's th dictatorial, semi-totalitarian influences became stronger and stronger, but the large masses of the people, in opposition to the government, remained attached to the democratic principles and the semi-totalitarian parties in Poland never won over mass support as they were able to in such countries as Germany.

In his book, Professor Rose discusses all of these developments. It is a well written and a most important guide for a student of Eastern European affairs.

New York City

Feliks Gross

Gerschenkron, Alexander, Bread and Democracy In Germany. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1943. Pp. 238. \$2.75.

The major part of this study is a careful analysis of Prussian agriculture, the part played by protectionism and the Junker influence in this field. It covers the period from the 1890's to 1933 and gives us a good picture of a powerful German pressure group.

However, the author takes for granted that the agricultural policies of the German Reich were largely of Junker origin. This may have been true but the facts given do not establish it. It could indeed be said that the Junkers served the state loyally, contributed heavily to the civil service and the army, but beyond that their influence seems to be assumed rather than proved. In her study of The Junkers in the Prussian administration under William II, 1888-1914, Lysbeth Walker Muncy confirms the Junker influence but does not sustain the thesis of Junker supremacy. It is generally admitted that the Junkers constituted a powerful pressure group, but such statements as: "... that it was primarily the Junkers who lifted Hitler into the saddle" (p. 183) and "The fate of German democracy depends largely on the solutions of the agricultural problem in that country" (p. 173), need more evidence than is submitted. The idea that part of East Prussia is not good agricultural land is well taken, but the author's solution of the German agricultural problem seems impractical. His solution is too complicated and depends too much on international cooperation.

In the field of Political Science the author seems to be on unfamiliar ground. His use of the term democracy shows his lack of an understanding of political terms. Everything not supporting his economic theories he holds as undemocratic. He overlooks the fact that pressure groups also exist in a democracy; that the period of the 1930's saw agriculture in a bad way, not only in Germany, but all over the world; that agriculture succeeded in getting government aid almost everywhere, not only in Germany. Why does the fact that the Junkers received aid set them off as so very exceptional? Had the author been content to give us a study of German agriculture, he would have accomplished what he was trained to do. Since he has chosen to go beyond that and link up German agriculture with Germany's political future, her past, the coming of the Nazis, democracy, future democracy, and world peace, he has attempted too much. The author maintains that not only does German democracy depend on German agriculture, but that unless the agricultural problem is solved no democratic peace is possible, that it then will be necessary to ruthlessly oppress the German nation in order to escape a third world war. To do this the Junkers ". . . who have been authors or co-authors of all the acts of aggression perpetrated by Germany in the last seventy or eighty years" (p. 173), must be eliminated. It is difficult

to take Mr. Gerschenkron seriously. He is presenting a popularly held prejudice; he presents no evidence to sustain it. We need objective studies not emotional tirades, and the public looks to the academic world to supply them. When the author says that "... if the grain of the Junkers grows, the grain of German democracy will wither and perish from the earth" (p. 224), he is making democracy look ridiculous. The study has value only as far as it is a history of German agriculture.

University of Arizona

O. H. WEDEL

DOBERER, K. K., The United States of Germany. London: Lindsay Drummond, 1944. Pp. 168. 7s. 6d.

At a time when so much thought is being devoted to the problem of what to do with Germany after the war, this volume is of particular interest, for it offers a solution by a German democrat. It is written by a refugee who prior to his flight from the Reich in 1933 was active in the republican Reichsbanner organization in Nuremberg and for a number of years was on the editorial staff of the Socialist newspaper, Fränkische Tagespost, published in that city. Three years after his flight he was deprived of his German citizenship and his property because of his anti-Nazi writings. The author seeks to show that Germany's salvation can be obtained only by the conversion of the Reich into a federation of self-governing pacific republics. Most of his space he has used to show, by citing incidents from 1860 to 1933, that "a desire for self-government and federal independence lies latent . . . in the German people", and he asserts that "it would be wrong for the world to prevent Germany from abolishing German war centralism once and for all in favor of a United States of Germany, which would play its part towards paving a way for European Federal Union." As in the case of many German writers, he endeavors to make the Allies responsible, at least in part, for German failures in the past. The Allies in 1918-1919, he maintains, paid no heed to the demand in Southern Germany for a United States of Germany "because, as Mr. Hoover had stated in his capacity as U.S.A. secretary for foreign affairs (sic/), the government in Berlin was the best guarantee against Bolshevism." The author is vehemently against Prussianism and militarism, both of which, he contends, thrive on centralization. He denounces the liberal Weimar constitution as a "pseudodemocratic system," and the so-called Baden system of proportional representation as actually a device for preventing the elector from choosing his Reichstag representative directly. In the matter of centralization of authority he apparently thinks that Ebert, Scheidemann, and other Majority Socialist leaders were as bad as any Prussian militarist. He deplores anything in the way of "a hierarchical state order" and advocates instead "an organic society in which administration is built up from co-ordinated organisms on the base." Such a state would have "more regard for the welfare of the individual citizen than the efficiency of the state machine."

The author makes specific constructive proposals for his United States

of Germany. It should consist of a league of from five to eight states. Though reluctant to draw boundaries, he names five possible units in the federation: A South German Republic (Swabia, Franconia, Bavaria), a Rhineland Republic, a Central German Republic (Saxony, Brunswick, Thuringia), a Northern Republic (territory between the Elbe and the North Sea, including Hamburg), an East Elbian Republic (territory between the Elbe and the Baltic, including Berlin). He makes no mention of Austria, East Prussia, or Silesia. The federal capital should not be in Berlin but in some city not too large nor too small; he suggests Halle. The president of the United States of Germany "should be an energetic executant of the people's will, i.e. his status should be more similar to that of the president of the United States of North America". Members of the parliaments of the several states should be elected by direct ballot from single member constituencies, and the state parliaments, in turn, should elect the members of the federal parliament, which would thus "constitute nothing more than a higher chamber of the united state parliaments." To prevent a member of the federal parliament from getting out of touch with the will of his home state, no one should be eligible to sit in the federal parliament for two consecutive terms, and each should be subject to recall by a two-third's vote of the state parliament which first elected him. The federal ministers should be responsible to the federal parliament, but—to increase the influence of the states—certain important portfolios should be held only by members of the federal parliament. Thus, if a state recalled a member, he would lose his portfolio. And obviously, since no member might succeed himself in the federal parliament, a new election would bring a change in all important ministries. What this would do to ministerial stability can well be imagined. The author is most suspicious of federal control of foreign policy and finance. How far he would go to prevent centralization the following excerpt indicates:

we would recommend that the postal service remain under a central organization, which shall have power to decide the size, colour, and value of stamps. But in view of the propagandist possibilities afforded by the pictorial matter, each state shall be empowered to decide upon the picture which best gives

expression to its own characteristic features.

The author also believes, somewhat too hopefully, that after this war "no German democrat would contemplate the idea of regarding war as anything but a crime against humanity in general and the German people in particular." Therefore any mention of war in the new German constitution

must take the form of a statement that war is outside the constitution and law, and that no federated state of the German Union could be forced to support any form of war whatever, no matter whether it was termed a war of defence, a people's war or a war for hearth and home.

The volume probably indicates the somewhat natural strong reaction of a German democrat to Nazi totalitarianism. But that in all its details it presents a feasible plan for postwar Germany seems doubtful.

Indiana University

F. LEE BENNS

Nizer, Louis, What To Do With Germany. Chicago-New York: Ziff-Davis, 1944. Pp. 213. \$2.50.

Mr. Nizer is a lawyer who has devoted much of his spare time to the study of contemporary international relations. In this concise little work he deals with his subject in the brisk and orderly manner of a successful attorney. On the whole his line of argument is fair, at least in so far as it consists of an analysis of what is the matter with Germany. This is not to say that his diagnosis, and much less his cure, will meet with anything resembling universal approval. That would be too much to expect from any book dealing with the German Question.

He first reviews, briefly but adequately, the chief proposals for curbing Germany's internationally anti-social behavior. He finds them to be "medicines without cure," and therefore proceeds to his own analysis of the ills and his own prescription of therapeutic treatment. He charges the German people—as a people—with a long and black record of moral irresponsibility toward the political and military activities of their leaders. This irresponsibility, he finds, is by now so ingrained in the character and mass mores of the Germans that only the most drastic measures can effect a real and lasting reform. Chapters III and V are devoted to his concrete suggestions for bringing about this reform: (1) punishment, not for revenge but to satisfy ineluctable demands of justice; (2) the demilitarization and long-term control of Germany's economic life by international action; (3) the re-education of the Germans, partly by their own efforts, but partly through necessary outside intervention and supervision. Chapter VI contains the author's ideas on world organization, in which he stresses the value of regional federation. Chapter VII is a useful summary of the whole book. Those who seek Mr. Nizer's theory "in a nutshell" will find it here.

Taken as a whole, one feels justified in saying that the book is begun on solid ground but gradually shifts to the realm of political unreality. Perhaps the reviewer is unduly pessimistic about the possibility of "reforming" either the Germans or ourselves. At any rate, he must record that he feels no confidence in the willingness of the civilized world to do those things which must be done if we really want to save ourselves, and the German people, from German militarism.

University of Denver

ROBERT GALE WOOLBERT

Von Mises, Ludwig, Omnipotent Government. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944. Pp. 291. \$3.75.

In this book the author, like so many European scholars, attempts to teach Americans the error in their economic and political trends by holding before their eyes the worst of all possible examples—the Germans. The device used is the one common to certain kinds of propaganda well-known in our own country the worst in bureaucratic intervention is contrasted with the best in an imaginary world of laissez-faire to show that the former leads inevitably to dictatorship and war.

His thesis is that omnipotent government is the result of deliberate intervention in economic affairs by those of socialist inclination, and that the result of this is a form of intense nationalism which makes free trade impossible and war inevitable. There is no middle ground between free enterprise and omnipotent government and no hope for the cessation of wars except in a return to the international gold standard and free trade.

Aside from this thesis which is restated many times, the book is difficult to review, for Von Mises' observations cover everything in the field of current international problems: the final disposition of Germany, the peace schemes, world planning, military affairs, and of course the whole range of German development as it touches upon these problems. Professor Von Mises missed an excellent opportunity to present helpful solutions to the world's difficulties which in the long run require the application of reason to the immediate situation. I can see no useful accomplishment in a broadside against the world as it is because it is unlike the hypothetical world which exists only in the mind of Von Mises.

There is much genuine scholarship and relevant observation in the book—especially upon developments in Germany—but these are outweighed, so far as this reviewer is concerned, by the exasperation which the reader feels because of the dogmatic simplifications which the author leaves unsupported by fact. For those who know their Germany it is no less revolting to learn that it was socialism that produced Hitlerism than to read, from those with extremely different views, that Hitlerism was due solely to sabotage of the Republic by Big Business.

No less disturbing are such passages as these. "All civilizations have up to now been based on private ownership of the means of production." "Governments have always looked askance at private property. Governments are never liberal from inclination." "From time immemorial governments have been eager to interfere with the working of the market mechanism. Their endeavors have never attained the ends sought." "The aim of the protective tariff is to undo the undesired consequences of the rise in domestic costs of production caused by government interference." "Almost all the monopolies that are assailed by public opinion and against which governments pretend to fight are government made."

Professor Von Mises uses "government" as an invidious abstraction apart from the individual and groups that give it life. It is the enemy against which we must either fight or stand in constant dread while we are devoured. This is untrue at least for American experience, and it is presumably for American consumption that the author raises the bogey. How can anyone who knows the story of government interference in the United States present "interference" to the reading public as something imposed by a special entity known as "government", from which apparently all group interests are divorced? Who were the Socialists in the administration throughout our tariff history? Or, at the inception of our railroad and utility regulation? My grocer and druggist would

doubtless read Professor Von Mises' book with unmitigated glee, but they were both responsible for the most unsatisfactory form of "government interference" on the statute books—the Robinson-Patman Act, and the Fair Trade and Unfair Practices Acts in the states. One could continue in this vein ad nauseam.

Von Mises tells us that "whoever wishes to understand the present state of political affairs must study history." A study of American history reveals one pertinent observation that cannot be denied; namely, that whenever the federal government has interfered with business in the past, it has done so, not out of an original intent on the part of Congress to interfere with private property, but because some group politically powerful found that some other group economically powerful or threatening was infringing upon the property rights of the former. The conflict of government versus property rights has its source in the competitive struggle of property rights versus property rights and there is no point in ignoring its complexities. Whether capitalism can be reconciled with the aggregate of "interference" which has mushroomed throughout the world remains to be seen. The problem for us today is to deal with it as it is and not from an assumption that "there is no third system between a market economy and socialism." To solve our problems we cannot use as a starting point either the "new earth" of the eighteenth century philosophers or the isolated example of Germany.

Granted that intervention in business may lead to economic isolation and nationalism and war; granted that the restoration of free trade would benefit all, it is still helpful in the present crisis to assume that we shall or can go back to the pure, unfettered market mechanism and leave the small competitor to the mercy of the large. For it is precisely that paradox involved in competition which has led small business to secure the services of government in their conflict against larger and more efficient ones; that has induced the small retail outlets to enlist government in their struggle against the chains. This is far more realistic, at least for us, than to assume a conspiracy between labor and government to fix high wages, thus increasing costs, and then following through with tariffs to protect the produce against competition from the outside.

This reviewer suggests that, after reading Omnipotent Government, the reader peruse the periodic reports of the Smaller War Plants Corporation.

University of Colorado

CLAY P. MALICK

Feis, Herbert, The Sinews of Peace. New York: Harpers, 1944. Pp. xi, 271. \$2.50.

The current book trade supplies the reader with innumerable treatises on future economic relations, warning, advising, imploring the man in the street and the statesman not to resort in the future to economic policies based on shortsighted economic egoism. Many of these books are based on intoxicated political speeches and on an excess of imagination in the expectation that future economic intercourse of nations will be principally founded on impersonal stand-

ards of social justice arrived at rationally. Many overrate the preparedness of strong nations to build up quickly an extensive and workable mechanism for intimate economic intercourse within the international community. Others disregard political realities, making bold assumptions about the close interrelation of absolute moral principles and relative standards of daily politics. Mr. Feis' reviewed book here avoids fallacies caused by thinking of the foreign policies of nations in too skeptical and too utopian terms.

Indeed *The Sinews of Peace* represents a penetrating balanced and responsible interpretation of controllable and uncontrollable political forces in the economic intercourse of nations. Vast experience in practical economic life and in government service, fine scholarship reinforced by a fluency of expression and last but not least intellectual courage has enabled the author to advance propositions which are easily understandable and realistic in a sincere attempt toward permanent peace.

The book is principally devoted to an investigation of the desirable course of economic relations of the United States with foreign countries after the Second World War. Mr. Feis attempts to be explicit on what points the national interest of the United States may coincide, or may conflict, with other (national and international) interests. The author sharply opposes political Darwinism as a guiding principle in reconciling really or potentially conflicting social interests. In his opinion the people and the Government of the United States bear historic responsibility for a future regime of freedom, justice and security in international economic relations.

Of course, the writer's task would have been much easier if past and current political doctrine had been more successful in clarifying the usual generalizations about what the common interest of the international community is. Thus, the reader must not be disappointed if the book does not develop in detail what the "sound" common ends of international economic intercourse are (Ch. 24). Mr. Feis cautions laymen and demagogues alike that fundamental inequalities in economic standards of nations may be moderated only by dealing with underlying political conditions.

Between an introductory and a concluding part four main sections of the study deal with International Monetary Relations, International Investment, Trade between Nations, and the International Aspects of the Trade with Foodstuffs and Raw Materials.

Mr. Feis analyzes the significance of monetary measures as a regulator of economic activities. The reader will find within a relatively short space an excellent historical and critical discussion of the Bretton Woods Plan for an International Monetary Fund. The importance of currency stability and the dangers from frequent and abrupt changes in currency relations are discussed in terms interesting to laymen and experts. Mr. Feis designates as the greatest shortcoming of the currency stabilization agreement the Fund's inability to satisfy very urgent requirements of certain countries, thus, making it imperative to seek

other sources, unless these countries adopt policies adverse to the purposes of the Fund. Conversely, the structure of the Fund may induce certain countries to use the resources of the Fund in an extravagant manner to gain small advantages. Thus he sees a basic discrepancy between the quotas and the financial needs of certain countries. This discrepancy is an obstacle to moderating temporary disequilibria in the balance of payments. The situation feared by Mr. Feis can be considerably mollified by intelligent management of the Fund. It is no secret that at Bretton Woods this objection was dealt with in detail. The resulting provisions gave the executive agencies sufficient power to stop extravagances or to apply liberal policies.

The section of this volume on international investment deals on the one hand with fundamental problems of American policies in connection with the movement of capital and on the other hand with the reasoned criticism of the Bretton Woods Proposal of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The hazards and benefits to the United States derived from foreign investments are taken up in the most objective way. Mr. Feis' evaluation of American investment policies in the interwar period states that so-called direct investments were the most satisfactory type of capital exports, whereas other forms of investment, often incompetently placed, led to losses and disappointment. He describes in dramatic terms how the funds lent by American banks to continental European institutions were recovered, contributing "to the ruin of monetary systems and the suffocation of trade during the depression." Mr. Feis envisages the possibility that the International Bank "could engage in operations detrimental to our interests or contrary to our ideas, provided dollars were not required." According to him, "no positive conclusion is possible as to the way in which the prospects of private capital would be affected by the creation of an international financial institution such as that proposed at Bretton Woods." One may safely state that the influence of the United States in the International Bank will be so great (even if no formal veto power is established) that policies violating the interests or wishes of the United States would lead to to the disintegration of this structure. Furthermore, one may assume that the executive agencies of the Bank will have every reason to placate decent private banking interests. The attitude of Mr. Feis toward the International Bank is generally favorable.

In Part IV the author offers a brief but pungent discussion of the defects of international trade in the interwar period. His discussion of American commercial policy is sincere and able. If the reader finds his treatment of future trade relations between the United States and Great Britain too fragmentary, he will realize that this brevity is due to the unpredictable future political situation. However, there are many fruitful suggestions related to this subject. Mr. Feis regards it as uncertain whether or not the United Kingdom in the next few years will maintain any measure of control over foreign exchange payments other than over capital movements. This reviewer assumes that the probability that the

United Kingdom in the next few years will free completely from restrictions its exchange payments with reference to current transactions is very slight. Should there be a situation which would permit the United Kingdom to eliminate all exchange restrictions (except for capital movements) it would certainly be a sign of rapidly improving trade relations all over the world. Mr. Feis treats too briefly his proposed agreements between the United States and Great Britain providing for the latter "generous opportunity for exports." These agreements should be supplemented by permanent understandings for mutual financial aid. They should make it possible for each country to acquire the right to draw on the other up to a specified maximum amount of currency paying in exchange with her own currency.

The author discusses international questions related to foodstuffs and raw materials with great skill. His criticism of supply regulation plans and buffer stocks is original and furnishes a good guide to see these modern devices of trade stabilization realistically. One may ask why Mr. Feis neglected a discussion of international aspects of the production and trade in manufactured and semi-manufactured commodities. Little mention is made in this volume of agreements among private entrepreneurs in international trade (cartels) coordinating supplies and prices to the benefit or detriment of a desired balanced expansion.

The Sinews of Peace is a very valuable contribution to the current literature on international economic intercourse. As such, it deserves a wide reading by experts and laymen alike.

University of North Carolina

ERVIN HEXNER

BARTLETT, RUHL J., The League to Enforce Peace. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944. Pp. x, 252. \$3.00.

Of all the groups which, during World War I, labored strenuously to win the American public to the cause of a League of Nations, unquestionably the League to Enforce Peace was the most powerful. Its influence stemmed not only from the simple, clear creed which it early espoused but from its illustrious supporters who mobilized not only the "best minds" of the Republican party, for a time including Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, but also much of the leadership on the Democratic side and virtually all the leadership among the intelligentsia. It became the prime mover in crystallizing an idea and activating a program due to the energy of men like Lowell and Taft who, down to mid-1916, managed astutely to win for its program the support of President Wilson, yet kept it out of party politics. That later, in 1917-18, it made a league to enforce peace a cardinal part of a nation-wide victory program and brought it home with carefully planned publicity to increasing segments of our public, is also a matter of known record. Reaching its pinnacle in May, 1919, it eventually tragically dissipated its massed power and influence, because its leadership split on domestic partisan issues and imperceptibly allowed itself to be maneuvered into the anti-Wilson camp. How this debacle actually occurred can now be, and has

been, told by an eminent historian from Tufts College.

What gives to Professor Bartlett's study of the rise and fall of the organization its imprimatur of high and practically final authority is his access to—and meticulous use of—the hitherto largely untapped resources of the League's Central Office files in the Widener Library, the Edward A. Filene Collection in the Woodrow Wilson Library, and the Taft, Lowell, Root, Bryan, and Vance McCormick papers at the Library of Congress. Following a concise summary of the American Peace Movement down to 1914, the author portrays, in subsequent chapters, with high fidelity and sympathetic insight, the founding of the League, the warm public response to the League idea, how the League became a war aim of the United States and how, initially, the organization supported the League of Nations Covenant. Not easy going, all of it, but, on the whole, a development free from vitriolic personal polemics.

Not so the other part of the story. The second half of the volume has to deal with as venomous a political controversy as has ever run its course among us—one in which two of the keenest intellects in the country, Root and Lodge, were in league to destroy the Covenant and all its works. In assessing responsibility for the "decline and fall" of the organization, Bartlett courageously hews to the line, sparing no one, but never overstepping the bounds of propriety, while marshalling his evidence deftly and convincingly. In the process, the leonine figure of Elihu Root shrivels perceptibly. Taft, caught between loyalty to the League and loyalty to the Republican party, first stalled, then equivocated, and finally capitulated ignominiously to the party wire pullers. Under the coolly perspicacious scrutiny of the Tufts historian, he loses much of his stature and virtually all of his statesmanship. Of the famous "31" who round-robined for Harding and the League of 1920, only A. Lawrence Lowell ultimately had the stamina to confess, avoid, and regret.

As the American people once again face, in the forthcoming San Francisco Conference, the problem of participating in a general international organization, the lessons of the League to Enforce Peace assume new and vital significance. Bartlett's volume should command a wide reading and receive the serious attention which its final "perspective" merits. As a warning against the excess of partisan strife this is an eloquent new tract pointing out a historic Chronology of Failure which our generation should avoid repeating.

University of California at Los Angeles

MALBONE W. GRAHAM

MARSTON, F. S., The Peace Conference of 1919. Organization and Procedure.
Oxford University Press, 1944. Pp. 276. 12s. 6d.

The renewed interest in the Paris Peace Conference rightly shown everywhere has induced the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London to issue this study on the organization and procedure of the last peace congress. This gives it an increased standing and an importance not wholly warranted by

the book as such. The author, it is true, has surveyed the printed field quite well; he has also seen the British Minutes, the so-called 'IC.' series (now available through the documents on The Paris Peace Conference issued by the State Department); but he has been unable to produce a readable book:—it is a time-table and a collection of notes rather than a book. Call it schoolmasterly, if you will, but not masterly, painstaking rather than scholarly.

This is not altogether Dr. Marston's fault. The Paris Conference worked in a haphazard manner, without proper plan—how then could any book on its procedure be anything but jerky and unsatisfactory? Dr. Marston asks for more planning ahead. Everybody would agree. But can it be done when so many of the necessary requisites to sound planning are as yet unknown? Moreover, real peace planning must be done by an enlightened and well informed public and cannot be left to a governmental department. This side of peace-making is outside the scope of this book. Sometimes it seems to be outside the scope of European statesmanship as well.

The author thinks that the Paris Conference made a mistake when they listened to the "dull uninspiring" statements through which the representatives of the Small Powers tried to further their cause. To other students these statements, e.g. by Venizelos, Beneš, Dmowski and others, appear to this day both brilliant and inspiring. Our author, it seems, accepts the snobbish attitude of Mr. Harold Nicolson who confessed that he was frightfully bored. Dr. Marston also echoes his criticism of the long-winded procedure of the Council of Ten and declares himself highly satisfied with the new method, adopted in March 1919. when the Big Three began to make up their mind without outside witnesses. Again, there appears no justification for such judgment. The fact that the Big Three decided upon a compromise did not in itself make for a better and more durable solution. In fact, some of the most short-lived and doubtful decisions seem to have been arrived at just in those triangular meetings. Not even the experts, e.g. of the American Inquiry, are safe from Dr. Marston's displeasure. He mauls them severely, singling out, with as much gusto as this otherwise dull book allows, the expert on Polish questions, Dr. Lord.

Finally, Dr. Marston repeats the criticism that two precious months passed by after the Armistice before the Conference met, and that another two months were lost before the real problems of importance were tackled. He thus ignores the fact that Britain held elections before Lloyd George went to Paris and that very important preliminary meetings took place all through November and December, 1918. He also brushes aside the creation of the League, practically accomplished by the end of January, 1919. He does not consider the question whether a longer cooling-off period would not have produced better results. Over fiftyone months of embittered fighting were followed by a mere eight weeks of Armistice—can mankind switch over from war to the mood which is necessary for reaching a permanent settlement of world-wide peace in quite so short a time? Dr. Marston still maintains that those weeks were wasted.

The book is provided with a Foreword by Professor C. K. Webster which gives him a chance to say: "I have myself seen most of the official documents that have not been at Dr. Marston's disposal"—if it were not for the State Department they would still be withheld from the public. And he adds: "It was one of my tasks to inform the peace-makers of the work of the Congress of Vienna. I cannot say that my monograph made any difference to the decisions that were taken at Paris." Why say it then? Neither the Institute nor the author of Castlereagh need such advertisement.

Elizabeth College, Buxton, England. F. W. PICK

GROSS, FELIKS, Crossroads of Two Continents. A Democratic Federation of East-central Europe. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945. Pp. x, 162. \$2.00.

This relatively brief volume is a highly important addition to the growing literature on multinational organization of regional scope developed by the application of federal principles. The volume is primarily concerned with some of the more recent plans for such a structure in east-central Europe, a region which, on prewar maps, embraced a cordon of small and medium-sized states between the Soviet Union and Germany, ranging from the Baltic to the Aegean. The author, a distinguished Polish sociologist, is currently the editor of the magazine New Europe and has for a number of years been secretary-general of the Central and Eastern European Planning Board consisting of representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Greece with headquarters in New York. He is consequently in a position to speak with authority on postwar political and other plans of the states of this general area.

The book presents a masterly analysis of the historical trend towards greater political and economic integration among the states in this part of Europe since 1848. Many of the proposals to this end, both official and unofficial, are examined, and several of the more recent ones are reprinted in extenso in the appendices. The author himself emphatically endorses federation as a political and economic solution for the area in question. It is for him a solution consistent with the logic of history and the practical demands of the moment. At the same time, he appears to be less concerned with blueprints than with the principles which shall guide the application of the federal idea and with the significance of regional federal solutions for universal organization. Dr. Gross' conception of federalism has not been derived from the students of the public law of the United States or the Australian Commonwealth. It is a much more generous conception than they could supply, being loose enough to embrace confederations, special forms of autonomy within a state, and even diplomatic ententes. Thus interpreted, he would apply the principle not only to regional unions of states but also to the internal structure of member states of a federation. He also believes that a regional federation, such as is proposed for east-central Europe, should be regarded as a subfederation of a still larger continental federation embracing all Europe, which in turn might become a constituent unit of a global federation. The author also insists that a democratic internal structure is the sine qua non of every level of a federation; any attempt to exclude this principle or to bring together political entities with democratic and non-democratic ideologies would, in his opinion, be foredoomed to failure.

Dr. Gross has presented a conception of pluralistic political integration leading towards a world order which, in some respects, resembles the ideas of the thinkers of the early seventeenth century, particularly those of Johannes Althusius. It is a conception which is out of fashion among present day architects of world organization. Indeed the idea of federation as applied to eastcentral Euorpe, or for that matter to Europe as a whole, as Dr. Gross points out, has met with the unqualified opposition of Soviet Russia. Yet it is reasonably clear that unless this idea of vertical organization is ultimately assimilated to our global political plans, these must prove inadequate and unrealistic. Mere indiscriminate association on a horizontal basis of all nations, great and small, in a global union can only produce a patchwork in which the large will inevitably dominate the small—in other words, a great-power alliance thinly obscured by the formal apparatus of a universal organization. Such a situation can be avoided only if the smaller states, in regions such as the one identified by the author, are permitted to pool their power and interests in an intermediate union to balance the world's larger states and great empires. Moreover, current plans for global organization, even if supplemented by vague formulas of regional cooperation such as are envisaged in the Act of Chapultepec, will provide no adequate solution for the recurrent political rivalry and disintegrated economic structure of such politically balkanized areas as east-central Europe or similar regions in Europe and elsewhere. For this reviewer it is a source of profound regret that the world will have to await the test of experience in order to prove the wisdom of such ideas as those expressed by the author of this book.

New York University

ARNOLD J. ZURCHER

LEMKIN, RAPHAEL, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944. Pp. xxxviii, 674. \$7.50.

Professor Lemkin's book might be considered an almost complete "legal encyclopedia" of the German occupation during World War II, with mention, in addition, of the military occupation effected by other Axis States. Other authors so far have either confined themselves to descriptions of the legal framework or the practical workings of the German occupation machinery in individual countries, or to an analysis of a single aspect of that machinery in all the occupied countries. In this field, Professor Lemkin, Polish scholar and lawyer, has done some remarkable work by publishing The Legal Framework of Totalitarian Control Over Foreign Economies (American Bar Association, Indianapolis, 1941), and Law and Lawyers in the European Subjugated Countries (North Carolina Bar Association, Bar Association,

ation, Durham, N. C., 1942). In Axis Rule in Occupied Europe Professor Lemkin presents an over-all picture of the subject. Not a single sector of the political, administrative or economic phase in the life of the occupation is omitted from the author's list. All are painstakingly analyzed from the point of view of changes forced upon these countries by the German authorities. Every conclusion of the author is based on German source material and many German decrees and laws have been translated and reprinted in full. Professor Lemkin deserves high praise for both the quantity and the quality of his research. While the approaching end of hostilities in Europe promises an early release of new and important source material—in quantities unavailable at the time of the author's research—it is almost certain that no future historian or student of German rule in the occupied countries will be able to overlook these findings.

The chapter on "Genocide" is one of the most important. This was unanimously emphasized by the reviewers, a circumstance which augurs well for the early and general acceptance of the term, "genocide." Professor Lemkin says, "By 'genocide' we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group. This new word is made from the ancient Greek word 'genos' (race, tribe), and the Latin 'cide' (killing), thus corresponding in its formation to such words as tyrannicide, homicide, infanticide, etc. Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by the mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions, aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aims of annihilating the groups themselves. . . Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group." Much of what has been going on in Europe since the book was written confirms Professor Lemkin's thesis. While there was no lack of informed people who, even before Axis Rule in Occupied Europe was published, had become award of the real differences between old-fashioned military occupation and the kind of treatment of some of the occupied European nations by the Nazis, credit is unquestionably due Professor Lemkin for having coined a term to fit what is, at least in modern times, a novel phenomenon.

Part I of the book, to which the chapter on genocide belongs, discusses "German Techniques of Occupation," and also contains chapters dealing with "Administration," "Police," "Law," "Courts," "Property," "Finance," "Labor" and "The Legal Status of Jews." These should be read by anyone interested in the situation of the formerly occupied European countries, for in many instances, full comprehension of developments in these countries is hard to achieve without knowledge of the facts presented here. There is definitely no use, in this instance, to try to apply the age-old reviewing method of condensation for the chapters referred to are crammed with facts and interpretations.

Part II of the book deals with the situations in individual occupied countries,

showing among other things, the amazing variety of techniques used by the Germans to achieve their unique aim: the political and economic domination of the occupied countries. Part III contains the decrees issued by the authorities of the Axis powers in occupied territory. They are arranged according to countries, so that often regulations proclaimed by the German or Italian occupational authorities are printed side by side with decrees promulgated by puppet governments.

It is the reviewer's difficult task to note that there are a few regrettable omissions in Professor Lemkin's otherwise excellent book. The German "Decree Concerning the Organization of Criminal Jurisdiction Against Poles and Jews in the Incorporated Eastern Areas," a most striking specimen of genocide legislation, probably constitutes the most important omission. That important decree, dated December 4, 1941, and promulgated by the Reichsgesetzhlatt ("Register of German Laws") of December 16, 1941, was available in this country* when Professor Lemkin was working on his book and should certainly have been referred to and discussed. The overlooking of the German "Decree Concerning the Organization of Criminal Jurisdiction Against the Jews and Disposition of Their Property After Death," dated July 1, 1943 and promulgated by the Reichsgesetzblatt of July 2,* 1943, is another serious omission, as this decree, too, is a perfect example of genocide legislation.

There are several other omissions. None of them, however, including those mentioned above, are serious enough to detract from the merits of Professor Lemkin's book. His was a pioneer's task and a work which will set a standard

in its field.

New York WIKTOR J. EHRENPREIS

* English translations of both decrees are reprinted in Nazi Justice, published by the Polish Labor Group in 1944.

WHITTON, JOHN B., ed., Second Chance: America and the Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Pp. 235. \$2.50.

This carefully considered volume is to be highly recommended to every thoughtful American. It consists of seven chapters by a group of Princeton educators. Though books composed of chapters by different hands are often uneven in quality and uncoordinated, this is happily not the case here. It grew out of numerous group discussions by the writers, and, under the able editorship of Professor Whitton, is a closely-knit, integrated, and very interesting discussion of what we should do to secure a better world organization for peace than was achieved after World War I.

Gordon W. Craig's historical retrospect reviews succinctly the mistakes of the Paris Peace Conference and the inter-war years. Gerhart Niemeyer and Professor Whitton discuss the problem of the role of Great and Small Powers and the kind of framework that a world organization should have. They wrote just prior to the publication of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, but it is signi-

ficant that their suggestions in many respects foreshadow the plans which were slated for discussion at the San Francisco Conference. They agree, however, in urging one novel and interesting point which has received comparatively little attention. They believe that, in addition to the formal organs like the Assembly, Security Council and Economic and Social Council, there should be a "Third Chamber." This would consist of representatives of public opinion throughout the world-"persons of high wisdom, capacity and moral stature," one or two for each nation but not more than a hundred in all. Like the International Labor Office, the Third Chamber would be representative, not exclusively of governments, but of various classes, parties or interests. It would give moral sanctions to a status quo based on its recommendations and enjoying a moral authority which no situation born of power politics could ever achieve. Once the status quo had been established on a moral basis, national politics could be judged in a universal frame of reference. The Third Chamber, although endowed with little or no legal authority, might in practice exert considerable influence on world opinion. As such, it could affect the decisions of the more formal and legal agencies of the World Organization, especially if its discussions and conclusions were widely broadcast. But how would these notables be selected? The authors merely say, "A detailed plan of representation would have to be devised," In view of this and other reasons, the reviewer is skeptical about the feasibility and value of such a Third Chamber, but he agrees that it is an idea that merits careful consideration.

Reforms in trade and finance which would lessen the tensions which tend to cause war are dealt with by Frank D. Graham. He rightly wants tariffs lowered, but thinks complete free trade, though desirable, is at present Utopian. Edward S. Corwin gives a very neat brief account of sovereignty and of the constitutional questions involved in American adherence to a world organization. He does not urge a constitutional amendment to abolish the Senate's right to ratify treaties, because he thinks the gradual evolution of constitutional practice indicates that "executive agreements" will meet the situation. Jerome S. Bruner, however, who analyzes American public opinion on the basis of Gallup and other polls, favors an amendment. Finally, George F. Thomas deals instructively with an aspect too little considered—the rôle of justice and morality in international relations.

Althogether, this volume is a lucid and high-level analysis of problems which face every American as well as members of the San Francisco Conference. A good index adds to its value.

Harvard University

SIDNEY B. FAY

VISSON, ANDRE, The Coming Struggle for Peace. New York: The Viking Press, 1944. Pp. 301. \$3.00.

In the author's own opinion this book should be regarded as a guide through the labyrinth of the United Nations; a book for diplomats written for the purpose of diagnosing the maladies rather than suggesting cures; and an implied appeal to the United States to find a workable formula that would assure the war-torn and socially disturbed world a sane and lasting peace. In twenty chapters Mr. Visson attempts to cover a fairly large area including most of Europe, all the Near and the Middle East, a large slice of Africa and "the not too Far East". Every serious student of international relations will admit that this is a large order and that, consequently, the analysis of the problems involved must of necessity be somewhat sketchy. Indeed, there are few first class journalists who could manage to forge a thousand and one intricate issues of four continents into a single volume as solid as it is instructive and absorbingly interesting.

After an introduction, filled with United Nations' spirit and anxieties, the author deals successively with British-American relations, the Soviet and her Allies, Poland, Finland and the Baltic States, France, Scandinavia and the Low Countries, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Danubian Europe, the Arab aspirations, Iraq, Transjordania, Syria and Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, French North Africa, Iran and the Far East. Each chapter consists of concisely recounted background material, the principal inter-war difficulties, an account of the respective positions during World War II and an analysis of issues awaiting postwar settlement. Occasionally alternative solutions are suggested but the author seems to have made no special effort to reveal his preference. Thus with some exceptions the reader is invited to strain his own capacity to think, which is perhaps what Mr. Visson intended.

British-American relations constitute admittedly one of the most vital tests of any postwar solution. The solidarity of the two countries forms the cornerstone of the United Nations. The author very rightly puts the question as to whether the two Atlantic powers, so closely united in the war, will continue to agree on the maintenance of peace. There are both encouraging and disquieting omens. Mr. Visson enumerates most of them. His assertion that the real problem concerns the postwar security and economic co-operation between the two nations is also correct. Let us also hope that this time the British will want "the right thing" and that "the Americans will know what they want." "The British want to be assured that the Americans will co-operate with them for international security and for the creation of a free but co-ordinated trade which would enable Britain to maintain her standard of living". The phrase summarizes the problem neatly except for the fact that we cannot have a free and a co-ordinated trade at the same time. The problem revolves about the degree of co-ordination, or organization, which both countries will be willing to accept or yield to each other in order to mutually accommodate their often divergent economic interests.

Next to British-Amercan relations, the nature of the reciprocal attitude of each of the two English speaking powers toward the Soviet Union and vice versa constitutes another major test of postwar solidarity. It could not be stated that the chapter devoted to this particular item is among the best. We are rightly advised to approach the subject on a political basis rather than emotionally.

Yet there is little in the chapter to provide us with a constructive lead. The suspicion of Soviet expansionism; the suggestion that Soviet Russia can either bolshevize Germany or offer her more advantageous conditions than the Atlantic powers in order to seduce her; the suggestion of the inability of the Russians to assimilate culturally higher central and western Europeans—all this has, unfortunately, a familiar sound and does not bring us any nearer to the adoption of a politically healthier understanding of the Soviet position. Reading the chapter, one feels that it is not so much the more or less manageable relations between the British and the Americans which form the cornerstone of the postwar world but rather the attitude of the Anglo-Saxon nations toward the Russians. And one becomes even more convinced that the problem of winning the peace is triangular, with England, America and Russia acting in unison in regard to the major solutions.

Compared with the supreme task of unity among the "Big Three", all the other questions are subsidiary. This should, by no means, be taken to mean that what happens in Central Europe, the Near East, or elsewhere, is negligible on the ground that the countries immediately concerned are small. Mr. Visson makes it very clear throughout the chapters concerned with these areas that international issues are interwoven and that in the modern world the concept of supposedly local problems has lost much of its meaning. Well written, the chapters are packed with knowledge, sometimes of the "inside" kind, and experience; and even if here and there emphasis is not distributed evenly, the book should be of real help to all those whom opportunity or fate will place in

a position to draw the plans for a better tomorrow.

New York City

JOSEF HANC

HERMENS, FERDINAND A., The Tyrant's War and the People's Peace. Introduction by Robert M. MacIver. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944. Pp. xiii, 250. \$2.75.

In his latest book, Professor Hermens extends his well-known fight for sound democratic processes into the International arena, arguing that "the enemy we fight is tyranny and . . . the solution is democracy, both national and international . . . the extent to which we strengthen the forces of democracy will be the measure of our success in winning the peace . . . they will be able to shape political forms according to their need . . . On the other hand, if the wrong political forces prevail, even the most ideal form of world organization will not work" (p. 151). In the coming peace settlement, a policy of force and nothing but force would not succeed because it would not last; and it would be fallacious because it assumes a geographical limitation on the spirit of aggression. Force alone would, therefore, be against the best interests of the United Nations.

Internationally, peace should rest on collective security and on our cooperation with the democratic elements in the Axis countries. The author proposes, therefore, a moderate peace—permitting Germany to retain the boundaries of 1938, and avoiding cash reparations of an unrealizable amount and prolonged Allied military government. A democratic government should be sponsored at an early date, under German democratic leadership. Domestically, the author favors the breakup of Prussia's power by the establishment of a true federal union, the dissolution of cartels, the punishment of war criminals, and the expropriation of large landed estates in favor of peasant farming. While the possibilities of a rebirth of German democracy are admitted to be "most controversial," the author does not despair. Germany has not always been "bad" and other nations "good"; as a matter of fact, most nations have been both at different times in history. Even now the Nazis do not constitute a majority of the German people, and there are strong indications that in many instances Nazi indoctrination either has not taken hold or that its effects can be overcome. Nazism should be destroyed by a variety of proposed means, but a democratic, stable Germany will be needed in the maintenance of peace.

The book presents a good analysis of a most difficult and complicated situation, and as such it should be studied and pondered. Readers will differ as to whether it provides the answer to the problem of Germany's part in the peace. Its general postulates of moderation, reason, and democracy appeal to the present reviewer as eminently sound—in fact, inescapable. As to details of the plan, diverse arguments can be advanced. The author has definite hopes and expectations as to how the Germans will react to such peace terms; one can hope without being as certain of the outcome. No one can afford, however, to throw up his hands and seek refuge in an emotional relapse into Vansittartism. That much

seems established.

Washington, D. C.

John Brown Mason

SHORTER NOTICES

Events Leading Up To World War II. Chronological History of certain major international events leading up to, and during, World War II with the ostensible reasons advanced for their occurrence. 1931-1944. United States Printing Office, Washington, 1944. Pp. 421. 50 Cents.

Under the cover of this clumsy title hides one of the best reference books on the decade preceding the present war in Europe and the Far East. A very reliable index leads the reader easily to the required entry in the chronological part. Each entry is supported by a short but equally reliable quotation from the documentary record. The source of the quotation itself is fully stated, thus enabling the student of international affairs to follow up the reference already provided and to further familiarize himself with the source-books for the years 1931-44 as far as they are available. The book is the work of the Legislative Reference Service and was, therefore, primarily, intended for Congress (whose House Document No. 541 it constitutes); but it should prove extremely useful to anybody, whether in or out of Congress or any Parliament of the free world, who tries to make up his mind about international affairs.

F. W. PICK

KONOVALOV, SERGE, Russo-Polish Relations. London: Cresset Press, 1945. Pp. 90. 4s.

Before his death in December, 1943 Sir John Maynard had prepared a report on the historical relations between Poland and Russia for the Anglo-Soviet Public Relations Association. Professor Serge Konovalov of Birmingham and Oxford universities has taken over considerable parts of the Maynard report, and added further documentation.

On a topic so variously approached and so bitterly debated, it would be difficult to do more than trace general trends in the short space of 90 small pages. In method, no claim to originality is advanced. Generally admitted historical facts are pointed up by apt quotations from Polish, Russian, American and British scholars, and an effort is made to maintain a balance between them, though it is not unfair to say that, in the balance, Russia is given a little the best of the argument. One example will make this clear: In section 7 (by Konovalov), p. 11, we read: "The 'Western Lands' and Eastern Galicia were, and always had been non-Polish in the sense that, taken as a whole, the great majority of the inhabitants were Ukrainian and White Russian or Lithuanian." There is no doubt of the truth of the assertion. But in cases of this sort, the choice of words indicates an approach. It would have been as true to say that "The great majority of the population were non-Russian" or "non-Ukrainian". On p. 18 we read: "On the whole, if the question of the 'Western Lands' could have been separated from that of partition, the Russian gains in the first and second partitions were justifiable, those in the third much less so."

The seven appendices, mostly documentation, are quite useful selections. The impression of the reader would have been better if Polish proper names had been spelled more accurately.

S. H. T.

SHARKEY, DON, White Smoke over the Vatican. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1944. Pp. 172. \$2.00.

Sharkey's book, bearing the *imprimatur* of the archbishop of Milwaukee, is not a great deal more than a popularized and Americanized account of The Vatican City: Guide for a Visit to the Pope, the Vatican Galleries and Museums (Rome, 1933), which before the war could be purchased for fifteen lire by any visitor to the Vatican. This is not to suggest that the work does not have a certain value for the layman or ordinary historian. Within its covers numerous small things not easily available elsewhere, may be found: a description of the ballots used in papal elections, an explanation of the terms cardinal-bishop, cardinal-deacon and cardinal priest, a discussion of the recent modernization of Vatican City. There are almost fifty excellent pictures of the Papal States reminiscent of the fine photography that formerly appeared in Ellustrazione.

The book is written, of course, from the Catholic viewpoint. Particularly in chapters XIII and XV on "The Pope's Kingdom" and "Mussolini and the Pope," does Sharkey exhibit a certain naiveté. Thus Garibaldi is the "chief advisor" of Victor Emmanual II along with Cavour, the events at Mentana in 1867 were occasioned by royal Italian troops clashing with the French, and the Catholic Party "was Mussolini's strongest opposition before he seized the reins of power." And apparently the correspondent Camille Cianfarra is a suitable enough source for Sharkey's account of Vatican diplomacy during the current war.

Until a larger and more comprehensive volume appears on the subject, the book will prove helpful to the average person seeking information about the papal temporality.

University of Missouri

DUANE KOENIG

MENNE, BERNHARD, Armistice and Germany's Food Supply, 1918-1919. London: Hutchinson, 1944. Pp. 96. 1s.

Soon after the Armistice of 1918 there was "displayed to an astonished world a population of some 200,000,000 people on the verge of starvation." Among them was Germany. Although she was only one of twenty countries to receive assistance, she was given almost one-third of the total supplies delivered. And yet, after the Armistice Germany did not lose any time in asserting that hundreds of thousands of non-combatants were done to death by the continuing blockade. A large propaganda campaign was instituted to bring home this alleged fact to the German people and to lay the basis for the idea of revenge. The New Germany planned from the very beginning to undermine the Allied victory by creating hatred.

This booklet attempts to expose this political maneuver "as a classic example of the cunning tactics... to distract the attention of their own people and the peoples of the world from the enormous burden of guilt which rests on their shoulders." The study sets out to demonstrate that the difficulties which arose in connection with the supply of food to Germany were due primarily to Germany's refusal to place her merchant marine at the disposal of the relief authorities, and

her refusal to pay for the deliveries allotted to her.

It seems useful to have recalled to our minds the German tactics after World War I. Just now the Nazis have started a new propaganda campaign alleging extreme economic inefficiency of the Allies in the territories recently occupied. The greater the destruction the Nazis bring about by their obviously futile resistance, and the greater the starvation, the more fertile is the soil for this propaganda glorifying "the golden old Nazi times." 1

Washington, D. C.

H. H. Browne

MIZWA, STEPHEN P., ed. Nicholas Copernicus, A Tribute of Nations. New York: The Kosciuszko Foundation, 1945. Pp. 268. Illustrated. \$5.00.

The four hundredth anniversary of the death of Copernicus, and the very day of the publication of the *De Revolutionibus Orbum Celestium*, May 24. 1943, found the land of Mikolaj Kopernik suffering under German oppression. Though the light of his homeland was dimmed, the significance of his achievements for the modern world was more clear than ever before in those eventful centuries. Throughout the free world, on that day, men of every nation and estate united to pay his memory its just tribute. It would be difficult to imagine a more im-

pressive demonstration of the eternal supremacy of ideas over force.

In this sumptuous volume, Dr. Mizwa has printed in full some of the speeches and letters devoted to the memory of Kopernicus, and listed the ceremonies and exhibits held in America and in foreign lands. The variety of approach in the many tributes is of itself imposing. School, college and university assemblies, more formal occasions, such as the presentation of Copernicus citations by the Copernican Quadra-centennial National Committee at Carnegie Hall, a number of radio programs (some of which are reproduced in toto), quotations from editorials in the press—all combine to create a deep and lasting impression which has profound undertones of hope that greatness of mind and heart, transcending age and language and nation, are discernible to Everyman.

S. H. THOMSON

WEISS, FRANCIS, Waltzing Volcano. London: Hollis & Carter, 1944. Pp. 238.

This book is the result of an emigré father's attempt to tell the family history to his children who had been torn away from the ancestral soil of Hungary, had grown up in England, and, as a consequence, were unable to understand the parental tongue and idiosyncrasies. The story begins with the growth of a poor Jewish community under the enlightened patriarchal government of the fabulous Eszterházy estate in western Hungary, whence an ambitious member of the community wandered to Buda and became a successful furrier. With him begins the story of the Weiss family, intertwined with the history of the Austro-Hungarian empire.

The book, in spite of its author's complete disregard for organization, has several parts which reward the toiling reader. Particularly the occasional glimpses

¹ F. M. Surface and R. L. Bland: American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period.

into social and economic conditions which seem to be based on profound study and observation. The description of city life in the old Danubian empire is excellent, and so is the account of the author's experiences in the first World War in which he fought as an officer of a Tyrolese alpine regiment. He ends his story with the despair of a man who has lost his country and his illusions, and his verdict of the peace settlement is bitter: "On the ruins of the Habsburg Monarchy new national states were built, with the assistance of the conquerors. A primitive, senseless jumble, which would have been more worthy of children playing a geographical game than of responsible statesmen. Versailles and Trianon.

. . . Experiments in pushing people like so many chess-men, while the chance was missed, the chance of a thousand years of putting Euorpe in order." He does not say, however, what that order should have been.

St. John's University Brooklyn, N. Y.

A. F. KOVACS

HARDING, BERTITA, The Lost Waltz: A Story of Exile. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1944. Pp. 312. \$3.50.

Possibly Noel Coward had Bertita Harding in mind when he spoke of a woman who wrote "very reverent biographies of minor royalty." Mrs. Harding established herself as a dilettante in Hapsburg lore when she penned *Phantom Crown* (from which the film "Juarez" was made), *Golden Fleece* and *Imperial Twilight*, glamorizing the lives of Maximilian of Mexico and Franz Josef and Karl of Austria. A background of Hungarian-Mexican ancestry, a familiarity with European customs, omniscient reading in half a dozen languages and work in Continental public and dynastic archives, have prepared her for serious study. It is only to be regretted that the lure of the dollar sign and a willingness to sacrifice history for a good story or the turn of a phrase, have prevented Bertita

Harding from producing something worthwhile.

Lost Waltz is the history of the family of

Lost Waltz is the history of the family of the Archduke Leopold Salvator of Austria, nephew of the Emperor Franz Josef, and a member of the Tuscan branch of the Hapsburg clan. The story of Leopold Salvator's brood of ten children, their life in Vienna during the World War, and afterwards in exile in Spain, France and America, is charmingly described in Mrs. Harding's piquant style. Indeed, she is one of the most readable of present day biographers with her account making up in color what it lacks in depth. The Archduke Franz Josef, one of the ten children of Leopold Salvator, provided much of the materials used; hence, he and his life are treated at particular length. Now and then Mrs. Harding's chronology goes awry, as when she says, "Napoleon III had meanwhile become emperor after serving as president of the second French republic that followed the death, in 1850, of Louis Philippe." But for a pleasant evening's reading of archducal wanderings from imperial Vienna to Yankee New Hampshire, Lost Waltz will prove delightful.

.University of Missouri

DUANE KOENIG

WEISKOPF, F. C., ed., Hundred Towers. A Czechoslovak Anthology of Creative Writing. New York: L. B. Fischer, 1945. Pp. xviii, 277. \$3.50.

This book is a necessary one, both by artistic and humanitarian standards.

Twenty-four authors, including the two Capeks, Hostovský, Šalda, Wolker, Olbracht, are rendered into lively English, the level of the prose translations being generally high. So faithful was the editor to artistic excellence that one or two stories are included which have no other quality. But for the most part these writings are deeply rooted in humanity and one nation's poignant realization of

that concept.

Czechoslovak authors seem able to sport with style fads without losing candor or passion. No less an ideal than love is needed to explain so fortunate a genius: love of a land, of a people—love of one's own. The poems, even in translation, are warm nearly to the point of escaping criticism. A subtly tormented mind like Hostovský's sprouts the purest tenderness. Prague is celebrated as a mistress would be. Poverty, when it is native, has a touch of the marvellous. Properly enough, excerpts from Capek's Talks with Masaryk crown this collection of sincere and limpid work of which Masaryk, the truth-adorer, would have been proud.

One could wish the selections had been dated. And so well is the appetite whetted that the Anglo-Saxon reader would have welcomed a bibliography of

translations, no matter how slender it must have been.

R. D. T.

Hostovsky, Egon, *The Hideout*. New York: Random House, 1945. Pp. 112. \$2.00.

This novelette throws into sombre relief the "bad days" of Prague, by projecting into the soul of a "little" man the frustration of a city and a nation. The Czech engineer, in the dimness of his French hide-out, takes on the sad but not ignoble colors of Everyman; and in his particular conquest of his own humble fear, when he yields his life to the cause of the underground, is heard the harden-

ing and almost happy resolution of his nation.

The Germans are not over-drawn. They are plain figures, but the sight of them nearly traumatizes the exiled engineer. Hostovský is an honest realist. He is also an honest poet, who, through his self-realizing engineer, tells us "... a good half of the human race got drunk in a kind of gigantic space where the air is all breathed out . . . the drunkenness lasts, the guilt is still debatable and the harm done is beyond imagination." Such high levels of poetic objectivity are not uncommon in the work of contemporary Czechoslovak writers; it is the sort of objectivity that can team comfortably with a strong sense of justice and little squeamishness in war.

R. D. T.

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

- Angell, Norman, "Russian Policy and Western Liberalism." New Europe, April-May, 1945, 8-9.
- Arciszewski, Tomasz, "Poland—A Test Case." New Europe, April-May, 1945, 4. Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, "Last Time," Foreign Affairs, April, 1945, 349-376. Balcanicus, "National Democratic Front of Rumania." Cent. Eur. Obs., March 23,

1945, 95 f.

Beneš, Eduard, "Victory—The Return Home." Cent. Eur. Obs., Feb. 23, 1945, 53-55.

Beuer, Gustav, "Der Weg Nach Hause." Einheit, April 7, 1945, 1-4.

Beuer, Gustav, "'Herrenvolk' ohne Herren." Einheit, March 10, 1945, 3 f.

Bilmanis, Alfred, "The Baltic States and The International Security and Peace Organization." Latvian Information Bulletin, April 25, 1945, 1-6.

Chamberlin, William Henry, "The Crimea Conference and Europe." New Europe, April-May, 1945, 5-7.

Circé, Armand, "I'Enseignement technique universitaire en Pologne." Bulletin of the Polish Institute, January, 1945, 261-264.

"The Crimean Declaration—Words and Deeds." The Ukrainian Quarterly, Feb., 1945, 101-104.

Czubatyj, Nicholas, "Dumbarton Oaks and Ukraine." The Ukrainian Quarterly, Feb., 1945, 140-151.

Dániel, Arnold, "Post-War Agriculture In The Baltic-Aegean Belt." Free Europe, April 6, 1945, 103-104.

Ehrlich, Hugo von, "Einem neuen Zeitalter entgegen." Einheit, Feb. 27, 1945, 4-6. Granovsky, A. A., "Free Ukraine is Vital to Lasting Peace." Ukrainian Qy., Feb., 1945, 117-131.

Guerster-Steinhausen, Eugene, "The Prophet of German Nihilism — Ernest Juenger," The Rev. of Politics, April, 1945, 199-209.

Gurian, Waldemar, "Russia and the Peace." The Rev. of Pol., April, 1945, 156-169.

Halasz, Nicholas, "Germany's Danubian Neighbors." New Europe, April-May, 1945, 26-29.

Halecki, O., "The Last Century—from Smyrna to Varna." Bulletin of the Polish Institute, January, 1945, 300-307.

Halecki, Oscar, "The Sixth Partition of Poland." The Rev. of Pol., April, 1945, 142-155.

Haussman, Frederick, "Deutsche Wirtschaftsfragen In Der Überganszeit." Deutsche Blätter, Jan. Feb., 1945, 16-22.

Heineman, Leopold, "Germany's Dream—A United States of Europe." New Europe, April-May, 1945, 29-31.

Hodin, J. P., "Jan Amos Comenius in England." Cent. Eur. Obs., Feb. 23, 1945, 65-66.

Hodin, J. P., "Panslavism and the New Slav Reciprocity." Cent. Eur. Obs., March 23, 98-100.

"The House of Commons on Poland." Polish Fortnightly Rev., Feb. 15, 1945, 1-8.

Hronek, Jiří, Czechoslovakia: The Immediate Problems." Cent. Eur. Obs., Feb. 23, 1945, 59.

Hronek, Jiří, "President Beneš Speaks to His People." Cent. Eur. Obs., March 9, 1945, 73-74.

Huntington, W. Chapin, "The Russian Translation Project of the American Council of Learned Societies." The Russian Review, Spring, 1945, 40-48.

Huszar, George, "Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the Danubian Region." Danubian Review, March, 1945, 9-11.

Kann, Robert A., "Wolfgang Menzel: Pioneer of Integral Nationailsm." Journal of the History of Ideas, April, 1945, 213-230.

Kiss George, "Rural Problems of Central and Southeastern Europe: A Review." Geographical Review, April, 1945, 286-291.

"Koniec Widowiska." Polska Walczaca, March 17, 1945, 1.

Kraft, Margit, "What Liberation Holds for Eastern Europe." American-Hungarian Observer, March 18, 1945, 1.

Kraus, Ljudevit, "How to Supply Yugoslavia." Danubian Review, March, 1945, 12-14.

Kreibich, Karl von, "Heimkehr." Einheit, Feb. 27, 1945, 6-8.

Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Erik R. von, "The Politico-Geographical and Demographic Aspects of Religion in Europe." *Bulletin of the Polish Institute*, Jan., 1945, 313-343.

Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Erik R. von, "Where Three Countries Meet The Region of Nauders." Geographical Review, April, 1945, 239-256.

Langsam, Walter Consuelo, "Emperor Francis II and The Austrian 'Jacobins', 1792-1796." American Historical Review, April, 1945, 471-490.

Lohman, Philipp H., "400,000 Germans." New Europe, April-May, 1945, 12-14. Manning, Clarence, "Taras Shevchenko as a World Poet." Ukrainian Qy., Feb., 1945, 105-116.

Meier, J. W., "The Lwów Polytechnic Institute 1844-1944." Bulletin of the Polish Institute, January, 1945, 249-160.

Meyning, Fritz, "Die Letzte Schlacht." Deutsche Blätter, Jan. Feb., 1945, 12-15. Mihan, George, "Germany's Raid On Polish Art." The Polish Review, April 26, 1945, 8-9.

Ozhevsky, Pavel, "The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic." Information Bulletin, Embassy of USSR, April 26, 1945, 6-7.

Palyi, Melchior, "Anglo-French Tension." American-Hungarian Observer, March 18, 1945, 2.

"Prehistoria Jalty." Myśl Polska, April 1, 1945, 1179-1181.

- "The President's Report on the Crimea Conference." Dept. of State Bulletin, March 4, 1945, 321-326.
- Razin, Z., "The Agrarian Reform In Hungary." Information Bulletin, Embassy of USSR, April 24, 1945, 6-8.
- Reimann, Paul von, "Zur Heimreise des Präsidenten." Einheit, March 10, 1945,
- Rojek, M. E., "Czarna Karta Swiatowego Niebezpieczeństwa." Myśl Polska, March 20, 1945, 1165 f.
- Rosnowski, Karol, "The Shevchenko Scientific Society of Lwów, 1873-1939." The Polish Review, April 26, 1945, 7-12.
- Roucek, Joseph, "Ukrainian Sociology After the First World War." Ukrainian Qy. Feb., 1945, 152-163.
- "Russian Zone." American-Hungarian Observer, March 18, 1945, 5-9.
- Schultz, Ignac, "Czechoslovakia's Minority Problems." New Europe, April-May, 1945, 31 f.
- Simpson, G. W., "Hrushevsky, Historian of Ukraine." Ukrainian Qy., Feb., 1945, 132-139.
- Snyder, Louis L., "The American-German Pork Dispute, 1879-1891." The Journal of Modern History, March, 1945, 16-28.
- Swietóslawski, W. "Lwów and Its Polytechnic Institute." Bulletin of the Polish Institute, Jan., 1945, 246-248.
- "Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Collaboration Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Polish Republic." Information Bulletin, Embassy of USSR, April 26, 1945, 1-2.
- "The Unrelenting Struggle." Polish Fortnightly Review, March 1, 1945, 1-8.
- Van Cleef, Eugene, "East Baltic Ports and Boundaries with Special Reference To Königsberg." Geographical Review, April, 1945, 257-272.
- Warwick, Peter, "Yugoslavia's Government of National Unity." Cent. Eur. Obs., March 23, 1945, 94.
- Wasielewski, Thad F., "Latvian History." Congressional Record, March 12, 1945, A1225 f.
- Winiewicz, Jósef, "How to Deal With Germany." Free Europe, April 6, 1945, 100-101.
- Winiewicz, Jósef, "Odwet Polonanych Niemiec." Polska Walczaca, April 14, 1945, 1.
- Winternitz, J. von, "T. G. Masaryks Kritik der Deutschen Kultur." Einheit, March 10, 1945, 5 f.
- Wunderlich, Frieda, "Fascism and the German Middle Class." The Antioch Review, March, 1945, 56-67.
- Zubrzycki, B., "The Institute of Technology in Lwów." Bulletin of the Polish Institute, January, 1945, 267-276.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Addams, Jane, Peace and Bread in Time of War. New York: Kings Crown, 1945, \$2.00.

Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean: Discussion of a Peasant Problem. New York: Chatham House, \$1.00.

To The Counsellors of Peace. New York: American Jewish Committee, 1945. Basch, Antonin, A Price for Peace. New York: Columbia, 1945, \$2.50.

Beneš, Ed., Návrat do Veasti. Introduction by Ján Papánek. New York: Czechoslovak Information Service, 1945.

Beuer, G.; Blatny, Fanny; and Zinner, J., Gemeinsamer Weg-Gemeinsames Ziel. London: Einheit, 1945, 1s.

Fierlinger, Zdeněk, Drešní valka jako socialní krise. London: Nova Svoboda, 1945.

Goerdeler's Politisches Testament. New York: Friedrich Krause, 1945.

Heberle, Rudolph, From Democracy to Nazism. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1945, \$2.50.

Klimas, Petras, Ghillebert de Lannoy in Medieval Lithuania. New York: Lithuanian American Information Center, 1945, \$1.00.

Marlio, Louis, Can Democracy Recover? New York: Doubleday Doran, 1945, \$2.00.

Masaryk, Jan, Speaking to My Country. Foreword by Anthony Eden. London: Lincolns-Prager, 1944. 10s 6d.

Mayer, J. P., Max Weber and German Politics. London: Faber and Faber, 8s. 6d. Meyer, Oscar, Von Bismarck Zu Hitler: Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen. New York: Friedrich Krause, \$2.75.

Miller, Douglas, Via Diplomatic Pouch, New York: Didier, \$3.00.

Mincer, Tadeusz, The Agrarian Problem in Poland. London: Polish Research Center, 1944, 2s.

Mitchell, Mairn, We Can Keep the Peace. London: Grout Publishing Co., 1945, 12s. 6d.

Muran, J. B., We Fight On. London: Lincolns-Prager, 1945. 2s. 6d.

Odložilík. Otakar, Povstalec An Emigrant. London: Čechoslovák, 1944.

Papánek, Ján, Czechoslovakia, in 'The World of Tomorrow' series. New York: International University Press, 1945. \$2.00.

Pavek, William J., 200,000,000 Slavs Need a New Alphabet. Detroit: S. J. Bloch, 1944.

Richter, Werner, Re-Educating Germany. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945, \$3.50.

Ripka, Hubert, East and West. London: Lincolns-Prager, 10s. 6d.

Scaevola, A Study in Forgery. London: J. Rolls, 7s. 6d.

Smorgorzewski, Casimir, About the Curzon Line. London: Free Europe, 1944, 6d.

- Steel, Johannes, The Future of Europe. New York: Holt, 1945, \$3.00.
- Talmont, Wladyslaw S., Justice in Exile (Notes on Dumbarton Oaks Proposals). New York: University, 1945.
- Thorne, C. B., St. George and the Octopus. London: Maxlove, 1945.
- Woolf, Leonard, The International Post-War Settlement. London: Fabian, 1945, 6d.
- The Problem of Statelessness. London: World Jewish Congress, 1944, 2s.
- Protection Against Group Defamation. London: World Jewish Congress, 1944 2s,
- Winterberg, Hans, ed., Auf Zum Kampf Für Die Freiheit Und Wiedergeburt Österreichs. London: Winterberg, 1945, 1s.
- Zbyszewski, Karol, Warsaw Was a Beautiful City. London: The Library of Fighting Poland, 1945, 3s, 6d.



JOURNAL of CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

VOLUME FIVE

OCTOBER 1945

NUMBER THREE

THE NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER OF ITALY

by René Albrecht-Carrié

INCE September, 1943 the relations of the United Nations with Italy have presumably been regulated by the terms of the still unpublished armistice; technically, pending the conclusion of formal peace, we are still at war with her. But the present war has been fertile in producing situations which should make the delight of a casuist. Thus, while formally at war with us, Italy—at least the Italy that we recognized—was also fighting her former ally, Germany, thereby being entitled to the novel status of co-belligerent, whatever that may mean. We have also resumed diplomatic relations with her, a step which normally follows instead of preceding the conclusion of peace, and Italy has been trying to obtain admission to the ranks of the United Nations.

In this endeavor she has been acting soundly from her point of view, but has so far been unsuccessful. Her calculations in signing an armistice miscarried, for her chief motivation was to withdraw from active participation in the conflict in order to escape the consequences of warfare on her soil. From that point of view, things could hardly have turned out worse than they did. That is unfortunate for the Italian people, yet can fairly be described as retribution. The frequent sentimental approach to the problem of Italy and the contrast which is often made between her and Germany is largely based on false premises. The chief difference between the two countries is one of power; that is what made it possible to assume a condescending attitude toward Fascism while the threat of Nazism was too serious to ignore, as we have had ample cause to find out. There is no denying that Fascism proved much less efficient and somewhat less brutal than its northern neighbor, but the two régimes were blood brothers and espoused essentially the same system of values. As to the people in either country, we shall not find many who, in defeat, will continue to own allegiance to the system that brought them to grief; they will regret this defeat far more deeply than the ideologies that led to that result. Had the Axis been successful in its bid for power, there is little reason to doubt that both régimes would have been intensely popular at home. There are indeed differences between the Italian and the German peoples and the cultures that they have developed, but it is perhaps well to consider that Italian easy-going softness as seen by Yugoslavs or Greeks bears more than a little resemblance to German gemütlichkeit as introduced to the Poles. We need not deny either that Germany and Italy have produced cultures of the highest order, or, on the other hand, that both nations fell under the sway of forces that are essentially evil.

At the start, we must clear our approach of a widespread confusion. There are in Italy and in Germany—as everywhere for that matter—forces of good and of evil. Both nations stand in need of re-education; but that re-education can only take place from within if it is to have any value. Defeat and its consequences must be looked upon as part of the cost of this education. To put it simply, Italy, like Germany, has been an aggressor and it is proper that she should bear the consequences of her failure. To the extent that it is feasible, it is simple justice that Italy should be made to compensate the victims of her aggression.

This perfectly legitimate idea of compensation must, however, be approached with care and clear-sightedness. The United Nations are at present all powerful and theirs is the task of organizing the world of tomorrow. With power comes responsibility. The victorious powers have no cause to apologize for their victory or to feel called upon to insure the happiness of the aggressor peoples. It is the part of these peoples to abandon their ill conceived notions of world domination. So long as they do not, we can only remain on our guard against their designs. But we do have a responsibility for organizing a settlement that shall be free of manifest injustices.

Granting that the notion of justice is not wholly objective and that the passions aroused by armed conflict inevitably warp our thinking, there is point in making a distinction between *temporary* arrangements and those intended to be of a *permanent* nature. The foregoing has been written by way of introduction in order to clarify our approach to the problem of frontiers.

It will be objected that frontiers are not permanent. To be sure, they are not. But there is a great difference in degree, if not in kind, between arrangements of an economic nature, such as reparations for example, which are self-liquidating or can be modified by peaceful agreement, and those

involving the transfer of territory. The latter has seldom taken place save as the result of violence.¹ We therefore set it down as a fundamental assumption of this whole discussion that, in retrospect, it will appear to have been the part of wisdom if the problem of frontiers is divorced from that of retribution for aggression and war crimes.² Unless we believe that certain peoples are congenitally endowed with fundamentally different characteristics from others, the future security of the world will not depend so much on the shifting of bits of territory as on such more fundamental matters as the setting up of an effective world organization or the relations of the major powers with each other. At the same time, to settle frontiers in fairness will, for the longer future, serve to eliminate certain potential centers of infection while creating confidence in the proposed world organization.

So much for our general approach to the problem in the circumstances of the present time. The next question is, how to determine a just frontier? The problem is not simple and it is one for the solution of which it is impossible to establish hard and fast rules. Because of the many factors that enter, each case must be considered on its own merits. Nevertheless, there are certain general principles that may serve as guides; they may be catalogued as ethnic, strategic-geographic, economic, and historic-psychological.

Ethnic considerations are placed first because, for good or evil, our age is still one of nationalism. It is conceivable that in a remote future the emphasis on nationalism will come to be looked upon as a passing aberration of mankind; even now we are very conscious of the importance of economic factors which have indeed assumed a growing rôle in our time. The fact remains that, since the French Revolution and with the spread of education, the masses of the people have become increasingly conscious of their nationhood; this process has gone on regardless of the color of political régimes, and even Soviet Russia which started on her path as a convert to Marxist internationalism has reverted to a considerable degree to the conventional nineteenth century pattern. The war itself, because of the very perversion of a diseased German nationalism, has evoked the resistance and intensified the consciousness of other nationalisms. This

¹ In 1938 Germany managed to acquire the Sudetenland by the mere threat rather than the actual use of force. But this "peaceful" transfer of territory proved to be in reality no more than the preliminary occupation of strategic positions in preparation for the outbreak of hostilities.

² To this writer, the recent arrangements for the eastern frontier of Germany, announced after the Berlin Conference, in no way impair the validity of the view here expressed.

is a fact that we have to deal with, and it has become impossible to offer any respectable arguments for the subjugation of one nationality to another. The acceptance of the principle of self-determination on the part of the allies was therefore as sound in this war as in the last. The first step in the determination of frontiers, especially in the case of such highly politically conscious areas as make up most of Europe, is to look at an ethnic map. To disregard self-determination in deference to economic calculations, for instance, would not be a solution of economic difficulties; it would rather serve to keep alive frictions and suspicions which would in turn have economic repercussions.

But an ethnic map will provide only a beginning, for two reasons: the first is that lines of ethnic separation cannot always be sharply drawn—there are many areas of mixed population; the other, that there is a degree of absurdity beyond which adherence to the ethnic principle becomes untenable. Compromise therefore becomes inevitable; a compromise which can only be the result of a study of the local circumstances of each particular case.

At this point a word might be said about the current widespread tendency to "tidy up the map" by making peoples fit into frontiers instead of fitting the frontiers to the peoples. Transfers of population should not be ruled out a priori. It may even be said, in the case of Germans, that if large numbers of them find themselves rudely shifted about that will be mere poetic justice. But it may not be amiss to remind ourselves that one of the fundamental reasons for this war was our objection to the German solution of certain problems and that, when considering populations, we are dealing not only with statistics but with human material as well. The cavalier advocacy of transfers of populations is less an instance of hard headed realism than a measure of the moral callousness and degradation which totalitarian ways have brought to our supposedly Christian society. Population transfers, if they are to take place at all, should be advocated with the greatest reluctance and care and only as a last resort. Moreover, if the world is going to continue to operate as a world of nations, as there is reason to believe that it is, it would be naive to expect that a nation will become reconciled to the loss of territory merely because its citizens have been forcibly removed from it.

It has become fashionable to minimize the strategic significance of frontiers. No one would gainsay the mobility of the airplane or the implications of the mechanization of warfare in general. Yet, we should beware lest our thinking be unduly influenced by a momentary state of affairs;

perhaps we, in America, with our devotion to the mechanical and the novel, are apt to try to be a few jumps ahead of the future. The value of the aircraft carrier has not rendered the battleship wholly obsolete, despite the predictions of certain enthusiasts; the collapse of Maginot and Siegfried lines has not eliminated the rôle of the infantry. Given sufficient superiority of weapons no fixed fortification is impregnable, but the contest between offensive and defensive is by no means settled, and, other things being equal, there is reason to believe that strategic positions can still play a great rôle. If, therefore, the strategic importance of frontiers is apt to be smaller than it has been in the past, it is yet a factor that needs to be taken into account. It is perhaps superfluous to add that, whatever may emerge in the way of world organization, there is no prospect of any immediate and thoroughgoing disarmament.

Coming to economic factors, there is no necessity in our time to stress their importance. To a degree, it may be said that Marx has converted the whole world, including his most rabid opponents. Clearly, the world in which we live is the result of scientific development and the by-products thereof, technology and industry. Much has been written to explain such things as the economic unity of the Danubian basin for example and the absurdities of the economic nationalism indulged in by the successor states of Austria-Hungary. All very true, and we may hope to have learned that the mere waving of the flag of freedom will not only fail to solve all difficulties but may create new problems of its own. Again, from the economist's point of view, the old Austria-Hungary was a more desirable creation than the post-1919 map of central Europe. There are two issues here, the political and the economic; the problem is to reconcile them. Free federation would seem a reasonable approach. But one thing is clear, neither problem is likely to be solved by ignoring the other. On the local level, when it comes to specific cities, like Danzig, Trieste or Fiume, economic considerations may, however, be sufficiently important to be decisive factors. It is perhaps worth pondering that Danzig, where an eminently sane compromise was attempted between the conflicting forces of nationalism and economics, was the starting point of the present war.

A word, finally, about the historic-psychological factor. It is perhaps difficult for us to appreciate its significance in Europe; the saying "history is the bunk" is credited to a famous American. The rôle of history is a most troublesome factor, one whose influence is due to the nationalistic stress in teaching history to the young, one also which has served to keep alive suppressed nationalities. We may be impatient with and somewhat

skeptical of the present-day reality of 1771 for a Pole, the field of Kossovo for a Serb, the Venetian influence in Dalmatia for an Italian. Such things have been distorted and abused for purposes of nationalistic advantage: no better illustration could be cited than the situation which developed in Italy after the last war. None the less these forces exist and we have come to acknowledge that the world of the mind is no less real than that of economic statistics. This rôle of history is an elusive factor which in some cases can only be dismissed as absurd while in others it must be allowed; in any case, the proximity or remoteness of an historic event is no measure of its present day importance.

Within the framework of the foregoing considerations, we may now approach the specific problem of Italy's frontiers. As the title of this discussion indicates, the northeastern frontier alone is considered, namely the segment from Switzerland to the Adriatic. The reason for confining ourselves to this portion of the Italian frontier is that in this region alone is there room for controversy, for we may assume that former Italian claims to Corsica, Nice, Savoy, or the Ticino will be relegated to the museum of historical curiosities.³ The same applies to changes which took place during this war, such as the annexation of a section of Slovenia and Dalmatia, or the creation of the kingdom of Croatia. We are therefore considering the situation as it existed prior to Italy's entrance into the war⁴

This frontier may be divided into three sections:

- 1. The portion from Switzerland to the vicinity of Dobbiaco, where the frontier established in 1919 rejoined the pre-1914 frontier;
 - 2. From this point to the vicinity of Tarvis;
 - 3. From Tarvis to Fiume, also the result of the last war.


The second section may be dismissed since it remained unchanged after the last war and no claims have been advanced for its modification in any quarter. We have therefore to consider two problems: that of the Upper Adige or South Tyrol, and that of the frontier with Yugoslavia or the fate of Julian Venetia.

The present frontier between Italy and Austria, the so-called line of

⁴ In the eastern Adriatic, from Istria to Corfu, Italy should yield all claims without qualifications. The situation there concerns Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece and should

not be complicated by Italian interference.

³ Conversely, the French velleities manifested in the Val d'Aosta and along a few miles of the Riviera coast should constitute no more than a passing—perhaps understandable, yet regrettable—aberration. It is as desirable that France should be associated with the victorious allies in dealing with Italy, as it is unsound for her to indulge in such petty pinpricks.





the Brenner, goes back to 1919. This was the frontier which had been promised to Italy in the famous Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, as the result of which she entered the war against her former ally Austria-Hungary. This frontier was determined on grounds of strategy to follow the divide of the Alps; the result was to include in Italy the purely Germanic South Tyrol with a population of about a quarter of a million Austrians. In this region, moreover, the linguistic line is fairly definite.⁵

The American intervention in 1917 introduced a complication, for President Wilson was not bound by the Treaty of London while on the other hand he stood definitely committed to the principle of self-determination without distinction of friend or foe. Where Italy was concerned, this took the form of stating that the frontiers of Italy should be drawn "along clearly recongnizable lines of nationality" (Point IX).6 On the strength of this statement, the American advisers of President Wilson came to advocate a line which represented a compromise between ethnic and strategic considerations. They were quite surprised to discover that Wilson had, unbeknown to them, committed himself to the line of the Brenner.7 At any rate this decision served to avoid any controversy on a national basis.

It should be added here that, while negotiating the Treaty of London with the Allies, Italy was also negotiating with Austria-Hungary the price of continued neutrality. During these negotiations, in a memorandum of April 8, 1915, Sonnino put forward a demand for the frontier of the Napoleonic kingdom of Italy of 1810. This frontier would have incorporated in Italy the Italian population of the Trentino and, in deference to strategic necessities, would have pushed the frontier beyond the linguistic line to include Bolzano. Such a frontier, judged adequate by Sonnino in 1915, probably presents the fairest compromise that could be arranged in this region and might well be advocated again. While not as good strategically as the Brenner, it is nevertheless reasonably satisfactory from that

⁵ According to the Austrian census of 1910, the population figures were as follows:
Trentino: 360,847 Italians and Ladins; 13,450 Germans
Upper Adige: 22,500 Italians and Ladins; 215,796 Germans.

On the reasons for using this census, see below p. 237.

⁶ During the discussion of the precise meaning of the Fourteen Points between Colonel House and the Allied leaders just prior to the German armistice, the attempt of the Italians to clarify their position with respect to Point IX was brushed aside on grounds of irrelevancy to the issue under discussion. The result was that the question of whether or not Italy was formally committed to the Fourteen Points in the case of Austria-Hungary remained ambiguous.

⁷ The manner and time of this commitment still remain somewhat of a mystery. Cf. R. Albrecht-Carrié, "A Note on the Brenner Frontier," in this Journal, October, 1941.

point of view and has the great advantage of reducing to a minimum the numbers of alien population. This would seem particularly desirable in view of the fact that the Italian treatment of the German speaking Tyrolese has been unduly harsh.

But a further consideration must be introduced at this point. In 1939, Hitler and Mussolini decided to liquidate the issue for all time by transferring the population. A plebiscite was taken which showed some two thirds of the German speaking population in favor of leaving the country; an influx of Italians from other parts of Italy was also fostered by the régime. Since this "tidying up of the map" was arranged between the two partners of the Axis, one might be tempted to let it stand, especially as it might not be easy to restore the situation amidst the chaos and confusion that prevail in Germany and may well continue to prevail for some time to come. However, owing to the outbreak of war, there seems to be some question about the extent to which the transfer of population has been carried out. Since we shall be dealing here with two former enemy countries, Italy and Austria, toward both of whom our inclination is lenient, while we are not hampered now by any such awkward instrument as the Treaty of London, that is all the more reason for approaching the problem in a spirit of detached fairness. Taking all the above into account, it might be best to withhold a definite commitment on the disposition of the territory between the Brenner line and what we may call the Sonnino line of 1915 pending the availability of further information on the present state of affairs in this region.8

The frontier with Yugoslavia, from Tarvis to the Adriatic, presents a rather different problem. For one thing, we are dealing here on one side with an ally instead of an enemy, and, whatever may be said of fairness and justice, it is not possible to place Yugoslavia on the same plane with her aggressor. Yugoslavia has already asserted claims on various occasions, recently again in the form of statements made by Marshal Tito at the time of his visit to Moscow in connection with the signature of the Russo-Yugoslav treaty. It is perhaps not without significance that Tito's claims should have appeared in the newspaper *Red Star*. These claims comprise the whole Istrian peninsula and include Trieste as well as Gorizia. They were made on grounds of nationality and are about the same as the extreme Yugoslav claims of 1919. As to Italy, she would regard herself fortunate if she

⁸ This solution is similar to the one advocated by Professor Salvemini in his recent article, "The Frontiers of Italy," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1944.

⁹ The New York Times, April 16 and 18, 1945.

could retain her frontiers of 1939 in this region. Now, as in 1919, the whole of Julian Venetia is thus an object of controversy.

It is therefore necessary to examine both the facts in the case and its historical background. The ethnic situation in this territory is not controversial. The frontier which Italy obtained at the end of the last war incorporated some three quarters of a million Croats and Slovenes within her borders, while no Italians to speak of found themselves on the Yugoslav side of the frontier. This frontier was that promised by the Treaty of London with two modifications: one, from Idria to Monte Nevoso, a slight change to include the railroad junction of San Pietro was secured by Italy; the other, the city of Fiume, after a somewhat hectic life, was finally annexed to Italy in 1924.

In this region, it is not possible to draw a clear line of demarcation between the Italian and the Slavic populations. The Italian density is higher on the west coast of Istria and the Slavic is higher in the center and in the East. The change in ethnic density is, however, not quite gradual, for the Italians constitute the larger element in the towns while the Slavs are predominantly engaged in agriculture; the ethnic problem cannot, therefore, in this region be divorced from its economic life. It might be stated, in addition, that, despite grandiloquent talk about her high civilization which would have made it an insult for her to be asked to sign a minority treaty, from the very beginning, Italy failed to respect the rights of this alien minority. The policy of oppression and denationalization was naturally emphasized by the Fascist régime. As a consequence, recent Italian population statistics are useless: having done its best to eradicate the use of Slovene (compulsory use of Italian in schools, courts, churches, etc.), the Fascist census went on to classify as Italians all who could use that language. We must therefore go back to the more representative Austrian census of 1910.12 However, this does not seem unreasonable, despite the lapse of time, if we consider that there does not appear to have occurred any displacement of population, that the time has been too short effectively to Italianize the Slavs, and if we assume, in addition, a similar rate of increase of the whole population, an assumption which, if anything, may be somewhat unfair to the Slavs.

¹⁰ By way of compensation, there were, however, Italians in Dalmatia which, save for Zara and some islands, went to Yugoslavia.

¹¹ At the northern end of the Italy-Yugoslav frontier, Italy also secured the town of Tarvis not originally included in the Treaty of London line.

¹² We may refer here to an article "The Italo-Yugoslav Frontier Problem, Some Facts and Figures," which appeared over the initials O. B. in *Il Mondo* for August, 1944.

In 1919, the same conflict developed over Julian Venetia as over the Tyrol between the Treaty of London and the Fourteen Points. But the results were different, for in this case President Wilson gave full support to the recommendations of his technical advisers. The story of the clash which developed has been told at length and need not be considered here, ¹³ It will suffice to recall that Wilson continued to exercise his power of veto over this frontier so long as he remained in office, and it was only after his elimination from the political scene and the American withdrawal from the quarrels of Europe that the settlement indicated above was arrived at by direct negotiations between Rome and Belgrade. ¹⁴

It might be mentioned also that the settlement was resented by the Slovenes and Croats on both sides of the frontier and that its conclusion was facilitated by the fact that the ruling group in Belgrade was overwhelmingly Serbian; Pašić in particular could take a relatively detached view of Croat and Slovene aspirations. Present conditions are different, and as a result of the situation which has developed in Yugoslavia during the war, the Serbian element is likely to be relegated to a less dominant position. Tito himself is a Croat.

As one might expect, the most reasonable approach to the problem, if we think in terms of local conditions rather than of former treaty commitments or power politics, was to be found in 1919 among the Americans. They have often been reproached and abused for their ignorance of and lack of understanding for the passions of Europe. Whether or not the charge holds true for the American public at large, the fact remains that the quality of the work done by the so-called experts, the real technicians in their various fields as distinguished from certain officious busybodies, was second to none. Their recommendations took the form of what came to be known as the American or Wilson Line.

From the neighborhood of Tarvis to that of Idria, it is worth noting that this line, the Treaty of London line, and the line of the Italian claims advanced in 1919 were identical. From Idria to the sea the three lines were distinct. This is due mainly to geographical reasons. In the northern segment, the divide of the Julian Alps is a well defined line which has in turn acted as a barrier to the spread of population in either direction. It would seem best to leave this portion of the frontier unaltered and the dispute may be confined to the portion between Idria and the Adriatic.

In this section, the geographical divide is not well defined. Even the

¹³ Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1938).
14 The Treaty of Rapallo in 1920 settled the frontier question and created a Free State of Fiume which was finally absorbed by Italy in 1924.

watershed is not easily determined owing to the physical nature of the Karst plateau: the region abounds in streams which disappear underground and whose course and re-emergence is not yet known with certainty. This lack of definiteness in the physical features of the land is in part responsible for the westward infiltration of the Slavs which has resulted in the present ethnographic distribution.

Here also, taking all the circumstances into account, the American or Wilson line of 1919 constitutes probably the best compromise. This line may be said to be somewhat unfair to the Slavs, appreciable numbers of whom would still find themselves within Italy. This was considered justified in 1919 on account of the local geographic and economic conditions and may be regarded as a reasonable quid pro quo for the complete surrender of Italian claims in Dalmatia where there subsist Italian nuclei, especially in some urban centers. A line closer to the ethnic, which would leave to Italy a narrow strip along the western coast of Istria¹⁶ would be a rather awkward arrangement. On her side, Italy will resent the small loss of territory involved in the Wilson line; but that loss, while it would undeniably be the result of her defeat in war, would be the loss of land to which her claim is poor. It is a loss which would not weaken her in any real sense and could not be presented as retaliation for her aggression. As stated earlier, the annexation of alien national territory is not the sort of things which constitute sound compensation, 17 irredentas are as likely to be sources of conflict in the future as in the past. To be sure, the Yugoslavs, as already mentioned, have put forward larger claims to include Trieste and Gorizia. These claims ought to be rejected.

Something must be said about both Trieste and Fiume at this point. The importance of Trieste is chiefly economic. From that point of view, Trieste does not properly belong either to Italy or to Yugoslavia, but rather to the territories that used to constitute the old Austria-Hungary. That entity is gone, primarily for the simple reason that it proved incapable of adapting itself to newer conditions of existence. Economically, its passing was not beneficial, but there is no point in seeking solutions for economic difficulties by creating worse political ones. Solutions along the lines of a

¹⁵ See the interesting article by A. E. Moodie, "The Italo-Yugoslav boundary," The Geographical Review, February, 1943.

¹⁶ Such as the line of demarcation between the Anglo-American and Yugoslav forces of occupation agreed upon in June.

¹⁷ Save perhaps in such cases as the Dutch claim to some German territory in compensation for the damage done by flooding, or the desirability of eliminating the East Prussian enclave. Even these exceptional cases should be considered with care before a final solution is adopted.

Danubian economic pool, if they come to pass, offer more grounds for hope. In any case, the countries for which Trieste is the logical sea outlet, such as Austria and Czechoslovakia, should be given adequate facilities in that port. Italy does not need Trieste for her own economic life and she should not be allowed to use her possession of it for purposes of exerting a strangle hold on Central European trade. Trieste is a place par excellence for the exercise of international controls. At the same time, Trieste, while it has a substantial Slavic and Germanic element, is essentially Italian and should be recognized as such. It is perhaps well to remember that the pre-1914 slogan of Italian irredentism was not Dalmatia or Fiume but "Trento e Trieste." Trieste has become a symbol in Italy; to take it away from her would produce a well-nigh unanimous, and on the whole justified, reaction of cynicism toward the professed war aims of the United Nations. 18

The recent Yugoslav protest against the entry of the British Eighth Army into Trieste should be looked upon as playing for position and staking a claim for bargaining purposes. The problem could probably be settled with ease and fairness if Italian and Yugoslav interests alone were considered. But the situation may become more difficult if the Yugoslav claim receives Russian support. Should that turn out to be the case, the fact could not be considered as other than a manifestation of Russian imperialism. In that event, it would be almost inevitable that Britian would respond by seeking to bring Italy within her orbit. A relatively minor dispute could thus be magnified into one of the issues around which could crystalize the division of Europe into rival blocs. Trieste is an Italo-Yugoslav problem and should not be turned into an Anglo-Russian test of power. The disposition of this city offers an excellent opportunity of convincing the world at large, and our former Italian enemies in particular, that the present war has not been a mere old fashioned clash of rival imperialisms.

The arguments that apply to Trieste also apply to Fiume, but they lead to the opposite solution. Fiume should be incorporated in Yugoslavia. The case of Fiume would probably not even need mention, were it not for the controversy, out of all proportion to the real value of the town, which developed over its possession at the end of the last war and was not finally settled until 1924 through its annexation to Italy. This city of some 50,000 was, in 1919, about half Italian in population. The Treaty of London

¹⁸ It is of interest that, save for the Communist element, Italian opinion has already reacted with remarkable unanimity to the threat to Trieste. Even the Communists seem to have deemed it expedient to moderate their readiness to disregard national feeling. This is a place where it might be well to remember the case of Frume. If national feeling was misled in that case in 1919, it would have a much sounder basis in the case of Trieste.

specifically—and wisely—excluded Fiume from the Italian claims. Unlike Trieste, Fiume had no real association in the Italian national consciousness, but, for a variety of reasons, an essentially foolish agitation for its annexation was allowed to develop. Inasmuch as the Treaty of London line reached almost to the gates of the city, this demand could be presented as a case of self-determination for a city contiguous to the national territory. Actually, Fiume, like Zara, is an Italian island, and a small one at that, in a Slav sea. Moreover, economically, Fiume, even less than Trieste, belongs to Italy, while it very definitely belongs to northern Yugoslavia and to Hungary. The settlement of 1924, while it disposed of the dispute on the political level, brought out in full the economic absurdities of severing Fiume proper and its harbor from its suburb of Sušak with Porto Baros. 19 The coming setlement will offer a good occasion for rectifying this state of affairs. As in the case of Trieste, adequate facilities under international guarantees should be provided to the non-Yugoslav users of the port.

After much uneasiness and acrimony during the late Spring, an agreement²⁰ was finally made between Great Britain, the United States and Yugoslavia which established a line separating the Anglo-American from the Yugoslav forces in Julian Venetia. This line passes just east of Trieste and Pola, placing the western edge of Istria in the Anglo-American zone. It obviously represents a compromise between the Yugoslav claim to occupy all the territory up to and even beyond the Isonzo²¹ and the contention of the Anglo-Americans that their forces should control all Italian territory contained in the boundaries of 1939. It is conceivable that this line of demarcation, ethnically more accurate than the Wilson line, may eventually become the frontier in this region. If we assume that, as a minimum, Italy will retain Trieste and Yugoslavia acquire Fiume, the area of controversy would reduce itself to the strip between the present line of demarcation and the American line of 1919.

To sum up then, taking all the factors into consideration, the best arrangement that can be proposed for the drawing of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier is a return to the American proposal of 1919. This would leave a small minority of either country within the confines of the other. It is to be hoped that the cultural autonomy of these minorities would be res-

¹⁹ See R. Albrecht-Carrié, "Fiume: Nationalism versus Economics," in this Journal, April. 1942.

²⁰ The text of this agreement was given out in Washington by the State Department

²¹ During the collapse of German resistance in North Italy, the Yugoslav forces actually overran all Istria as far as the Isonzo and set up in Trieste a local administration favorable to themselves.

pected on both sides of the frontier, although it would probably be desirable that the members of either nationality who chose to remain within the confines of the other should not enjoy special privileges such as the protection of minority treaties. Italy and Yugoslavia might be left to work out by direct negotiations any arrangement that seemed suitable, including the exchange of populations; that, however, should not be forced on them from the outside.

To repeat once more, this whole discussion has been based on the assumption that Italy, Austria, and Yugoslavia will, like others, continue to exist as distinct national units; that, if they do, the best frontier for Italy is one which represents a fair compromise taking into account the various factors that enter into the situation. It is perhaps logical that such a "fair" compromise should stem from American sources; not from any superior moral endowment of America, but from the simple fact that, in such a situation, America enjoys a greater detachment than either those immediately concerned or, for that matter, than any member of the European community of nations. It is the combination of this fact together with the power of this country which, in 1919, and even now, cause it to be looked up to as the best hope of smaller nations. It is a moral asset which, for all the supposedly hard boiled realism that makes many people shrink from the mere mention of the notion of justice, ought not lightly to be thrown away.

Objections will doubtless be raised to the solution that has been proposed, as to any solution for that matter. Unreasonable, aggressive nationalism cannot be appeased: it reads into concessions signs of weakness. Nor again do we believe that an approach solely in terms of power is likely to produce durable results; power shifts with time and we must beware lest we mistake the power balance at this or any other moment for the "wave of the future." If a peaceful world is what we desire, in the small sector of Italy's frontiers as in the case of other frontiers—however important or unimportant frontiers may turn out to be in the world of tomorrow—it would seem reasonable to believe that the best contribution that can be made is one that will tend to reduce sources of conflict to a minimum. The case of Italy is among the easiest. It was poorly handled in 1919, by Italy herself as well as by her chief opponent, Wilson. Yet, for all Wilson's mistakes, there is point in recalling the spirit which moved him to declare to his technical advisers: "Tell me what's right, and I'll fight for it."

BARNARD COLLEGE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARIES OF AUSTRIA by Erik R. v. Kuehnelt-Leddihn

T IS a well known fact that the geopolitical structure of Central Europe, so carelessly conceived at Paris, became after 1919 the greatest menace to world peace, and that Rump-Austria was the weakest link in the chain of the whole Danubian settlement. The collapse of some leading Vienna banks heralded the beginning of the great economic crisis, and it was Austria who became the first victim of Nazi aggression; even the circumstance that Hitler happened to be born on Austrian soil has a symbolic value. Exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor! The poisons emanating from the decaying, mutilated fragment of the once powerful Dual Monarchy penetrated the Old World and the New. Although the psychological aspects of this greatest territorial cataclysm in all modern history are of immense importance, they cannot be dissociated from the economic factors. Rump-Austria was an economic absurdity.

Vienna with its two million inhabitants was meant to be the metropolis of a country with a population twenty-six rather than three times its size. The rest of the country, moreover, had a large unproductive area, poor soil, difficult agricultural conditions, no coal, industry depending on imported raw materials, a transportation system expensive to maintain, no foreign investments and insufficient production of food. Waterpower, a limited tourist trade, timber and one place with important iron deposits were its only assets. The postal rate for an ordinary letter from Graz to Marburg or from Innsbruck to Zürich was the equivalent of a breakfast. The round-trip railway fare between two stations seventeen miles apart was one dollar, or the daily wage of a fully employed factory worker. The country's small size prevented mass production, skyrocketed the price of public utilities and necessitated imports. These were the main causes of Austria's neverending economic crisis. That country never had a chance to lead a tolerable existence.

Austria's general situation was well characterized by Clemenceau who said in 1918: "We have left the breeches of the Emperor Charles and nothing else," but it was the Austrian Peace Delegation which, in its reply to the unilateral decisions of the Allied and Associated Powers, sounded a warning and prophetic word:

En examinant nôtre prise de position, le Conseil Suprême voudra bien reconnaître que la Délégation Autrichien-Allemande s'est, dans l'état actuel des negociations scrupuleusement bornée a ne demander que les atténuations

à l'existence du peuple autrichien allemand et dont le refus l'exposerait à l'anarchie et à la misère.

Il a été prouvé que l'Autriche Allemand ne saurait vivre dans les frontières restreintes qu'on lui impose et que l'assujetissement de ses nationaux par des Etats voisins entraînerait une grave fermentation et un danger latent pour la paix et l'ordre social au centre de l'Europe.¹

The purpose of the present study is to examine the possibilities of territorial remedies for Austria's intolerable situation. If we examine the boundaries of Rump-Austria, we will discover that those established in the West and North have an historical background without any ethnical implications. Although there is some reason to believe that the German-speaking population of Southern Bohemia and Southern Moravia prefer the rule of Vienna to that of Prague, there is no hope that the Atlantic Charter will find its application in that region. It might be possible to make a case for the Berchtesgaden region on historical lines, basing it on the age-old association of that semi-enclave with the bishopric of Salzburg, but the outcome of a plebiscite in that territory would be doubtful. It is also questionable whether a referendum in various larger communities on the Hungarian side of the Eastern frontier of Austria would basically change the verdict of the Ödenburg (Sopron) plebiscite of 1921, even in spite of the economic advantages which incorporation into Austria could offer to these agricultural centers. There remains the problem of the Southern boundary whose unfavorable delineation deprived the struggling Alpine state of its natural southern system of communications as well as regions providing it with essential foodstuffs and minerals. Historical considerations played no part in tracing Austria's southern boundary since the newly established frontiers cut across the provinces of the old Dual Monarchy, detaching from it areas which were Austrian centuries before Columbus set eyes on the New World.

The Italians claimed the watershed of the rivers draining to the Adriatic as a boundary and already in the Treaty of London (April, 1915) they were promised areas by the Allies to which they were not morally entitled. Sir Edward Grey later excused this irregularity with the remark that arrangements are made during war time which under normal conditions would be considered criminal. Yet the Italian demand, not unlike the present unjustifiable territorial expropriations, was based on the alibi of "strategic security"; Italian geographers had, moreover, maintained for

¹ Die Note der deutschösterreichischen Friedensdelegation an den Präsidenten der Friedenskonferenz am 6 August, 1919. Deutschösterreichs Antwort auf die Friedensbedingungen (Wien, 1919), Zahl 914, pp. 3-4.

quite a long time a theory of "natural borders," insisting that only watersheds can be regarded as such. But there was no doubt that the cession of the Central and South-Tyrol to Italy constituted a violation of two of Wilson's Fourteen Points which insisted on borders determined along clearly recognizable ethnic lines in conformity with the wishes of the inhabitants. Such a "clearly recognizable" line happens to exist. It separates the Central from the South Tyrol (Trentino)² and neither the German-speaking nor the Ladin or Italian-speaking population of the Tyrol were asked about their wishes. There was no question about the sympathies and loyalties of the first two groups. A prolonged sojourn in the Trentino in 1939 convinced this writer that Austrian sentiment in that part of the Tyrol is still exceedingly strong. Italian nationalism and chauvinism which have made headway in the middle classes and in professional circles have not engulfed the peasantry, whose memory of the "good, old times" ties them to the Austrian past with its non-fascist character, its high prices for agricultural products, not to mention its officialdom averse to the taking of bribes

The claims of the newly constituted Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia after 1929) were of a purely ethnic nature. It must be borne in mind that an ethnic boundary can easily be disastrous to the states involved for a variety of reasons, and, furthermore, that it is frequently opposed to the very principle of self-determination. It is utterly untrue that ethnic groups always desire political union with their "racial comrades." The vast majority of Masurian Poles preferred Prussian-German to Polish administration; many Alsatians felt French rather than German; the people of the Tessin have shown no desire to join Italy. The various constituent aspects of a good boundary have been discussed elsewhere;3 one should remember that every border has two angles: its intrinsic "local," twodimensional character and the territorial, three-dimensional distribution it inevitably involves.

Mussolini, always a great champion of the Brenner boundary, put himself in a very equivocal position when he argued during the Sudeten Crisis in 1938 that ethnic boundaries should always prevail "unless God Himself has drawn the frontiers of a country in an unmistakable way." This allusion to the Brenner could easily be applied to the mountain chains

Thought (March, 1945).

² The expression "Central Tyrol" for the German-Speaking South Tyrol is geographically more correct. Lord Bryce made use of it. The distance from the Brenner to Ala on the Adige (Etsch) is more than twice that to the Bavarian frontier.

3 Cf. Erik v. Kuehnelt-Leddihn, "The Problem of Frontiers in Post-War Europe,"

of the Böhmerwald, Erzgebirge and Riesengebirge, which divide the Bohemian Basin from Germany. There is no doubt that a watershed might constitute an ideal boundary, but it is highly significant that passes are practically never on ethnic lines of demarcation. The St. Gotthardt Pass and the Jablonica are exceptions to the rule. Passes often unite rather than divide, a fact testified to by the rise of pass-states extending on both sides of a watershed (Savoy, Navarre, Switzerland). And watersheds, in turn, are not necessarily on mountain-crests, not even in Alpine areas, as demonstrated by the divide between the Black Sea (Drau) and the Adriatic (Rienz) on the Toblacher Feld in the Eastern Tyrol. A much more exact boundary, as the late A. Penck has pointed out, is the river narrows (Klause). A survey of European boundaries would bear him out.

The handing over of the Central Tyrol to Italy has created for Austria a score of problems. The rank injustice of this arrangement⁴ and the sufferings of the German-speaking population under the fascist régime⁵ are too well known to need elaboration here. The blame for this catastrophic error does not rest on the Treaty of London alone. President Wilson has been blamed by David Lloyd George for yielding in this question to the Italians, and there is little doubt that the responsibility was largely his.⁶ Woodrow Wilson's decision, which he later deplored, he blamed on a lack of

⁴ An extract from the appeal of Lord Bryce and other British scholars against the Italian demands can be found in E. Reut-Nicolussi, Tyrol Under the Axe of Italian Fascism, Trsl. K. L. Montgomery (London, 1930), p. 32. Sincere, democratic Italians like Leonida Bissolati protested not less vociferously. It is worthwhile to remember that Italy in her blackmailing note to Austria in 1915 demanded merely the Trentino and the city of Bozen (i.e. the northern boundary of the Kingdom of Italy under Napoleon), but the London Treaty assured her of the watershed boundary. Italy's manoeuvring for illegitimate territorial concessions was nothing short of blackmail. The disgust of British statesmen with the Italian attitude is well described by Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (Boston, 1933), pp. 159-160. "They (the sentimentalists of the British Foreign Office) did not relish promising so huge a price for Italy's act of betrayal and at the expense of the very people whom she was about to betray. These old-world emotions had, however, to be suppressed in favour of 'war necessity.' Yet the Foreign Office took unkindly to its task. Sir Edward Grey was so disconcerted by Italy's conduct and demands that he retired to the country on a plea of illness. The Permanent Under-Secretary, in his first conversation with the Italian Ambassador, allowed himself an expression which savoured of somewhat contemptuous realism. 'You speak,' said the Ambassador, 'as if you were purchasing our support.' 'Well,' said the Under-Secretary, 'and so we are.' 'At the Peace Conference, Italy demanded in addition the Sexton Valley and the Tarvis triangle beyond the divide, which she got practically without a fight.

⁵ Cf. Hans Margreiter, Die Literatur über Südtirol seit der Lostrennung von Österreich (Innsbruck, 1926); Wilhelm Rohmedet, Das Deutschtum in Südtirol (München, 1932);

Paul Herre, Die Südtiroler Prage (München, 1927).

6 Cf. S. M. Bouton, Robert Dell and C. H. Herford, English and American Voices about the German South Tyrol (New York, 1925). Lloyd George's accusation of Wilson can be found in his Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, 1939).

information. Yet American as well as British geographers had protested against the readiness to compromise on the Central Tyrol.⁷ British observers were baffled by the President's lack of resistance.⁸ Wilson's attitude in the Tyrolean imbroglio differed fundamentally from his later pugnaciousness in the Fiume question when he became unyielding to Italy's demand for this city which was undoubtedly Italian in majority.

Before discussing the Italian desire for security, we shall look at the problem from an Austrian point of view. The loss of the Central Tyrol deprived the young state of a quarter million citizens, the vast majority of which were Austro-Germans in speech and culture.⁹ The feeling among the small Ladinian minority was for a variety of reasons pro-Austrian.¹⁰ The Tyrol was cut into three sectors, and the inhabitants of the Eastern Tyrol had to provide themselves with passports and visas to travel to their own provincial capital unless, they chose to detour across Carinthia and Salzburg. From the mere point of view of communications, the loss of the

⁷ The propositions of the American geographers tended to create a compromise boundary which would have given to the Austrians the Upper Eisack and the Puster Valleys, thus securing them α corridor between the North and the Eastern Tyrol. The propositions of the British geographers were more to the point. They wrote: "The line of demarcation between the two races is remarkably clear and to all intents and purposes coincides with the administrative boundary between the Trentino and the Alto Adige if we include the Ladins with the Italian population. The German-speaking population of the upper valleys of the Adige and the Eisack are intensely strong in their devotion to Austria and to bring any large population of them under Italian rule would be a distinct violation of the principle of self-determination." See René Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Peace Conference (New York, 1939), pp. 414-416; and D. H. Miller, My Diary at the Peace Conference of Paris, VI, Document 513, pp. 407-410.

⁸ Cf. T. A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944), p. 252. Liberal observers were profoundly shocked and disillusioned. The area involved was not large, but the principle was. At the very outset of the Conference anxious inquirers began to ask themselves and one another, "Can Wilson be trusted?" Harold Nicolson, who was there, later wrote of the current feeling that, "if Wilson could swallow the Brenner, he would swallow everything."

⁹ Between the Austrian Census of December 31, 1910, and the Italian Census of December 1, 1921, there is a considerable difference. The Italian statistics can be gleaned from the publication of the Ministero dell' Economica Nazionale. Direzione Generale della Statistica. "Risultati sommari del Censimento della popolazione eseguito il 1, Dicembre 1921." The percentage of German-speaking inhabitants in the Venezia Tridentina (South and Central Tyrol) is given as 32.4%, whereas the Austrian Census of 1910 figured a share of 37.8%. This is more than can be accounted for by the shift of military and administrative personnel. The Ladins figure among the Italians.

¹⁰ Culturally, more than linguistically, the Ladins are different from the Italians. Nobody would take a place like St. Ulrich in Gröden (Ortisei) as an Italian village, and even Cortina d'Ampezzo is very distinct from the Friulian towns across the old border. Just because the Iitalians have shown a tendency to "annex" the Ladinians, their resistance to Italianization has been very marked. Among the organizers of the Central Tyrolean resistance movement against Italian encroachment, Ladinian names are very prominent.

Brenner was a great one. 11 One has to bear in mind that communications in the mountains are always problematical, and that passes, especially those which can be kept open in the winter, are rare, God-given conveniences. Rump-Austria is dissected by the dorsal spine of a huge mountain chain which begins at the Swiss boundary near the Reschen Pass, halves the Tyrol, and continues along the border of Salzburg and Carinthia under the name of *Hohe Tauern*. Finally, as *Niedere Tauern*, the range follows a northeastern course across Northern Styria, its last foothills descending to Lower Austria. There is not a single year-round automobile road crossing the Hohe Tauern; 12 therefore, the Brenner Pass with its relatively low altitude (4,495 feet), exposed to warm winds from the South (sirocco, Föhn), is of paramount importance to inner-Austrian transportation.

Of even more critical importance are the economic resources of the Central Tyrol. Not only is the tourist traffic in Meran and the Dolomites a valuable source of income, 13 but the water-power and, more than anything else, the wine and fruit-growing industry in the Riviera-like climate of the Upper Adige valley are of paramount importance to small Austria. The interests of this valley's population and peasantry are parallel to those of Austria. In the years of Italian domination their products merely swelled the surplus of wine, grapes, and fruit in Italy, while Austria had to buy these commodities from abroad. Austria is essentially a wine-drinking country, but in the Republic of 1919, only very small areas south of Vienna and in the vicinity of Graz had vineyards. Since a wine-drinking people see in this beverage a "staple food" rather than a frivolous luxury, wine had to be imported. The high altitude of the larger part of Austria with its exposure to northern winds limits somewhat the possibilities of fruit growing. A comparison of the fruit harvests in Northern and Central Tyrol shows that the fertility of the latter was considerably higher than that

¹¹ It should also be mentioned that Austria lost a considerable source of income by the lost railway kilometers between the German and Italian boundary. Making use of cheap hydroelectric power, the railroads can make sizeable profits from a large volume of freight in transit, provided the mileage is substantial.

¹² A railroad crosses the Hohe Tauern through a tunnel near Bad Gastein, but the highway which parallels it further to the West (finished in 1935) reaches an altitude of 7,600 feet and is naturally closed during more than half the year (Grossglocknerstrasse).

¹³ A country with imports greater than exports needs foreign currency badly in order to continue its necessary purchases abroad. In order to overcome this constant drain on its gold reserves and foreign currencies and holdings, a country must have either large investments abroad or a large influx of tourists. For example, Switzerland, a great importer, is not only a tourist center, but also a large scale investor. Hitler, with his regulation prohibiting German tourists from visiting Austria, wrought great havoc in Austrian economic stability which was always of a most precarious nature.

of the former. The value and revenue of real estate were accordingly higher.¹⁴ The Central Tyrol was the most valuable section of Alpine Austria.

The Tyroleans, having a strong attachment to their province, despaired almost completely after the dissection. The Northern Tyrol, reduced to a narrow strip, became a sort of panhandle to Austria. The people of Innsbruck, deprived of their natural hinterland, toyed with the idea of Anschluss¹⁵ while the inhabitants of Vorarlberg became receptive to the idea of union with Switzerland. Recovery of dismembered Austria seemed to them improbable if not impossible.

The reasons for demanding the Brenner boundary, which the Italians put forward at the Peace Conference, were largely strategic. Their fear of six and a half million Austrians was so inordinate that they rejected all other boundary lines which might have given to them fair protection against the irresistible assault of this powerful, if totally bankrupt, nation. They could have chosen a line from the Monte Adamello over the Brenta to the Adige and from there over the crest of the mountains dividing the waters of the Brenta River and the Avisio to the Cima Rosella on the old border; increasing their demands, they might have postulated a frontier along the watershed between the Noce and the Etsch (Adige) and, further east, between the Avisio, Eisack and Rienz. But Italy, emphasizing that Austria had menaced the northern Italian plains by control of the Central and South Tyrol, pushed its borders into the vicinity of Innsbruck and

¹⁴ The following data are taken from the essay "Das Wirtschaftsleben" by Hermann Schullern-Schrattenhofen from the collection Südtirol edited by Karl v. Grabmayr (Berlin, 1919). His statistics are taken from Mitteilungen des Finanzministeriums, XXI Jahrgang, 1913, pp. 95-96.

Region	All Types of Fruits in Hundredweights	Wine in
	(Kernobst, Steinobst and Schalenobst)	Hectoliters
Northwest-Tyrol	2,651	0
Northeast-Tyrol	3,911	0
Eastern-Tyrol	450	0
Central-Tyrol	77,402	519,689
· ·	Income from Real Estate in Kronen	
Innsbruck, Hötting	282,000	
Bozen, Gries and en	831,000	

Meran and environs, Central-Tyrol, 26,000 inhabitants 613,000

15 Cf. J. F. Bass, *The Peace Tangle* (New York, 1920), p. 160. This author pointed out rightly that this incentive for an *Anschluss* would finally result in a new war. It did.

¹⁶ T. A. Bailey, op. cit., p. 253. "The Italians were careful not to point out that a defensible line excluding the great bulk of the Germans could have been drawn farther south." Yet their arguments would have gotten nowhere if Wilson had not co-operated. The President admitted on November 12, 1919, that he had out of "sincere sympathy for Italy" permitted her to incorporate the Central Tyrol, "a considerable region populated by alien inhabitants." Cf. H.W.V. Temperley in the Encyclopedia Britannica (London, 1926), 13th ed., III, p. 784.

Bavaria. It is interesting to remember that the Trentino played no rôle in inflicting the defeat of Caporetto on the Italian Armies in 1917; while the Austrian efforts for a break-through from the Trentino around Asiago and Arsiero (1916) ended in a stalemate, the attack from the Upper Isonzo ended in an Italian rout. Nor has the Brenner boundary given to Italy any protection whatsoever from Germanic domination. Mussolini's disciple, who had sworn to respect his master's control of the Central Tyrol, ¹⁷ by 1943 dominated the Apennine peninsula from one end to the other.


What, then, would be a just and equitable border between Italy and Austria? The answer would be, obviously, a line drawn according to the moral principles of the Atlantic Charter and the sound rules of political geography. In this case the solution should not be difficult. The Austrian character of the Central Tyrol is beyond dispute; therefore, the boundary offered by the Austrian Government to Italy in April, 1915 should be deemed adequate. The Trentino (South-Tyrol proper) should be subjected to a plebiscite and zones established in order to reach a result conforming rigorously to the wishes of the population. The valleys of the Noce and the Avisio, in which transitory Italo-Ladin dialects are spoken, ought to have a separate referendum. If the inhabitants of these valleys wish to return to Austria, there is no reason why they should not live outside Italy as the Swiss Tessinians, since Austria is traditionally a multi-national state. The same considerations hold good for the southern part of the Trentino¹⁸ with the city of Trent, though Italian hopes for a victory in a plebiscite are considerably higher, owing to the larger urban element. 19 Whatever the outcome, the principle of "no annexations without the express wish of the inhabitants" should be honored.


¹⁷ The nefarious Hitler-Mussolini plan for the Austrian Central Tyroleans was only partially carried out. Not more than 25-30% of the German-speaking population was transferred to various parts of the Greater German Reich, mostly to Bohemia and Poland. The fate of some of them has been well described by the Austrian writer, Ernst Lothar, in his novel, Beneath Another Sun (New York, 1944). The return of these displaced persons who are fascist victims must be facilitated.

¹⁸ The natural boundaries between the Central Tyrol and the Trentino run, through the following points: Zufallspitze Monte Cevedale, Eggen Spitze, Gleck Spitz, Schrumm Spitz, Hochwart, Langer Spitz, Hofbichl, Mendel, Ober Göllner, Roën Berg, a point south of Salurn, Castionberg, Schwarzhorn, Monte Agnello, Reiterjoch Monte Viezzena, Monte Aloch, from here the boundary of 1918. The Boundaries between the Northern and Southern Trentino run as follows: La Busazza, Cima Presanella, Cima di Nambino, Bocca di Brenta, Monte Paganello, South of Lavis, Monte Gardone, Stelle della Sute, Caston di Slavaci, Rolle Pass, Cimone della Pala.


¹⁹ Early in this century, the Austrian government wanted to cede to Italy a small community east of Lake Idro, which was shut off from Austria by a chain of rugged mountains and was accessible only from Italy. The population was in language solidly Italian. As soon as the intentions of Austria became known in the village, the peasants protested

THE DISTRIBUTION OF LANGUA COMMUNITIES OF SOUTHERN CARINT









The Tarvis triangle, a part of Carinthia overwhelmingly populated by German-speaking Austrians, should also be returned to Austria. The town of Tarvis belongs hydrographically to the Drau and thus to the Black Sea.²⁰

East of Tarvis, Austria faces two border problems: South Carinthian territory, upon which demands have recently been made by Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia; and the Marburg-Maribor area, whose return to Austria is of greatest urgency. There is a certain connection between these two geographically coherent problems.

Marshal Tito's demands are nothing but a renewal of the Yugoslav postulates of 1919. Carinthia, it must be borne in mind, was Austrian since 1335. This province consists largely of a sector of the Drau (Drava) valleys with various side valleys between the Tauern in the North and the Carnic Alps with the Karavanken in the South. Geographically, it represents a perfect unit: a basin with elevated rims. From the point of view of communications, it is the natural corridor of transportation between the Central Tyrol and Central Styria, thus representing Austria's southern artery of commerce. Its division would be a crime against all laws of economic or political geography. Even the drafters of the St. Germain Treaty did not want to yield to the Serb demands and a plebiscite was held which, in spite of Austria's miserable economic situation, ended in the Southern Zone with a 60-40 victory for Austria. The Northern Zone of South-Carinthia, which is almost purely German in language, was accordingly left with Austria without further consultation.²¹

The basis for the Yugoslav demand was an ethnic one. There is no doubt that the Slavic element once predominated in the largest part of Austria, just as did the Celtic element in England or the Germanic element in Lombardy. Yet a dead past cannot be transformed into living history. The

most energetically to Vienna, and the plan, prompted by the desire to bolster the Triple-Alliance with little gifts, had to be dropped in face of the wildest demonstrations of loyalty to Austria.

The proposal to return the Central Tyrol to Austria and to subject the Trentino to a plebiscite has been made by Rep. William Langer from North Dakota in the House of Representatives on May 28, 1945.

²⁰ The Italian census of 1921 gave for the population of the Tarvis triangle: 4,185 German-speaking inhabitants, 1,207 Slovenian-speaking, and 1,106 Italian-speaking. The number of Italians was undoubtedly due to an influx of carabinieri, custom officials and railroad employees in that borderland.

²¹ The city of Klagenfurt, capital of Carinthia and center of the northern zone, had according to the Austrian census of 1934, only 429 Slovenian-speaking inhabitants among 29,671 citizens, the Judicial District of Klagenfurt (partly in the Southern Zone) 3,365 Slovenian-speaking inhabitants among 47,824.

Slovenians of Carinthia, already strongly mixed with the Germanic element, adopted gradually a language spoken in the cities, a language that was used not only for cultural and trade purposes, but was the most important medium of communication in all of central and eastern Europe, inside and outside the Dual Monarchy. The Slavic dialect spoken in Carinthia differed again from literary Slovenian, 22 a language spoken by little more than a million and a half.23 No wonder that the German language was adopted by an ever increasing number of Slovenians and that we find among Austrian writers, politicians and statesmen a host of Slovenian names; the best known, perhaps, in this country is Chancellor v. Schuschnigg. Thus there was in Carinthia a process not unlike that witnessed in certain parts of the United States where the larger towns, located among villages populated by recent immigrants, exercise an Americanizing influence. This process became more rapid with improvement in the means of communication. It is only in the most inaccessible parts of Carinthia that a Slovenian dialect survives; it is today little more than an ethnological curiosity.²⁴ Under the Austrian Republic, which scrupluously respected the liberty of the press only one Slovenian weekly (printed in Vienna) was necessary to meet the popular demand. There were constant recriminations from nationalistic groups south of the boundary against the alleged "suppression" of the Slovenian-speaking Carinthians, but the truth, attested by numerous observers, was that the vast majority of Slavic Carinthians were Carinthian and Austrian in sentiment.²⁵ Their number was never large, in spite of the amazing map which the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation produced at the Paris Peace Conference.²⁶ The economic interest of the peasantry in Southern Carinthia is entirely on the

23 Before the 19th century, Slovenian was nothing but the irregular agglomeration of

kindred dialects full of Germanisms.

26 Cf. the map entitled "Narodnostna karta Koroške lastno štetje leta 1910" (in the

²² Klagenfurt in literary Slovenian is called Celovec, while in the Carinthian dialect it is called Celouc. Linguistically and psychologically the Slovenes, though few in numbers, do not form a real unit and only recently does there seem to have been a weakening of provincial differences. The character of the cities in Slovenia is still typically Austrian.

²⁴ We cite the percentage of the Slovenian-speaking population of Carinthia according to the Austrian census: 1880, 26.6%; 1890, 25.5%; 1900, 22.3%; 1910, 18.3%; 1923, 10.1% (Austrian citizens only 9.7%); 1934, 6.6% (Austrian citizens, 6.3%). From Österreichische Volkszählung vom 22. März 1934. Veröffentlicht, 1935. (Bundesamt für Statistik). Heft Einleitung, p. 54. It would be a safe guess to speak of a maximum of 4% of Slovenes in this region today.

²⁵ About popular sentiments in Carinthia, cf. Fred Du Bois, Berichte eines Schweizers über Kärnten; Offener Brief an Dr. de Jong van Beek en Donk Generalsekretär des Anti-Orloog Raad im Haag (Vienna, 1919). A comparison of the conditions of the Austro-German minority in Yugoslavia and the Slovene element in Austria can be found in Martin Wutte und Oskar Lobmeyer, Die Lage der Minderheiten in Kärnten und in Slovenien (Klagenfurt, 1926).

side of Austria, which has a deficit of food and not a surplus like Yugo-slavia.

A just solution of the Carinthian problem is simple. It should remain a part of Austria without further question. If Yugoslavia believes that the population of the Klagenfurt basin wants to join the Southslav state, a new plebiscite, at the expense of the Yugoslav taxpayers, should be arranged, But this proposal will hardly be accepted, since a defeat in a plebiscite, even outside the national borders, is unacceptable and dangerous to an absolutist régime.²⁷ There is every indication that such a plebiscite under British-American control would result in a decisive defeat of the Yugoslav cause. Today, even the propaganda leaflets for Yugoslavia would have to be printed in German. It must be expected that Tito will insist on downright annexation, or desist completely.²⁸

The Marburg-Maribor problem is of a much more delicate nature, owing to the status of Yugoslavia as a "belligerent" and Austria as a formerly enslaved enemy neutral who embarrassed the democracies by resisting Nazi aggression for five years and by having a government-in-jail instead of a government-in-exile with headquarters in the luxurious hotels of London, Washington and New York.²⁹ It is true that full Allied status does not protect a country from losing fifty percent of its territory to a more powerful neighbor, but Austria is anything else than powerful. The value of the small Marburg-Maribor zone for Yugoslavia is insignificant; it

Hoover Library, Stanford University). Almost all of Southern Carinthia appears on this map as "90-100% Slovenian." Klagenfurt itself figures on the borderline of two areas, one 40-50% Slovenian, the other one 30-40% Slovenian. In this connection it must be borne in mind that ethnic maps frequently produce very distorted pictures of numerical relationships by completely ignoring the density factor.

²⁷ It can be argued that Hitler "had to" invade Austria once Schuschnigg announced

his plebiscite. The Führer could not have "survived" this defeat.

28 By cleverly rejecting the offer of a plebiscite, he could capitalize on the British-American refusal to let him have Southern Carinthia unconditionally. An anti-Western and pro-Soviet course in his foreign policy will thus appear thoroughly justified in the eyes of Yugoslav nationalists (and internationalists). According to the census of 1934, the plebiscite zones of 1920 had 25,057 Slovenes among 143,695 inhabitants. Since then the percentage of those speaking Slovenian has decreased and we know by experience that not more than two-thirds of those speaking Slovenian have any sympathies with Yugoslavia.

²⁹ Of course, there were Nazis in Austria, but there were also collaborationists in France, Bohemia, Slovakia, Holland, Belgium, Norway, Russia and Croatia. Denmark, for instance, had a Socialist government which co-operated with the Nazis from 1940 until 1943. The defense of Denmark cost the country 28 lives in 1940, while less than 90 were executed until 1945. Yet Denmark has never been declared a "guilty nation which supported German aggression." Thousands of Austrians died. The reason for this odd treatment of Austria cannot be found in the fact that Hitler was born 400 yards east of the German boundary, but in diplomatic intrigues, quid pro quos, and yet undeclared deals which some day will be unearthed by enterprising historians.

embraces not more than two-thirds of one per cent of her territory, roughly 510 square miles. To this must be added an area of about 50 square miles around Unter-Drauburg (Dravograd-meza) in the easternmost sector of Carinthia, which was ceded to Yugoslavia in 1919 without benefit of plebiscite. (The reasons for excluding this small sector of Carinthia from the plebiscite are rather mysterious. The economic or strategic value of this area for Yugoslavia is negligible.³⁰) Along the Mur river, which forms the boundary between Yugoslavia and Austria in the East-Styrian sector, are numerous communities linguistically German which have also been, against their will, included in the Southslav State.

In order to understand the value of this whole area for Austria, it is necessary to consult the map. The shortest and most natural communication between Graz, the second largest city of Austria and capital of Styria, and Klagenfurt, the eighth largest city and capital of Carinthia, leads over Marburg and the Drau Valley. (The Packstrasse, built in the nineteenthirties, is snowbound during part of the winter and cannot supplant a railroad.) Travellers from Klagenfurt bound for Graz, made their trip prior to 1919, in an easterly and then in a northerly direction; after 1919, they went north, then northeast, and finally, due south. This detour is increased for all persons or goods in transit from points east of Klagenfurt to points south of Graz³¹ or vice-versa. The alternative is the crossing of two international boundaries and the loss of transportation revenue to Austria. A similar situation exists in the Lavant Valley, which belongs to Carinthia and runs into the Yugoslav sector of the Drau Valley. An official of the Carinthian Provincial Administration in Klagenfurt bound for Wolfsberg or St. Paul has to travel 230 km. instead of 100 km. (The railroad distance from Voelkermarkt in Carinthia to St. Paul over Austrian territory has increased from 50 to 270 km.) The return of the Central Mur Valley to Austria would work no transportation hardships whatsoever to Yugoslavia, while the extreme fertility of part of the area would serve to alleviate the food shortage of Austria and at the same time diminish the Yugoslav surplus. There is no doubt that the local peasantry would be better off economically in regaining its old, lost market, the city of Graz.

³⁰ The lead mines of the Mies-Valley, mostly British owned, are of limited size and by no means the only ones in Yugoslavia.

³¹ Marshal Tito, convinced that the best defense is attack, has already claimed additional Styrian territory (inhabited solidly by a German-speaking element), and also—if we can give credence to reports published in responsible papers—the city of Graz (160,000 inhabitants). Once British troops liberated Styria from the Russian occupation forces in Summer, 1945 these demands were not repeated.

The economic advantages to Austria of the incorporation of these parts of Central Styria and East Carinthia are, we readily admit, a morally insufficient basis for a change in sovereignty. Such a change can only be the result of a fairly conducted plebiscite under neutral supervision. Though the majority of this area is Slovenian,³² there is good reason to believe that a plebiscite would produce a majority for Austria, which controlled this area from 1192 until 1918. Marburg and Windischgrätz were Austrian centuries before the Austrian flag flew over the Tyrol.³³ The reasons why the Slovenian-speaking Styrians of that area might prefer Austrian to Yugoslav rule are similar to those of the Slovenians of Carinthia who also prefer to belong to Central Europe rather than to the Balkans, to the Atlantic community rather than to the Russian orbit.

If a majority of the population wants to join Austria, a very equitable plan could be drawn up for the minority preferring Yugoslav rule. There is a large German-speaking minority in Yugoslavia, not only in the Vojvodina (South-Hungary) but also in Southern Styria and especially in Carniola, settled homogeneously in the district of Gottschee (Kočevje). An exchange of population on a completely voluntary basis might work in the future for greater amity between Austria and Yugoslavia. The latter country can also expect rich compensation along the Italian border and, probably, in the Adriatic.

Based upon the census of 1910, the division of the province of Styria as decided upon in 1919 gave to Austria and Yugoslavia areas inhabited by the following linguistic groups:

Styria	Total	German-Speaking	Slovene-Speaking34
Austrian Share	917,105	911,850	4,425
Yugoslav Share	469,352	65,582	403,506

³² Cf. Arnold Luschin-Ebengreuth, Styria Cut Into Pieces, Two Memorials (Graz, 1921); Fred du Bois, Marburg und seine Umgebung (Vienna, 1919). The Austrian Peace Delegation in their reply to the peace conditions of the Allies (op. cit., p. 29) rightly calls the Graz-Marburg-Villach railroad "les artères vitales en Autriche." Cf. also the article of R. Reynolds in the London Daily News, June 15, 1919.

³³ Colonel Miles, an American, visited Marburg on January 27, 1919. The local population, overwhelmingly Austrian in sentiment, organized a demonstration which was soon quelled by the Yugoslav gendarmerie. There is no doubt that the German-speaking element has suffered considerable losses, but this has no bearing on the pro-Austrian feeling of the Stajerci, the Styrians using the Slovene language. A good map showing the German-speaking element south of the 1919 boundary (according to the 1910 census) by Dr. Richard v. Pfaundler can be found in "The Southern Frontier of German-Styria" Memorandum of the Academic Senate of the University of Graz (Graz, 1919).

The proposed extension of Austrian territory to the crest of the Bacher-Mountains along the watershed of the Drau and the Save would change this balance so that, based upon the 1910 census, the following situation would come about:

Styria	Total	German-Speaking	Slovene-Speaking
Austrian Share	993,598	951,930	40,735
Yugoslav Share	392,659	25,502	367,196

Let us now assume, theoretically, that the German-speaking Austrians of Southern-Styria could be exchanged with Slovenes. The following condition would be obtained:

Styria	* Total	German-Speaking	Slovene-Speaking
Austrian Share	993,598	977,432	15,233
Yugoslav Share	392,659	0	392,659

There would be, naturally, a large number of Slovenes, mainly among the non-urban (peasant) element who would rather stay, and theoretically again, there would be a reservoir of hundreds of thousands of German-speaking Yugoslav citizens who would desire fervently to live under Austrian rule. All of Southern Styria could be filled with those persons and given to Austria. However, keeping in mind the general situation, such plans today are, sound as they may be intrinsically, totally out of the question.

Since we are thinking of utopias, it can be pointed out that the most natural solution of the Austrian problem would be the establishment of a dual Austro-Slovenian State comprising all territories which were Austrian before the end of the 14th century. This would include the city of Trieste and the countship of Görz-Gradiska. This state of almost nine million inhabitants with access to the sea and a geographically coherent hinterland could be an asset to Central-European stability and economic well-being. Yet politics is the art of achieving the possible, and the most logical solutions are, therefore, often dreams that cannot materialize.

Even after rectifying its Southern boundary, Austria will face grave economic difficulties aggravated by the war, Nazi depredations, Allied bombings and the systematic looting by the Russians. There are also other problems which will not be solved in the near future, such as, for instance, the relocation of refugees in Austria, among whom are Hungarians, Poles,

³⁴ Most of these were living in Graz, the capital of all Styria, and not along the Yugo-slav boundary.

Sudeten-Germans, Croats and Slovenes.³⁵ The aforementioned access to the sea would be a substantial help; direct connection with the ocean not only assures an easier and cheaper flow of exports and imports, but also constitutes an avenue to extraordinary sources of income and revenue. Austrian goods shipped from Vienna to New York, if they reached Trieste on an Austrian railroad and their American destination on an Austrian boat, would be a greater asset to the national economy of that country than goods reaching a boundary 200 miles from their place of manufacture. Other sources of income for countries with a coastline are fisheries and transportation sold to third parties. Poor countries like Norway or Greece have derived considerable profits from transporting goods and passengers all over the globe.

How could such a "corridor" to the sea be established for Austria without the wholesale incorporation of Slovenian lands? The only imaginable alternative is a plebiscite in the former province of Görz-Gradiska (Gorizia-Gradiscia), which is populated by Friulians and Slovenes and a few Italians and Germans, as well as in the City of Trieste, both regions Austrian for over 500 years. Here again, no "downright annexation" should take place but a plebiscite in accordance with the Atlantic Charter; the local populations in these areas have had since 1918 the opportunity of experiencing a whole variety of régimes and thus are able to draw comparisons between the Austrian administration and that of its successors: Italian fascism, Nazi control and the government of Marshal Tito. The outcome would be less certain in the city of Trieste where, since three competitors would contest the plebiscite, no clear-cut majority might be obtainable. The situation there might differ materially from that in the Isonzo Valley.

If such an arrangement, or a similar one, could be made in this area, the Austrians would have to build an additional railroad from Tarvis over the Predil Pass to Tolmein (Tolmino), a distance of only forty-five to fifty miles, in order to link up with the old main line which connects Klagenfurt with Trieste. The area west of the lower Isonzo could remain with Italy if the local inhabitants so desire, 36 and a few districts in the East (in the Ternova Forests, on the lower Idrija and the Wippach-Valley) should be given the opportunity to join Yugoslavia, even if the majority of the whole area wishes inclusion in Austria.

³⁵ Slovenian circles in the U. S. speak of 50,000 Slovenian refugees in Austria.
36 It is precisely in that small triangle that the population is Italian and not Friulian.
The Friulians are closely related to the Ladinians in the Central Tyrol. They were in the "Litoral" loyal to Austria.

If an Austrian corridor separating Italy from Yugoslavia should not prove feasible, Austria might be given a free zone with exterritorial rights in the harbor of Trieste, whatever the status of that city. Railroad privileges across Italian territory should also be given Austria; it should not be impossible to have a railroad belonging to the Austrian government linking Trieste with Austria proper. The Canadian Pacific has tracks right across Maine linking Quebec with New Brunswick and the Southern Pacific has a line which crosses twice into Mexican Lower California. It must be admitted, though, that the lack of good will in Europe makes such simple arrangements more difficult than in the Western Hemisphere, and this is the reason why avenues of traffic of importance to specific nations should better be under their own control, especially if the populations involved in the territorial aspect of this problem are willing to accept the sovereignty of the state whose vital interests demand the inclusion of the areas they inhabit.⁸⁷

In conclusion, the gravity of the Austrian problem cannot be underestimated. If Austria is not to be given a chance to live, she will inevitably be nothing but a festering sore on the body of Europe and finally contribute to the laying of the foundations of the Third World War. A hungry, depressed, humiliated nation with numerous grudges and no prospects for the future has nothing to lose. One has also to remember how deeply the Austrian domestic situation was affected by the injustices of 1919 and how Austria's internal weakness, in turn, affected the whole world. With the Central-Tyrol in Italian control and its population under the heel of the Fascist denationalizers, no Austrian government co-operating with Italy could be widely popular.38 Yet Italy was the only great power bordering on Austria that demonstrated for a number of years a real interest in the preservation of Austria's independence, while the Little Entente with their fear of a Habsburg restoration always preferred the Anschluss to a monarchy. Yugoslavia even went so far as to shelter thousands of Nazis who had fled to that country after the abortive rebellion of 1934 and to "repatriate" them to Germany.

When Austria was betrayed in 1938 by her fellow-members in the League of Nations, the most important brick of the edifice of 1919 had

³⁷ The Polish "corridor" was not only of paramount economic importance for Poland, but had the support of the local population. The proposed Austrian "corridor," on the other hand, would not bisect a country, but could act as a buffer between Italy and Yugoslavia.

³⁸ Unofficial Nazi propaganda depicted the Austrian government as traitors to the German-speaking Tyroleans while Hitler worked for a secret understanding with Mussolini on that issue.

been removed and the catastrophes of the next eighteen months were practically inevitable. If the most elementary grievances of Austria are not redressed, this mutilated fragment of a once great empire will throw its weight onto the delicate scales of Europe and thus again upset the balance of power with devastating results.

CHESTNUT HILL COLLEGE PHILADELPHIA

THE SCHISM BETWEEN THE GREEK AND ROMAN CHURCH AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

by Peter Charanis

N FEBRUARY 10, 1945 the most eminent ecclesiastics of the Greek Orthodox Church, sitting in Moscow, following the election of the new patriarch of all the Russians, issued a statement in which they raised "their voices against those—the Vatican especially—who try to protect Hitlerite Germany from responsibility from crimes committed by her and ask forgiveness for Fascists who spilled the blood of innocent victims all over Europe." This is only one of the many indications that the churches may interject themselves in the politics of the world, complicating an already complex situation. In view of this, it is not inappropriate, perhaps, to review the factors involved in the original schism and to point out their true character. This may be of some help in grasping the real motives behind the active antagonism which is apparently developing between the re-established Russian church and the Vatican. It will be extremely unfortunate, indeed, if, for political reasons, the religious differences among the Christians were exploited by the various conflicting interests in Europe and America.

The permanent schism between the Greek and the Roman churches came in 1054. The way for it, however, had been prepared to some extent by the controversy over the election of Photios to the patriarchate of Constantinople at the end of 858. The Photian controversy began in the Greek church itself, but the intervention of the papacy transformed it into a schism between the two churches.¹

On the feast of Epiphany, 858, the patriarch Ignatius of Constantinople publicly refused the communion to Caesar Bardas, uncle of Michael III, and the effective ruler of the empire, on the grounds that he entertained questionable relations with his daughter-in-law. Bardas was angered to the point of drawing his sword, but managed to contain his anger, vowing, however, vengeance on the patriarch. By his austerity and uncompromising insistence on the strict observance of the canons of the church Ignatius had already created a nucleus of opposition among a small but powerful group

¹ On the Photian schism the standard work until now has been that of J. Hergenröther, Photios, Patriarch von Konstantinople, sein Leben, seine Schriften und das griechische Schisma (Regensburg, 1867-9), 3 vols. A comprehensive summary may be found in J. B. Bury, A History of the Eastern Roman Empire from the Fall of Irene to the Accession of Basil I, A. D. 802-867 (London, 1912), pp. 180 ff.

of ecclesiastics; and when he refused to tonsure the mother and sisters of the emperor Michael III whom the latter, under the influence of Bardas, wanted put in a monastery to deprive them of their political influences, charges of treason were brought against him, and he was removed from his see (Nov. 23, 858). But as Ignatius refused to resign despite the cajolements and threats of Bardas, his chair was not de jure vacant, and when the imperial party proceeded to install a new patriarch, many of the clergy and of the monks rallied to the support of the deposed patriarch and a schism in the Byzantine church was thus created. The new patriarch was Photios, the most remarkable man the medieval Greeks produced. At the time of the deposition of Ignatius he was a public functionary, holding the position of Protoasecretis or First Secretary and, therefore, a layman. But in four days he was rapidly ordained lector, subdeacon, deacon and priest in order that he might become eligible for the patriarchate. On Christmas day, 858, he was consecrated bishop of Constantinople. The rapid ordination of Photios was one of the elements later used against him, but this was not without precedent in Byzantium. The patriarchs Tarasius (784-806) and Nicephorus (805-815) had been similarly ordained.

The deposition of Ignatius and the elevation of Photios produced a schism within the Byzantine church, for a considerable portion of the clergy and the monks, perhaps the majority, took up the cause of the deposed patriarch. The Ignatian party appealed to the papal see, occupied then by Nicholas I, one of the greatest of the medieval popes, and Nicholas seized this opportunity to intervene in the affairs of the Byzantine church and exact certain concessions from it. What he wanted in particular was the cession to the papacy by the Greek church of the important provinces of Illyricum and Bulgaria.

Illyricum² was an administrative term used to describe the whole of the Balkan peninsula, with the exception of Thrace, but including Crete. Administratively, Illyricum had been under the jurisdiction of the see of Rome and the archbishop of Thessalonica acted as papal vicar. But in the eighth century, during the first iconoclastic controversy, and as the result of the excommunication of the Byzantine emperor, Leo II, by the popes, Gregory II and Gregory III, Illyricum as well as the Byzantine possessions of southern Italy and Sicily were removed from the jurisdiction of the papacy and placed under the jurisdiction of the patriarchate of Constantinople. This the papacy refused to accept, and Nicholas I saw in the

² On the question of Illyricum and Bulgaria see Fr. Dvornik, Les légendes de Constantin et de Méthode vues de Byzance (Prague, 1933), pp. 259 ff.

Ignatian dispute an opportunity to revive the issue and recover the lost provinces. Bulgaria on the other hand was still officially pagan, but there was considerable missionary activity going on there, both on the part of Byzantium and of Rome and the Bulgarian king, Boris I, was on the verge of accepting Christianity. Nicholas was anxious to have the Bulgars accept their Christianity from Rome and consequently tried to use the Ignatian schism in order to obtain the withdrawal of the Byzantine missionaries from Bulgaria.

To the letters of Photios and the emperor, announcing the installation of Photios and requesting the pope to send legates to a council that was to deal with certain matters concerning the iconoclastic controversy, Nicholas replied that he could not recognize the consecration of Photios before he had received the report of his messengers, the men to whom he had entrusted the delivery of his reply; that the Roman see was supreme; that no ecclesiastical matter of importance was to be settled without the consent of the pope; that in the case of Ignatius this principle had been violated; and that if the emperor really cared for the Church of Rome he should return Illyricum as well as Calabria and Sicily to its jurisdiction. He intimated that the question of Photios might be solved in a satisfactory manner, for after all, his messengers might report favorably. "It is perfectly clear that Pope Nicholas proposed a bargain, in the interest of what he calls ecclesiastica utilitas."3 The emperor might keep Photios provided he restored to Rome Illyricum, Calabria, and Sicily. But neither Photios nor the imperial government had any idea of giving up Illyricum; instead, by threats and intimidations, they won over to their cause the papal legates, and in a council held in May, 861, the latter approved the deposition of Ignatius and the elevation of Photios. However, upon their return to Rome Nicholas disavowed their actions, held a council of his own (863), and there he seated Ignatius and excommunicated Photios, the excommunication to take effect if the latter did not vacate his see. To the excommunication of Photios by the pope, the emperor replied that the pope had no jurisdiction, and four years later a brilliant council, in which the other three eastern patriarchs participated, was held in Constantinople where Nicholas I was excommunicated as a heretic. Photios, in his letter to the other three eastern patriarchs inviting them to attend this council, denounced the heretical practices and doctrines that the papal missionaries were introducing in Bulgaria, emphasizing in particular the celibacy of priests, the use of milk and cheese during Lent, and, above all, the doctrine of the filioque, and it was on these grounds that

³ Bury, op. cit., p. 195.

Nicholas was excommunicated. On the question of the *filioque* Photios was right, for no general council of the church had ever introduced this doctrine in the creed. This is the so-called first Photian schism. Until quite recently, however, it has been believed that there was a second Photian schism after the first one was healed, but the recent researches of certain Catholic scholars have shown conclusively that this belief is without real foundation. It was based on documents which had been tampered with by certain fanatical followers of Ignatius who refused obstinately to recognize Photios and sought to create the impression that he was never recognized by the papacy.

It is well known that Photios was deposed shortly after the council of 867 as a result of the palace revolution that put Basil the Macedonian on the throne. Basil had murdered his predecessor in order to ascend the throne, and he needed to bolster his position by winning the support of the majority of the clergy; his first act was to depose Photios and reinstate Ignatius. As Photios had been the principal issue in the schism with Rome, his deposition removed the main obstacle in the re-establishment of friendly relations between the two churches. Nicholas, however, was already dead and it was the fortune of Hadrian II (867-872) to triumph in Constantinople. A council was held in Constantinople (867-70) in which the legates of the pope participated; Ignatius was vindicated and the authority of the pope was recognized. On the question of Bulgaria the Byzantines made no commitments, but it was understood by the pope that they would abandon it to the Roman see. Whatever the papal understanding of the Bulgarian question may have been, however, Ignatius had no idea of giving up Bulgaria. When the pope, now John VIII (872-882), learned of this, he sent his legates to Constantinople to excommunicate Ignatius, but the latter died before their arrival (878).

The death of Ignatius brought Photios back on the patriarchal seat of Constantinople. Photios had been reconciled with Basil I some years before and had been put in charge of the education of the emperor's two sons. Towards Ignatius, too, he had become friendly and courteous and there seemed to be no obstacle, now that Ignatius was no longer among the living and the patriarchal seat was de jure vacant, to Photios's reinstatement. But for Photios reinstatement was not enough, unless it was approved by the whole church, including the papacy, and the charges that had been made against him in the council of 869-70 were withdrawn. It was in this atmosphere that a brilliant council assembled in Constantinople

in 879-80 in which more than three hundred prelates participated, including the legates of the pope.

The proceedings of this council have been the subject of controversy among scholars. The historicity of the council has even been denied, and its acts have been denounced as non-authentic. That it was held, and that its acts were substantially as they have been preserved is now recognized

by competent Catholic scholars.4

The council of 879-80 was a triumph for Photios, for in this council he obtained what he really wanted. He was not only recognized by the whole church, but he won the high praises of the entire council and procured satisfaction on a number of important points. It was agreed that the two sees of Rome and Constantinople were to recognize the sentences of excommunication of each, and this meant the recognition of the independence of the Byzantine church; the council of 869-70 which had condemned Photios was annulled; and the Nicene creed without the *filioque* was sanctioned. All these decisions were approved by the papal legates.

But in the eyes of the western church these acts of the council would be without validity unless they were approved by the pope himself. The traditional view has been that the Pope, John VIII, denounced the acts of the council as soon as he became acquainted with them and once again excommunicated Photios; that his policy was followed by his successors and so the schism with Byzantium continued as long as Photios was patriarch and beyond. As Jager puts it, "nine popes, five councils have successively exhausted all the resources of their authority in order to check his [Photios'] ambition and subdue his pride; and, despite their united efforts, they were neither able to make him yield nor prevent him from separating two great Churches by a fatal schism which still endures and which has been the source of great calamities." ⁵

It is precisely this view that has been shown to be without foundation by the recent researches. Working independently and with the same material, the Catholic scholars, Grumel and Dvornik,⁶ have come to the conclusion that there was no second schism of Photios, that John VIII recognized the

⁴ M. Jugie, "Schisme byzantine" in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* (Paris, 1939), XIV, p. 1341.

⁵ Abbé Jager, Historie de Photius, patriarche de Constantinople (Paris, 1845), V. Cited by Henri Grégoire, "The Disruption of European Unity." Belgium (1942), II, 17.
6 V. Grumel, "Y eut-il, un second schisme de Photius?" in Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques (Paris, 1933), XII, pp. 432-457; Fr. Dvornik, "Le second schisme de Photios, une mystification historique, in Byzantion (Brussels, 1933), VIII, pp. 425 ff.; Grumel "La liquidation de la querelle photienne," in Echos d' Orient (Paris, 1934), XXXVII, pp. 257-288.

Byzantine patriarch, and that his policy was continued by his successors so that there was no break between Rome and Byzantium during the second patriarchate of Photios. Their conclusions have been accepted by Jugie and others. Jugie indeed, in accepting the view that John VIII did not break with Photios, tries to prove that John, in recognizing Photios, had before him only an imperfect version of the acts of the council of 879-80, but his arguments are not convincing. What really explains John's attitude toward Photios is the fact that he obtained satisfaction on the question of Bulgaria. Photios indeed seems to have yielded on the question of Bulgaria, but the sacrifice was only nominal, for he had the insight to see that the question of Bulgaria would be solved, as it was, by the force of circumstances, in favor of Byzantium. Photios has been vindicated. This verdict is that of Catholic scholars.

In the period between 900 and 1054 when the final break between Rome and Constantinople took place, the relation between the two churches remained correct if not cordial. There was no disposition either on the part of Rome or Constantinople to interfere in the affairs of the other. Morally and politically this was a brilliant period in the history of the Byzantine church during which it achieved some of its greatest triumphs as, for instance, the conversion of the Russians, while for the papacy it was most depressive and unstable. Less than four was the average of the number of years that each pope was in office during this period, while for each patriarch the average was more than ten. The popes had neither the moral capacity nor the means to interfere in the affairs of the Byzantine church.

But toward the middle of the eleventh century a change took place in the position and the attitude of the papacy. This is the period when the papal see fell into the hands of the Cluniacs with their fervent desire to cleanse the church from the mire of corruption into which it had fallen. Beginning with Leo IX (1049-54) the papal see came to be occupied by a series of able and active popes who strove energetically and not without success to free the clergy from the clutches of the lay nobility, striking hard especially against simony and clerical marriage. As is well known, one of the important results of the reforming zeal of these popes, especially of Gregory VII, was the investiture struggle of the eleventh century.

The papal offensive for reform had important repercussions in the

⁷ Jugie, op. cit., pp. 1340 f.8 Ibid., pp. 1343 f.

relations of the papacy with the Byzantine church. Byzantium still had important possessions in southern Italy and the churches of these territories were under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople. But these territories were now being systematically conquered by the Normans and Catholic influences began to penetrate the churches. At the same time a powerful personality occupied the patriarchate. This was Cerularius, remarkable for his physical beauty as well as his learning. A clever and ambitious politician he had barely failed to ascend the imperial throne, and when he became patriarch (1043), his one ambition was to render his church independent of the state. Obviously with a man like Leo IX in Rome striving to extend Catholic influence in the Byzantine possessions of southern Italy, and a man like Cerularius in Constantinople seeking to make his see independent of any other power, a clash between the two churches became inevitable. The initiative was taken by Cerularius who had become disturbed over a projected alliance between Leo IX and the emperor in Constantinople, Constantine IX Monomachus (1042-1054). against the Normans in Southern Italy, for he feared that such an alliance might impose the supremacy of the pope over his see. He began by closing the Latin churches in Constantinople (1052 or 1053) and then through Leo, archbishop of Ochrida, issued a manifesto against certain usages of the Latin church, particularly the use of unleavened bread in the celebration of the Eucharist, which was addressed to John, bishop of Trani, and through him to all the bishops of the west, including the pope. Subsequent developments in Italy, the failure of the Byzantines and of Leo IX to stop the Normans, and the captivity of Leo IX, made it more imperative for pope and emperor to co-operate, and Cerularius wrote to the pope a more conciliatory letter in which he said nothing of the Latin usages which he had previously criticized, but he implied that he was the pope's equal. The pope, on his part, seems to have thought that conciliation was a better policy, but he was prevailed upon by the Cardinal Humbert-who composed his letter of reply—to call upon Cerularius to clear himself of a number of accusations if he were to avoid a condemnation by the pope. This reply made reconciliation impossible.

The papal delegation that carried the letter of the pope was headed by Cardinal Humbert. No less suitable man could have been found to head this delegation. Humbert was a man of limited learning, obstinate, arrogant and tactless and easily given to polemics. No sooner did he arrive in Constantinople than his behavior completely alienated the Byzantine patriarch. Humbert made matters worse by raising the question of the filioque, a question to which the Byzantine patriarch had not referred, and charged that the Byzantines had tampered with the Nicene creed by suppressing that phrase, when in truth it was the western church that had done the tampering by inserting the controversial phrase. In the meantime Leo IX died (April 13, 1054) and his successor, Victor II, creature of Henry III, of Germany did not take office until April 3, 1055, and it is questionable if Humbert had the authority any longer to continue his activities in Constantinople. But he continued to make charges against the Byzantine patriarch, and as the latter refused to listen or enter into any negotiations he resolved to hurl against him and his followers a sentence of excommunication. On Saturday, July 16, 1054, at the moment when the clergy of St. Sophia was about to celebrate the holy liturgy, the Roman delegation with Humbert at the head, marched toward the principal altar and there deposited the sentence of excommunication while the Byzantine clergy and people looked on. The sentence of excommunication was couched in language which could not be more arrogant and libelous.

"From every point of view," writes the Catholic scholar, M. Jugie, in his recent article on the schism of 1054, "this theatrical act was deplorable: deplorable because it could be asked whether the legates at a time when the Holy See was vacant were duly authorized to take a measure so serious; deplorable, because useless and ineffectual, for Humbert and his companions had no means of having the sentence executed; deplorable especially by the contents of the sentence itself and the tone in which it was drawn. Besides the well founded grievances it reproached Cerularius and his partisans, and indirectly all the Byzantines, with a series of imaginary crimes and heresies."

Humbert and his associates had thought that they would be able to detach the emperor and the people from their patriarch and his clergy, but in so thinking they had miserably failed to understand the true feelings of the Greeks. To quote again from Jugie's learned article: "The Roman legates were under illusions concerning the sentiments of the Byzantines on the whole toward the Latins. They had wished to separate the cause of the patriarch and his clergy from that of the emperor and the people, to treat Cerularius like a black sheep of St. Peter's flock, to act in Constantinople as they would have acted in a city of the west. And they did not notice that in Constantinople they cut the figures of arrogant strangers

⁹ Jugie, "Le schisme de Michel Cerulaire," in Échos d'Orient (Paris, 473), XL, 460.

with insupportable airs. It was enough for their sentence to be known to provoke a popular tumult."10

Scholars have tended to attribute the schism of 1054 to the ambition of Cerularius.¹¹ That prelate was doubtless in part to blame, but the chief responsibility for the break must now be placed on the shoulders of the Roman legates, particularly on those of Cardinal Humbert. This is the important contribution that Jugie's article on the Cerularian schism has made.

The schism with Rome, whose roots are found in the conflict between Rome and Constantinople over the jurisdiction of the Balkan peninsula and southern Italy, was used as a pretext by the war lords of western Europe to carve out principalities for themselves at the expense of the Greek empire, and in this they were encouraged by the papacy. Whatever the original aim of the crusading movement may have been, it was not long before it began to be directed against the Greeks on the ground that they were an heretical people. And it was this aggressive and hostile activity of western Europe against the Byzantines together with the arrogance of the Italian merchants who became more and more dominant in the Near East which consummated the schism and made it permanent. The attitude of the Greeks toward the Latins was very well expressed by the contemporary Greek historian of the Fourth Crusade, Nicetas Choniates: "Thus," he writes, "between us and them (the Latins) a bottomless gulf of enmity has established itself; we cannot unite our souls and we entirely disagree with each other, although we keep up our external relations and often live in the same house."12 When in the fourteenth century the Byzantine empire was threatened by the expansion of the Ottoman Turks, the Greeks repeatedly appealed to the western Christians for help. They were told that they had first to submit themselves to the authority of the papacy before any help could be given. This answer further alienated the Greeks and many of them, indeed the majority, came to prefer the domination of the Ottomans rather than submission to Rome.

The schism of 1054 was one of the most important and catastrophic events in the history of Europe and of Christianity. It really brought about "the disruption of European unity," to use the phrase employed by Henri

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 473.

¹¹ Bury, "The Patriarch Michael Kerularios" in Selected essays of J. B. Bury, ed. by H. Termperly (Cambridge, 1930), pp. 210 ff.

¹² As quoted by A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire (Madison, 1929), p. 94.

Grégoire as the title of a popular but brilliant article on the Greek Schism.¹³ For, with the exception of the Croats, Slovenes, Czechs and Poles, all the other Slavic peoples, and these form the vast majority of this extremely numerous branch of the European peoples, followed the Greeks in their independence from Rome. And so Europe was cut in two with consequences the discussion of which would fill volumes and would constitute a history of eastern and central Europe.

Nor have these consequences lost their vitality in our day. When the Greeks fought so valiantly against the Italians in Albania, they were thinking also of the integrity and independence of their church. The difference in religion between the Serbs and the Croats is one of the most important factors in the internecine strife of these otherwise similar peoples. And the antagonism between Poles and Russians, the source of the present Polish issue, is to be explained to a large extent by the divergent religious, and hence cultural, development of these two peoples.¹⁴ The extension of Russian influence in central Europe recalls to mind the situation of the ninth century when the Greeks attempted to establish their influence over the Slavs in the same regions. The papacy tried to check this extension and with the aid of the Germans succeeded in Moravia. Do the Russians fear that the Vatican will try to check them also, and was this what the Orthodox ecclesiastics had in mind when they raised "their voices against those—the Vatican especially—who try to protect Hitlerite Germany from responsibility for crimes committed by her and ask forgiveness for Fascists who spilled the blood of innocent victims all over Europe?"

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

¹³ Grégoire, op. cit., pp. 17 ff.

¹⁴ In a truly brilliant book a Polish scholar has recently written: "Poland had for long centuries been bound by her historic life and her spiritual efforts to western civilization. Her geographical situation—given her proximity to the eastern side—had assigned her historic mission, which was to push this civilization into regions it had not reached. Poland very quickly understood her role, and she had inaugurated it brilliantly—with the aid of the sword and the aid of culture. The sword was the defensive; culture was the offensive." Waclaw Lednicki, Life and culture of Poland (New York, 1944), p. 117.

BRITAIN AND EUROPE

by F. W. Pick

ITH each new turn in world affairs as seen from Great Britain the old question about her connection with the continent of Europe puts itself anew. The familiar arguments about American participation in the affairs of this one world of ours—and about "isolation" from its worries and wars—can similarly be applied to the more limited field of British foreign policy with regard to the continent on her doorstep:—is she part of Europe or does she stand apart from Europe? Between these two extremes of, on the one hand, forming a union with Europe and on the other of isolating herself from the continent, a third possibility offers itself: namely, a middle course which would allow her to be, at one and the same time, a European power as well as an extra-European Empire. We need not dig deep into the special mental make-up of an Englishman—or, in the parallel case of the United States, into that of human nature, if you will—to see the attractions of the third road, of the compromise solution which makes the best of both worlds.

"A.D. 449, English land in Britain"—thus begins a popular history of the English people.1 Clearly, the close connection of the continent with Britain, and of the people therein, needs no further comment. But it seems pertinent to recall the centuries during which the British Isles formed an integral part of the political structures erected when the idea of the Nation State (or of nationalism) had hardly been conceived.2 Without, therefore, speaking of either the spiritual links, e.g. the Irish missionaries going out as far as Bavaria or Riga, or the waves of invaders coming to these Western islands of Europe and going out from them, King Canute's North Sea Empire must be mentioned as a milestone in any history viewing Britain as a constituent part of Europe. Binding together, as he did, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Britain, he appears almost a forerunner of the modern Empire builders of the age of naval power. His empire embraced the whole North Sea. Considering the naval power at his disposal, it was as far-flung as any the world has seen since. If it fell quickly asunder, traces of his vision can still be discovered, even in to-day's political thought.

¹ J. R. Green, A Short History of the English People. A justly famous book. The quotation is from its Chronological Annals.

² For the latest statement on the growth of nationalism, and a good many other things, see Hans Kohn, *The Usea of Nationalism* (New York, 1944). On the other hand, E. H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London, 1945), somewhat hopefully speaks of the decrease in nationalistic feeling in the post-war world.

Canute's North Sea Empire, never revived, was followed by the familiar Anglo-French struggle for union, for separation, for supremacy. From the Contentin Peninsula and from Caen in particular—household words once more since D-Day of Hitler's War—came the "French" rulers of Britain. If "Britain" was ruled by "France," the wheel came round full circle in due course; out of the English-Scottish duel emerged the Hundred Years' War with "Britain" ruling "France" in turn. In the experience of alien rule can be found the first and fundamental reason for the emergence of the modern structure of the Nation State. Neither overlordship lasted. Britain drifted away from Europe. With Queen Elizabeth both the English-Scottish and the Anglo-French struggle abated:—Dunkirk, Britain's last foothold on the continent, was lost by the time she began building modern England, i.e. an Empire based on naval power. With her advent we stand at the threshold of our modern world which wrestles with problems as far-flung as the Seven Seas.

Spiritually, Britain remained part of Europe: Reformation. Renaissance, Nation State, Democracy, Self-Government and Self-Determination, whichever forming force you like, Britain was part of it, if not its protagonist. Materially, however, Britain cut loose from Europe, renouncing any territorial claims to continental lands. It is true she took a fleeting interest in Bohemia when the daughter of James I married the unfortunate Winter King; some of her veterans fought in the Thirty Years' War; in the seventeenth century she almost entered into a union with Holland (did not Winston Churchill propose a similar way out to the France of 1940?); she acquired, from 1714 to 1837, a German State, Hanover; repeatedly she fought on the continent, particularly in the Low Countries, against Napoleon for instance; she remained deeply interested in the Baltic and the Mediterranean, even fighting Russia in the Crimea in 1854-56. Yet, as against these links, stands recorded her attitude about Poland in 1733 and 1830; in the Franco-Austrian war of 1859; in the Prusso-Austrian-Danish war of 1864; in the Prusso-Austrian war of 1866; in the German-French war of 1870. This is at least as impressive a record of non-intervention as any which showed her taking sides in European problems. The fact is that Europe, in British eyes, had become a side-issue, of some but not of absorbing interest. From Chatham onward, till at least Joseph Chamberlain, Britain's main interests have been extra-European.

This being so, her policy has been described in Europe—ad nauseam, one is inclined to add—as one of the Balance of Power. This formula can cover a good deal; even if it were not too technical and mechanical

to be true to life, its conception has proved a failure. It failed in 1914 for the simple reason that even a balance in the power of two opposing camps cannot, with modern weapons, be held so finely as to convince either side of the superiority of the other. This lesson was learned in the fearful years of 1914-1918. The so-called balancing of power is useless as a means of securing the absence of war in Europe, which alone would allow Great Britain to concentrate on her overseas interests.

The English, therefore, embraced the more fervently the idea of the League of Nations and of collective security, the two pillars of peace being its sanctions to uphold the rule of law and its provision for peaceful change of outmoded conditions. The League appeared "the one solid gain from the sufferings of the last four years," it was said in 1918.3 The change from the so-called balance of European powers to collective security throughout the world took time and was carried out, not without hesitation, by statesmen steeped in the thoughts of the pre-1914 world. Even so, the twenty years' record (1919-39) of no other single power shows such persistent support of the new principles of collective security and peaceful procedure. Regional agreements, like the material guarantee of the German-French and German-Belgian frontier under the Locarno pact of 1925, were made part of this same peace structure, the crowning consummation of which the Kellogg-Briand Pact was meant to be. Again, there was failure at the end. Once again, war engulfed us all. Is it then true to say, as the late Deputy Under-Secretary of State of the British Foreign Office has said, that both the Balance of Power and Collective Security failed?4 I think not. The time during which the new principles have been tried has been much too short, not more than a few years, not even a few decades. No peace system can be said to have grown up before at least one or two generations have tried it out. The late Lloyd George himself said in 1919: "When nations are exhausted by wars in which they have put forth all their strength and which leave them tired, bleeding and broken, it is not difficult to patch up a peace that may last until the generation which experienced the horrors of the war has passed away." As he himself was forced to witness, even this proved too much, too difficult. Driven to their doom by Hitler, the selfsame generation witnessed the carnage once more. The Great Experi-

4 Sir Victor Wellesley, Diplomacy in Fetters (London, 1945).

³ Edward L. Wood (the present Lord Halifax) and Sir George Lloyd (the late Lord Lloyd) The Great Opportunity (London, 1918), p. 50. For the League see particularly Lord Cecil, A Great Experiment (London, 1941).

⁵ Cmd, 1614. Memorandum circulated (to the Paris Peace Conference) by the Prime Minister on March 25, 1919 (London, 1922).

ment of organized peace cannot, therefore, be said to have failed. It has not been properly tried yet. Success can only come if two or three generations are allowed to work at it.

* * *

The question whether Great Britain forms a constituent part of the continent was discussed again, almost with passion, in the dark days, back in 1940-41. At that time "Federal Union" was widely recommended, e.g. by Sir William Beveridge, as the panacea of the future. If this federal dream remained music of the distant future, those who supported it may yet be proud of the fact that their inner ear perceived it in the midst and in spite of the wailing of the sirens and the thud of bombs all around us. Most of these federal planners of a Europe reshaped into a continent of reason—instead of a continent reduced to a madhouse of racial slaughter-seemed to agree that Britain was to remain outside their scheme, that she did not form part of Europe. Planners, by nature, must like things tidy: both Russia in the East and Great Britain in the West, they argued, should be left outside an European union. This sounded fair enough, and no less than four Governments accepted this view and acted accordingly. "Having observed past experience, and more particularly recent experiences," the Governments of Greece and of Yugoslavia suggestively declared in London on January 15, 1942, they would aim at a Balkan Union. "The purpose of the confederation is to assure common policy with regard to foreign affairs, defence, economic and financial matters, social questions, transport, post and telegraph"—thus the treaty signed by Poland and Czechoslovakia in London on January 23, 1942.6 By June that year these two Governments had set up four mixed commissions to prepare their federal union, which they considered the primary aim of their foreign policy "during and after the war."

While Hitler's armies were crawling across Europe to force upon it the artificial unity and deadly uniformity of a single military master; while in the East the Russian forces were pushed back far into the interior of the Soviet Union; while Britain, after the evacuation of Dunkirk constituted no more than a lonely outpost of the free forces, lying as she did precariously exposed on the fringe of the continent—at that time the mind of Europeans appeared ready to accept a federal Union of their martyred continent. Enslaved Europeans listened to the voice of

⁶ Events Leading up 10 World War II. Chronological History, 1931-1944 (Washington, 1944), p. 315; cf. sources given there.

their escaped leaders, from de Gaulle to Beneš, proclaiming the unity of the freed Europeans. The agreements then signed by Greece, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland were but the diplomatic expression of that longing. The voices coming from the underground movements of the European countries-from Holland to Estonia; from Latvia to Belgium; from Luxembourg and France to Poland, to Lithuania; from Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece to Denmark, and Norway, all these voices in so many languages spoke of the same aim, liberty at home and unity of the free nations. It is true, they looked to Britain for leadership; it is true, their only hope was Anglo-Saxon help. But they were content to leave the British Commonwealth outside their own co-operative effort. A European Commonwealth was to be formed without, but not against, Great Britain.

Outwardly, Hitler's "jerry"-built Europe showed one trait that was not dissimilar. He too thought of a Europe without Russia and without Britain. Yet, while in the federal idea of a united Europe the accent lay in free-willed co-operation of all, in Hitler's system the stress lay on the exclusion first of Britain and Russia, and next on the exclusion of all influence but his own. This stress thus became the strain of enforced uniformity stamped upon an unwilling continent reduced to slavery for his own benefit. His aim of excluding Russia from Europe became, in truth, an attempt to colonize her territories and thus to make her riches part of the German Lebensraum. He asked Britain to acquiesce in this. Imperial Germany, he had written as far back as 1924, ought to have renounced overseas colonies, world trade and the construction of a navy in order to strike such a bargain with Britain, to gain her approval for a German drive into Russia.7 It was the same thought that made his own deputy, Rudolf Hess-earmarked to be his and Goering's successor—fly to England in May, 1941.8 Yet Britain refused to deal with him as she had done ever since March 15, 1939. Moreover, for the first time in modern times, she reversed her traditional policy of "no special commitments" in Europe and guaranteed, from April, 1939, onwards in quick succession Poland, Rumania, Greece and Turkey, secretly binding herself also to uphold Lithuanian independence and, conditionally, Estonian and Latvian integrity.9 To this day there are many who considered this action "quixotical." 10

A. Hitler, Mein Kampf. (Popular edition, 2 vols. in one), p. 154.
 Cf. the contemporary record, F. W. Pick, "The 'Mission' of Rudolf," Free Europe. (May 30, 1941).

⁹ Secret Protocol to Anglo-Polish Treaty of April 25, 1939. Published April, 1945. 10 Dr. Shuster: "This time the British, it may be quixotically, took a firm stand." G. N. Shuster and A. Bergstraesser, Germany, A Short History (New York, 1944), p. 211.

Hitler himself, having first pocketed his native Austria and then the whole of Czechoslovakia, thought it madness for Britain to promise assistance to Eastern European states when he knew that he could strike a bargain with Soviet Russia. The basis for this was the partition of the intervening lands.

British action, however, can already be explained by the fact that her statesmen were steeped in the knowledge of the peculiar rôle Europe has played in her own as in world history—they knew that the destruction of a further series of European states must lead to a continent united not without Britain but united against her (and, incidentally, against Russia); that force applied "at home," i.e. to the family of European nations, must of necessity lead to an attempt to apply force to the rest of the world. Unlike the Russians they knew that the question put by Hitler was not the mere partition of square miles (other peoples' square miles, moreover), but was a blow at European liberties without which neither Europe nor Britain nor any nation anywhere would be able to live.

This explanation has often been brushed aside by those who style themselves "realists"—Dr. Niebuhr's "Children of Darkness"—as sheer idealistic humbug. Hitler himself proceeded on the assumption that to argue thus was a waste of time. Having counted his weapons, and those of the Western democracies, he turned and signed his agreement with Russia on August 23, 1939. With the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact in his pocket, he addressed himself once more to Britain, saying that "he desired to make a move as regards England which should be as decisive as the move as regards Russia which led to the recent agreement." In exchange for British acquiescence about his and Russia's move into Poland he would willingly pledge himself to guarantee the British Empire and to offer "German assistance regardless of where such assistance should be necessary."11 Counting German planes, tanks and guns, comparing them with British planes, tanks and guns (not to mention anti-aircraft weapons), it was "quixotical" indeed of Britain to refuse to consider Hitler's offer. His surprise at Britain's attitude cannot have been much greater than Stalin's at the time. Realists, counting material power first and foremost, overlook the long-term issues (not to mention the values in which Niebuhr's "Children of Light" believe). Mr. Neville Chamberlain and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, have never been thought of as heroes. Yet, in the sense of continental realists, they were nothing else in 1939 when they stood up to Hitler and took their country into the war over Hitler's attempt

¹¹ Documents Concerning German-Polish Relations—and the Outbreak of Hostilities Between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939, Cmd. 6106. Pp. 120-22; No. 68.

to destroy Poland. In the eyes of the British people, and of the free world, they took but a belated step to save the freedom of Europe as well as of the other free nations, of the individual state as of the individual within the state. "If out of the struggle," Chamberlain said on September 1, 1939, "we again re-establish in the world the rules of good faith and the renunciation of force, why, then even the sacrifices that will be entailed upon us will find their fullest justification." It is important to recall these words at a time when Hitler's infamy has been wiped off the earth. Nobody had a greater horror of war and its coming broke him, yet Chamberlain believed his stand was justified by the principles then enunciated.

Germany, in trying to exclude Britain and Russia from Europe, fought them both. Russia, in fighting back, not only saved herself from becoming colonial territory for Germans but soon staked out claims of her own to additional territory, even to additional nations. Britain, in fighting Hitler first-declaring war on September 3, 1939-instead of waiting for an invasion, as Russia did, until June 22, 1941, fought also for her own life. But she did more than go out to meet the danger half-way; she also fought without any territorial claims in Europe or any desire for spheres of influence. To the materialist or realist this must appear a paradox. It resolves itself, however, if we understand Europe's need, i.e. unity in diversity, not uniformity; if we understand that great continent which is not the field for single military rule but finds its historic mission in the variety of its intellects, a variety which can survive only through the free co-operation of all its nationals and nation-states. "We should remind ourselves of the essential unity of European civilization," said Lord Halifax, one of the main architects of Britain's courageous and far-sighted policy of 1939 when she stood for European liberty. "European minds meet across political frontiers. With the same background of knowledge, with the same heritage of culture, they study the same problems; the work of the great masters of science, and literature or art is the common property of all peoples; and thinkers in every land exchange knowledge on equal and friendly terms. Truly a divided Europe is a house divided against itself." That is why he, as Britain's spokesman, refused to admit the threat of force in the fabric of Europe. 13 That is why Hitler's use of force was immediately resisted by Britain.

12 Ibid., p. 161.

¹³ Ibid., p. 65. Speech delivered on June 29, 1939, at the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

The British themselves viewed the position in no other light. To bear this out, there are a good many statements by Neville Chamberlain and his colleagues (Lord Halifax at the Foreign Office; Mr. Winston Churchill at the Admiralty; Mr. Anthony Eden at the War Office) as well as of the then opposition parties, Labour and Liberal. The most detailed study of this view of a Europe united without, but not against, Britain, to come from a Cabinet Minister is the memorandum which was "written towards the close of 1940, not with a view to publication, for which the time was obviously not ripe, but to clear his own mind." Its author is Mr. L. S. Amery, Secretary of State for India and Burma in Mr. Churchill's administration. He has since included it in his Framework of the Future.14 It does more than mirror the thoughts of the innermost governmental circles of Great Britain at that time; his voice carries particular weight in the Dominions as well; moreover, his views on Europe, steadily ripening since the days when he, as Lord Milner's young man, was an Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, express a view of many Englishmen of otherwise different party connections. Long ago he translated one of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's books on Pan-Europa from the German to familiarize the English-speaking world with the movement toward European unity. He now re-states "the idea of a union of continental Europe" west of Russia. It is, he reminds us, a geographic and economic unit. It has inherited from Greece and Rome and Christianity a common outlook. "A Europe freed from the essentially anti-European onslaught of Nazism may well be far more ready for some form of union than has ever seemed possible before. It is the only constructive idea which opens upon any other vista than that of ever recurrent war and increasing exhaustion." In case federal constitutional forms should prove too ambitious, he recommends the looser bond that has proved its worth for the British Commonwealth-there might be, he thought, a declaration of European rights and principles, including the essential principles of individual freedom, impartial justice and toleration of minorities—"for which we are fighting." Did not Prime Minister Churchill make a similar declaration for at least one nation the Italians—when he tried to give them some sound democratic advice about the test to be applied to any Government? A Europe thus bound together by a pledge of no-more-war, by an Economic Development Commission, a European Labour Organization, our author thought, would form a unit which could also command a sufficient source of raw materials since

¹⁴ L. S. Amery, The Framework of the Future (London, 1944), Ch. VII, "A European Commonwealth."

it would be able to draw upon the French, Dutch, Belgian and Portuguese colonies.

This, Mr. Amery thought, should be Britain's aim in Europe. Can it be reached? "The answer is one which only the European nations directly concerned can furnish for themselves." As to Russia and Britain, he did not see any room for either in such a new and pacified Europe. Quite apart from Russia's autocratic régime and her economic structure, her interests are largely and, he thought, increasingly, Asiatic. Britain, needless to repeat, is a foremost partner in another extra-European Commonwealth and is also pledged to Anglo-American co-operation which makes amalgamation with Europe impossible. It is thus up to the nations of Europe to give the answer, if, indeed, they will be given the chance of making their own choice.

* * *

We are halting, be it remembered, in the years 1939-42 when Mr. Amery wrote this memorandum and when no less than four European statesmen, among them perhaps the shrewdest of all, Dr. Beneš, thought of federal groupings. Yet the world did not halt there. Since then we have witnessed a staggering event. Russia did not only recover from the two Hitlerian waves of brutal attack in 1941 and 1942; in the pursuit of the defeated invader she has broken right into the continent of Europe on a scale for which there is no parallel in her own history. Even Peter the Great did no more than annex the Estonian and part of the Latvian lands; even Catherine the Great no more than partitioned Poland and defeated the Turks. In fact, only by going back to the days when the Russians themselves were mere subjects of alien overlords, tossed about by eastern invaders, can we find parallels for the present upheaval of Europe. While the Anglo-American armies represent no un-European principle and are ready to withdraw in favor of a united Europe, the aims of Russia remain shrouded, dependent upon one man. The idea of European unity has faded into the background once more. Its geographic unity has been broken already. Eastern Europe has been claimed by Russia. While the Twenty Years' Pact of mutual assistance signed by Britain and Russia on May 26, 1942, still spoke of no aggrandizement and of the freely expressed wishes of the populations concerned, the wheel came round full circle within the year. Her recovery from bitter retreat to overwhelming advance brought another aim of Russia to the forefront. In February, 1943 the dispute about the Eastern part of pre-war Poland came into the open. By April, Russo-Polish relations were broken beyond repair. The Polish-Czechoslovakian

idea of a federal union was quietly buried. On November 12, 1943, Czechoslovakia signed her own treaty with Russia; and France as well as Yugoslavia have followed since. The Royal Yugoslav and the Royal Greek Governments themselves faded away, making room for Regents. A part of Finland, the whole of Estonia, the whole of Latvia, the whole of Lithuania, a part of Poland, as well as a part of Rumania, has been claimed by Russia as Russian territory.

And Britain? Is she to join the scramble and to ask for her share? Should she revive Canute's dream? Might she stretch out her hand to the coastline whence destruction came to her capital city in such grievous form?¹⁵ Democracies cannot change their aims or policies according to momentary expediencies. She cannot go back on herself. As far as self-preservation goes she has won, with the help of her sister states in the Commonwealth and particularly with the assistance of like-minded America; she has won through triumphantly. As far as the problem of Europe goes, however, she stands face to face with something like temporary failure in respect to free-willed co-operation of liberated and united Europe. ... to write these words down is to state how far short of our aim we are. From her very nature—as a democracy at home, a member of the British Commonwealth and a friend of the United States—she cannot join in a partition of Europe. "If we are not to witness a partition of Europe, perhaps with the former Germany as a no-man's land of waste between, there seems no other hope for Europeans' than the one sketched by Mr. Amery under the flag of a European Commonwealth.¹⁶ All she can do is to repeat this hope. All she can do is to offer some assistance to the smaller Western and Scandinavian powers, perhaps to the Southern ones as well, if France desires to add her growing weight to so loose and vague a scheme. But whatever the group as far as Britain is concerned, it can play only a minor rôle as compared to her world-wide interests outside Europe. Since she cannot deny her soul she can do no other than adhere to her policy of no aggrandizement and no changes without the clearly expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. "We cannot say to the world 'You have got to do this, you have got to do that'. That is beyond the power of forty-five million (in Great Britain.) But what we can do is, in our own conduct and by our own leadership, to

¹⁵ Civilian casualties due to enemy action, i.e. rocket bombs, in the United Kingdom during March, 1945 were 792 killed, 1,426 injured and detained in hospital (total civilian casualties through enemy air attacks from 1939 to March, 1945, inclusive, were 60,583 killed and 86,159 injured).

16 F. W. Pick, "A Conservative Estimate," The Contemporary Review (July, 1944).

try and to establish and maintain those standards of international conduct without which there cannot be peace."17

It is up to the nations of Europe on the one hand and to the Big Three on the other to meet and hammer out a solution in accordance with these principles.

ELIZABETH COLLEGE, BUXTON, ENGLAND.

¹⁷ A. Eden, House of Commons, May 25, 1944. Cf. F. W. Pick, "Ourselves and Russia" in The Baltic Nations, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. (London, 1945).

"LA VERTUE DE LA POLITIQUE"

by M. K. Dziewanowski

"La politique est une vertue et la vertue de la politique est la justice" — Talleyrand

N THE third book of Tolstoy's War and Peace there is an episode from the Allied council of war which took place at Olmütz on November 15, 1805, on the eve of the Battle of Austerlitz.

When the council was over, Andrew Bolkonski took Boris Drubetskoy, a new A.D.C., to present him to the Tsar Alexander. Coming out of the Emperor's room they met a short man in civilian dress with a clever face and sharply projecting jaw which, without spoiling his face, gave him a peculiar vivacity of expression.

"Who was that?"—asked Boris Drubetskoy.

"He is one of the most remarkable, but to me most unpleasant of men, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Adam Czartoryski. It is such men as he who decide the fate of nations."

* * *

In setting out to write his Essai sur la diplomatie, Prince Adam Czartoryski imagined that it would contain the testament and intellectual summing-up of his public activities.

In reality he had only finished the first period of his political life, and barely passed Dante's "messo camin del vita."

Prince Adam had been born in 1770, and was thus fifty-three years old in 1823. He had studied at Edinburgh University, taken part in the campaign of 1792, was a knight of the order of Virtuti Militari, had been first a hostage at the court of the Empress Catherine, and aide-de-camp to the young heir to the throne. Thus he could not be accused of having passed a particularly tranquil youth. After this he spent two years as envoy at the Sardinian court, a disguised form of exile devised by the Tsar Paul, who feared that the Polish adjutant might gain too much influence over his son. Paul's death caused the Prince to be recalled and nominated Curator of the Scholastic District of Wilno, and finally, in 1806, he was almost compelled to accept the post of Russian Foreign Minister, terminated by his resignation two years later. His administration was strange enough, for he only agreed to hold office under the condition that he should receive neither salary nor decorations—surely the only occurrence of this kind in history.

On giving up his ministerial duties, Czartoryski retained his curatorship of Polish education in the territories seized by Russia. The years between 1816 and 1823 were occupied in unsuccessful attempts to make use of the influence he possessed over Alexander with the aim of settling the Polish question by uniting all the territories of the Republic with Russia and assuring these territories free, constitutional development within a personal union.

The Congress of Vienna and the first years of the Polish Congress Kingdom showed the Prince that he had been deceived in his hopes that it would be possible to realize completely his plans of Polish-Russian collaboration. After years of hope, ardor and illusion, after years filled with intensive diplomatic and political labors, there came a period of discouragement and disillusionment. Czartoryski tried to withdraw from active political life, and began to assemble a library and concentrate his attention on his duties as curator of education for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Volhynia. In order to restore his health he traveled abroad: to Italy, France, Switzerland and Germany. When he was in Poland, he spent much time in Wilno, where he was in contact with the poet, Adam Mickiewicz. He read a great deal, and went through his notes. Finally he began to write.

The fruit of this labor was the *Essai sur la diplomatie*, which is Czartoryski's main literary work apart from his memoirs. It was finished in 1827, but the first edition appeared in print in June, 1830 in Marseilles. It was reprinted at Paris in 1864.

He began his analysis of contemporary European diplomacy with experiences at the Congress of Vienna. In Czartoryski's view, Napoleon's failures were caused by lack of understanding of the essential nature of Europe, with which collaboration in the name of certain principles was possible, but on which the will of one power could not be imposed permanently. Such attempts always led to a crisis and war which united the majority of the continent against the state which was trying to establish a hegemony over it.

The Allies had defeated Napoleon with catch-words on their lips about respect for law. They were inclined to forget these when they felt themselves masters of the situation, and promises given in their period of weakness had become inconvenient and embarrassing to them.

"The ease with which they could enlarge and round off their own territories impelled them to commit on a small scale the same injustices which Napoleon had perpetrated on the grand scale"

Moreover, when the danger passed, the powers became aware that their

interests were profoundly conflicting. So, forgetful of their fine promises and declarations, the four Allies, avoiding war among themselves, began to divide Europe into spheres of influence, without considering the aspirations and desires of the different nations.

Opinion in Europe, at first dazzled by the successes of the Coalition, reawakened, and throughout the continent a murmur of dissatisfaction and criticism began to be heard. It was in such an atmosphere that the Congress of Vienna met.

Although the former promises and declarations had been forgotten, the words "right of nations" came up from time to time during the discussions of the Congress, for "such is the power exerted over men by the idea of right that even those who violate it feel an irresistible desire to refer to it constantly." L' hypocrisie est l'hommage que le vice rend a la vertue."

The powers which gave the prevailing tone to the Congress did not—in the opinion of Czartoryski—understand the rôle of the small nations, seeing in them only dummies, and not co-creators and co-partners in the European order, essential elements in a harmonious international collaboration. Fundamentally, he declared, these smaller states determine international equilibrium, since the respective strengths of the great powers are almost equal.

In his criticism of the Vienna Congress, the author of the Essai sur la diplomatie laid down the tasks of diplomacy as he saw them in consequence of his own experience. The world needs long periods of peace, and the prolongation of these periods becomes more likely with a return to the ideas formulated by Henry IV and Elizabeth of a "European League," or community of nations possessing equal rights, collaborating with one another willingly on a foundation of the ideals of Christian justice. The aim of this league should be to assure the security of its individual members, lasting security being attainable with the introduction into international life of the principles of Christian ethics. Mediation and arbitration should be the means of settling disputes arising between members of the league. Czartoryski was in favor of drawing up a code of international law, which should—according to him—be the reflection of moral law, applied to life between nations. Here he agreed with the view of Herbert Agar that "politics are applied ethics," and "what is morally wrong cannot in the long run be politically right."

Both large and small states have the same basic right to life and the development of their national qualities. But because the smaller states

can assure their true independence only by possessing adequate strength to back it, Czartoryski put forward the idea of linking the smaller and weaker states in federation and counter-federation. He wrote: "Europe has even the right to demand of them, because it is the only way in which the small states can effectively contribute to the realization of a happy and successful functioning of the European community. Confederations and federation of states are in so far a desirable form of state union that their strength is purely defensive and by its very nature cannot threaten the greater powers."

"The federational system protects the smaller states from the rapacity of the great without prejudice to their national interests or loss of their national individuality," wrote Czartoryski. Nations of different origin and tongue can come closer together, impelled by common interests. By forming unions based on consideration of their fundamental interests, they can create a force which will assure them the position of honorable

partners in conversation with the great powers.

When describing the rôle of Great Britain, Czartoryski remarks that during the Napoleonic Wars, she fought courageously, often alone, in defense of the rights of all Europe, showing a consistency which won her immense authority on the continent. But when the danger passed, British statesmen were unable to take the leading part which rightly belonged to Great Britain in the European community, on account of both her past achievements and her future possibilities.

"History will some time point out with astonishment that after the downfall of Napoleon, England did not in the least realize the duties and also the advantages of the position in which victory had placed her. Not only did she not play the rôle for which she had been cast, but it may be said that she did not play any rôle at all." Having made a vast military effort to overcome her difficulties and to help the other members of the Coalition, she had at the time of victory nothing to say in the matter of organizing the European continent.

"The great British nation," wrote the author of the *Essai*, "is characterized by all the virtues and faults which arise from the fact that the millions of individuals making up this nation have been formed of the same clay: ministers, great lords, politicians, orators, scholars, writers, merchants, shop-keepers, industrialists and workers—all and every one of them, when placed in the most diverse situations, act in the same manner, think alike and show similar reactions, always thinking of the national interests, of which they

never lose sight. And this is England's elemental strength." However, from the point of view of the rest of the world, Britain's tendency to interfere with and pronounce sentence upon others, combined with a desire to wash her own hands of the matter, i.e., to make judgments without supporting the right cause until injustice directly threatens her own interests, is, and has been in the past, one of the greatest menaces to Europe.

He also foresaw rightly the great part which the United States would play in the future world, seeing in her a potential defender of the principles of freedom and justice. "The new world"—he wrote—"proclaims principles from which we may expect much, and the doctrines originating in the Washington Cabinet appear to herald a new era in the history of diplomacy."

Czartoryski devoted much space to Russia and her rôle in the world. His observations are all the more interesting because his whole life was passed in closed relationship with Russia. Through the campaign of 1792, his "internment" at Catherine's court, his adjutancy and subsequent friendship with the young heir to the throne, later Tsar Alexander, his post as envoy to the Sardinian court, and his two years as Russian Foreign Minister, Czartoryski's relationship to Russia passed into an opposition phase, finally to become volens nolens one of open warfare, to which he was compelled by the events of the November Rising of 1830-31. Thus in the course of over ninety years, he passed through revolutionary changes—as a soldier fighting against Russia, a hostage, a politician trying to achieve collaboration and union with Russia, an oppositionist, a member of the revolutionary government and in the last phase of his life as the leader of an émigré movement which based its hopes on an armed intervention against Russia by the European powers. His profound studies and convenient position for observation made it possible for Czartoryski to attain a wider knowledge of the problem than any other contemporary diplomat. Without being a Russian, he had the opportunity of observing Russia and the Russians close at hand, almost from within, while all state documents and almost all state secrets were available to him. Thus he was in a position to formulate opinions whose authority is greater than that possessed by any other observers of the period.

Thus Czartoryski was, during the greater part of his life, drawn by the thought of union with Russia. His whole life passed either under its influence, or in opposition to Russia when he came to the conclusion that the idea of union could not be achieved.

When the orientation of Russian foreign policy shifted and Alexander rejected the idea of carrying out plans concerning Poland worked out jointly by himself and Czartoryski, the latter resigned his post as Foreign Minister in 1806, after two years of office and presented to the Tsar a "Memorandum concerning the Political System which Russia should follow." Here he formulated the idea of a union between Poland and Russia, based on a system "in which would exist a natural harmony between the rights and the interests of both countries." This harmony he perceived to consist in a respect for the national rights of Poland, guaranteed constitutionally, and an adaptation of the Russian Empire's foreign policy to the new principles. The Memorandum maintained that the test of Russia's sincerity towards Europe is her relationship to Poland. The same thesis is adopted in the Essai.

"Russia's appearance in Europe, desirable and necessary under the condition that she should observe the laws of right and justice, has become a fatal source of new complication in consequence of the acts of aggression committed by her . . ." "By widening her sway to the south and west, and being by nature inaccessible from east and north, Russia has become a source of constant danger for Europe. . . ."

Have her conquests on Polish territory become a source of strength for Russia?—asked Czartoryski. Russia needs neither new territories nor new population, as her population is growing at the same rate as that of the United States. Control of Poland—he wrote further—is also not necessary to assure Russia the possibility of exerting a decisive influence on the fate of Europe. Being a continent in herself, and a continent with inexhaustible resources in men and raw materials, Russia should rather incline her rulers to occupy themselves with making available and exploiting all these natural riches for the benefit of the population. Thus by concentrating on questions and problems of internal development, surrounding herself with friendly and loyal allies, Russia can extend her influence and authority and permanently ensure her own interests, without losing anything of her strength. A good and loyal friend—he wrote—is in the long run always more worth while than a slave. "Un ami vaut mieux qu'un esclave."

Czartoryski, realizing the Prussian menace not only to Poland but to the whole of Europe, uttered a warning in his *Essai* against the danger inherent in Prussia's possibilities of growth, and demanded that East Prussia be eliminated by incorporation into Poland.

Although some sceptics say that history teaches us one thing above

all, and that is that it has never taught anybody anything to date, we are nevertheless inclined to estimate the intelligence of individuals and communities according to their ability to profit by experience.

LONDON, ENGLAND

KAMIL KROFTA 1876 - 1945

by S. Harrison Thomson

TITH the passing of Kamil Krofta, Professor of History at the Charles University in Prague and Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Munich crisis, on August 16, 1945, Czechoslovakia lost one of her most able and versatile political and intellectual leaders. His death also marks the end of our era in Czechoslovak historiography. The mantle of Palacký, the historian, fell upon Jaroslav Goll. As Palacký had no university chair, it is not surprising that he had few pupils in the usual sense of the word. But Goll had the great good fortune to have inspired and trained a relatively great number of gifted and prodigiously industrious pupils. Lubor Niederle, Václav Novotný, Josef Pekař and Šusta were all trained by Goll. They are not too well known in the West, as they chose, for the most part, to write in their native Czech. But their high erudition and their consistent productivity could not be surpassed and

hardly equalled anywhere else in Europe.

Krofta was a few years younger than the men of his circle but he, like them, began his studies in the period of the Czech reformation—the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries—and like them began his serious publication with archival studies. One of his first publications, completed when he was not yet 30, was his Vol. V of Monumenta Bohemiae Vaticana, containing the letters of two Avignonese popes that concerned Bohemia. From this study he expanded his interests to the pre-White Mountain period. The main lines of his academic work were, therefore, focussed mainly upon these two key periods in Czech history: The Hussite reformation and the question of the facts and the significance of the disaster of the White Mountain. His studies led Krofta to a position closely akin to that taken previously by Palacký—that the essence of Czech history could be understood only in the light of a Hussite interpretation of these centuries. This conviction brought him into frequent disagreement with Josef Pekař whose approach to the position of Palacký was unsympathetic. But it was typical of Krofta that these polemics were on a high level of expression, without the bitter acrimony so often found among academicians. During the war years of 1914-1918 he was engaged in extensive research into the history of the peasant class of Bohemia and Moravia, published in 1919. From some points of view it remains his most significant scholarly work.

With the coming of independence, Krofta's gifts of personableness and gracious erudition were needed in the diplomatic service of his country

and, though he retained his professorship and continued to publish his researches, his attention was diverted to other fields to which he brought the same high quality of sympathy, urbanity and historical vision that had been so clearly marked in his earlier teaching and writing. He was successively Minister to Vienna, to Rome and Berlin and was thereafter retained at the Foreign Office in Prague by Beneš, who probably thus early saw in him his successor as Foreign Minister. But even with the increasing weight of a full diplomatic life upon him, he continued to write brilliant history in articles and books which reflected not only his broad and deep reading, but a freshness of approach that could only have been due to his active participation in the making of the modern history of his own country.

On the death of Váciav Novotný in 1931, the comprehensive Česke dějiny which he had founded and directed was entrusted to Krofta. His initiative and contagious enthusiasm gave this great work new life and three volumes appeared in a few years.

From 1936 to Munich Krofta was Foreign Minister. After the heart-breaking days of the partition of his country he retired from office and wrote a memorable book of reflections on the history of the First Republic. Z dob naše republiky—which, of course, disappeared from the market after the German occupation of Prague in March, 1939. In retirement he sought another, less controversial, outlet for his energy, and wrote a history of the Czech people from 1620 to the nineteenth century entitled, Nesmrtelný Národ (An Immortal Nation). The title page gives the date 1940, when the Germans were making some show of placating Czech opinion. Krofta lived some miles from Prague until late in 1943 when he was imprisoned in Terezin (Theresienstadt) and subjected to considerable brutal treatment and indignity. Early in 1945 he was released, but the effects of his imprisonment were evident to all who had known him, in spite of his gallant spirit and determination to finish his work on the modern period of the people's history.

Few men have so nearly approached living two full lives—that of an historian and that of a man of public affairs, and fewer still can be sure of being so highly regarded in both careers by posterity.

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

On September 6, 1945, Professor Pfitzner, Professor of History at the now extinct German University in Prague, was publicly executed by hanging in the square in front of the Pankrac Prison in the Czechoslovak capital. He was sentenced to death by a People's Court which sat for two days and heard his defense in a perfectly calm and legal fashion. Pfitzner, a Czechoslovak citizen and employee of the Czechoslovak state for many years, had been a leader in the Sudeten German Nazi party, had long been an advocate of the Henlein program, and, shortly after the Nazis took over Prague, was named Vice-Mayor of the city. In this capacity he was responsible for the death of many leading Czechs, he made every possible effort to germanize the city of Prague, closed Czech schools, accepted military honors from Hitler, among them that of SA Standartenführer and the Kriegsverdienstskreuz II and I. It is currently estimated that around 4000 Czechs perished at the hands of officials who were under Pfitzner's orders.

At the trial, speaking in Czech, he proclaimed that he had done everything within his power to bring the Czech and German peoples closer together. At that point a ripple of bitter laughter broke the general quiet which marked the course of the proceedings. Pfitzner's conduct on the gallows was dignified. It is fairly reliably reported that his last words were: "Ich sterbe für Deutschland." This was the first public execution in Prague for centuries and was well attended. There was hardly a person in the crowd of 30,000 who witnessed the ceremony who did not have some personal interest in the retributory aspects of the administration of justice.

Pfitzner was the author of a large number of "scholarly" works, books and articles, mostly intended to show that Bohemia and Moravia were German in history and culture, that the Czechs were interlopers of a very inferior grade and that their national heroes, such as Charles IV and Žižka, were either fictional or German. There was never any doubt of Pfitzner's ability. What he did with it was perhaps another thing.

There was considerable and audible negative reaction to the public execution, and many individuals and groups protested against it to the government. The protests resulted in making the execution of the next on the list of Czechoslovak traitors and war criminals, Kurt Blaschtowitschka, the former Nazi public prosecutor for Prague, a restricted affair. He was executed, after a formal two day trial, on September 14. Without doubt a pathological case, he made a specialty of witnessing executions all over Greater Germany, listing several thousand such executions he had enjoyed, then gave vent to the deeper yearnings of his soul in music. He was, as a matter of fact, a rather good pianist, if we may believe the reports of those who attended his public concerts. Failure to attend such an invitation affair was likely to be a serious matter.

On June 29, 1945 there was signed a pact by Russia and Czechoslovakia by which Czechoslovakia ceded to Russia the Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia).

The text of the pact follows:

The praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.—Vyacheslaff Molotoff, deputy chairman of the People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., and Foreign Affairs Commissar of the Soviet Union, and

President of the Czechoslovak Republic—Zdenek Fierlinger, president of the Council of Ministers, and Vladimir Clementis, State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry,

Who, having exchanged thir plenipotenitary documents, which were found to be in due form and order, have agreed upon the following:

The Carpatho-Ukraine, which according to the Czechoslovak Constitution bears the name of Sub-Carpathian Rus, and which on the basis of a pact of Sept. 10, 1919, concluded at St. Germain-en-Laye, entered the Czechoslovak Republic with the rank of an autonomous republic, will, according to the wish manifested by the population of the Carpatho-Ukraine and on the basis of the friendly agreement of both high contracting parties, unite with its long-standing motherland, the Ukraine, and is included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The frontier between Slovakia and the Carpatho-Ukraine, existing since Sept. 29, 1938, will, with modifications described, become the frontier between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak republic in agreement with the map attached.

This pact is subject to confirmation by the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak National Assembly. An exchange of ratified documents will be effected in Prague. The present pact has been drawn up in Moscow in three copies, in the Russian, Ukrainian and Slovak languages. All three copies are equally valid.

Upon the authority of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Molotoff.

Upon the authority of the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Fierlinger, Clementis.

Here follows the text of a protocol appended to the pact on Carpatho-

At the signing of the pact concerning the Carpatho-Ukraine, the two parties agreed as follows:

Article I

Tracing the frontiers in areas agreed by Clause I of the pact will be done by a demarcation Commission to be appointed, consisting of three representatives from each high contracting party, who will have the right to call a necessary number of experts. The expenses of the demarcation commission will be borne in equal share by both governments taking part.

Article II

Persons of Ukrainian and Russian nationality living in Czechoslovak territory have the right to opt for Soviet citizenship until Jan. 1, 1946. Opting proceeds according to the existing Soviet laws. It becomes valid upon having received the agreement of authorities of the U.S.S.R.

Czech and Slovak nationals residing or having their permanent domicile in the territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine have the right to opt for Czechoslovak nationality during the time until Jan. 1, 1946. Opting will take place under the present laws of the Czechosolvak Republic and will become valid with the consent of Czechoslovak authorities. Persons who have the right of the abovementioned, during the twelve months following the obtaining of consent of the relevant governments will move into the state whose nationality they intend to acquire, and may take with them all their mobile goods. These goods will not be subject to any customs duties. For immobile goods they will be compensated. Compensation will also be given to persons of Slovak or Czech nationality who have been forced to leave the territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine through enemy occupation. To these persons also belong juridical persons who should be considered Czechs or Slovaks from a point of view of legal rights existing before the occupation.

Article III

In dealing with points with the first clause and the second article of this protocol, when questions of juridical ownership or financial order are involved, a commission of liquidation will be instituted, to which each of the high contracting parties will appoint its representatives who will hold the right to enroll persons and material indispensable for this purpose.

This commission will be entrusted with the task of transferring state property of Carpatho-Ukraine from the Czechoslovak Republic to the U.S.S.R.

In agreement with Article II, sections three and four, on the principles upon which the liquidation committee representing the Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments, the following procedure will be pursued:

The high contracting parties will decide on reimbursement after which the payment of such obligations will be proceeded with. The liquidation of all reimbursements and repayments of divergencies will be completed within a period of eighteen months after the ratification of the treaty.

This protocol is a component part of the treaty and subject to ratification of the main treaty.

Molotoff, for the Soviet Union.

Clementis, Fierlinger, for the Czechoslovak Republic.

BOOK REVIEWS

SCHMITT, BERNADOTTE E., ed., *Poland*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945. Pp. xix, 500. \$5.00.

For this imposing volume we have to thank the enterprise of a number of people. It is one of a United Nations Series, edited by Professor R. J. Kerner, who has written the Epilogue dealing with the events of 1944. Professor Schmitt is the author of the chapter dealing with the years 1914-1923. The rest of the book is the work of American and Polish scholars, and the choice will at once commend itself to all who have any acquaintance with the field. Part One entitled "Land and People," Part Two "Historical Background," (and this in my view should have been longer), Part III, "Political Development," Part IV "Economic and Social Development," and Part V "Cultural Development" set out in succinct fashion the issues and achievements of the years of independence. Parts VI and VII deal with Polish-American and Foreign Relations respectively (the latter is done by Professor S. H. Thomson), and then we have 40 pages on the war period since 1939.

To review a book of this sort is next to impossible. There is in it unity and diversity. The main body of the material is quite rightly devoted to the

inter-war years, during which the Polish people proved its title to self-government. Some of the chapters have been done by men who themselves occupied high positions during those years, e.g. those on education and scientific work by the former Minister, Professor W. Swiętosławski, and that on financial policy by Mr. Z. Karpinski, Manager of the Bank of Poland. In this appraisal one can

only notice a few points, while commending the detachment and balance shown by almost all who have contributed.

The chapter on Partitioned Poland, by Miss Orvis, is an admirable example of compression. One might have asked for more space here in which to trace the rise of the Political Parties, in particular the reasons for the growth of Socialism, and the thorny path followed by the pioneers of the Peasant Groups in politics. I am not sure that one can say that Galicia was "the most backward" of Polish lands. Professor Schmitt has given a clear, if somewhat simplified, account of the way in which the two greater leaders (and rivals), Dmowski and Piłsudski, complemented each other in preparing the way for restoration in 1918-19, and of the contribution made by Paderewski. Professor Graham attributes the fall of the last named in December, 1919 largely to the difficulties over the Eastern frontiers. I should say that internal difficulties played an even more important part here. Paderewski was more of a patriot than a politician; he hated the game of politics, and was unhappy when immersed in it. On the other hand the same writer tells the whole truth when at the top of page 155, in connection with the assassination of Narutowicz he warns against love of country which will not "let the procedures of legality operate."

Professor Graham's estimate of Pilsudski is fair and incisive. It would have

helped if we could have been told more about Marshal's inability to work with the veteran Peasant leader, Witos. In general, throughout Central Europe Socialism and Peasant Politics did not find a way to work together, with the result that the latter gravitated toward the Nationalist camp at times when this was a dangerous thing to do. In the same way, we must some day know more about the relative barrenness of Dmowski's contribution to the internal political structure after the liberation. When all is said and done, in spite of one-party controls, both before and after the Marshal's death, Poland remained in essence democratic. Only time, and peace in Europe, was needed to make this clear to the world.

Professor Thomson has given us in Chapter XXV the clearest account of Poland's Foreign Relations that I know of in so brief a form. His comments on Col. Beck's career are sharp, but based on the facts. It is well that attention should be drawn to the latter's unwillingness to see the implications of his "playing ball" with Hitler Germany, both in regard to Polish-Czech relations and in the wider field. But he rightly notes Poland's refusal to join the Anti-Comintern Pact: and one might only suggest that Warsaw was always at a loss in view of the unreadiness both in Paris and in London, to recognize the way things were going. That is the real reason for "bilateral accommodation" (p. 402); though an excess of confidence in Polish strength was certainly one of the characteristics of Warsaw policy.

Space does not permit of more than a word of commendation of such fine chapters as that of Prof. Kridl on "Literature" (in particular what he says of the novel); or of Dr. Kasprcak on Social Progress. Dr. Rouček has given us a dispassionate account of the Minorities tangle, setting out both sides with candor. Music and the Fine Arts are also well treated. What a pity that all this grand heritage has been laid in the dust, because the Allied Powers (the

League) would not face up to the German problem in time!

It is fifteen years since the stout volume "Poland," the work of Roman Dyboski, was published by Benn (London) in the Modern World Series. It is long since out of print, and for that reason this new work is the more welcome. I wonder whether it can be made available in Britain. The sooner, the better. University of London

WILLIAM J. ROSE

Steinberg, S. H., A Short History of Germany. Cambridge: The University Press; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945. Pp. 304. \$3.00.

History, which has so much to teach, is being called upon just now in a constant stream of new histories to prove, according to the views of those writing, that the Germans are or are not incorrigibly atavastic, that they are or are not capable of governing themselves and earning the confidence of their neighbors; that they are or are not inherently as vicious as their late Nazi leaders. S. H. Steinberg's Short History of Germany is not, in this respect, one of the worst offenders. Nor does it quite live up to the author's stated intention, which was

to give the English people a narrative history of Germany "on a modest scale."

It is in fact a swift survey of German history since the year 900, sketchy at best, and doubly so when the narrative waits for the author's comments or is obscured, as it sometimes is, by a rather disconcerting disregard for chronology. The publisher's blurb on the jacket calls the book "suitable for the ordinary reader," but it seems to the reviewer to offer the general reader more detail than he will take, and the student less than he will need. Although it is interlarded with praise of British political institutions and foreign policy, it will probably not become a standard textbook in German history either in Great Britain or in the United States.

The author does not give, in so many words, a solution of "the German problem." One surmises that he would recommend the establishment of a federal union of German states, including several new or reconstituted states to be formed by a partition of Prussia. He emphasizes throughout, the separate identities of the various German peoples, and calls the growth of Prussia's power disastrous for Germany. He was obviously dissatisfied with either Bismarck's answer or Hitler's to the real German problem, which, as he defines it, is: to find "a working compromise between uniformity and disruption, . . . between centralism and anarchy."

One misprint was noticed by the reviewer: the preliminary peace of Nikolsburg (p. 219) must have been made in July, not June, 1866. Americans accustomed to associating the name of Robert Morse with the telegraph may be startled to see Wilhelm Weber mentioned as "the inventor of telegraphy," (p. 195). Carl Schurz was not Lincoln's "home secretary" (p. 207). Those who think they know Bismarck may wonder whether he was as much surprised by the advent or the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War as is implied on page 228. And students of the making of the armistice of 1918 may question whether it was "the imperial government" or only the high command that "fell into a panic" in September and October of that year (p. 260).

Yet the book is, on the whole, sounder and less biased than most of its contemporaries. It attributes much of the political ineptitude of the Germans to their habit of obedience. Without so much as a nod in the direction of Weimar, it calls 1848 "the one attempt to create a democratic Germany" (p. 205) . . "In fact, the Germans had never achieved any political and social progress by their own exertions, but had always been granted it from above (p. 281) . . . Civic rights mean very little to a nation which has no Magna Carta, Bill of Rights, Declaration of Independence, . . . no Bastille Day, and no Fourth of July (p. 281) . . . There is no doubt that the Nazis have succeeded in appealing to some instincts of some people in every section of the German community" (p. 278).

University of Wisconsin

CHESTER V. EASUM

BILMANIS, ALFRED, Baltic Essays. Washington, D. C.: The Latvian Legation, 1945. Pp. 268.

The three Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are finding themselves once more crushed by a powerful neighbor after a brief existence as independent entities, during which period they proved to be economically stable and politically and culturally progressive. Their plight in the past and the present is the subject of this book from the able pen of Latvia's first minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary to the United States.

In five chapters entitled: The Baltic Sea, The Baltic States, Germans in Latvia, The Baltic Peoples and the Slavs, The Baltic Peoples and Russian Imperialism, accompanied by an Appendix of Comparative Statistics, a Bibliography and an Index, Dr. Bilmanis describes the geography and the people of the Baltic region, their history, their struggle for cultural, economic and political self-expression, their foreign relations after having gained their independence, and their tragic fate first, under Soviet, then German and then again under Soviet domination. Although much of the material of this book can be found in Dr. Bilmanis' previous publications (the chapter on the Germans in Latvia is actually a reprint of an article which appeared in *The Slavonic and East European Review* for November, 1944), the book represents a valuable compilation on the troubled problem of the Baltic which no student of Eastern European history should neglect to consult.

Dr. Bilmanis courageously presents a strong case for the independent existence of the three Baltic peoples who have shown in the brief span of twenty-five years that they had the cultural and political maturity so absolutely necessary for statehood. The achievements of the Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians present a not unimportant contribution to contemporary European civilization and culture. It is, therefore, the more unfortunate that Dr. Bilmanis weakens his case by an obvious anti-Russian bias when in his eagerness to prove his case he draws no distinction between the policy of the Russian Government before 1917 and that of the Soviet Government, both of which, according to him, were dominated by "the imperialistic Eastern Great-Russians" (p. 112).

When describing the situation in the Baltic Provinces under Russian domination, Dr. Bilmanis attempts to show that the Russian Government supported the Baltic Germans. He pays this writer the honor of quoting a passage from one of his articles. However, shorn of its context, the passage becomes a misquotation. It reads: "The self-government of the Baltic Provinces was in reality a means of perpetuating the domination of Latvians and Estonians by the German minority, the nobles" (p. 136). Actually the passage was as follows: "The policy of the Russian Government toward the Baltic Provinces was complicated by a local national question. The self-government of these provinces was in reality a means of perpetuating the domination of Latvians and Estonians by the German minority composed of the landed nobility and of the bourgeoisie. Therefore, all the actions of the Tsarist Government directed toward the limit-

ation of the confirmed rights and privileges of these provinces can be considered as helping the people to free themselves from the centuries-old yoke of the German barons."

Dr. Bilmanis states further: "The Russian Czars lived up to the promises given by Peter the Great to the Livonian German nobility, and so did the German Baltic landlords in regard to the promises they had given to the Czar. They did not even raise their voices in protest when in 1877 Alexander III [it was Alexander II] started to russify the schools, the University of Dorpat (Tartu), the law courts and local administration in Livonia. The German landowners, however, knew that the language used in their oligarchic Diet was still to be German . . . Besides, the Russian Czars would not dare to attack the privileges of the German Baltic nobility—that would not please the mighty Prussian King [sic]" (pp. 136-137).

Actually what happened was this: In 1877 the Russian municipal law of 1870 was extended to the cities in the Baltic Provinces and in 1888 the institution of justices of peace (this function was previously fulfilled by the German nobles) and considerable changes in the procedure of the old law courts were introduced. In 1884 an investigation of the local (German) administration was carried out and a number of local reforms followed. In 1887 (not in 1877) as Dr. Bilmanis has it) German as the language of instruction was replaced by Russian in all primary and secondary schools maintained by government funds (private schools were exempt from this measure) as well as at the University of Dorpat (Tartu) which was renamed Yuriev, its original name. Finally in 1888 the right of the German nobility to maintain its own police was withdrawn. All these measures favored the population of Latvians and Estonians at the expense of the German element and by the end of the nineteenth century there was little left of the rights and privileges agreed upon in 1700 and 1712 (and only confirmed by the Treaty of Nystadt in 1721) by the representatives of the nobility and cities of Livland and Estland and the Russian Government.

On the whole, the treatment of the historical relations of the Baltic peoples with the Russians is the weakest part in the book and contains a further number of factual errors, such as calling Rurik—"founder of the principality of Kiev" (p. 131), Admiral Kolchak—"General Kolchak" (p. 47), or deriving Murmansk (its official name was Romanov-na-Murmane) from Normansk (p. 153) and the title "Czar" from the Arabic "Kaysar" (p. 130) and not from the byzantinized latin Caesar as was the case. Limitation of space prevents this reviewer from further analyzing these and other errors and misstatements concerning Russia, but as a friend of Latvia and the Latvians of long standing he deplores that such a good thesis as presented by this book should be marred by historical inaccuracy and bias.

Harvard University

LEONID I. STRAKHOVSKY

CARR, EDWARD HALLETT, Nationalism and After. London: Macmillan. Pp. 74. 3s.6d.

This is a distressing book. Not satisfied with his notorious onslaught on Western democracy and its basis, self-determination, as expressed in his book on the Conditions of Peace (1942), Professor Carr now returns to the charge. What makes his work doubly distressing is the fact—hardly denied by anyone -that we must learn to overcome some of the more extreme expressions of present-day nationalism if peace is to be established. Carr makes use of this healthy realization, of this yearning for a world "after" the excesses of rabid nationalism, and paints a picture of a world at peace. But what forms the background and ultimate goal of his world? "The world," he says, "will have to accommodate itself to the emergence of a few great multinational units. Economically, the term Grossraum invented by German geo-politicians seems the most appropriate" (p. 52). Does Professor Carr really expect us to swallow this without protest? Did we defeat Hitler only in order to accept the Haushofer-Hess-Hitler conception of super-states? Small countries, he told us in his last book, "can survive only by seeking permanent association with a Great Power." The small units, as he calls them now, "can survive only as an anomaly and an anachronism (p. 37). A distressing book—this appears too mild a judgment. It is sinister in its invitation to the destruction of the Small Nations.

Carr makes no attempt to define nationalism, and his speedy survey of the three periods (1500-1815; 1815-1918; 1918-1939) into which he tries to press three different types of nationalism appear to have little relation to historical fact. It might be noted, however, that he thus carefully avoids giving the French Revolution any importance for the development of modern nationalism. "Why nationalism should have been regarded as a promising stepping-stone to internationalism," he asks with a sigh and without knowing the answer—which, of course, is simple: nationalism was never regarded as such a stepping-stone. The aims of nationalism are, primarily, directed towards the fullest possible development of a nation's gifts which, it was thought, could be secured only if foreign overlordship was avoided. But Carr does not even touch this problem, nor does he make any suggestion about international co-operation except through praising the Big Units and damning the Small.

It seems best to skip the historical part of this tract for distorted terms (it abounds in gems like this: "The world war of 1914 was the first war between socialized nations"—to wit I can think only of the Tsar's Russia, the Kaiser's Germany and . . . no, I shall not mention Woodrow Wilson's America). What of the prospects of internationalism? Carr thinks the belief in equality of nations "neither equitable nor desirable"; agreements like Bretton Woods are similarly "both false and sterile." So what? It was not the method that was at fault, it was "the narrowness and inappropriateness of the geographical limits within which these methods were employed" (p. 47). Is sinister a fair judgment? Are we

to see superbarter agreements applied to Carr's Grossräume, so that we may forget all about Hitler's nightmare?

Since Professor Carr has no use for the will of a nation (p. 30—it makes for insecurity in international affairs, says he); since he thinks that both collective security and neutrality are escapes of the past (p. 55); since he has little faith in international organizations and believes it quite possible that "no special institution be required for the maintenance of peace and security which could be settled by ad hoc discussion between the Great Powers . . ." (p. 53) what, the distressed reader must be asking himself impatiently, what then does he propose? There are common principles and purposes, we are told. They are: government should be broadly based on the consent of the governed; social justice; no discrimination on grounds of nationality; full employment (pp. 63-9). On this basis peace and a sound international order is to be established. All these aims are the same in the United States, in the British Commonwealth, and in the Soviet Union.

Thus Professor Carr. Irrespective of the fact that I deny the truth of this facile assumption I cannot see that international collaboration and peace can be based on a home program of social advancement. Some other positive aims, surely, must form common ground if peace is to be established. I have no shadow of doubt that, to a democrat—pace professor—this common basis can only be found in the equality of all nations, Small and Great, in self-determination for all if it is combined with self-willed co-operation.

Elizabeth College Buxton, England F. W. PICK

ENGEL-JANOSI, FRIEDRICH, The Growth of German Historicism. The Johns Hopkins Studies in Historical and Political Sciences, Series LXII, Number 2. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1944. Pp. 101. \$1.25.

One may sincerely say that the little volume under review is interesting and useful. Dr. Engel-Janosi, who is here "concerned with certain basic approaches" (p. 13), treats a group from Herder to Burckhardt of ten men (one chapter deals with the Romantic school) who have contributed to German historicism in the 19th century. He finds these intellectual figures an essentially unified group because all are concerned with the problems of development, individuality, success in history, problems "which gain increasing importance during the period with which the following reflections are concerned, at least within the realm of German thought" (p. 15). They likewise agree in stressing "the special dignity of history, of 'tradition'" (p. 17), which was afterward assailed by Nietzsche. The author includes in his group Marx, and emphasizes Burckhardt, whose importance he places far above that given him elsewhere in basic historiographical surveys. This inclusion is all to the good.

One may be as sincerely doubtful, however, whether this study "helps to fill a long-felt gap in the fields of historiography and philosophy," the service

claimed for it in the Foreword by a colleague (p. 12). American students need, above all, for better understanding of German thought (or any current of thought) in 19th-century Europe some clear integration of this thought with the cultural forces at work behind it. Dr. Engel-Janosi does not mean to leave one with the feeling that Marx is the product of Hegel, Feuerbach, Ricardo, and the British Museum; yet his account furnishes one, in last analysis, with no other insights into the origins of Marxian thought. Similarly, there is no indication why Ranke's work on that of Burckhardt has failed to measure up to our own standards. Except for one passing reference to national unification as a force in developing interest in the problem of success, the three problems Dr. Engel-Janosi treats are never specifically related to the 19th century; they merely grew out of the 18th Century, with certain deviations and variations in the hands of 19th century thinkers.

In short, this is another volume of intellectual history in vacuo, and one must explore the failure of such well-equipped European scholars as the author to give us detailed background.

Washington, D. C.

PAULINE R. ANDERSON

LYNCH, CLAIRE M., The Diplomatic Mission of John Lothrop Motley to Austria, 1861-1867. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1944. Pp. viii, 159.

This book, which deals with Motley's views on Austrian affairs while he was American minister in Vienna from 1861 to 1867, is based chiefly on the Austrian despatches in the National Archives and unpublished letters of Motley in the Houghton Library of Harvard University.

The book begins with a biographical sketch of Motley's early life and a description of conditions in Austria at the time of his arrival in the Habsburg capital. Then the author takes up the American minister's views on the internal affairs of the monarchy. In decided contrast to contemporary writers like Jászi, he frequently commented on "the marked cheerfulness of the Empire and the growing confidence in its new constitutional life" (p. 61), and he wrote time and time again of the "thrift, contentment, and prosperity" of the Empire (p. 51).

A large part of Sister Lynch's book is devoted to a discussion of Motley's views on the Austro-Prussian struggle for supremacy in Germany. Although Austria wished to maintain peace (p. 98), she was forced to fight Prussia over Schleswig-Holstein to keep from abdicating "her position as the first German power" (p. 118). The Habsburg monarchy was ignominiously beaten, but Motley expressed the hope that Austria would profit by defeat "to shape her course in harmony with the spirit of the age" and enter upon "a career of great prosperity and advancement" (p. 137).

In spite of Motley's strong anti-Catholic bias and his friendship with Bismarck, he was astonishingly fair and sympathetic to Austria in all his despatches to Secretary Seward. Sister Lynch is very objective both in reporting

Motley's views and in discussing Austrian affairs and the struggle for supremacy in Germany.

The books contains certain defects. Some of these, as the author points out, are due to Motley's tendency to "oversimplify grave political crises" (p. 149) and to his "custom of selecting a single trend and neglecting all others" (p. 149). The greatest faults of the book, however, are due to faulty organization. Forty-eight of the one hundred fifty-one pages of the text are taken up with background material. The rather lengthy second chapter on Austria in 1861, much of which could have been omitted with profit, is based on secondary works, most of them in English. Of the twenty-four pages in Chapter IV, on Motley's interpretation of Austrian foreign affairs, in the reviewer's opinion only five or six pages concern themselves strictly with Austrian foreign affairs.

Neverthless, in spite of these defects, the book is a solid, objective work which makes an important contribution to the growing bibliography of Austrian

history.

United States Army

R. JOHN RATH

Hughes, Philip, The Popes' New Order: A Systematic Summary of the Social Encyclicals and Addresses, from Leo XIII to Pius XII. New York: Macmillan Co., 1944. Pp. viii, 331. \$2.50.

This is the American edition of a volume published two years ago in London by the Catholic bookhouse of Burns, Oates and Washburne. Bearing the imprimatur of Archbishop Spellman of New York, *The Popes' New Order* groups by topics the social pronouncements of the popes from 1878 to 1941. Some of the more important chapters are, "The State and Its Powers," "The Capitalist System and the Worker," and "The International Problem." The editor, Father Hughes, is well known to British and American Catholic historians for his three volume *History of the Church*, his *Pius the Eleventh*, and his *Rome and the Counter Reformation in England*.

The book belongs in the library of every person interested in the Roman Church for several reasons: (1) It makes readily accessible materials that are not often seen except in publications such as those of the Catholic Truth Society; (2) Since the pontiffs' letters and homilies are arranged by subject, it is easy to trace the elaboration of the Church position over a given period of time on a given social problem; (3) The work furnishes well prepared digests of the principal papal encyclicals on society for those who may find the actual texts too long or too complex. To this Father Hughes adds one note of caution when he says, "The book will, it is hoped, be an aid to those who need to study the texts: it would be mischievous if it were understood as though it offered itself to the student in place of the texts."

The sins of the compiler are those of omission rather than commission. The time limits of 1878-1941 are far too rigid. Some attention should have been given to earlier papal statements. Thus the analysis of Sapientiae Christianae

loses something because there is no discussion of Mirari Vos, and that of Immortale Dei, because Quanta Cura and the Syllabus of Errors are not mentioned. With the republication in the United States of The Popes' New Order, it would have been desirable to have included addresses of Pius XII for 1942, 1943, and 1944. As matters now stand, the book was incomplete before it was published.

During the first half of 1942, Dr. Guido Gonella published in the Osservatore Romano a series of articles discussing the three Christmas messages Pius XII had delivered since his election in 1939. The articles took the form of elaborate commentaries and notes on the pope's words; Hughes should have done the same thing. Placed in their proper historical perspective and criticized by an able Catholic commentator, the social encyclicals could have become even more understandable to the layman or student.

As a parenthetical observation, it is unfortunate that this manual cannot be placed in the hands of some of the less learned critics of the Church. There these readers would see the lie given to such old charges as the condonement by the Church of forced conversions or the absolute rejection of all religious toleration. Leo XIII categorically states in *Immortale Dei*, "no one shall be forced to embrace the Catholic faith against his will," and the Catholic Church, "does not . . . condemn those rulers who, for the sake of securing some great good, or of hindering some great evil, tolerate in practice that these various forms of religion have a place in the State."

Hughes' work is accurate, the style is acceptable, the index is well arranged. The Popes' New Order is one of the best reference books on Catholicism to have appeared in recent months.

University of Missouri

DUANE KOENIG

MEYER, OSCAR, Von Bismarck Zu Hitler: Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen. New York: Friedrich Krause, 1944. Pp. 238.

In spite of the title this work does not equate Prussianism with Hitlerism (cf. E. H. Zeydel's review of Stirk's *The Prussian Spirit* in this Journal, April, 1944), nor is it conceived as an antidote to prevailing criticisms of the Weimar Republic. The author merely sets down observations. He does not startle the reader with any revelations, if he possesses any. There is nothing here concerning machinations in the field of *Machtpolitik* or cartels, the latter of which surely must have come within the purview of an official of the Berlin *Handelskammer*.

This autobiography recounts the reactions of an intelligent German to the political and social nuances in Germany from ca. 1900 through 1943. Mr. Meyer was a serious student, devoid of the usual German university life. He read the *Freisinnig Zeitung*, contributed to a "dangerous" newspaper and prepared himself for the legal profession and became an important official of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce. In 1907 he became a member of the

Charlottenburg council after consciously choosing the Freisinnige Partei. Later he was active in the Prussian ministry and the Reichstag, 1924-32.

The very first chapter, which is probably the raison d'être of the Bismarck element in the title, is obviously inconsequential. When Bismarck was dropped by Wilhelm II, Mr. Meyer was fourteen years old. His observations on Bismarck's foreign and domestic politics are necessarily only of a school text nature. The remainder of the personalities that he mentions functioned during the author's mature years. And he associated with many of them. Yet they lack concreteness and substance. This is not to say that the author lacks the ability to write. On the contrary his style proves him to be practiced in the art. If Hindenburg appears in all his senility and treachery toward the Weimar Republic (pp. 168, 124), von Papen in his chicanery (p. 192), Schacht in his undeserved credit for stabilizing the mark in 1923 (p. 133) and in his Machiavellism toward the Young Plan (pp. 164-166), all these characterizations lack newness for the American student of German contemporary history.

Similarly conventional appear Mr. Meyer's many comments on political events. His reaction toward the peaceful Austrian Anschluss in 1931 (p. 171) was shared by many Americans. The German attitude toward the Versailles *Diktat* (pp. 102-106) the author details in nine points. The rejoinder might be—just to take the first point—that the Allies' disposition of the German army was based on Napoleon's experiences with Prussian evasions. Can the authors of Versailles be blamed if the German General Staff again found a way to evade restrictions?

If throughout the book Mr. Meyer abstains from vindicating his own or his party's actions, it is the more noteworthy that he clears Stresemann of insincerity in international commitments in spite of some indiscreet entries in his diaries (p. 131) and that he ascribes Brüning's bad impression abroad to his reticence and asceticism (p. 167).

The poor binding should be tolerated by readers, if only to learn a lesson from the senseless duels between Communists and Social Democrats which facilitated the Rightists' and Nazis' inundating Germany. This the author makes clear repeatedly.

University of Houston

Louis Kestenberg

MAYER, J. P., Max Weber and German Politics. A Study in Political Sociology. London: Faber & Faber, 1944. Pp. 124. 8s. 6d.

This is a very stimulating essay on certain aspects of German politics between the years 1880 and 1920 as exemplified in the career of Germany's most outstanding political theorist, Max Weber. The author, who is at present attached to the London School of Economics and Political Science, has made discriminating use of Weber's extensive writings to document his study of this epoch of German history. He rightly believes that until Weber's political sociology has been studied, one cannot gain a full appreciation of his other work. The

present essay, therefore, lays no claim to being a biography of Weber, nor a complete study of his thought. It uses Weber "as a mirror of Germany's socioeconomic and cultural developments since the early eighties of the last century."

One secures a very clear picture of German strength and weakness in following the career of Weber. One finds great intellectual power but also an almost childish acceptance of the *Machtstaat* idea. Admiring the tolerance, fairness, and love of freedom of the British, Max Weber, in helping to fashion the draft of the Weimar Constitution, tried to get the Germans to accept a plebiscitary Persident. But in doing so the party system was not invigorated, and the President became "the guardian of the Constitution" who really undermined it. Weber did not question the German state, and when he returned from Versailles where he served as an adviser to the German delegation, he said: "I have no political plans except to concentrate all my intellectual strength on the one problem, how to get once more for Germany a great general staff." Unfortunately Weber was not the only one who concentrated his thoughts on this point!

One should not minimize, however, the great contributions of Weber, and the author succeeds remarkably well-although often with heavy, bad sentences -in presenting many of the brilliant thoughts, and profound ideas of Germany's great sociologist. Weber's emphasis on what he referred to as the Mittelschichten, the groups between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, his opinions of administration and the power of the Civil Service; and finally his ideas on "Politics as a Profession" should be pondered by all social scientists. Weber's last warning deserves quotation. "Politics," he wrote, "is like digging slowly and steadily into hard ground, with both enthusiasm and judgment. History proves that you will not be able to achieve what is possible if you do not strive sometimes after the impossible. The man who undertakes this must be a leader and not only a leader but also—using the word in its literal sense—a hero. Those who do not possess either of these qualities must arm themselves with that stoutness of heart which gives hope even to desperate men, or they will not even be able to achieve what is already possible. Only he who is certain that he will not despair when the world, as he sees it, is too stupid and too mean to appreciate what he is offering it, and who is prepared to persevere, only he should take up politics as a profession."

This little book gives us a very useful introduction to Weber, and it concludes with a brief postscript containing some sane ideas on the German problem. There are four Appendixes which contain Weber's remarks on bureaucratization, Tawney's criticism of Weber's *Protestant Ethic*, and tables showing Germany's social structure and some of its election figures. There is also a good bibliography.

University of Michigan

JAMES K. POLLOCK

FRAENKEL, ERNST, Military Occupation and the Rule of Law. Occupation Government in the Rhineland, 1918-1923. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. Pp. xi, 267.

This book, although not a history of the occupation of the Rhineland, must be regarded as altogether indispensable for understanding certain basic problems of military government in general, and for any future work on the Rhineland case and especially the French zone of occupation after the first World War. It deals with measures rather than with men. The principal actors in the struggle during the Peace Conference over the political future of the Rhineland are, therefore, mentioned only fleetingly and casually. Neither Clemenceau nor Tardieu, Louis Barthou, Charles Benoist, or Leon Bourgeois-to mention the names of only a few outstanding participants on the French side of the Rhineland discussion—are listed in the index. Fraenkel's conception of the prime weakness of the first German Reichskommissar for the occupied territories, namely that he viewed the Rhineland problem as a chain of legal cases rather than as a political phenomenon, is precisely the outstanding feature and special strength of the book, which includes no more political or historical background material than is essential for a strictly legal interpretation. Although it is a highly technical study of legal and administrative aspects of the Rhineland occupation, this work belongs to the rather limited group of books which rank high among social science publications as revisions of prevailing historical judgments, and which summarize and supersede whole libraries in their respective fields.

If the Allies fighting Nazi Germany ever entertained serious hope that the experience of the Rhineland occupation might help in solving problems of Allied occupation, relief and rehabilitation arising from the Second World War, this book disappoints such expectations by making clear the fundamental difference between conditions in the two periods, especially in the moral and psycho-

logical spheres.

The book is divided into two parts dealing separately with the Armistice period (November 11, 1918, to January 10, 1920) and the first years under the Versailles Treaty; covering roughly only one half the Rhineland occupation which lasted until June 30, 1920, it does not include the Ruhr conflict. In both parts special chapters are devoted to the "Institutions of the Occupying Powers" (Ch. I and V) and "Relations with the Occupied Country" (Ch. II and VI), supplemented by "Persecution of War Criminals" (Ch. III in Part I) and in Part II by "The Rhineland Agreement" (Ch. IV), "Administration of Justice" (Ch. VII) and "Jurisdiction of the Occupying Powers" (Ch. VIII); Ch. IX, "Judicial Review by Courts of the Occupied Country," refers to both periods.

The differences between the Anglo-Saxon and Continental legal systems pose certain questions as to the terminology used in translating German legal terms; however, any question of the exactitude of the terms used is forestalled by the fact that the main thesis is set forth admirably in the opening pages and sustained and developed throughout the entire book. The central problem

which Dr. Fraenkel treats is whether the rule of law (a principle applicable to national governments exercising their powers by virtue of national laws) can also be applied to the policies of foreign governments that exercise their powers by virtue of international law. The framers of the Rhineland agreement aimed at making peaceful occupation essentially different from "belligerent occupation." The occupation régime, as laid down in the Rhineland Agreement, "reflected an almost unlimited belief in the force of law" (p. 4) and "was planned as a model of legally restricted exercise of military power" (p. 5). In text and spirit "a particularly liberal document" (p. 77), it attempted to apply basic ideas of constitutional government to the rule of an occupation authority. This was a basic error, for, as Fraenkel puts it, "occupation represents not a constitutional government, characterized by a balance of powers, but rather a sort of emergency government, in which all forms of power are concentrated in one centralized body" (p. 85). Discussing basic differences between the Anglo-American concept of "rule of law," the French idea of "droit administratif" and the German concept of "Rechtsstaat," Fraenkel remarks that the Rhineland Agreement was "a document written in the spirit of Anglo-Saxon mistrust of the executive branch of government." The régime was planned as an occupation of law and not one of expediency (p. 197); based on Anglo-American concepts, it stressed the supremacy of civilian government and trusted that it would guarantee a maximum of protection of the occupying forces with a minimum of interference with the occupied country (p. 124). The unity of Allied occupation policy was jeopardized by the fact that the occupying armies were merely of individual sovereign states and not of an international authority (p. 161).

As long as the High Commission existed, it was never able to bridge the gap between its proclaimed intentions and the execution of occupation policy; it lacked civilian executive officers, for instance, and had to rely on military police. Problems of execution were left mainly to the French, who had advocated a preëminently military occupation policy, and who occupied much the largest part on the left bank of the Rhine. Fraenkel is mainly concerned with occurrences in the French sector; for instance, in discussing the tasks of the local representatives of the High Commission, he confines himself to the remark that their duties in the British and American zones were "considerably less extensive" without explaining these differences in detail. The Germans succeeded in convincing foreign public opinion that the methods applied by the occupants in the Rhine territory were nothing but a travesty of the principles proclaimed at the beginning of the occupation and later laid down in the Rhineland Agreement and "were supposed to be the moral and legal justifications of these acts."

The cardinal point of disagreement between Allied and German conceptions of the occupation régime was the power of the High Commission to issue ordinances (Art. 3 of the Rhineland Agreement). This right (which resulted in 319 ordinances) was bitterly resented and continuously contested by the Germans. Fraenkel does not exaggerate when he points out that it is possible to regard

the controversy over the interpretation of so broad an authorization "as the whole history of the Rhineland occupation during the peace period" (p. 190). Friedrich Grimm, a leading Nazi spokesman in the field of law, gained his wide reputation as a lawyer before courts in the occupied zone. In 1931, concentrating his attacks on Tirard, the French President of the High Commission and author of La France sur le Rhin (1930), he assailed the whole system of occupation by characterizing Tirard as "the man of the ordinances and martial courts, of the expulsions and of the veiled and forcible tendencies of separatism" (in his Frankreich am Rhein, 1931). Likewise, the Ordonnanzensystem had been called in 1928 "a bitter persiflage of all modern democratic principles of government" (Zehn Jahre deutsche Geschichte 1918-1928, p. 121).

The author denounces as a kind of "appeasement policy" what he regards as a major mistake of Allied policy in an early stage of the occupation, namely that the occupying Powers in the Rhineland "took the part of the German reactionaries, bureaucrats and militarists in their fight against the progressive forces of the German democratic revolution." This is one of the author's unsubstantiated politico-historical judgments which are based on modern hindsight. Such generalizations become impossible when one takes sufficient account of differences in local conditions. Theoretically, a hands-off policy seems generally bestsuited to the interests of a Power occupying a country on the verge of civil war; in fact, however, it is hardly possible to avoid taking steps which unavoidably favor one side as against the other. Serious blunders may have been made by occupation authorities at an early stage, and measures may have been taken which strengthened weak German authorities, but so many and such complex factors contributed to the consolidation of the Weimar Republic that the Allies' tolerance of representatives of the fallen régime can hardly be assigned serious influence in the ultimate failure of the German revolution. Likewise, the author's contention that the United States and Great Britain "participated in the occupation because they considered French control of the Rhineland incompatible with world security" must be considered a rather limited explanation.

There are a number of other interesting historical side-lights in Fraenkel's study. It was truly "a historic letter" (p. 74) which Pierrepont B. Noyes laid before Wilson, which resulted in the rejection of the Supreme War Council's proposals and in the drafting of the Rhineland Agreemant, which shifted the center of administration from military to civilian agencies. It should also be noted that the establishment of the Reichskommissariat für die besetzten Gebiete was suggested by the similar position of a French official during the German occupation in France, 1871-1873. The Supreme War Council's draft of a statute for the planned Rhineland occupation very closely followed the precedent set by Germany in 1871 and, in several passages, it was actually a literal copy of the Rouen Convention of March 16, 1871. With regard to martial law (Art. 3 of the Rhineland Agreement), the occupying Powers invoked the German law of May 30, 1892 (p. 88).

Although Fraenkel deals with a period of only three years of "peaceful" occupation in the Rhineland, a territory which, constituting no more than 7 per cent of the post-Versailles area of Germany, contained approximately 11 per cent of Germany's total population (12,000 square miles with seven million inhabitants) and had hardly been touched by the war, he shows us the baffling complexity of the tasks which confronted the occupying Powers, particularly in the economic, social and judicial spheres. His book helps us to imagine the magnitude of the unparalleled task which today faces the new occupation régime in a devastated and demoralized Germany. This task will be, as suggested by the New York Times of May 12, 1945, "far-reaching, endlessly complex and, at times, no doubt, discouraging."

Washington, D. C.

FRITZ T. EPSTEIN

HARRISON, E. J., Lithuania's Fight for Freedom. New York: Lithuanian American Information Center, 1945. Pp. 63. 50 cents.

Originally published by The Federation of Lithuanian Societies in Great Britain in 1944, this pamphlet was reprinted in this country and provided with a few introductory remarks. Another new feature of the American edition is a small map of Lithuania reproduced from the book The Economic Reconstruction of Lithuania after 1918 by Anicetas Simutis (Columbia University Press, 1942). The author of the pamphlet is introduced as a former "British Vice-Consul in Kaunas and Vilnius." This writer was assistant director of the Lithuanian Information Bureau ("Elta"), a subdivision of the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1921-22. At that time E. J. Harrison was our agent in London and he seems to have maintained friendly relations with the Lithuanian Legation ever since. He was in Kaunas and Vilnius before my time (I lived in Kaunas from June 1921 to June 1939, and all that time Vilnius or "Vilna" was under Polish domination), that is to say during the period when several Allied missions were stationed there. Mr. Harrison may have belonged to one of those missions.

The subject matter is presented in six chapters, a "Postscriptur," and an "Appendix" consisting of several documents. Chapter I ("Brief Historical Sketch," pp. 5-11) is full of inaccuracies and had better been left out. The rest of the booklet, on the other hand, is an eloquent brief for the cause of Lithuanian independence without interference from east or west. Chapter II gives a correct though very condensed description of the cultural and economic progress during the two decades following the First World War. I had the opportunity to observe this progress personally during my nine years of residence in Kaunas, from 1922 to 1930 as assistant professor of linguistics at the University of Lithuania and as principal of a Lithuanian college for adults. There were a few things which I, a non-Lithuanian, did not like; but I have yet to find the country where everything is perfect. My observations made in Lithuania confirmed me in my previous view that small countries have a definite mission to fulfill which cannot be fulfilled if they are under the domination of the big powers. It is

really remarkable what small countries can achieve when they are left alone. The reader will be interested to hear of the agrarian reform which converted Lithuania, back in 1921-22, from a country of great landowners into one of smallholders, hard-working farmers directly interested in the national well-being. This change in the national economy of the country together with signal advances in the sphere of social services made Lithuania a progressive "Western" state cultivating primarily relations with Great Britain, France, and the Scandinavian countries. The loss of Lithuania's independent status is a painful loss for Great Britain. Chapter III (pp. 16-23) describes the events of 1939 when Lithuania tried to adhere to a policy of neutrality, refusing an invitation to join Germany. Chapter IV deals with the first Soviet occupation, giving first a brief survey of the previous relations with the Soviet Union beginning with the Treaty of Moscow of July 12, 1920. It is interesting to read what Harrison has to say about the famous "elections" held July 14 and 15, 1940. Only one list of candidates was submitted to the voters, and it contained the exact number of candidates to be elected. Moreover, the author claims that the results of the "voting" were announced in one of the London papers 24 hours before the polls were closed. In this chapter we read also of the mass deportations of the people from Lithuania (mainly in June, 1941) and their dispersal throughout the remote regions of the Soviet Union. We have in this country a possibility of checking on this, since in the spring of 1942 the two Lithuanian daily newspapers appearing in Chicago, Naujienos (of Social Democrat tendency) and Draugas (Catholic), published a list of about 16,000 persons known to have been deported, the list having been prepared by the Lithuanian Red Cross. In Appendix I of our pamphlet (pp. 51-55) an English translation of instructions regarding the procedure of carrying out the deportations from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is given, signed by a Soviet public security official named Serov. Chapter V (pp. 31-44) describes life under the German occupation while Chapter VI (pp. 44-49) reveals the origin and growth of the underground movement with its press and Supreme Committee

Although written by an Englishman, the pamphlet reviewed here presents the views of the Lithuanian people. Basing my judgment on my intimate knowledge of Lithuania and its people, I venture to claim that Harrison's booklet presents the views and hopes of not less than 90 percent of the Lithuanians living in Lithuania. Lithuanian hopes are based on the honest application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

University of Pennsylvania

ALFRED SENN

MITRANY, DAVID, ed., Economic Development in S. E. Europe. London: Oxford University Press, 1945. Pp. 165. \$3.00.

The present volume, edited by Professor David Mitrany and published by Political and Economic Planning in London, deals with the problems of economic development in Southeastern Europe, which includes here Poland, Czechoslovakia,

Austria, Hungary, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece. While it can hardly be said that Poland is in Southeastern Europe, it is doubtful whether it is right to include also Czechoslovakia and Austria among the retarded countries. These two countries belong more to Central than to Southeastern Europe; their economic structure follows more the pattern of the industrialized countries than that of the backward agricultural nations. A careful reader, comparing the numerous statistics offered in this book will soon discover for himself the difference between these two and the other six countries. We are not mentioning this fact because of some hairsplitting finesse in grouping the countries, but because the proposals made for the economic development of Czechoslovakia and Austria must naturally be different from those for Roumania or Bulgaria.

The major economic problems of the region are discussed in the following six chapters: Nutrition; Food and Agriculture; Industrial Development; Transport; Marketing; Financial Aspects. The conclusions at which the study arrives are nowadays no more revolutionary or new. It would have been of value if the study which has a great number of good statistics would have helped the reader with a bibliography of some important books dealing with this subject matter.

The conclusions are in themselves clear and logical. They start with the statement of a low standard of nutrition, particularly with the inadequacy of animal protein. An increase in food production is the key to the nutrition problem. The real problem is not so much one of land distribution—except in Hungary—as one of land utilization. The raising of the output per unit of labor and per unit of land is indispensible. A comprehensive program of development in agriculture is outlined. Such a program, however, must be supplemented by industrial development, especially because of the estimated agricultural overpopulation of at least 20 per cent of the present number engaged in agriculture. The resources of the region with regard to industrial development are analyzed, and it is stated correctly that the means of the region are meager in relation to its needs.

The new development would not be possible without great improvements in transport and without a thorough reorganization of the system of marketing.

The whole program of development will require an amount of capital which is great if measured with the pre-war formation of capital, particularly in the agricultural countries. Requirements must be matched with the available physical resources. A substantial increase in the volume of investment is needed and, as the study says, outside help would have to play an essential part in any large scale development of the area. At the same time a change in the structure of public expenditures and a modernization of the system of taxation would be necessary.

Throughout the discussion it is repeated that a higher level of general as well as of professional education is indispensable, in order to reach a higher degree of economic development. And soberly the author reminds us again and again that no sudden miracle can be expected and that any such development of the backward countries will require time.

The study purposely does not enter into the examination of international economic relations except to emphasize in some instances the importance of regional co-operation. Although suggesting the need of comprehensive and several direct controls, it does not enter into the discussion of an appropriate economic and social system. The pure facts, however, so clearly presented throughout the book, show that no changes in the social or economic system will enable the nations to carry on their programs easily without hard work and, furthermore, without respecting economic necessities.

For all postwar planners, politicians, and statesmen who are busy promising speedy increase of general welfare, this study should be required reading. A valuable part of the book is its statistical annex, which compiles a great many pertinent statistics. This reviewer wishes the authors would have checked more carefully on them to avoid a number of mistakes that were made; especially the chapter on industrial development would have needed a scrutiny by someone familiar with the industrial situation in these countries. As a whole the study is one more valuable contribution to the analysis of one of the most vital problems in Europe.

Columbia University

ANTONIN BASCH

FRASER, LINDLEY, Germany Between Two Wars, a Study of Propaganda and War Guilt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945. Pp. viii, 184. \$2.50.

This is not a history of Germany nor of German propaganda; it is, as the author himself points out, an argument. Fraser, a political economist at Oxford and later at Aberdeen University, has been employed by the British Broadcasting Company as German News Commentator speaking in German. A series of talks delivered in 1941 formed the basis for this book whose primary purpose is to analyze and refute German propaganda concerning the defeat of 1918, the Versailles peace treaty, Nazi aims, and the outbreak of the war in 1939. Fraser has brought to his task not only a study of the evidence but also a close personal acquaintance with Germany and the Germans.

Whether or not the arguments in refutation of such tools of propaganda as the "stab-in-the-back," the starvation blockade, the "unjust" peace, the right to colonies, "encirclement," the right to living space, the war of "defense" of 1939, and so on, are so marshalled as to convince Germans of their falsity, this critical examination of the origin and uses of these stock concepts is of great value. It would be most interesting to see what a fair-minded German would make of them and into what terms he would transcribe them, for certainly there are some points here upon which he could not agree and others where the approach is probably not the best one from the German point of view.

With the latter part of the book, which deals with National Socialism and its propaganda, this reviewer has no quarrel. At some points in the earlier story, however, the author attempts to prove too much. For example, he tries to prove that Wilson's Fourteen Points not only did not constitute a peace

offer to Germany, but also that the Armistice of 1918 made no promise of peace based upon them. Technically he is correct, but Wilson in his pre-armistice exchange specifically required the Germans to accept his Fourteen Points and subsequent speeches before he would refer the German request for an armistice to the military men (a point overlooked on pp. 43-44); and the acceptance by the Allies on November 4 of the Fourteen Points with two reservations (not "three," p. 45) was forwarded to the Germans by Wilson and thus constituted a part of the formal and written arrangements for the conclusion of the armistice. Furthermore, the author's discussion of Versailles does not take account of the fact that Allied participants in the peace conference, and not merely the Germans, have left diaries and letters written when the Treaty was signed, expressing the opinion that the peace did not fulfill Wilson's peace program. Finally, the author makes his basic assumption too lightly that the Germans were actively pursuing a policy of preparing for the next war from November 11, 1918, onward. This is an assumption concerning the early months and years of the Weimar Republic which requires more proof than he has offered and it is one which would probably cause dissent among the non-Nazis most likely to be persuaded by the principal contentions of the book. In other words, the author here weakens the force of his argument.

Despite these, and two or three minor slips noticed, this book admirably summarizes the basic concepts with which the re-education of Germany, and also the victims of German propaganda elsewhere, should begin.

Clark University

DWIGHT E. LEE

SEYDEWITZ, MAX, Civil Life In Wartime Germany. The Story of the Home Front. New York: The Viking Press, 1945. Pp. 448. \$3.50.

A book describing civil life in Nazi Germany during the war is bound to evoke the greatest interest. The author does not content himself with telling the story of the German home front but analyzes the foundation on which that life rested and the attitude of the population toward the war and the Nazi régime. From a book written by a man who was a Socialist member of the pre-Hitler German Reichstag, the reader would expect an answer to many a question with regard to the future of Germany after the destruction of Nazism.

Mr. Seydewitz has collected and used a mass of documented material as substantiation of his views. Through these documents, old reports and stories may revive in the reader's mind and gain significance with regard to a future peace settlement.

The author describes, in five main divisions, the changing situations: during the Blitzkrieg campaign; from Blitz to total war; the first winter in the war with Russia; the totalization of total war; the atmosphere of impending doom. The military and political calculations and miscalculations of the Nazi rulers are pictured, the intent to overrun Europe, West and East, in lightning strokes, and the changes

forced upon them in order to wage a war of many years for which even the

gigantic preparations of six years of peace were not sufficient.

Mr. Seydewitz describes the people's mood and attitude: at first the dread of war; during the Blitz the belief that there is "no risk," and the hope for a quick and victorious peace; after the first winter in Russia, the recognition that the time of Blitz is over, that the favorable reports of the High Command of the Wehrmacht are "not always" true and that the home front has to sacrifice, in goods and labor, to keep the fighting front alive. Gradually Hitler's compulsory "One-Great-Commons" (Volksgemeinschaft) disintegrates. Not only those who were and remained anti-Nazi became hostile to the rulers. Workers who joined the German Labor Front to find protection against abuse by the industrialists; the middle class which, by the totalization of the war, lost their little shops, enterprises, and factories, and had to work 10-12 hours a day, in the factories of the big industrialists; women who had to leave their households and domestic occupations and go to war plants;—all of them, states Seydewitz, wanted the end of the war and of the régime which had brought about such conditions. When the air raids of the Allies began and laid waste city after city, the general grumbling became louder and elicited the only answer the rulers were capable of giving: terror from Himmler's SS and the Gestapo. The people became apathetic. They were frozen in their jobs by decrees, made homeless by air raids, separated from their families by evacuation measures. Disintegration gradually spread to the army: deserters appeared at home, swarmed behind the fronts, even mingled with the foreign slave workers in the factories, to escape death at the front.

There was an underground movement in Germany since the Nazis' advent to power, says Mr. Seydewitz, and it increased continually by force of the events. This "other Germany," according to the author, consists of two separate groups of people: anti-Nazi by conviction, and the mass of the disappointed and discontented.

"These unknown soldiers (the active anti-Nazis) of the underground have done great things for Germany and its people. They have laid the cornerstone for a new free Germany. Their perseverance when hopes were dimmest has made it possible for the masses to join in the opposition. Only when the war is over will it be possible to see how much the German underground has helped in stopping Hitler's train of victories and bringing to naught his war of conquest."

In the author's opinion, this active underground consists of men of all political colors, Communists and Social Democrats, Conservatives and even Monarchists, Trade Unionists and people of no definite party affiliation, and the

opposition within the Catholic and Protestant Churches.

Of special interest is what Mr. Seydewitz says about the German Youth. It should not be subjected to appraisal as a uniform mass. Three main groups are mentioned. The first group includes people of all classes in opposition to Nazism. Their representatives are young men and women, like the students

of Munich and Berlin, who in February and March, 1943 openly rioted against Nazism and paid for their deeds with their lives or their liberty. The author sees in them a "noteworthy argument against the belief that the entire German youth was captured by Nazism," although he admits that in the last years of the Weimar Republic the German universities were breeding-spots of Nazism. Furthermore, according to the author, the young workers who are influenced by the older anti-Nazis belong to the opposition.

The second group comprises the Nazi fanatics, the "dyed-in-the-wool faithful" boys and girls. But Mr. Seydewitz estimates that at the end of the fourth year of the war these fanatical boys and girls constituted no more than 10 per cent of the entire German youth, though they appear to be more numerous because of their permanent display, their importunity, arrogance and aggressiveness.

The third group, the majority, includes neither confirmed Nazis nor anti-Nazis, according to Mr. Seydewitz. Once fascinated by the uniform of their organizations, they have become tired of the strict drill, the everlasting monotony and the constant exercising and emphasis on obedience. They have no political convictions, no ideals, and they have faith in nothing. They dread work and they want to avoid order and discipline at all costs. "This category," Mr. Seydewitz concludes, "comprising the majority of the German youth is the truest product of National Socialist education. After the overthrow of Nazi rule the moral re-education of the German youth will prove a far more difficult problem than the liberation of the young generation from the Nazis' false political and racial doctrines."

In the sixth part of the book—what will become of Germany—the author asks the question: "After Hitler, what?" His suggestions for a future Germany after the destruction of Nazism are the following:

- 1. No prolonged period of occupation to which Germans would react as did the peoples of the countries which they occupied;
- 2. Grant of the same rights to the German people as will be accorded to other independent nations;
- 3. Admittance to the family of democratic nations as partners;
- 4. Freedom of press and opinion for the anti-Nazi elements and the right of free assembly for all except the National Socialists;
- 5. Complete overhauling of the administrative and judicial apparatus;
- Punishment of war criminals by German peoples' courts and reparations for the wrongful acts perpetrated by the Nazis as well as return of stolen property;
- 7. No new edition of the Weimar Republic in which the Junkers, the military men and the industrialists might play their harmful game;
- 8. Curb of the economic power of the "plutocrats" by nationalization and confiscation;
- 9. A planned economy of a democratic Germany as the fulfillment of

the lively impulse to Socialism to repair the country's damages by collective labor of all classes of the people.

Some of the author's descriptions may appear peculiar and some of his conclusions and claims probably never will become reality. To be sure, the book was completed before the end of the European war and before certain new facts had become known. These include the conditions which prevailed in the prisoner-of-war camps and concentration camps in Germany, revealed by the American and British armies, as well as those in the extermination camps in Poland and formerly occupied Russia, horrors which for a long time have been discredited as propaganda stories, but finally have found official acknowledgement as the tragic truth.

New York City

GERHARD JACOBY.

MAC CURDY, J. T., Germany, Russia, and the Future. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1944. Pp. viii, 140. 3s. 6d.

Dr. J. T. MacCurdy, Lecturer in Psychopathology in the University of Cambridge, contributes herewith No. 23 in the series of brochures on current problems edited by Sir Ernest Barker. Like its predecessors it is a compact little volume of pocket size meant for the average man who reads as he runs and would, perhaps, like to think as he reads.

The author states, and the reader should bear in mind, that he is well aware his conclusions are scientifically only "highly tentative hypotheses." He offers them, notwithstanding, in the hope that they will provoke thought.

Primarily the author's interest is in "what the ideologies of the National Socialists and Communists mean to Germans and to Russians and how the national trends symbolized in these political theories may affect the behavior of the nationals." To this end the similarities of the two systems as to dictatorship, party structure and religious character of their respective ideologies are briefly set out, followed by an analysis of German policy and action based on the Herrenvolk myth that has led her inexorably to destruction. This comprises Chapter I; the remaining four chapters of the essay are devoted to considering the Russian ideology, objectives and future. The proportion given to the Communists is probably intentional, reflecting MacCurdy's preoccupation with the problem as yet unsolved, in comparison with the Fascist crisis seemingly on the point of being overcome. But such imbalance hardly results in a thorough comparison.

Nevertheless, within its limitations of size and approach, the work presents an interesting, informal, colloquial discussion of the Russian background, current trends and future possibilities, stressing the elements of realism, nationalism (modern Communism is held to be a truly national socialism), orthodoxy, and reform, and recognizing the evolutionary character of social change. For the years ahead the guesses—or hypotheses—include: more wealth and higher standards of living; more social stratification; purer and less venal religion;

more demand for political democracy, which is termed not incompatible with the economics of Communism; no territorial gains beyond the 1939 boundaries; and rivalry with a renascent China. The conclusion pleads for knowledge and tolerance on the part of the democracies as well as the Soviet empire.

Whether we agree with MacCurdy's analysis and prognostications, it appears to this reviewer that they could have been arrived at by any intelligent layman reasonably *au courant* with the data. A psychopathologist, as such, is unnecessary. And the lore of his craft contributes little to scientific understanding.

Instead, it may perhaps be timely to challenge the assumption on which so much current theorizing rests, namely, that psychology, the study of the individual organism and its behavior, is either adequate or accurate for the comprehension of social groups and their unique product of culture.

It is true that MacCurdy does use the term "social psychology" once, in the preface (p. vi), as if the mystic word. "social" were a license for unrestricted scampering about the cultural domain. But from then on he never employs it again, and plunges straight ahead into old-line and unwarranted ascription of socio-cultural phenomena to bio-psychological causes.

For example, he speaks of Italian "character" (p. 2). What sort of an animal is it? He relies heavily on the "ethos" of a people (pp. 2, 54, 108), a vague and variable concept at best. He invokes the shade of Freud by hauling in "inferiority complex" as an explanation of German militarism (p. 9) and Russian suspicion of foreigners (p. 121 et passim). Amidst a seasoning of references to "Weltanschauung" he probes what is evidently a collective German soul in deducing that the fanatic Nazis would fight to the end even if it brought the whole world down with them for "to share in an apocalyptic end of all civilization is to participate in a mystical triumph" (p. 24). Again, National Socialist "reeks of the pathological" (p. 33) and its inconsistencies are "those of the psychopath" (idem). Acute doubts and distrust of the western world by Russia are "paranoid reasoning" (p. 48), and all national suspicion has a "psychological basis" in "inferiority" (idem). Russian religion is defined as those "matters that fall, psychologically, into the religious category" (p. 55). Man is a "gregarious animal" (p. 123). And so on.

Reversing the old saw, "It's art, but is it good?" is it true that inferiority complexes exist on a national scale? That whole cultures, however barbaric and disorganized, are literally psychopathic in the exact meaning of that attribute? Have these qualities been demonstrated scientifically to exist for single individuals? One person may well reason as a paranoid. Do we know that a society does? In what laboratory, by what methodology, from what verified cases have such conclusions been drawn?

Do we not have in this particular instance as we have in far too many others the rather glib and definitely unproven assumption that what is true for the individual is true for society, and that the tools valid in examining individual behavior will suffice easily to explain culture? This position ignores

completely all that has been discovered about the nature and dynamics of culture from Spencer to date, especially its superorganic character. Kroeber, Wissler and Murdock, to name but three, are mandatory antidotes to this kind of loose verbalizing, popular though it be.

No grounds for complaint against MacCurdy exist because he dared hypothesize. As he says, it must be done. No derogation may be aimed at the Cambridge Press for popularization. That too has its place. It is this writer's belief, however, that psychopathology as yet is unreliable in cultural diagnosis.

An index is appended to the essay.

University of Colorado

WILLIAM S. BERNARD

ZIFF, WILLIAM B., The Gentlemen Talk of Peace. New York: Macmillan, 1944. Pp. 530. \$3.00.

The publisher's announcement solemnly assures the reader of this book that the facts "already available to specialists" are here for "the first time—so marshalled as to give an overview of the world today." The "facts" that are referred to are to be found in the vast flow of books from the pens of journalists, publicists, statesmen and professors that has clogged the shelves of our libraries for the last twenty years. Mr. Ziff, the reviewer is ready to believe, has read them all. But in common with so much of that literature, he has not brought much critical judgment to the problem of deciding what material is valid or what is significant. The book that he produced is as remarkable for the amount of information and misinformation that is amassed between its covers as it is for Mr. Ziff's bold suggestions for the creation of a new political world that will allow man "to take his breath for a new plunge forward into eternal progression."

The reader will find the book exciting and, at times, stimulating. Mr. Ziff is not content to explore the awful majesty of the march of history; he vigorously tears aside the veil of the future to see the road that it will take. The reviewer is somewhat afraid that Mr. Ziff's knowledge of the future may be as shaky as is his knowledge of the past, but it is only in the past that any reasonable check can be made upon his information. The past, especially the past before, say, 1930, is almost a terra incognita to the author; while, of the

past since 1930, he knows many things that probably are not true.

The future, however, is not much to his liking; Mr. Ziff finds that the world is in terrible shape, and far be it for the reviewer to deny this basic discovery. The real difficulty with the future becomes apparent only when Mr. Ziff turns to a plan for remaking the world. It is clear that he resents the irrationalities of history and geography. These irrationalities he would correct by not treating "peoples and provinces like pawns in a game," but like pieces in a puzzle. Nature thoughtlessly forgot to give the Russians a tropical area in which to grow rubber, so Mr. Ziff would give them the island of Java. The Negroes in the United States, an unfortunate historical accident, he would make into the core of a great African "power aggregate" in Africa. Splendid and powerful is the

position that he would give to the United States (North and South America, England, Australia, New Zealand and most of the Pacific Islands would become one of his "power aggregates"). But the reviewer put the book down with the uphappy feeling that one more planner had taken out a pair of shears and set

to work on a global map.

In spite of all this, scattered throughout this volume are observations and suggestions that are brilliant in conception and apt in expression. It is, in the reviewer's opinion, a pity that all the hard work that went into the compilation of this volume, and all the creative ability that the author obviously has, could not have been tempered with a little more critical judgment and scholarly discipline. A disciplined scholar probably would never have had the courage to try such a book, but at least one or more such scholars should have gone over it before it was published.

University of Minnesota

JOHN B. WOLF

BASCH, ANTONIN, A Price for Peace. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945. Pp. xii, 209. \$2.50.

Professor Basch presents us with a diligent and painstaking study of the structure and development of the trade of continental Europe. He defines this as the area covering all of the European countries with the exception of the Soviet Union and of the United Kingdom and Ireland. The thesis of his book is that "Europe can maintain her standard of living, her level of production, and the welfare of her people only as an integral part of a well-functioning world economy. The data given are both full and revealing. One point which he emphasizes throughout the study is the key position of Great Britain in the economy of continental Europe, purchasing more than one-third of the goods exported from the European continent, or more than North America and Latin America together. This single fact tends to emphasize the critical problems Europe must meet to reconstruct her economy. In the light of present circumstances this alone would fend to substantiate that a return to pre-war status is in the realm of impossibility.

Dr. Basch himself states that during the whole inter-war period Europe has never reached a real consolidation of her economic position. He very vividly describes the increasing split between "wealthy Europe" and "retarded Europe," between one area with prevalent multi-lateralism and another area where bilateralism of the Schacht variety prevailed. Like most liberal economists, Dr. Basch makes an eloquent plea for a return to multi-lateralism on a world-wide basis and regrets the trend toward an economic bureaucracy.

In contrast to some foreign economists who were taken in by the synthetic successes of Nazi economy, the writer states that "the Nazification of Europe was not intended to produce an economically integrated Europe, the objective of the German policy was to organize Europe for the maximum benefit of the German race." He proposes that in order to achieve a greater integration of the European continental economy, restrictive trade policies be replaced by

policies of trade expansion, that European agriculture be reoriented away from imaginary self-sufficiency, and that industrial reconstruction be constituted on an

all-European basis.

While most economists will wholeheartedly agree with his plea for greater co-operation and integration of world economy, it is questionable whether it is possible to stop the trend toward state guidance of economic life which he deplores. His criticism of the impact of an economically untrained state bureaucracy upon private industry based upon first-hand experience in large scale industries in Central Europe is no doubt valid, yet it does not seem probable at this time that there would be any break in this trend. Only a new type of economic management and personnel can solve the staggering problem of production, cost, and efficiency which will depress Europe's plane of living for many years to come. None of these problems, however, should be insolvable in the long run. As Professor Shotwell states in his Foreword, "the elimination of war as an instrument of national policy is therefore not an external but a fundamental part of the economy of nations."

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. FRANK MUNK

BOULDING, KENNETH E., The Economics of Peace. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945. Pp. 278. \$2.75.

Professor Boulding presents us in this book with a concise and competent analysis of both the short-run and the long-run economic problems of the postwar world. The book is couched in simple language, and though the author deals with some of the most complicated matters of economic theory his presentation is thoroughly lucid and understandable to any educated layman. This is the chief merit of the present volume. Confused thinking, half truths, propaganda, and outright nonsense have been dispensed lately in such profusion and the market has been and continues to be so flooded with the outpourings of so-called economists that it is exceedingly refreshing to read this clear and sober account of the economic problems of the reconstruction period and the years thereafter.

The book is divided into two parts: the first, chapters I to IV, deals with the economics of reconstruction; the second is entitled "Economics of Reform." This second part consists of three groups of chapters. Chapters V to X are concerned with a general discussion of present day economic problems and with a statement of the policies advocated by Professor Boulding in order to bring about a state of affairs from which the worst scourges of mankind, hunger, unemployment, low living standards, the fear of war, and actual warfare will be absent. This part is in essence a restatement of the results of modern economic theory and a careful application of lessons to be learned from the discussions of competent writers in the field of economic policy. Professor Boulding proves conclusively that if we do not enjoy a better life in the future it is not due to our incapacity for dealing with the problems confronting us, but rather to our

own stupidity, selfishness, and shortsightedness. He offers the tools to solve many of the ills of the world, and he teaches us how to use them. It is up to us to draw the proper conclusions.

Chapters IX to XII contain a discussion and refutation of alternative solutions. Professor Boulding disposes of what he calls "right-wing illusions" in a somewhat summary fashion. These right-wing illusions are classified as: "1, the illusion of national sovereignty; 2, the illusion of sound finance; 3, the illusion of laissez faire; 4, the illusion of deserving poverty" (p. 205). The second and fourth of these illusions are relatively easily disposed of, especially since a large body of economic and political thinking has been applied to show their fallacious character. I agree with Professor Boulding that the concept of national sovereignty has become devoid of much significance in the modern world and that its retention is economically unsound and contains serious dangers for a constructive policy in the postwar period. But it would be irresponsible indeed to dismiss the argument lightly. Professor Boulding acknowledges himself that "men feel themselves to be 'Americans' or 'Germans'" in numerous instances, and these attitudes, however irrational they may be, bring up a host of real problems which must be solved if countries are to develop mutual understanding and collaboration.

The "illusion" of laissez-faire is, in my view, inadequately dealt with by Professor Boulding. The same criticism holds with regard to one of the "leftwing illusions"—the Marxian. Professor Boulding can dispose of these two alternatives so easily because he does not describe them in the elaborate, sophisticated form in which they have been presented more recently; he prefers to dress them up in crude and primitive garb and knock them all to bits. This is not an overly difficult task, but it is hardly fair to the more complex systems designed by the more recent exponents of traditional liberalism and socialism. 1 Boulding's failure adequately to deal with the subject is particularly unfortunate in the case of socialism, since there are strong indications that it will exercise an important influence on the thinking and the political activity in postwar Europe. It appears that the shortcomings of the book in this regard are due primarily to the author's lack of understanding or to his faulty interpretation of social currents in Europe. In addition, Marx is given credit for having attempted a synthesis of economic relationships, but he "tried to describe it in terms of vast heterogeneous aggregates such as the 'working class'" (p. 223). In the first place, Professor Boulding himself refers to the working class on page 246, but, what is much more important, in the whole preceding analysis he deals with such concepts as income and investment, both "vast heterogeneous aggregates." In consequence, the chapter on socialism is rather unsatisfactory.

The last chapter should be read by every student of social problems, is entitled "An Appendix on Politics and Morals" and contains Professor Boulding's

¹ See such works as F. A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago, 1944); H. C. Simons, *A Positive Program for Laissez-Faire* (Chicago, 1943); Oskar Lange, *On the Economic Theory of Socialism* (Minneapolis, 1938).

views on international organization and social relationships within a country. Even though Professor Boulding argues against the solution offered by the second left-wing illusion, that of Christian humanism, his political and social views are essentially humanist. Professor Boulding is too good an economist to be carried away by pure utopianism, and whenever he sets out on a flight of idealism, his economist's conscience soon brings him back to the firm ground of facts and rational judgment.

University of Chicago

BERT F. HOSELITZ

MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW, Freedom and Civilization. New York: Roy Publishers, 1944. Pp. xiv, 338. \$3.50.

Here is the last book of that argonaut of the Pacific, the eminent cultural anthropologist, Malinowski. And it is by all odds the greatest theme he ever attempted, although not his greatest work. Compiled and published after his death by his widow, Valetta Malinowska, it represents partially the chapters he had already written and corrected, partially his copious notes from which the remainder was to be compiled. Mme. Malinowska has joined these notes together and fitted them into chapters but has not changed or altered them in any other respect. Neither editorial excision nor expansion has been undertaken.

Critics of Malinowski have suggested that his reputation was not in proportion to his actual achievement, that his Doctorate in the natural sciences was hardly a preparation for authoritativeness in the field of social and cultural phenomena, and that his years of field work in the Trobriand Islands were too limited an experience for him to dogmatize safely about all primitive peoples.

To these views it may be rejoined that Malinowski had as wide a knowledge of the literature of his chosen province as any arm-chair anthropologist alive. In addition he had actually done work in the field, both extensively and intensively, which is more than three-quarters of the warmers of chairs of anthropology can say for themselves.

Moreover, he was a functionalist; that is, he did not dissociate the data of investigation from the total context of their cultures. He argued, and this reviewer believes correctly, that the presence of a tool or trait in a society was of preliminary significance only. Its use or function in that society was its vital characteristic. Hence he was not another dreary compiler of types of baskets and bowstrings, but a scientist peering into the dynamics of cultural life on a broad and realistic scale, comparing what he found in one setting and milieu with what he, or other investigators found elsewhere.

It is from this point of view and with these techniques that he set out to write of freedom. Much, perhaps too much, had been written on the subject before. But a great deal of these outpourings was either vague and philosophical or narrowly esthetic, and patriotic rhetoric had so befogged the issue that although many men talked of freedom, few could define it.

Malinowski proposed to rescue freedom from the maunderings of the metaphysicians and to deal with it as a basic attribute of the cultural process, a condition precedent to an effective equilibrium in human society. In this book that is his clear and inductively established thesis. Freedom comprises "the conditions necessary and sufficient for the formation of a purpose, its translation into effective action through organized cultural instrumentalities, and the full enjoyment of the results of such activity." As such, it embraces all the time-honored freedoms, whether four or forty, it is neither grandiosely philosophical nor narrowly psychological, and it "can only be defined with reference to human beings organized and endowed with cultural motives, implements and values . . . in short, a cultural system."

Restraint and freedom are not contradictory to it so long as they are useful parts of a whole, without which the whole could not function at its optimum. But when these restraints are imposed by force from above or from without and for the purpose of individual or class aggrandizement, then the oil of freedom is drained off and the machine bogs down. With equal vigor Malinowski opposes the introspectionists' concept of free-floating freedom, or complete absence of law, as being unrealistic and identical with anarchy.

In this rich volume there are many tempting bypaths. Interwoven with the analysis of freedom, its rôle in society and its evolution in culture, are collateral discussions of war, power, democracy, cultural determinism and other social factors. It is not as if Malinowski had anticipated his death and collected definitive answers to a host of problems; it is more like a set of guide-posts, pointing out unexplored areas ahead along with a thoughtful note or two on possible procedure.

His point of view may be summed up somewhat as follows: freedom is the most important characteristic of both society and culture. With it men achieve maximum flexibility, answer their social needs to greatest advantage, and share mutually in socially created rights as well as responsibilities. Without it, might makes right, caste and serfdom appear, the few control the many and arrogate power, prestige, and perquisites to themselves. If we apply ourselves to the task of implementing and spreading freedom there is no limit to man's potential achievement. He may even conquer that disease of his own creation—war. Totalitarianism, the enemy of freedom and culture, may also be obliterated. In the long run a higher civilization may be reached.

This last point has apparently been missed or at least misunderstood by certain reviewers of this work. Guérard in particular quibbles about the "constrictions" of culture and postulates what is to this writer a wholly false dichotomy between "culture" and "civilization" and one that smacks of mysticism. The two are not antithetical. Civilization is a form of culture, its dynamics and laws entirely cultural, its differences those of degree and not of type. All people have had and will have cultures. Some of them, however, we are pleased to call primitive, others civilized.

To avoid this kind of confusion is mandatory today. No one will deny the rôle of esthetics in our life, but the mystic-esthetic approach will not unlock the doors of social nature. One Sumner or Keller is worth a thousand Spenglers. One Malinowski is worth ten thousand Von Wieses.

The bibliography is woefully sketchy. The style is uneven in spots. There are portions that could have stood expansion or elucidation. Above all, from the scholar's angle, there is a lack of factual documentation, of which fault the author, unlike many of his pretentious colleagues, was never guilty before.

What stands out, nonetheless, is that this study was Bronislaw Malinowski's last and greatest hypothesis. Sociologists and cultural anthropologists will naturally use it with interest and profit. How much good it would do the historian, the psychologist, the philosopher, not to mention the devotee of belles lettres! But will they even read it?

University of Colorado

WILLIAM S. BERNARD

WACHSMAN, Z. H., Jews In Post War Europe. New York: H. H. Glanz, 1944. Pp. 111.

The title of Mr .Wachsman's book is rather unfortunate, being apt to create a certain misunderstanding. Apart from a short introduction by the author, not much is to be found in the book about Jewish postwar problems. It consists mainly of statements, made during the war years by various Governments-in-Exile, in which, on the one hand, the anti-Jewish policy of the Germans is condemned and, on the other, promises are made for the abolition of the discriminatory laws and regulations and for the reinstatement of Jews in their rights, their positions, and their property. In this respect the present volume may be regarded as an addition to the series of publications devoted to similar problems, of which the pamphlet on Governments-in-Exile of the Research Institute of the American Institute of the American Jewish Committee¹ and the well-known book on Jewish martyrdom under Nazi rule of the Institute of Jewish Affairs² deserve special mention.

This is a useful book. It was a good idea, towards the end of the war, to publish anew the various statements, which to a certain extent may certainly be considered obligations on the part of the governments concerned. Both from the academic and from the political point of view the importance of this publication can hardly be questioned. I have, however, some doubts as to whether, for this very reason, it was wise to combine the documents with remarks on the situation in the various conutries and with reprints of articles published elsewhere, especially as this is done in a way which in many cases makes it difficult to discern where the remarks or the articles end and where the official statements begin.

¹ Governments in Ixile on Jewish Rights (New York, 1942). Pp. 64.

² Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews (New York, 1943).

A simple reproduction of the documents, with a few footnotes after, or with a short introduction before each document, would have been much more helpful.

There is a considerable disproportion between the various parts of the book. It is hard to understand, for instance, why the chapter devoted to Czechoslovakia occupies almost one fourth of the volume. Neither the numerical strength of the Czechoslovak Jewish community nor the character of the statements made by the representatives of the Czechoslovak Government warrants this preferential treatment. The author should also have been more critical in conveying information about the situation as it existed before the war. It makes a rather strange impression to read about the "complete freedom of religion and cultural development" which the Jews enjoyed in Poland, as also about the Polish laws for the protection of all minorities, which allegedly were "the most advanced in Europe." Not only the scholar, but even the man in the street knows today how inaccurate such a statement is and how strong was the policy of anti-Jewish discrimination in Poland before the war. It may, incidentally, be well to point out that the resolution adopted by the Polish National Council on June 2, 1942, in favor of the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, which is so conspicuously quoted in this volume, was submitted by a notoriously anti-Semitic member of the Council, and was certainly prompted more by the desire to get rid of the Jews in Poland than by any sympathy with Jewish national aspirations. Of the two Jewish members of the Council, one voted against the resolution and the second abstained from voting.

The figures cited in the book are not always sufficiently accurate. The figure on the Jewish population of Denmark, 16,000, if it is not a typographical error, is grossly exaggerated; at most, there were no more than 8,000 Jews in Denmark before the war. Also an overstatement is the figure for Poland. According to the last census of population in that country, that for 1931, there were 3,113,900 Jews in Poland; and in view of the slow process of natural increase, their number before the war was somewhere beteen 3,250,000 and 3,300,000 and "not less than 3,500,000, as stated in this book. On the other hand, the number of European Jews exterminated by the Germans and their satellites during the war, is certainly understated, which may partly be explained by the fact that the book was apparently written a full year before the end of the war. Not three million Jews perished in the war, but almost twice as many, including, of course, Russian Jewry, which figures with more than a million victims in these statistics of horror.³

The short introduction on Jewish Post War Problems, while interesting and containing a few important remarks—as, for instance, the statement about the responsibility of the United Nations for the process of rehabilitation and about the right of Europe's Jews to decide their own fate—is too sketchy to afford a real picture of these extremely serious and difficult problems. The question of resettlement of those who cannot or do not wish to be repatriated, is not even

³ For details, see the mimeographed pamphlet, "Statistics on Jewish Casualties during Axis Domination, issued by the Institute of Jewish Affairs in August, 1945. 23 pp.

mentioned, nor is anything said about the problem of rehabilitation as such. Vague, too, is the connection between this introduction and the following chapters of the book.

It is certainly not the fault of the author that so many of the statements made during the war seem rather academic and exaggerated when compared with the grim reality of today; he could not have foreseen this sad turn of the events. This is especially true of such governments as the Czechoslovak and the French, whose actual policy can hardly be brought into agreement with the statements and promises so lavishly made during the war. The well-known incidents in connection with the revalidation of the Cremieux decree, the slow and disheartening process of reinstatement of French Jews in their property, the still prevalent policy of discrimination against Jewish "enemy aliens," the attempts of some Czech officials to deprive the Jews of their right to consider themselves members of the Jewish people, the violent anti-Semitic propaganda in Slovakia-these and many other instances could be cited in support of our thesis. It may also not be amiss to point out in this place that, of all former Governments-in-Exile, only one, the Greek Government, has so far accepted the principle—held apparently, and rightly so to be self-evident by Mr. Wachsman—whereby the property of exterminated Jewish families is to be used for the benefit and the rehabilitation of the Jewish population; the others prefer to say nothing or to act contrary to this principle. It would thus be a rather tempting, though not very pleasant, task to publish a work like the present in a new form, showing, on one side, the statements and promises made by the various governments during the war years and, on the other side, the actual policy and existing situation in the liberated countries. I fear that the picture arising from this contrast would be incomparably less encouraging then the impression which may be carried away from a perusal of the book in its present form.

This remark, of course, should not be taken as critical. Indeed, even the preceding few strictures were prompted by a desire to correct certain details rather that a captious attitude toward the volume under review. Jews in Post War Europe can certainly be considered a valuable contribution to the literature on the problems of World War II and deserves to be recommended to readers in this as well as in other countries.

Hebrew University Jerusalem ARIFH TARTAKOWER

HIRST, FRANCIS W., Principles of Prosperity. London: Hollis and Carter Ltd. 1944, Pp. vi, 188.

Mr. Hirst comes with his small book on the *Principles of Prosperity* in the same year in which Sir William Beveridge has published his *Full Employment* in a *Pree Society* following shortly his *Pillars of Security*. Mr. Hirst has endeavored, as he puts it, to make "the leading principles and precepts of Political Economy intelligible to the common reader by using plain and simple language."

He finds that the refinements of casuistry, though they may amuse our schoolmen just as they did the schoolmen of theology in the Middle Ages, have done more harm than good to science by distracting public attention from central truths. The author organizes his discussion of principles of prosperity around these simple truths, such as division of labor, the laws of supply and demand, the theory of money, the creation of wealth, and others.

While Sir William Beveridge regards central planning by governments as necessary to achieve full employment, and subordinates to this eventual goal many other issues including eevn multilateral trade and private ownership of industry, the main theme of Mr. Hirst's volume goes just in the opposite direction. It is very interesting to read in his book pertinent quotations by various British economists and statesmen, by French economists, and from early American and old Greek books. With some changes this book could practically have been published after or even before the First World War; and it is obviously the author's intention that this should be the case. He does not enter into a learned discussion of the Keynesian economics or business cycles theories, or deficit spending. He tries to reduce the whole Political Economy to a few fundamental principles which can be understood by anyone possessed of common sense. He thus warns against various fallacies, saying that many of the worst social evils arise from ignorance of the basic truths.

Any prosperity is obviously based on production. To increase wealth means an efficient organization of production and a free flow of goods and services. The greatest danger to prosperity are major wars impoverishing nations and bringing about unforseeable social and economic changes. Therefore, to foster prosperity means to avoid wars.

The author warns against the danger of huge government budgets and growing government debts and taxes. He is against foreign trade obstacles, against bureaucracy replacing competition, against monopolies putting a straight jacket on the whole production. He is against communism, socialism, or even economic planning if the question of what is being planned, on what principles, and if the planners are competent, is not answered satisfactorily.

Stating that "Truth never grows old," the author writes that nothing is more certain for Britain than that hard work and sustained effort will be needed to regain the trade on which not only her prosperity but her very existence will

depend.

Many will find that this little book, which does not develop any new elegant economic theory, is out of date. Yet it can be said that substantial principles of prosperity apply to any economic systtem. It would be of great advantage for most of the economic planners, especially in war-torn Europe, to read such a book and to check their high sounding plans and promises with the simple statements which sometimes seem to be coming from the old and definitely surpassed world.

Columbia University

ANTONIN BASCH

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

- "Arrangements for Control of Germany by Allied Representatives." Dept. of State Bulletin, June 10, 1945, 1051-1055.
- Aseoli, Max, "Postscript on San Francisco." Free World, August 1945, 13-17. Beza, Marcu, "The Unity of the Balkans." Free Europe, August 10, 1945, 41-42.
- Clayton, William L., "Security Against Renewed German Aggression." Dept. of State Bulletin, July 1, 1945, 21-37.
- Chamberlain, William Henry, "The Issue of Ukrainian Nationhood." The Ukrainian Quarterly, June, 1945, 228-235.
- Cornea, Victor, "Rumania—A Year After Liberation." Free Europe, August 24, 1945, 54-55.
- Czubatyj, Nicholas D., ed., "The San Francisco Conference and Ukraine." The Ukrainian Quarterly, June, 1945, 205-211.
- Daniel, Arnold, "The New Land Reforms in Poland, Hungary and Russia." Free Europe, August 10, 1945, 37-38.
- Davies, Rhys J., "Some Lessons of the European Conflict, 1939-1945." The Ukrainian Quarterly, June, 1945, 212-215.
- Deutsch, Julius, "Austria's Disputed Government." Free World, June, 1945, 67-68. Dolivet, Louis, "Emerging Europe." Annals of the Am. Acad. of Political and Social Science, July, 1945, 79-85.
- Dugdale, Blanche E. C., "From Haman to Hitler." The Quarterly Review, July, 1945, 268-281.
- Dulles, J. F., "The General Assembly." Foreign Affairs, October, 1945, 1-11. Eulau, Heinz, "Counter-Revolution in Greece." New Republic, July 30, 1945, 121-122.
- Fay, Sidney B., "No Peace For Poland." Current History, July, 1945, 7-11.
- Fierlinger, Zdenek, "Soviet-Czechoslovak Economic Relations-Past and Future." Amer. Rev. of the Soviet Union, Aug., 1945, 29-37.
- Fifield, Russell H., "Geopolitics at Munich." Dept. of State Bulletin, June 24, 1945, 1152-1162.
- Gaurilovie, Stoyan, "How Is Yugoslavia Ruled?" Free World, June, 1945, 69-72.
- Gruenewald, Max, "The Jews in Medieval Carinthia." Historia Judaica, April, 1945, 1-12.
- Gurian, Waldemar, "Hitler-The Simplifier of German Nationalism." Rev. of Politics, July, 1945, 316-324.
- Hermens, F. A., "Germany, Europe and the World." Rev. of Politics, July, 1945, 325-342.
- Hochfeld, Julian, "The Social Aspects of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising." Polish Review, August 9, 1945, 4-5, 15.
- Hudson, M. O., "The New World Court." Foreign Affairs, October, 1945, 75-84. "Inside Poland." Poland Fights, July 15, 1945, 6-7.

Jacobson, Carol, "The Jews in the USSR." Amer. Rev. of the Soviet Union, August, 1945, 50-68.

Johnson, Alvin, "The Rehabilitation of Europe." The Yale Review, Summer, 1945, 577-586.

Kane, R. K., "The Security Council." Foreign Affairs, October, 1945, 12-25.

Kleinlerer, Edward D., "Trieste: Barometer of Allied Unity." New Europe, June, 1945, 23-24.

Kodiček, Josef, "The Germans of the Border Districts." Cent. Eur. Obs., June 29, 1945, 185-186.

Kodíček, Josef, "News From Czechoslovakia." Cent. Eur. Obs., June 15, 1945, 169-170.

Koht, Halvdan, "The Role of Small Nations." Annals of the Am. Acad. of Political and Social Science, July, 1945, 86-88.

Krása, Arnošt, "New Administration in Germany." Cent. Eur. Obs., June 15, 1945, 178-179.

Lászlo, A., "Economic Rehabilitation of Europe." Cent. Eur. Obs., July 13, 1945, 205-206.

Lednicki, Waclaw, "For What Cause is Poland Sacrificed." New Europe, July-August, 1945, 11-16.

Levin, Meyer, "What's Left of the Jews." The Nation, July 28, 1945, 74-76.

Manning, Clarence A., "Panslavism, Its Use and Abuse." Ukrainian Quarterly, June, 1945, 216-227.

"New Economic Life In Czechoslovakia." Cent. Eur. Obs., June 29, 1945, 189-190.

"The New Polish Government." Poland Fights, July 15, 1945, 1-2.

Nowy, Jan, "The Hungarian Situation." Weekly KAP Review, July 27, 1945, 2-5.

Oak, Liston M., "The 'New' Polish Government." New Europe, July-August, 1945, 16-18.

Paton, H. J., "Truncation As a Means of Preventing German Aggression." International Affairs, April, 1945, 180-195.

Petrov, N., "German Economy in Bulgaria." Cent. Eur. Obs., August 24, 1945, 241-242.

Reston, J. B., "The Critic Turns Actor." Foreign Affairs, October, 1945, 50-61.

Scholz, W., "Difficulties In Austria." Cent. Eur. Obs., July 31, 1945, 206-207. Schwarz, R. P., "The U. S. Balance of Payments and Reconstruction in Central

Europe." Central European Trade Review, August, 1945, 145-147.

Sender. Tom. "Will Europe Nationalize Industry?" Free World. August, 1945.

Sender, Tom, "Will Europe Nationalize Industry?" Free World, August, 1945, 68-71.

"The Situation in Western Austria." London Information, June 15, 1945.

Slochower, Harry, "Thomas Mann: Poetic Symbol for a Future Germany." To-morrow, September, 1945, 20-23.


- Smogorzewski, Casimir, "The Problem of Carinthia." Free Europe, June 15, 1945, 183-184.
- Steiger, A. J., "How Soviet Economy Emerged from the War in Europe."

 Amer. Rev. of the Soviet Union, August, 1945, 42-49.
- "Text of Agreement Between the United States, British, and Yugoslav Governments on Venezia Giulia." Dept. of State Bulletin, June 10, 1945, 1050.
- Thomson, S. H., "Masaryk a americá demokracie." Obzory, September 15, 1945, 54 ff.
- Thornbury, Ethel M., "Legacy of Destruction." Tomorrow, September, 1945, 45-48.
- "Tripartite Conference at Berlin." Dept. of State Bulletin, August 5, 1945, 153-161.
- Urzidil, Jan, "The U. S. A. Looking At Prague." Cent. Eur. Obs., July 27, 1945, 219.
- Vandenberg, A. H., and Grew, Joseph C., "Policy Toward Polish Provisional Government of National Unity." Dept. of State Bulletin, July 22, 1945, 109-111.
- Van der Bijl, F. V., "The Tešín Question." Cent. Eur. Obs., July 13, 1945, 201-202.
- Warwick, Peter, "Don't Forget the Gentlemen!" Cent. Eur. Obs., June 15, 1945, 176-177.
- Winner, Perey, "A Sense of Shared Guilt." Commonweal, August 3, 1945, 374-378.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- Cech, Jan and Mellon, J. E., Czechoslovakia. London: Lindsay Drummond, 1945, 15s.
- Cole, G. D. H., Reparations and the Future of German Industry. London: Fabian Publications and Gollancz, 6d.
- Cobban, Alfred, National Self-Determination. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, \$4.50.
- Cressey, George B., The Basis of Soviet Strength. New York: McGraw-Hill, \$3.00.
- Dacie, Anne, Yugoslav Refugees in Italy. London: Gollancz, 1945, 6d.
- Dallin, David F., The Big Three. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945, \$2.75.
- Druce, Gerald, Two Czech Chemists, Bohuslav Brauner (1855-1935), Frantisek Wald (1861-1930). London: New Europe, 1944.
- Ebenstein, William, The German Record: A Political Portrait. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, \$3.00.
- Ekis, Ludvigs, Latvia Economic Resources and Capacities. Washington: Latvian Legation, 1943.
- Eyck, Erich, Bismarck. Erlenbach-Zürich: Eugen Rentsch, 1943. Three volumes. Estreicher, Karol, The Mystery of the Polish Crown Jewels. London: Alliance.
- Goldschmidt, Siegfried, Legal Claims Against Germany. New York: Dryden Press, 1945, \$3.00.
- Górka, Olgierd, Outline of Polish History. London: Alliance, 1945, 8s 6d.
- Harper, Samuel N., The Russia I Believe In. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945, \$3.50.
- Hogg, R. D., Yugoslavia. "Cross-Roads" Series. London: MacDonald, 1945, 5s. 5s.
- Krzesinski, A. J., National Cultures, Nazism and the Church. Boston: Humphries, \$1.75.
- Lehmann, L. H., Vatican Policy in the Second World War. New York: Agora, 1945, \$.25.
- Ligocki, E. E., Poland. "Cross-Roads" Series. London: Mac Donald, 1945, 5s.
- London, Kurt, Backgrounds of Conflict. New York: Macmillan, 1945, \$5.00.
- Lowenbach, Jan, Czechoslovak Music—The Voice of the People. New York: Czechoslovak Information Service, 1943.
- Ludwig, Emil, The Moral Conquest of Germany. Garden City: Doubleday Doran, 1945, \$2.00.
- Mende, Tibor, Hungary. "Cross-Roads" Series. London: MacDonald, 1945, 5s. 5s.
- Moodie, A. E., Italo-Yugoslav Boundary. London: Geo. Philip & Son, 1945, 8s. 6d.

- Morgan, Carlyle, Bretton Woods: Clues To a Monetary Mystery. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1945.
- The Nazi Kultur in Poland. London: Polish Ministry of Information, 1945, 5s. Nutrition and Relief Work. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, \$1.50.
- Paneth, Philip, Chiang Kai-Shek Carries On. London: Alliance, 1945, 7d 6s.
- Paneth, Philip, Eduard Beneš, A Leader of Democracy. London: Alliance, 1945, 8d 6s.
- Polevoi, Boris, From Belgorod to the Carpathians. London: Hutchinson, 1945, 10d. 6s.
- Pruszynski, Xavier, Poland Fights Back. New York: Roy, 1944, \$2.50.
- Reeves, Emery, The Anatomy of Peace. New York: Harper & Bros., 1945, \$2.00.
- Rogers, James Grafton, World Policing and the Constitution. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1945.
- Rudin, Harry R., Armistice, 1918. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944, \$5.00.
- Seton-Watson, G. H. N., Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918-41. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1945, \$6.50.
- Spiecker, Karl, Germany—From Defeat to Defeat. "Cross-Roads" Series. London: MacDonald, 1945, 5s.
- Vlekke, H. H. M., The Nederlands and the United States. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1945.
- Weber, August, A New Germany In a New Europe. London: Lindsay Drummond, 1945, 10d. 6s.



JOURNAL of CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

VOLUME FIVE

JANUARY, 1946

NUMBER FOUR

AUSTRIA IN THE SUMMER OF 1870*

by Friedrich Engel-Janosi

The March of 1870 Clarendon, Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the Gladstone Cabinet, wrote to the British Ambassador in Paris: "On paper, Austria has an army of 800,000;¹ but she could not even at the most pressing emergency bring 250,000 men into the field—her finances are dilapidated and her internal disorganization affords just cause of alarm."² Six weeks later the historian-diplomat, Bancroft, then American Minister to Berlin, reported of the Hungarians that "no nation in Europe is at this moment moving forward like the Hungarian people," but he continued, "Far different is the state of things in the Austrian Crownlands . . . the government of Cisleitha . . . by keeping Germany disunited,

*NOTE: This article is based on the following unpublished sources: (a) Diplomatic Reports 1869/70 in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. (quoted as N.A.); (b) Protocols of the ministerial Councils held in Vienna in July and August, 1870, kept in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna (quoted as St. A.); (c) the handwritten memoirs of Baron Prokesch, the Austrian Ambassador in Constantinople from 1856 to 1872: "Sechszehn Jahre in Konstantinopel" (quoted as "Jahre"), kept in the private archives of Baron Schleinitz-Prokesch in Gmunden, Upper Austria. In a letter (not published in the Correspondance entre Gobineau et Prokesch (Paris, 1933) addressed to count Gobineau from Graz, May 20, 1873, Prokesch says of these memoirs: "...j'ai tracé un tableau de mes seize années à Constantinople ...je ne suis pas content de ces travaux ...le contenu historique n'interesse plus et le fond de la pensée est en désaccord flagrant avec tout ce que notre époque prône et protège. Cependant je crois à ces travaux le mérite d'une grande indépendance des sottises du jour et du mensonge officiel. Après un siècle il (sic!) trouvera peut-être grâce aux yeux d'un historien critique ..." The memoirs are quoted in this article according to the chapters which follow a chronological order, and to the pages of the typed copy of the writer.

¹ The military laws of XI/13, resp. 28, 1868 increased the army of the Habsburg monarchy to 800,000 men. A. Stern, Geschichte Europas, 1815-1871 (Stuttgart, 1924), X, p. 35.

² H. Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 1938), p. 320.

increases in Cisleitha the tendencies to restlessness and decomposition . . . The distraction seems hopeless."³

On the other hand, Napoleon, in his plans for a triple alliance against Prussia, was thinking first of the Danubian Empire, and of Italy only as

a second partner.

It is well known that immediately after the catastrophe of Königgrätz, a political compromise was reached in the Danubian monarchy, according to which control of the eastern half was handed over to the Hungarians—to "the political nation," as they called themselves—while in the western half the German-speaking Austrians were supposed to play a somewhat similar rôle. It was a matter of constant complaint in the western provinces (to which, as a whole, no name was ever given officially) that in the Compromise of 1867 the peoples of the eastern half (Transleitha) -and above all the Hungarians-fared much better than the inhabitants of the other half (sometimes called Cisleitha).4 While in Hungary the inner political order established by the Compromise of 1867 remained unchallenged for some years, that fact was not true of the laws laid down in the Constitution of December, 1867 which was to establish the common political fundament for the provinces forming "Cisleitha." The opposition to the "December Constitution" corresponded to a characteristic rhythm running through all of Austria's constitutional life, and even as far back as the middle of the eighteenth century, when the monarchy was reorganized in accordance with the concept of a "modern" state. From that time on there may be observed a regular oscillation between federalistic and centralistic concepts. The latter found its main support among the liberal bourgeoisie and the German-speaking bureaucracy, the former, among the nobles. the Slavic nationalities and some sections of the German peasantry. The Constitution of 1867, like that of 1861, was mainly the work of the liberal

introductions by E. Bernatzik, loc. cit.

³ Reports Prussia, IV, 18,1870; Department of State, N.A. When the American Government made Bancroft's report public in laying it before the Senate, the American minister at Vienna, John Jay, launched a stern complaint. Reports Austria, VII, 1, 1870, N.A.

The name is not very properly applied if one thinks of provinces like Galicia and Bukovina which were as much to the east (Transleitha) as any section of the Hungarian half. The official denomination for the political unit formed by the Cisleithan provinces was: "Die im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder"—hardly a very striking formulation. Colloquial reference was made to "Austria" as meaning the non-Hungarian part of the Dual-Monarchy; moreover, the term "Austria," in the sense just mentioned, was used in the Constitution of April, 1848 and December, 1867 though not consistently. Cf. E. Bernatzik, Oesterreichische Verfassungsgesetze (Wien, 1911), p. 62.

⁵ By far the best presentation of the constitutional history of the Danubian monarchy up to 1867 is Joseph Redlich, *Das österreichische Staats-und Reichsproblem* (Leipzig, 1920, 1926), I, II. The texts of the constitutional laws have been published with brief, lucid

bourgeoisie. By the spring of 1870 the reaction against it was in full swing. It began earlier with the protest of the Czechs in the summer of 1868, and when in January, 1870 the two feudalistic members left the government, they were joined by one German liberal minister, Dr. Berger, who favored federalism also.⁶ The Czech deputies had refrained from attending the parliamentary sessions ever since 1863; by the end of March, 1870 the Tyrolese, the Polish, the Slovene and the Rumanian deputies had also left the parliament in Vienna which had by now become a "Rump-Parliament." A few days later the German liberal ministry ("Bürgerministerium") resigned, and a new government was formed under the presidency of Count Alfred Potocki, a wealthy Polish nobleman. "Never," he wrote to the Emperor Francis Joseph, after he had chosen his cabinet, "did the German and the non-German nationalities in the monarchy oppose each other so violently as now."⁷

To Alfred Potocki it was the provinces, especially the large ones that were the real "historico-political individualities" which together had built up the monarchy as they had grown up through the centuries. Accordingly, like his federalistic predecessors, Goluchowski in 1860 and Belcredi in 1865-67, he felt that they should be granted a great degree of autonomy. This concept of "historico-political individualities" is rooted ideologically in the Romantic thought which permeated the ideas of many statesmen in the period of Francis Joseph, as, for example, Anton Széscen, Clam-Martinic and Belcredi. They did not believe in a centralistic government, nor did they approve of too much governmental activity. To them, Austria represented the model for a federalistic empire of which each part enjoyed its own individuality, and of which all the parts were united by what they would call a spiritual tie. However, in the institutions through which their plans were to be carried out, we may observe a continuation of medieval feudalism.

It is significant that Count Beust, the Foreign Minister and Chancellor of the monarchy, in preparing for the new order, had previously appealed to "the government and the people of the United States" to support the Austrian government in what he termed "their plans of freedom and progress." In April, 1870 Count Potocki told the American minister to Vienna that "the principal changes which he proposed to introduce, were

⁶ Among the German Austrians who favored federalism was also Fischhof, who had been active in the revolution of 1848. He published in 1869: Oesterreich und die Bürgschaften seines Bestandes.

schaften seines Bestandes.
7 "Vortrag an den Kaiser nach erfolgter Kabinettsbildung" in Der politische Nachlass des Grafen Eduard Taaffe (Wien, 1922), p. 95.

⁸ Reports Austria, IX, 17, 1869. N.A.

borrowed from the American Constitution." The provinces were to be made almost the equivalent of American states.

It is equally significant that at the same time Prince Czartoryski, "an able advocate of the policy of Count Potocki," read a paper before "the Polish historical and literary Society of Paris," in which he explained that "the true Austrian idea is not found in German centralism, which seeks the exclusive domination of one race over all others, nor in Czech separatism, which threatens the dissolution of Austria. It lies in that intermediate direction between the two extremes, which is that of Poland and which wishes to combine harmoniously the unity and the force of the state with a reasonable autonomy for the provinces which have a distinct national character."10 The American minister who reported the speech of Prince Czartoryski added, "if the program [of Potocki] can be successfully carried out and harmony be restored between the nationalities, the Empire will be re-established upon something like a federal basis by the suffrages of the people, a singularly free Constitution." One senses a feeling of sympathy underlying this comment of John Jay. The man who had been active in the Irish Relief Committee in 1847 and was to become the first president of the Huguenot Society of America in 1883, was certainly not lacking in independence of judgment; there is no reason to believe that the grandson of the first Chief Justice was biased in favor of the Habsburg monarchy.¹¹

While Potocki planned to change the Cisleithan Constitution of December, 1867, there exists no evidence whatsoever that he thought to overthrow it by a coup d'état. He wanted to bring about a reform of the constitution in the way provided by the law itself. The Prime Minister, as he himself explained to the Emperor, conceived of the principle of autonomy as something too lofty to be debased to the level of a petty expedient. Austria, being a country of many people, should not make of any one national egoism her leading idea in politics. Therefore, "the revision of the constitution in a strictly parliamentary way had become necessary." But, the Count went on, historical experience shows that any single nationality is powerful enough to forestall, through its operation, the completion of the constitution: this work could be carried out only through the co-operation of all the nationalities.

Serious objections were raised against Potocki's program, both at that

Jbid., IV, 18, 1870. N.A.
 Ibid., VI, 7, 1870. N.A.

¹¹ Cf. the article on him in the Dictionary of American Biography.

¹² Taaffe, loc. cit., p. 97; G. Kolmer, Parlament und Verfassung in Oesterreich (Wien, 1903), II, p. 55.

time and by future critics. The German liberals, who were the leading group in the parliament, particularly now that so many of the other parties and nationalities had withdrawn, were not ready to consider such a change as that recommended by Potocki; they seemed to look upon the legislative work done hardly more than two years ago as something that had grown through the centuries to be the palladium of the Empire; convinced of the merits of the constitution as written, they would not listen when Potocki declared that the foundation of Austria could not be based either upon so many articles or even upon any particular form of government, but only on the spirit of her peoples—again a concept very close to the basic ideas of Romanticism. Two days after the new cabinet had made known its program, Dr. Zuckerkandl, professor of political economy, published an article, in which he assigned the Potocki ministry to what he termed "das Reich der Unwahrscheinlichkeiten" (the realm of improbabilities); and in the Austrian House of Lords Professor Unger, then the leading Austrian jurist, attacked the ministry as a government of mere halfness. 13 There seems to have been agreement as to the nobility of Potocki's mind and the breadth of his personal views; but the Chancellor of the Empire, while calling him an Austrian Whig, 14 criticized the Transleithan Prime Minister for his lack of assurance, for what he termed "an estimable, but reprehensive, because mistaken conscientiousness." Beust did not conceal the fact that he soon became greatly disappointed by Potocki's attitude. But the readiness to give up when failure became apparent, the lack of any will to fight hard, together with an absence of any personal ambition may be explained by a tendency characteristic of many Austrian statesmen of the time especially, but not exclusively, those of noble origin.

Having their roots in the country, living during the larger part of the year close to nature, such men were particularly apt to discredit the effectiveness of human activity in fundamental issues; they were suspicious of attempts to change the existing order, not because of any conviction that what had been attained was especially praiseworthy, but because of an instinctive distrust, an "agricultural" distrust of innovation. Since they spent most of their time in the same place where generations of their families had lived before them, and since they lived in much the same way as had their ancestors, they tended, each of them, to think of themselves, and indeed of human beings in general, as links in a long chain, rather than as individualities. Moreover, they knew that in these provinces so familiar to them

¹³ Kolmer, loc. cit., pp. 54, 81.

¹⁴ Memoirs (London, 1887), II, p. 168.

there had never been, so far back as memory went, equality, no more for the men on the soil than for the beasts in the forest. "What is essential," Austria's last poet was to say, "is not to deny one's past or to seek new foundations." Thus being grounded in rural ways, the members of this group were not prone to take quite seriously either political or social issues; they seemed to feel that, interesting as such things might be, life was centered in none of them. The men felt themselves to be neither called nor forced to remain on the political scene, much less to carry out orders against their political convictions. All of them, Mensdorff, Szécsen, Moritz Esterházy, Belcredi, Huebner, Richard Metternich, and now Potocki, were far from being the diehards that Bismarck and Cavour (and many lesser ones) had been; yet if their resolution was less firm and their political will infinitely weaker, still their general outlook, open to all culture, to the world at large, was immeasurably broader and in their hearts they felt themselves to be unthreatened, or ungefährdet to use another expression of Hofmannsthal. Their attitude was not far different from that of their own peasants: "es kann dir nix g'schehn," as Anzengruber said. 15

As for the principles underlying Potocki's program, the American diplomat in Vienna refers to these as "the liberal policy adopted by the existing government" of Austria and explains that "it is thought that the influence and example of the [Danubian] Empire . . . would render abortive all efforts of the cabinet of Berlin to induce the South German states to consent to be absorbed by Prussia." But while the Czech representatives were disappointed that Potocki did not go far enough along the way toward federalism and remained intransigent as ever, the Austrian Germans resented the government's plans for the opposite reason and came out in open opposition by the end of June. Not even Potocki's co-nationals, the Poles, supported him effectively. 17

Before two more weeks elapsed, the international crisis commanded attention in Vienna, where opinion became unanimous that war between France and Prussia was inevitable.¹⁸ Exactly one week later it broke out.

At that time the situation which Austria had to face was complicated by still other problems than those just mentioned. Potocki's program of

16 Reports Austria, VI, 7, 1870. N.A.

¹⁵ However, the sentence in Anzengruber's comedy "Die Kreuzelschreiber" is not applied to the peasant specifically.

¹⁷ A. F. von Czedik, Zur Geschichte der k.k.österreichischen Ministerien, 1861-1916 (Teschen, 1917), I, pp. 150, 156.

¹⁸ Reports Austria, VII, 12, 1870. N.A. The report was written the day before the famous interview at Ems.

federalistic internal policy was violently objected to by the Hungarians, who had no intention of dealing with their own Slavic problems in similar fashion; moreover, such a program was naturally opposed by the Russian Empire, which feared repercussions in its Polish provinces, 19 where the last insurrection had been quelled a few years previously, not without serious danger to the peace of Europe. And in the summer of 1870, not only did the Polish problem threaten the peace in this part of Europe; the never absent "Eastern question" had assumed great proportions once more.

Several years before, when negotiations were in progress between Paris and Vienna anent the matter of forming a triple alliance against Berlin, it was generally agreed that the three principal threats to the peace were Constantinople, Rome and the Rhine.²⁰ As for the first, both Beust, who shaped the foreign policy of his country, and Rouher, who was the mouthpiece of Napoleon, took delight in exposing and analyzing the intricacies and ambiguities of the situation in the Ottoman Empire, and with some reason. The general tendency toward the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire along national lines was most pronounced in the second half of nineteenth century, and the article of the Treaty of Paris guaranteeing the integrity of Turkey had become a scrap of paper almost as soon as the document had been signed. Well known were the conflicting attitudes of Turkey's two important neighbors, Russia and Austria-Hungary, in regard to the Eastern question. All the problems arising along the extensive European frontiers of the Ottoman Empire offered continual occasions for rivalry between St. Petersburg and Vienna. The thorough-going Slavic-Russian solution may be stated in the words of Prokesch. "The final goal of Russia," he wrote, "can never be Belgrade or Bucarest, but always and only Constantinople."21 The solution championed by Austria was the preservation, as far as possible, of the general status quo. Though the Austrian stand was backed by the attitude of the British, it was inherently weak because

¹⁹ The concessions made by Austria to the Poles were a subject of discussion at the meeting between the Czar and King William of Prussia at Ems. Origines Diplomatiques de la Guerre de 1870/71, XXVII, p. 424; Gramont to Fleury VI, 6, 1870 (quoted: Origines)

²⁰ The standard work on these negotiations is H. Oncken, Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleons III 3 vols. (Stuttgart, 1926). Indispensable, also, for corrections of Oncken, is Origines, esp. vols. XXVI ff. Cf. Oncken, III, pp. 60 f., Beust to Metternich, XI, 6, 1868; pp. 89 ff., Note of Rouher XII, 30, 1868, pp. 100 ff., Note Annexée à la lettre particulière du II, 3, 1869, being Beust's answer to the note of Rouher. It is characteristic that Bismarck took the opposite attitude: he wanted to "avoid the oriental territory as unfavorable" for his policy. C. W. Clark, "Russia and the Origins of the War of 1870" in Journal of Modern History, 1942, p. 198.

^{21 &}quot;Jahre," 1869, p. 30.

of its provisional nature; and what is more, the Chancellor himself was ready to compromise the issue. Of all the statesmen and diplomats who busied themselves with the Eastern question at that time, it was only the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople, Baron de Prokesch, who was genuinely interested in the Ottoman Empire for its own sake. He perceived in it a political configuration of a specific character which—though he admitted the advisability and even the necessity of many changes in its inner structure—he was still convinced should be preserved for the benefit of Europe. Prokesch was ridiculed by the Chancellor for his "Eastern mania" when at the time of his appointment to Constantinople he told Beust that the prospect of negotiating there with the wise Ali, the Grand Vizier, instead of with Bismarck at Frankfurt, seemed to him like an Oriental vision of the blessed. However, it must be admitted that the Ambassador's reports and memoirs, permeated by his particular bias, have a value and significance all their own.

The Ottoman Empire at this period was not lacking in outstanding statesmen; the names of Reshid, Fuad and Ali have a definite place in the history of the nineteenth century. At the international gathering in 1856 at Paris most observers were highly impressed by the representatives of the Porte.²² Beust, to whom a cynical attitude came easily enough, wrote of his meeting with Ali Pasha in Constantinople (1869): "All that I had heard about his great accomplishments and his engaging manners was surpassed by the reality."23 These Turkish statesmen were fully aware of the problems and the dangers facing the Empire. While they were not opposed to changes in the internal policy, their chief aim was to win for the Empire a breathing space, a period of external peace that would last long enough to carry out a program of necessary internal reform, genuine to Turkey. The trouble was that St. Petersburg, fully informed of their plans, was not at all eager to see this task accomplished, while the "friendly" powers wanted to insist on certain provisional reform measures conceived according to strictly western patterns. There is some evidence for assuming that the Grand Vizier and his friends might even have agreed to a severance of certain Balkan countries provided that such a settlement would really guarantee the perpetuation of the Empire in its Islamic importance, thereby allowing a greater emphasis on the character of the sultan as caliph, as the supreme protector of all the Moslems. But behind the exchange of courteous messages which solemnly took place at the Porte, the expressions of friendship on the part of the

²² Cf., e.g., A. Hübner, Neun Jahre der Erinnerungen (Berlin, 1904), I, p. 243.
23 Memoirs, II, p. 136.

European ambassadors and of a sincere desire to grant protection, and the expression of deep gratitude on the part of the Turks, there prevailed continuous distrust. This was all the more so because the Turkish ministers were very well aware of the secret means to which the European countries resorted in their dealings with the Balkan states. They knew, for instance of the exact sums spent by Russia to bribe the Montenegrin potentates.²⁴

According to the views of the Austrian ambassador, there was complete harmony between the interests of the Danubian monarchy and the plans of the Grand Vizier, Ali. But this opinion was not shared in Vienna itself and even less in Budapest. As a result of the Compromise of 1867 foreign policy remained one of the very few topics common to both halves of the Habsburg monarchy; in practice, however, divergencies developed between the views of Cisleitha and of Transleitha even in this field. Prokesch was right; it was as if the sails on a ship were set in such a way that they worked against each other.²⁵

Around 1870 the hope was fondly cherished at Budapest of settling first the relations with Serbia and next the internal Serbian problems by cordial collaboration with Belgrade and by supporting certain claims for an increase of Serbian territory. These involved, in particular, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were to be taken from the Ottoman Empire.²⁶ Beust was well aware that such a plan might weaken a definitely friendly power for the benefit of a state whose future relations with the Danubian monarchy were, to say the least, of a dubious nature, although the last ruler had assumed a friendly attitude. This friendliness was one of the two possible attitudes for nineteenth century Serbia. But if the Chancellor offered far less resistance to the suggestions of the Hungarians than his ambassador at Constantinople expected, this was owing mainly to his desire for ultimate collaboration with France. Therefore, he was eager not to forestall her traditional claim to being protector of the Christian nationalities throughout the Near East.²⁷ In a somewhat ambiguous way Rouher, the Minister of State, said in his note: "The orient is a well chosen territory for an energetic common action."28 In elaborating on the common Oriental program, the Austrian Chancellor declared explicitly that among the claims

²⁴ Cf. on this topic Ali's remarks to Prokesch in 1869 ("Jahre," p. 5) or *Ibid.*, p. 25 on analogous expenditures of the Khedive. *Ibid.*, 1870, p. 7: the Grand Vizier hands over to the Ambassador at copy of a letter of a secret Russian agent in Vienna.

^{25 &}quot;Jahre," 1869, p. 54.

²⁶ E. v. Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrassy (Stuttgart, 1910), I, pp. 458 ff.

²⁷ For this program cf. especially the "note annexée," Oncken, III, pp. 102 ff.

²⁸ Oncken, III, p. 91.

of the Balkan countries, those of Serbia deserved special attention, Serbia being the least hostile to the existence of the Ottoman Empire.²⁹ In 1869 Serbia published a constitution which, though moderate in matters concerning domestic policy, disregarded the still existing rights of Turkish sovereignty. Austria urged the Porte to pass over the matter of existing treaties and international law and to keep in mind merely the question of political opportunity, from which point of view, Beust thought, no objections could be made to the new constitution of Serbia.³⁰

But even more urgent, as well as more irksome, was the Rumanian problem as it had developed by that time. Prince Charles, the brother of that Hohenzollern, who, through his candidature for the throne of Spain, was to become in the crucial month of July, 1870 one of the occasions for the Franco-Prussian war, represented to the world the national union of the two former Danubian principalities; he represented the very existence of the Rumanian nation. There were, however, still some European nations who considered the Rumanian nation to be a sort of "invention"; faced with this attitude, the Rumanian statesmen were all the more eager to present the world with a declaration of independence of the national Rumanian state and to rid themselves, thereby, of any remnants of Turkish suzerainty. However, there was some chance that such a riddance would mean the change from a mainly juridical dependence to an actual political one either on Russia or even Austria-Hungary. It was obvious that with such general unrest prevailing in the country, the other nations, Russia and Austria, France and Prussia, should seek to profit from this situation. None was more active in this respect than Russia, though Gortschakoff, the Chancellor, insisted that the utmost restraint on the part of Russia was being observed in regard to any question of Rumanian internal policy.31 How could it be otherwise? the Chancellor added. And when the French Ambassador complained about the secret activities of Russian agents, 32 he replied: "A great country like Russia does not act in secret." In the meantime the internal conditions of Rumania continued to deteriorate and by the beginning of July, 1870 reached an almost catastrophic state; foreign intervention seemed unavoidable, and the intervention of either Russia or Austria would necessarily mean that the other would follow suit. Constantinople was opposed to granting a single concession to Bucharest, such as a change of the

²⁹ Ibid., p. 104.

^{30 &}quot;Jahre," 1869, pp. 29/ff.

³¹ Origines, XXVII, pp. 227, 257 f., 287 ff., 328 ff.

³² Ibid., p. 287; Fleury to Ollivier, V, 13, 1870.

ruler's title from "prince" to "king," or the right of autonomous coinage. All such steps, Ali argued, would only intensify the trend toward complete national independence in Rumania and increase the revolutionary influence which Russia was already exercising in the Balkans. He warned Austria, whose policy was vacillating again, that the establishment of an independent national state in Bucharest would have the inevitable result that her own territory would be penetrated by Russian-inspired revolutionary activities so long as there were any Rumanians and Serbs living within her frontiers. As a matter of fact, Russia, by the beginning of 1870, seemed inclined to negotiate with Rumania as with a completely independent state. While France was fondly hoping to build up an independent Rumania as a bulwark against Russia, to substitute for the rôle that Poland had once played, Russia would have looked upon a declaration of Rumanian independence as just a step leading from Turkish to Russian hegemony in Bucharest.

But in the last analysis, the Rumanian question was only of secondary importance to Constantinople, and the same was true of Serbia and even more so of Montenegro, where troubles went on constantly. On at least two occasions Ali spoke in clear-cut terms of the willingness of the Porte to let Rumania pass into the hands of the Dual Monarchy,³⁴ though not into those of Russia whom she feared. Constantinople had quite different feelings about Egypt. The Grand Vizier told the Austrian Ambassador that if Turkey should lose the tributary states at the Danube, the Ottoman Empire would still continue to exist. "But if we lose Egypt, and in consequence of this, Arabia also, the country will be split in two. Egypt is Islamic territory; its loss would mean death for the Empire." Back in 1829 Friedrich Gentz, one of the best political thinkers in Metternich's Austria, had written: "The future of Constantinople will be always the reflection of that great bankruptcy which lies in store for all of Europe." ³⁶

Rumors of plans in Cairo for the independence of Egypt went back certainly as far as the 1820's when the powerful personality of Mehemet Ali seemed to become providentially the center of a great pan-Islamic movement. On the other hand, it is well known that at least from the end of the eighteenth century onward, imperialistic thought in France turned to Egypt again and again. Furthermore from that time Egypt served as the object of a bitter rivalry between France and England. These two trends, the one

^{33 &}quot;Jahre," 1870, pp. 4 f., 12 f., 17.

³⁴ Beust, Memoirs, II, p. 132; 'Jahre,' 1870, p. 6.

^{35 &}quot;Jahre," 1869, p. 27; cf. also pp. 37, 43 f.

³⁶ Prokesch, Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen vom Türkischen Reiche (Wien, 1867), II, p. 386.

aiming at the independence of Egypt and the other of European imperialism directed toward that country, had necessarily to reach a new intensity at the moment when the waterway was finally cut through the Isthmus of Suez. In November, 1869 the Suez Canal had been opened with brilliant festivities. On the day of this event Arabia and India moved close to Europe; the territory of Egypt became an annex to the Canal.

The Khedive of Egypt, Ishmail Pasha, was far different from Mehemet, his great predecessor, who had been the inspiration and the embodiment of pan-Islamic feeling throughout the world. Reared in Paris, and a great admirer of what he considered to be French civilization, he was imbued with that cheap type of westernization which allowed him to think a historical deed accomplished when he had his harem attend behind the screens a performance of Offenbach's La Belle Hélène in his capital. "And soon, I hope, even the screens will be removed," he did not forget to add in his report to the Austrian diplomat.³⁷ But though he had not the slightest interest in the artistic and cultural relics of Egypt's past—just as most of the leaders in the Greek war of deliverance cared little for those of their country he yearned passionately for his country's independence. Toward such an attitude the French had a twofold policy. On the one hand they were interested in keeping the Ottoman Empire intact; on the other, the ideas that France had cherished of her mission in Egypt together with her rivalry with England, made her interested in any movement toward independence in the Nile valley. And in Vienna, while there was little interest in this independence as such, Count Beust, whose policy it was to seek general collaboration with France, influenced the Danubian monarchy to speak in Constantinople (to the amazement of the Porte) in favor of some extravagant claims of Cairo.38 Since the Khedive, of course, had placed his highest hopes in the effect that would be produced by the opening of the Suez Canal, he had arranged for the presence of the French Empress and Emperor Francis Joseph among the illustrious guests who had gathered there on November 16, while the legitimate sovereign of Egypt and his ministers were absent. However, the moment passed without any direct political consequences; it was not in the plans of St. Petersburg to have the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire start from Egypt. The policy in Cairo remained unchanged, though the Khedive went to Constantinople to pay his respects there. It was in the first week of July that he made this trip, at a time when the threat of a conflict between France, his protecting power, and

^{37 &}quot;Jahre," 1869, p. 2. 38 "Jahre," 1869, pp. 25, 28, 35, 45.

Prussia had grown in intensity, thereby endangering the position of Ishmail, who feared the occupation of the Isthmus by French or English forces.89 Certain disturbances which occurred among Arabian tribes near Mecca in the fall of 1870 and the ambiguous rôle played by the Khedive on that occasion, 40 certainly did not let the Porte forget the importance and the dangers of the Egyptian problem, which, as a matter of fact, were by no means restricted to the Turco-Egyptian situation. As an American diplomat wrote:41 "It is hardly possible that an armed conflict can exist for any considerable length of time between Turkey and Egypt without provoking the intervention of Austria, France and England." On July 1, 1870, this diplomat added, "should the peace of Europe be disturbed, Serbia, Rumania and Egypt would be likely to combine to break the fetters which now bind them to the Porte, with very good chances of success."42 In spite of, or because of these serious dangers Turkey had made thorough preparation for war; her armament program had proceeded far; her troops were well trained; 43 and in the case of a conflict between Berlin (regarded as the secret ally of Russia in the Oriental theater) and Paris, her sympathies were sure to be on the side of the latter. "The Porte is tacitly the ally of France ... It seems as if we were on the eve of a general war which will lead to a radical change in the political status of Europe." In those words the American Minister, reporting on the calling up of the reserves by Turkey, summarized the situation on July 18, 1870.

On that day in Vienna the ministers were assembled under the presidency of the Emperor, in order to determine the policy of the Habsburg Empire: by that time, the general carrying the French declaration of war had already left Paris and was to reach Berlin the next morning. It is well known today how Count Beust, though wholeheartedly working for collaboration with France, refrained from entering into any explicit engagement to that effect. The letters exchanged between the monarchs of Austria-Hungary, Italy and France in September, 1869 included no mention of any obligations on the part of Vienna and Florence. As a consequence of a number of additional errors committed by the French diplomacy, the Foreign Minister, duc de Gramont, was unable to refer to any valid obligations

³⁹ Egypt, Consular Reports, VIII, 5, 1870, N.A.

^{40 &}quot;Jahre," 1870, pp. 28 f. 41 Reports Turkey, XII, 1, 1869. N.A. 42 Reports Turkey, VII, 1, 1870. N.A.

⁴³ Cf. the highly favorable impressions which Francis Joseph and his suite received at the maneuvers held in their honor near Constantinople on October 30, 1869; "Jahre," 1869, p. 41; see also ibid., 1870, p. 21; and Reports Turkey VII, 18; IX, 2, 1870, N.A.

when he found himself compelled to plead in the two capitals for assistance

as the crisis grew rapidly graver towards the middle of July.

Certainly the attitude of the Hungarians and of the majority of the German-speaking Austrians would have made it very difficult for the Habsburg monarchy to pursue a more outspoken policy, and certainly speculations on the probable attitude of Russia worked in the same direction. It is also true, however, that the procedure was in accordance with the personality of the Austrian statesman who at that time was described by the French chargé d'affaires as "an artist in diplomacy and policy who enjoys moderate excitements and the game of lesser intrigues, but who fears violent measures or serious involvements where one must put up heavy stakes and make quick decisions."44

On July 18 there were present at the crown council in Vienna the following persons: Archduke Albert, the best military authority of the Empire who had recently led the Austrian army to the brilliant victory at Custozza in 1866; Chancellor Count Beust; the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Andrássy; Count Potocki, the Cisleithan Prime Minister; the Minister of War, Baron Kuhn; the Minister of Finance, Count Lonyai. The two last represented the empire as a whole. The council was presided over by the Emperor.45

Beust opened the discussion by surveying the situation of Europe; he emphasized the fact that so far, the monarchy had accepted no obligations of any kind and defined her policy as one of passivity—"Passivitätspolitik." Reminding the council of the attitudes of the other powers and especially of the conversations just held between the chancellors of Russia and the North German Confederation, Beust asked for advice as to whether such a policy of passivity could and should be continued; he certainly did not give his own opinion. The first to answer was the Hungarian Prime Minister, who stated that it would be highly dangerous to continue with a merely passive policy, since Prussia already had her own agitators in the monarchy, sent there to act under the pretext of fostering liberalism, while France, who was busy working for a revolution in Rumania, would be sure to involve Austria-Hungary in the difficulties which were likely to arise at the lower Danube. Austria-Hungary, Andrássy continued, was not called upon to participate in a war by the side of France; her only policy should

Cazaux to Gramont, VII, 17, 1870; Origines, XXIX, p. 60.
 Protokoll vom 18. Juli 1870; Ministerrat für gemeinsame Angelegenheiten. St. A. This protocol has been partly used by A. Stern, loc. cit. (Stern is biased against Beust and in favor of Bismarck) and by E. v. Wertheimer, loc. cit. (Wertheimer is biased against Beust and in favor of Andrassy).

be one of neutrality; this, however, should not be an armed neutrality which might provoke Russia and cause her to suspect that the Habsburg monarchy intended to occupy the former Danubian principalities. Her neutrality ought to be similar to that of the Netherlands, allowing the monarchy to make preparations to a certain degree. Horses and provisions could be bought. perhaps about 300,000 men mobilized and everything prepared so that the army would be ready within three weeks. Austria-Hungary should continue to avoid assuming any obligations; the monarchy should make a declaration of neutrality, stating plainly that she would not enter the war so long as Prussia remained alone and that the military preparations were undertaken only in view of eventualities which might arise in the Orient. Andrássy characterized the policy he advocated as one of a "wait-and-see" neutrality. He admitted that a Prussian victory was far from desirable from the point of view of the Danubian monarchy; but he was confident that such a victory could not be won within a short time, since to France a war with Prussia would be of a national rather than a dynastic character. If, however, Russia should enter the war, he repeated, the monarchy would have no choice.

Count Potocki, while stressing his personal feelings in favor of France—admitted that pro-German sympathies prevailed in the Cisleithan provinces. He was convinced that Austria would finally decide for armed neutrality because Russia would threaten to occupy Galicia in the event of a Prussian failure. Nevertheless, he favored, for the moment, the continuation of a passive policy provided that this attitude was coupled with an energetic diplomatic activity. The Prime Minister warned that since the armament program had to be voted in the way prescribed by the constitution, the government should be prepared to listen to certain voices in the diets that would sing no pleasant melodies.⁴⁶

To this Andrássy replied that the neutrality he advocated was different from what Potocki understood as armed neutrality which would give Prussia a pretext to involve the monarchy in the war. He wanted only a partial military preparedness. The Emperor criticized this suggestion from the point of view of military technique; he saw only one alternative left between complete military preparation and continuance of a passive policy. Thereupon Archduke Albert pointed out the amount of time necessary for military

⁴⁶ Potocki proved to be right according to the survey given by W. Rogge, Oesterreich von Vilagos bis zur Gegenwart (Leipzig, 1873), III, pp. 341 ff. concerning the discussions held at the opening of the diets in August, 1870. Potocki's feelings in favor of France and against Prussia were at that time also shared by his former colleague Dr. Berger. A. Freih v. Berger, Gesammelte Schriften, (Wien, 1913), I, p. 65.

preparation; he thought the necessary minimum would be forty days. Next the Minister of Finance, who shared Potocki's sympathies with France, also agreed with him that the Dual Monarchy should continue the passive policy for the next days while increasing her diplomatic activity. Moreover, since a declaration of neutrality by Austria would be favorable to Prussia, Count Lonyai suggested that Berlin be asked in return to discontinue Prussian agitation within the boundaries of the Habsburg monarchy.

This suggestion was attacked by the Minister of War, who held that the monarchy would inevitably have to wage war since the whole world was already arming. He compared the present situation with that existing before the Thirty Years' War. Then, as now, Europe was full of unsolved problems; now, as then, any attempt to localize the war was bound to fail. A general conflagration had become unavoidable. He dwelt on the serious danger to the Habsburg monarchy of a Prussian victory and pointed out the likelihood that such a victory might be won very speedily. Therefore, Baron Kuhn believed that the Dual Monarchy must prepare to speak and to act in favor of France before it was too late. Armaments should be started immediately and on a large scale—"in grossartigem Massstabe."

Archduke Albert once more reminded the council of the time factor. According to his expectations the decisive battle would be waged by the beginning of September somewhere along the borders of Saxony.¹⁷ If Austria-Hungary did not wish to enter into action at that time, no armaments at all were needed; in the opposite case preparations should be begun energetically. At this Beust rose to speak again. The Chancellor referred to the good relations which had existed between Paris and Vienna during the past years, and explained them partly by the fact that no object of controversy had arisen, partly because of the impossibility of reaching a tolerable understanding between Vienna and Berlin. 48 While reiterating that no alliance had been concluded with Paris, Beust thought it nevertheless obviously demanded of Vienna to avoid anything that would give assistance to the enemies of France. For his part the Chancellor believed that the war would last rather long; and in view of "the well known perfidy of Prussia," he thought it useless to try to sell Austria's neutrality: one had only to remember the result of the famous Gastein convention of 1865. What Beust strongly advocated was to watch Russia closely, who was growing more dangerous daily. He expressed his conviction (as he had done pre-

⁴⁷ As a matter of fact, September 1 was to be the day on which the Battle of Sedan occurred.

⁴⁸ Beust elaborated this point more in detail at the conference held VIII, 22, 1870.

viously in his correspondence with Paris) that a war in this theater would be highly popular in the Danubian monarchy. In his opinion, the decisions taken by Belgium or Switzerland, the two neutral countries, could not apply to Austria-Hungary, where the conditions were so different. He considered it of no great importance whether the monarchy declared for simple or for armed neutrality; what mattered to him was to be prepared against any surprise and to continue the diplomatic conversation with Italy in a sense friendly to France. Notwithstanding the experiences of the Danubian monarchy during the Crimean War, Beust considered military preparations necessary even if a declaration of neutrality were to be made. The enmity of Russia was increasing more and more, and it was necessary to be armed in order to be able to mediate peacefully.

Andrássy's reply was directed in the first place against the Minister of War. He considered it still possible that the Dual Monarchy would not have to enter the war at all; and what was more, since it was generally agreed that the war could not be brought to an end as quickly as was done in 1866, there was no need for hasty action. He reminded the council that some risk was also involved in collaborating closely with Napoleon. Referring to the events of 1859 at the close of the war against Austria, Andrássy warned that in case of an alliance with France, Napoleon might make a sudden peace with Prussia, leaving the Habsburg monarchy at the mercy of Prussia and Russia. An expectant attitude would still prove the most advantageous; only in that way could preparations be made to meet the situation in Constantinople, Belgrade and Bucharest. While Andrássy readily admitted that he too had no great trust in Bismarck, he disagreed with Beust's assumption that it was useless to talk with Berlin. It was, he felt, to Bismarck's interest to attempt nothing against the Danubian monarchy as long as she kept inactive. To this Beust replied that the main concern was to keep in touch with France; the Chancellor gave as his final opinion that Austria-Hungary, on the basis of the discussion just held, should make a declaration of neutrality and then begin mobilizing. The Emperor brought the council to a close with the decision that neutrality should be kept for the time being and that preparatory armaments were to be begun; explanatory notes should be forwarded to the powers.

The declaration of neutrality was made on July 20. In the next weeks several more councils of ministers followed,⁴⁹ which were concerned with

⁴⁹ According to the protocols kept in St. A. conferences were held on: July 22, 23, 24, 30; August 3, 7, 22, 30. Beust presided over the conferences held on July 22, 23, 24; the others were presided over by the Emperor.

the military preparations and their necessary cost. The Minister of War felt the Monarchy to be threatened by Russia, and was eager to provide against such danger effectively. Most of the members of the council, however, were perturbed by the sums asked by Baron Kuhn for this purpose. Moreover, Count Potocki was afraid lest Russia should be provoked, but this did not move Andrássy who was already greatly disappointed by the vagueness of the declarations which Russia had given up to then. "Graeca fides, nulla fides," he quoted.⁵⁰ He deemed energetic measures of defense indispensable. The Emperor and Kuhn, on the other hand, were afraid of spending so much money on measures which in the end might not prove adequate.

It is well known that after the declaration of war on July 19, the Emperor of Russia on several occasions promised his country's neutrality on condition that Austria-Hungary would abstain from taking part in the conflict, or, as it was stated in the St. Petersburg declaration of neutrality issued on July 22, that Russia's interest would not be "affected" by the war,⁵¹ a wording which contained a strong hint to Austria and France as to their proper attitude on the Polish question. Once again we find Beust dwelling on the tension which existed between Vienna on the one hand and Berlin and St. Petersburg on the other, which his policy had been unable to counteract. 52, Finally, toward the end of August, two weeks before the collapse of the Second Empire, he admitted that the Danubian Monarchy was no longer able to contemplate military action, and he pointed out in this connection the technical flaws in the handling of the Hohenzollern candidature in Paris. The Chancellor wanted Austria-Hungary to join in the chorus of those powers, England, Russia and Italy, who were to abide by a policy of neutrality; he was even ready to give Russia assurances in regard to the dreaded Polish question. Andrássy was still concerned about Russia's plans for the future; he compared the idea of entering into common action with this country with the expedition which the Habsburg monarchy had made in common with Prussia against Denmark in 1864. One should not blind oneself to the fact, he felt, that any state of importance would always have enemies; and this applied especially to the Danubian Monarchy because of her geographical position and her internal conditions. Any

⁵⁰ Protocol VII, 24.

⁵¹ Origines, XXIX, pp. 120, 124, 150, 186, 311, 349ff., 434. Cf. F. Charles-Roux, Alexandre II, Gortschakoff et Napoleon III (Paris, 1913), p. 481. For Bismarck's appeal to the Czar through the Russian ambassador at Berlin on July 14, cf. Clark, loc cit., pp. 203ff.

⁵² Protocol VIII, 22.

improvement in the relations with Russia, so the Hungarian Prime Minister feared, would not last long. The historic mission of the Danubian Monarchy was to be for Europe a bulwark against Russia. Only so long as Austria-Hungary should fulfill this mission, would her existence be necessary to Europe. Accordingly, Andrássy advised that the armaments and the building of the railroads continue. The council which met on August 22, was brought to a close with the picture of a gloomy future offered by the Minister of War. The military overthrow of France, which could already be foreseen, would be, according to Baron Kuhn, disastrous for Austria-Hungary from every possible aspect.

The American Minister to Vienna had reported at the beginning of August that the general impression he had received there, was that the Dual Monarchy was quietly, but effectively, preparing for war as for something which, despite every effort, she was helpless to avoid. The British Ambassador was skeptical about the effectiveness of these preparations. While they were going on quietly in Vienna, much still remained to be done to place Austria on a war footing, and he criticized Beust, the most influential political personality in Vienna, for being so "anxious to be always busy, and not ready enough to wait and let events develop themselves." 53

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

⁵³ Reports Austria, VIII, 4, 1870. N.A.

AMERICAN DOCUMENTS ON ITALY'S ANNEXATION OF VENETIA (1866)

by Howard R. Marraro

URING the winter of 1865 and the spring of the following year the question of the liberation of Venetia seemed to be approaching a final and definitive solution. This was a natural result of the alliance Prussia offered to Italy in a common war against Austria. The Prusso-Italian treaty of alliance, signed on April 8, 1866, provided that Venetia would be ceded to Italy and that neither party would sign an armistice or treaty of peace without the consent of the other. When, in May, 1866, Austria learned of the Prusso-Italian treaty, she offered Venetia to Italy through Napoleon; but Prime Minister La Marmora¹ refused the offer, preferring to uphold the treaty of alliance with Prussia. Shortly afterward (June 16-19) Prussia and Italy declared war on Austria, and presently the opposing armies met on the battlefields. The Prussian army, after defeating the Austrians at Sadowa on July 3, continued its victorious march through Moravia, encamping within fifteen kilometers of Vienna where it wished to dictate the peace terms. But Bismarck opposed the view of the army, and on July 26, without consulting the Italian government or King Victor Emmanuel II, offered an armistice. Four days later he signed the preliminaries of peace. The final treaty of peace, signed the following month (August 24) at Prague, enabled Prussia to achieve the purpose for which she had waged war against Austria, i.e., the complete exclusion of Austria from German territory.

Bismarck's disloyal conduct toward Italy must be attributed, in part at least, to the unfortunate vicissitudes of the Italian campaigns in this war. In order better to understand the defeats suffered by the Italians, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the organization of a strong Italian army was at the moment in its initial stages and that it encountered numerous obstacles due to the jealousy of the leaders, regional rivalries, the absence of a military tradition, serious economic difficulties, and finally to many defects in the public life of the country which naturally had their repercussions on the organization of the army.

From the beginning of the campaign the Italian army lacked unity of

Alfonso Ferrero, Marquis de La Marmora (1804-78). Commander of Sardinian troops in Crimea; president of the council of ministers and minister of foreign affairs (Sept. 28, 1864 to June 20, 1866); from June 20, 1866, minister without portfolio.

command. In order to satisfy two generals—La Marmora and Cialdini²—the army was composed of two separate divisions. The King with La Marmora, his Chief of Staff, was in command of the first division composed of 120,000 men; Cialdini was placed in command of the second division with 80,000 men. The two divisions operated almost in complete indedendence of one another: Cialdini was to engage the enemy on the lower banks of the Po; La Marmora was to fight along the Mincio. A corps of 30,000 volunteers with Garibaldi was to advance in the Trentino with the object of cutting the communications with Austria from that side.³

On June 24, the Austrian army dealt a severe blow to the Italian army at Custoza.⁴ However, about a week later (July 3) when the Prussian army crushed the Austrians at Sadowa, the Austrians were anxious to withdraw entirely from Italy, going so far as to renew the offer of Venetia to Italy through Napoleon. The Italian Government, under the premiership of Ricasoli,⁵ refused the offer, being still hopeful of Italian military and naval victory.⁶ Though these hopes were well-founded, on July 19-20, the

² Enrico Cialdini (1811-1892). Duke of Gaeta. Patriot, exiled in 1831, he returned to Italy in 1848, and entered the Sardinian army. After Garibaldi, he was the most popular Italian general. In 1860 he freed the regions of Marches and Umbria. In 1864 he directed the memorable siege of Gaeta.

³ Referring to the volunteers, Mr. Marsh wrote in his despatch No. 141 that "the enrolment of volunteers has been suspended for the alleged reason that it is impossible to arm and equip and organize them as fast as they present themselves. The number already accepted is stated at forty thousand. . . Some of the opponents of the present ministry ascribe the suspension of the enrolments to a reluctance on the part of the ministry to admit into the army so large an infusion of what is regarded as democratic elements. . ."

⁴ Referring to this defeat, in his despatch No. 144, dated Florence, July 2, 1866, Mr. Marsh wrote to Mr. Seward: "... the battle of the 24th of June... was in the highest degree creditable to the valor of the Italian troops... The commencement of an offensive warfare by a defeat was an event certainly not calculated to encourage the friends of Italy, but the battle has established the claims of the Italian soldiery to an equal rank with that of the Austrians, and I do not think the national spirit or the credit of the government is much depressed in consequence." MS archives American embassy, Rome. Published: United States, Foreign Relations, 1866, pt. 2, p. 113.

5 Bettino Ricasoli baron di Brolio (1809-80). In 1859 he was head of the provi-

⁵ Bettino Ricasoli baron di Brolio (1809-80). In 1859 he was head of the provisional government of Tuscany; from June 12, 1861, to March 3, 1862, and from June 20, 1866, to Apr. 4, 1867, prime minister. During the former period he was also minister of foreign affairs; and during the latter period also minister of the interior.

⁶ On June 20, 1866, in his despatch No. 143 Mr. Marsh wrote to Secretary Seward that he had visited Baron Ricasoli that morning and had found him engaged in the duties of his new position. "He" [Baron Ricasoli], wrote Mr. Marsh, "is very hopeful of success in this great struggle and indeed it must be very difficult for a patriotic Italian to believe defeat possible, when the whole nation is inspired with such enthusiasm. I am sure that the history of modern Europe, with the possible exception of Republican France, in and after 1793, has never exhibited an example of such universal, absorbing, and generous

Italian navy under Admiral Persano7 was severely defeated in the battle of Lissa. The effects of this defeat were very grave, not only because of the losses Italy sustained, but more particularly because of the repercussions. it had on the prosecution of the war and on the psychology of the people.

It was to Prussia's own interest to hasten the end of the war. Accordingly, on July 26, without previous consultations with the Italian Government, Prussia signed an armistice with Austria. In this manner the victorious advance of the Garibaldians and the victories of Cialdini's army along the Isonzo were rendered unfruitful.⁹ The remote effects of the Prusso-Austrian peace were disastrous for Italy, for though Austria ceded Venetia to Italy through Napoleon, she was able to retain her almost absolute control of the Adriatic, since she kept Istria and the Trentino. For more than half a century the new boundaries continued to be a constant menace to the safety of the young Kingdom of Italy.

The final treaty of peace between Italy and Austria¹⁰ was signed at

devotion to a national cause as is presented by the people of Italy today. Of course the clergy in general do not sympathize with the people, but they have not influence enough to embarrass the government, and their political position is regarded with great indifference." MS archives American embassy, Rome. Published, United States-Foreign Relations, 1866,

7 Count Carlo Pellion di Persano (1806-83), admiral; from Mar. 3 to Dec. 8, 1862,

minister of the navy; made senator, Oct. 8, 1865.

8 For an account of this naval engagement see: Howard R. Marraro, "Unpublished American documents on the naval battle of Lissa (1866)," Journal of Modern History,

Sept., 1942, XIV, pp. 342-356.

9 After the signing of the preliminaries of peace between Austria and Italy, Green Clay, secretary of the American legation in Florence from 1866 to 1868, in his despatch No. 160, dated Florence, September 10, 1866, wrote to Mr. Seward that "the only name -of all the heads of the different branches of the service-that issues from the war with increased lustre, is that of the Commander-in-Chief of the volunteers. It is known in confidential circles that this officer, before the commencement of hostilities, was led to expect the command of an expedition to the Dalmatian coast, but was forced to relinquish it from political considerations which were imposed upon the Italian Government by foreign powers, who feared the spirit of revolution and did not wish the Eastern question to spring in the war. And when ordered for similar reasons to withdraw his volunteers from the portion of the Tyrol which he had occupied by dint of the hardest of fighting, his simple reply was that of a soldier 'ubbidisco." The conduct of General Garibaldi in these difficult situations and since, during other distasteful events, is the subject of general comment and for purity of character and patriotism he stands alone in the universal estimation." MS archives American embassy, Rome.

10 Discussing the peace terms between Austria and Italy, Green Clay in his despatch No. 153, dated Florence, August 13, 1866, wrote to Mr. Seward: "Although I have never shared the opinion of those who believe the Emperor Napoleon wishes to keep Italy in a state of quasi-vassalage to foreign powers, yet I think there is no doubt his tutelage of Italian interests in the present war has to a certain extent paralyzed the military arm of the Kingdom. The wisdom of Count Cavour's policy in forming and maintaining the Franco-Italian alliance is beyond question; only in the hands of the weaker men who have Vienna on October 3, 1866; about two weeks later, by means of a plebiscite held on October 21-22, the provinces of Venetia were united to the Kingdom of Italy.

The following nine despatches, (eight of which have been hitherto unpublished) by American diplomatic and consular representatives in Italy contain eyewitness accounts of the events as they were gradually unfolding. As our representatives were keen and impartial observers they were in a position to give a careful and objective analysis of the political, military and economic situation that prevailed in Italy during this critical period of her history which, however, ultimately resulted in the annexation of the rich region of Venetia to the Kingdom of Italy. The despatches fall into two distinct categories: military and political on the one hand, and commercial reports on the other. Consul Lawrence's despatch of June 11, 1866, gives an authentic account of the military preparations and the enthusiasm of the people of Italy before the actual outbreak of hostilities. In his three despatches (two of them marked "Confidential") Minister Marsh discusses the causes of the defeat at Custoza, the spirit of the Italian people, the dispute arising from the intervention of Napoleon III in the settlement of what was considered a strictly Italian affair, and the ceremonies held on the occasion of the King's entry into Venice which he (Mr. Marsh) attended in person. Consul Colton's five despatches discuss the immediate political and economic results---a source of great disappointment to the

succeeded that great statesman has it degenerated into a certain subserviency to the imperial will. It is now to be hoped—and with every probability of realization—that the present head of the cabinet will elevate the foreign policy of Italy to that dignity which reposes on the reciprocal respect and confidence of nations.

"The short period of this war is fruitful of lessons to Italian statesmen and the Italian people. Peace is now acceptable to all parties—by the party of the government, who desires it-glad to escape from a situation that was becoming more difficult for them every hour; by the party of the opposition who has taken umbrage at the reappearance of Napoleon on the scene of the affair of the Rhenish Provinces-to complicate the relations of Italy to Prussia and to France—they demand immediate peace in terms of bitter denunciation of the man whom they accuse of having turned to ashes the golden fruits of an opportunity so auspicious for the cause of national unity . . ." MS archives of American embassy, Rome. Extract published: United States—Foreign Relations, 1866, pt. 2, pp. 113-114.

In a later despatch No. 159, dated Florence, September 3, 1866, Green Clay wrote to Mr. Seward:—". . . In the history of the Franco-Italian alliance no event that I remember except perhaps the announcement of the September Convention . . . has caused such surprise and widespread humiliation as this new dictatorial mediation of the Emperor Napoleon. Certainly nothing could tend more than his present policy to confirm the conviction of those who believe the newly erected Italian kingdom can never become a faithful ally and support of France. It is to be hoped that Baron Ricasoli will be able to resist the pressure that is brought to force him from power and sacrifice the Prussian alliance to the designs of a foreign potenate. . ." MS archives American embassy, Rome.

local population — that accompanied the liberation of the region from Austrian domination.

United States Consulate General for Italy, 11 Florence, June 11, 1866.

The Hon. William H. Seward¹²
The Secretary of State
Washington
Sir:

The refusal of the Austrian Government to take part in the international Conference at Paris and the consequent failure of that well-intentional effort to preserve the peace of Europe, has terminated the state of inaction on the part of Prussia and Italy, and hostilities on their part are expected to commence during the present week.

I am informed upon high authority that a forward movement of the Italian army upon the line of the Mincio, may be expected on the 14th instant, simultaneously with the commencement of active operations in the North on

the part of the Prussians.

The flower of the army of Austria under Benedek,¹³ the most skilful of her generals, is opposed to Prussia, while Venice is defended by troops of an inferior quality. The combined Prussian and Italian armies are about equal in point of numbers to those of Austria, so that the contest between the combatants is by no means unequal.

The King is to leave Florence tomorrow to take command of the Italian army in person, his two sons, the Princes Umberto and Amedeo having sometime since assumed their respective commands, the first of a division, and the

latter of a brigade.

The Prince of Carignano, 14 cousin of the King, will act as Regent in the absence of His Majesty, while Baron Ricasoli, it is supposed, succeeds General La Marmora as Prime Minister, the latter taking position as Chief of the Royal Staff.

General Garibaldi arrived at Genova from Caprera in a Government

11 MS. archives American consulate, Florence.

12 William Henry Seward (1801-72). Secretary of State, 1861-69.

14 Savoia, Eugenio. Prince of Carignano (1816-88). Born in Paris, the son of Prince Giuseppe, Count of Villafranca. On several occasions, during the wars of Italian independence, he was appointed Lieutenant General of the Kingdom. From Jan. 7 to May 20, 1861, he was Lieutenant General of the King at Naples. After the war of 1866 he

was retired from public life.

¹³ Ludovic Benedek (1804-1881). Studied in the military academy of Wienner-Neustadt, entering the army in 1822. Fought against the Piedmontese in 1848-49 and again in 1859. Appointed field-marshal. Enjoying the complete confidence of the Emperor Francis Joseph, when the war against Prussia broke out in 1866, he received the command of the army of Bohemia. His failure to take the offensive, which permitted the Prussians to enter Bohemia, resulted in the defeat of Austria at Sadowa on July 3, 1866, leaving the path open to the Prussians to march on Prague and Vienna.

vessel last night and proceeds today to Como (on the lake of the same name, one of the four governmental depots for volunteers), and will, as requested by Government, speedily take command of the volunteer contingent. 15

The Italian fleet is to operate in the Adriatic simultaneously with the army, and as the Italian Navy is now in a good state of discipline and efficiency and greatly superior in every respect to that of its antagonist, a highly satisfactory result is justly expected from its operations.

The greatest enthusiasm with regard to the war is manifested throughout the kingdom, not excelled even by that of our loyal states at the commencement of the rebellion. While but twenty regiments of volunteers have been called by the Government, at least treble the requisite number of men have offered themselves for enrolment.¹⁶ Large numbers of young men belonging to the oldest and wealthiest families have enlisted in the ranks of both regular and volunteer regiments, all classes being inspired by the same ardent enthusiasm.

I transmit herewith a well executed map of Northern Italy et cetera, just printed at Milan, whereon I have designated in red ink the fortresses of the famous Quadrilateral.17

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

T. Bigelow Lawrence, 18 Consul General

¹⁵ In his autobiography (Memorie autobiografiche, Florence, 1920, pp. 406ff.) Garibaldi relates that on June 10, 1866, his friend, Fabrizi, arrived at Caprera inviting him, on behalf of the government and friends, to take over the command of the volunteers who were gathering in large numbers everywhere in Italy. On the same day Garibaldi left the island on a ship for the continent and immediately headed for Como where the largest number of volunteers had concentrated.

^{16 &}quot;With a mediocre government," Garibaldi wrote in his Memorie (p. 408) "the volunteers could have reached 100,000 in number, but on account of its customary fears, they were limited to about a third of that number, and treated in the usual manner as far as armaments, clothing etc. . . . And when the catastrophe of Custoza occurred, several thousand volunteers were at Salò, Lonato and Lago di Garda, while their rear regiments were still in southern Italy, waiting for shoes, arms, etc."

¹⁷ The fortresses of the Quadrilateral comprised Mantua, Peschiera, Verona and Legnago.

¹⁸ T. Bigelow Lawrence, of Massachusetts, was commissioned consul-general at Florence on Mar. 27, 1861, and assumed the charge of his post on Oct, 25, 1862. For two months (Aug. 3 to Oct. 3, 1868) he was chargé d'affairs ad interim of the American legation at Florence. Lawrence died in Washington on March 21, 1869.

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 146

Legation of the United States¹⁹ Florence, July 11, 1866.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward Secretary of State Sir:

. . . These delays, [in the prosecution of the war] with the defeat of Custozza [sic] and the subsequent repulse of Garibaldi on the Caffaro would naturally excite great discontent among the people, but this sentiment is quite thrown into the shade by the feeling of wounded pride and indignation at the conduct of France in encouraging, if she did not prompt, the offer of the cession of

Venetia to that power.

The firm belief of the nation that Italy is able to wrest from Austria the territory which she conceives to be wrongfully withheld from her, the desire of atoning for a check so discreditable to Italian generalship though so honorable to the valor of Italian soldiery at the battle of Custozza [sic] and the insult to the nation implied in the proposal of the Emperor of Austria to negotiate with Italy only through the Emperor Napoleon as her natural guardian, the cool arrogance with which the latter sovereign has accepted this proposal and the fear that France will refuse to renounce Venetia to Italy except upon unjust and humiliating conditions, have produced a general exasperation which would lead to popular outbreaks of a dangerous character in any people but one so conspicuous for patience and long suffering as the Italians. . .

It is certain and undisputed that the advance was undertaken without any knowledge whatever of the position or force of the Austrian army, and I have been informed on what I consider entirely trustworthy authority that Gen. La Marmora refused to resort to any of the usual modes of reconnaisance upon the left bank of the Mincio before the order to march was given. It is even asserted, upon what seems sufficient evidence, that the leading column, Cerale's, 20 advanced without sending scouts forward, that they were marching as to a parade, with band playing, when they found themselves at once in the midst of the enemy, and that all the musicians at the head of the column except two were shot down at the first fire. Knowing Gen. La Marmora's rash and thoughtless impetuosity of temper and his incapacity for intellectual combination of any sort, I can readily believe that he has been guilty of any conceivable military imprudence and nothing that I have seen in Italian political

19 MS. archives American embassy, Rome.

²⁰ Enrico Cerale (1804-1873). At twenty years of age he was a lieutenant in the Pinerolo brigade. Promoted to rank of captain in the wars of 1848. Took part in the war of 1859 as major general. In the war of 1866 he commanded the first division, distinguishing himself for his bravery despite wounds received in an engagement. Retired in 1867. M. Rosi, Dizionario del Risorgimento Nazionale (Milan, 1930) II, p. 655.

life has surprised me more than the patience with which the nation has borne the entrusting such important civil and military trusts to a person who has given so little evidence of capacity to direct the duties belonging to them.

His present official position in both services is due mainly to his aristocratic birth and to the influence of the Emperor of France, of which sovereign he is a devoted admirer. It was to sustain French policy that he was called to the head of the cabinet in 1864 and he has never wavered in his attachment to that power . . .

With respect to the volunteers, I have always feared that the means and the occasion of doing anything creditable to themselves or advantageous to Italy would not be afforded to them. There are soldiers of high rank and influence in the Italian army to whom a victory by Garibaldi would not be a welcome event. His army is to have been sent into the field as unprovided as possible with military material, with supplies and comforts and with sanitary arrangements and conveniences. He will scarcely be able to effect anything important, unless the fear of popular indignation shall secure him a better position and more efficient material means than the supreme military authorities would voluntarily bestow upon him.21

In the remarks I do not intend to imply any censure upon the King, who is as honest and true as he is brave. But the assumption of La Marmora imposes upon him, and he stands in great awe of the European Napoleon.

It has been announced that Prince Napoleon²² and a distinguished French diplomat may soon be expected in Italy, the bearers of an Imperial . . . script, but later advices render this doubtful. Whether the King, in such an event, will stand by Ricasoli and the nation I cannot say, but I am not without hope that the spirit which he showed on his accession to the throne, after the fatal battle of Novara, and on some subsequent occasions, will, in this most critical hour for his dynasty and his country, revive, and that he will show himself adequate to this great emergency.

The spirit of the Italian people, I am happy to say, is not broken, but, on the contrary, their confidence and courage rise with their difficulties. The Tuscan and Neapolitan soldiers from whom less was expected, have fought well, the public stocks are advancing and the premium on gold has fallen very considerably. The national enthusiasm has made some impression even on the ecclesiastical party. Young men have left theological seminaries and enrolled themselves in the army, and in some instances even ordained priests

22 Prince Jerome Napoleon, cousin of the Emperor and son-in-law of Victor Emmanuel II of Sardinia, having married his daughter, Clothilde.

²¹ In his autobiography (p. 408) Garibaldi wrote that "the government, forced by public opinion, although it continued to be the enemy of the volunteers whom it mistrusted and feared, because they were the representatives of the rights and liberty of Italy, armed some of them, but their armaments, organization, and needs reflected the antipathy and illwill with which they were received."

have turned from cursing, and publicly blessed and prayed for the sovereign

and the armies of Italy.

If good counsels prevail with the King I have no doubt the Italian people will sustain him to extremity and win for him and them an honorable and a commanding position among the thrones and nations of Europe.

[Signed] George P. Marsh²³

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 150

Legation of the United States²⁴ Florence July 31 1866.

Hon William H. Seward Secretary of State Sir

The war between the German powers, and between Austria and Italy, is apparently drawing near its end, but not much is publicly known in regard to the precise condition of the negotiations. It seems surprising that Prussia, after such an extraordinary succession of victories, should content herself with so little direct territorial acquisition as she now claims, and that Austria should be deprived of none of her Teutonic or Slavic provinces. But the new relations of Prussia to the Northern Germanic states will give her a political importance which may be worth more than a wide extension of her boundaries, and her moderation is doubtless, in a great measure, due to the distinct understanding of all the belligerents, that any party, who should refuse to accept the Emperor Napoleon as an arbiter, must prepare to meet him as an enemy.

Upon whatever terms peace may be concluded, the mode in which the conditions have been imposed by Napoleon has deeply wounded the pride of all parties, and an invitation will be left which may lead ultimately to a new coalition like that of 1813, a war of nationalities against the pretorian bands of the second emperor. Such a war would, at this moment, be accepted with enthusiasm by the people of Italy, and the gallantry manifested by her soldiers and sailors in the late battles abundantly shows that, commanded by officers of any ability, they would prove formidable antagonists.

The principal point of dispute as between this government and Austria is the possession of the Italian Tyrol. Prince Napoleon, doubtless enlightened by imperial inspiration, is said to have suggested one of those half-solutions which are so characteristic a feature of the Napoleonic policy. He proposed to give to Italy a territory of some economic and political value, but to leave all the important military positions on the crest and flanks of the mountains,

²³ George Perkins Marsh (1801-82) was born in Woodstock, Vermont, and graduated in 1820 from Dartmouth College. He was elected to the supreme executive council of Vermont in 1835, was a member of Congress from 1843 to 1849, and was minister to Turkey from 1849 to 1853. In 1861 he was appointed by President Lincoln as first minister to the new Kingdom of Italy, and held, that post to his death.

²⁴ MS. archives American embassy, Rome.

including a part of the shores and waters of the Lake of Garda, in the hands of Austria. If this scheme were to be adopted, the Emperor of France having, by the cession of Savoy and Nice, obtained possession of the keys of the North Western and South Western frontier of Italy, and secured to Austria those of the central Alps, would be able to keep this kingdom indefinitely in that state of tutelage and dependence which his policy towards it has always tended to establish and maintain.

Prussia, it appears, gives but a cold support to the Italian claim to the southern Tyrol, and it is alleged that she bases her action on the omission of La Marmora to put forward that claim in the negotiations for the alliance. Such a mistake is possible enough, but those who are familiar with the position of Prussia in 1848 and 1859, will remember that, at those crises, her military men declared that the possession of the passes of the Tyrolese Alps, and even the line of the Mincio, by Austria, was essential to the security of Germany. Thus far Ricasoli seems inflexible in insisting on all that part of the Tyrol which can fairly be called Italian, and the annexation of so much at least, is evidently as obvious a necessity to Italy as the acquisition of any territory whatever. I trust he may carry his point, and if he succeeds, it will be a most remarkable triumph of simple, straightforward moral force over diplomacy, intrigue, political jealousy and national animosity. In that case, Italy may well boast that the wisdom, virtue and firmness of her great national statesmen has compensated the mortifications which the subservience of Gallicized politicians to foreign dictation, and the imbecility of her general, and her admiral in chief have brought upon her.

Nothing further transpires authoritatively in regard to the insane movement against the territory inclosed within the quadrilateral. There is, however, no doubt that it was a sudden departure from the plan agreed upon at the council of war, according to which La Marmora was to remain on the Italian side of the frontier with a corps of observation, and the offensive movement was to be led by Cialdini through the country south of the great fortresses. It is suggested, with great probability, that the whole operation was a plan of La Marmora to anticipate Cialdini and gain credit for himself by striking a blow before the latter could get within reach of the enemy. At any rate, it is certain that Cialdini's first intelligence of even an intention to advance on the part of La Marmora came in the form of a telegram from that officer, announcing a defeat much more crushing than the facts warranted. Indeed the commanding general seems to have been panic-struck, and he telegraphed Garibaldi to fall back and save Brescia, describing his repulse as a "complete and irretrievable overthrow."

There is now a strenuous effort on the part of La Marmora's friends and the French party to divert public attention from his short-comings, and save him by concentrating public indignation on the unfortunate Persano, who is to be made a scape goat to bear the burden of the

general's sins. It will doubtless be easy to throw a great weight of responsibility on the shoulders of the admiral, who certainly was incompetent to the duties of his position, but the army will not be satisfied with a substitute, and will, sooner or later, demand the retirement of La Marmora.

The volunteers have proved very efficient, considering how very inadequately they were supplied with material means. All they have accomplished has been effected by the bayonet, for fire-arms, properly speaking, they have

none.

I am, Sir, very respectfully Your obedient servant [Signed] George P. Marsh.

No. 167

Legation of the United States^{2,5} Florence, November 13, 1866.

The Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State Washington, D. C.

Sir:

His Majesty the King of Italy having determined to make a solemn entry into Venice on the 7th of the present month, attended by his court, the president of the council, the minister of foreign affairs, and the other members of the cabinet, the diplomatic corps residing at Florence were invited to accompany him.

I deemed it my duty to accept this invitation, and proceeded to Venice accordingly, in company with the rest of the corps. The various ceremonies and festivities to which the foreign ministers were invited continue until tomorrow, but the court dinner having taken place on Sunday evening, I felt myself at liberty to return to Florence, and left Venice for this city on Monday morning.

The Italian troops had entered into formal possession of the city several days before, and the first burst of popular excitement was naturally spent on that occasion. There was, however, an abundant manifestation of enthusiasm on the reception of the King, and no spectator could doubt the sincerity of the fervent protestations which bore witness to the public joy at the long-delayed accomplishment of the desire of the Venetian people for incorporation into the Kingdom of Italy.

The national tradition and feeling of the Venetians are republican if not democratic, and the accession of Venetia to the Italian kingdom will, I think, strengthen the hands of the liberal party; but I see no cause to doubt

²⁵ MS archives American embassy, Rome. Although this despatch was published in the United States-Foreign Relations, 1866, pt. 2, p. 120-121, it is included here because this publication is not readily available even in many libraries of the United States.

that they accept in good faith the rule of the present dynasty and the constitution of 1848, and will prove both patriotic and loyal citizens.

As the period of the promised evacuation of Rome by the French garrison approaches, the excitement as to the Roman question, which had been for a time allayed, is renewed, and the object of the extraordinary mission of General Fleury^{2,6} to the King is a matter of eager discussion and anxious conjecture. It would be idle to speculate on state secrets which a week will probably reveal, and I shall only add that, in my judgment, the sovereign possession of Rome by the Italian government and people, whether with or without the assent of France, is a question of time only, though doubts may still be entertained whether that city will become the political capital of the kingdom.

The finances of Italy are in an embarrassed condition, her industry is prostrated, her agricultural interests depressed, but she still has natural resources—diminished, indeed, but not exhausted—and it may be hoped that the final achievement of her complete unity, and, above all, of the independence of foreign interference or dictation, may soon leave her at full liberty to concentrate the wisdom of her publicists and statesmen upon her internal administration, the development of her physical resources and the moral and intellectual advancement of her people. . .

[Signed] George P. Marsh

No. 11

Venice 2nd Oct 186627

Sir.

Permit me to say, that the last quarter, ending the 30th Ultimo, has been a period of more than common interest in this consular district. Venice has been the centre of a conflict, which tho' short, has proved sanguinous.

This day a "treaty of peace" has been signed which cedes, to Italy, the territories of Venetia; thereby displacing a government which has a history of something more than half a century, and inaugerating a new one which will doubtless be sanctioned by a free Expression of the popular choice at the "Plebiscito", a few days hence: What will be the result of this change in the government is difficult to predict.

The future developments will be watched with deep concern by our

27 MS The National Archives, Washington, D.C. Records of the Department of State. Consular Despatches, Venice, vol. 3. In these documents no attempt has been made to correct the peculiar spelling and punctuation of the original manuscripts.

²⁶ Emile F. Fleury (1815-1884). In 1848 he supported the cause of Louis Napoleon. During the Empire, he became general, aide-de-camp, and senator. In 1861 he was head of the French commission sent to Turin to recognize officially the new Italian Kingdom. In November, 1866 he returned to Italy to inform the King of Italy that if an insurrection broke out in Rome after the departure of the French troops from that city, the French Emperor would not have hesitated to embark at once for Civita Vecchia the 20,000 French soldiers who were being kept between Nice and Toulon to meet such an emergency.

people, who have always been interested in the history of the "old Republic", and no less in the approaching consummation of a "United Italy".

It has been generally understood that the policy of Austria has been to foster the commercial interests of her possessions upon the eastern shore of the Adriatic in prefference and even to the detriment of her province on this side the Sea; this fact added to the desponding state of feeling existing among the Venetians, has induced an unwillingness to create or sustain trade & manufacturing which should pay tribute to a government under whose rule they always chafed: these and other influences have combined to make Venice a prey to foreign tradesmen, and to destroy her prestige as a commercial & maratime city: and her citizens, who in former centuries were the most enterprising people of the world, have become noted for their inefficiency. The last half century has produced a great revolution in Venetian Society; the rule of a foreign power has entirely broken down the cast which existed, seperating the dominant class of the nobility from the masses: Today they stand upon a common level, will vote at the same polls and be eligible to the same offices: Intelligence and education being adopted as the standard of superiority, in harmony with the Spirit of the age.

Venice of to day has an opportunity, & circumstances favorable to her development: It lies in the disposition of the people to make her a power in conjunction with the united states of Italy: Yet with all the encouragement of a liberal government, sustained by the energy & enterprise of the people, she cannot expect to assume her ancient position as a maratinme city, which her former central location gave her for near a thousand years. The reconstructed geographical bounderies of Ancient Europe and the movement of the centres of trade northward & westward forbids so complete a revolution as that Venice should again become the "Queen of the Sea" but she may and probably will become a prominent port, and the entrepot of a considerable Eastern trade and the point of transit between the east & west, for valuable goods, to Hamburg & Havre by rail; but on account of its location at the head of the Adriatic, and the consequent lengthened Sea-route for vessels up the Mediterranean, heavy tonnage will seek ports further south & west, even this obsticale may in a measure be overcome by new land routes & railway connections.

The large natural harbor of the Venetian "Lagune" peculiarly fits it for a naval rendezvous, while the heavy forests of the northern districts of Venetia are capable of furnishing an almost unlimited supply of timber for vessels of war, and merchant marine. The rich copper mines of Agordo; the excellent coal in the Valdagno—both provinces of Italy adjoining Venetia; the superior iron for naval construction in the contiguous German provinces—all together will doubtless influence the Italian government in establishing its chief naval station at Venice and bring into use the immense shops, yards, & docks of the old "Arsenal" of the "Republic".

The bounderies of Venetia embrace, beside the numerous islands of the "Lagune", a large and most fertile territory upon the main-land, capable of producing abundant crops of corn wheat, Hemp, Flax, Rice, besides many of the shipping fruits which are produced in abundance; while the product of the Vineyards & Mulberry trees, alone is of immense value. Austria has derived great profit from the manufacture of this silk product furnished to their looms free from duties; the spinners of Milan having to compete with them under the disadvantage of heavy import duties added to the first cost: The change of government will reverse this to the mutual advantage of the Venetian producer and the Italian manufacturer.

It need hardly be added that the manufacturing interest of Venice is quite meagre; excepting its noted glass bead factories, there exists nothing of any importance beyond the fabricating of very coarse articles for household & farm use in a style quite primitive. Formerly they refined large quantities of American sugars, but the product of the root sugar under Austrian protection destroyed this branch of industry, which will be revived again under the new government and make a demand for the American staple. The Venetians to a limited extent work the precious metals and stones into articles of ornament, but the ancient skill in moulding of them has to a great degree been lost. A peculiar style of Mosaics are made in Venice, employing quite a number of artists & Artizans.

Venice is a standing monument of the effects of "Free trade." It being a free port, their markets have been supplied by British, German and French goods at prices which forbade competition; the consequence is that the people are supplied with cheap goods and the country at the same time drained of its wealth to enrich foreign manufacturers while home industry and skill unencouraged alone finds employment in producing the raw material: The new government will rectify this mistake, and Venice may yet become a manufacturer of her own products to a large extent.

In regard to the relations existing between this consular district and our own government it may be remarked that there exists an almost universal sentiment of good will and an ernest desire for more intimate commercial relations. Here I would speak of the article of "Petrolum" which is coming into quite general use in Southern Europe, and I can see no reason existing why it should not be shipped direct to these ports from America instead, as at present, largely passing through the refineries of Great Britain paying to the English refiner a profit and to the shipper a toll for reshipment; when it should be refined at the place of production at a great advantage over the foreign refiner; and then shipped be direct by a much shorter route to the Italian consumer.

There exists no reason why a large & profitable trade and exchange of commodities of the two countries may not be established. Sugar, Cotton, Tobacco, Petrolum, dyewoods, articles of American invention, and Agricultural

impliments from the United States, with a return cargo of Hemp, Rice, Wines, raw silk, fruits, Glass Ware & beads, straw goods etc.

The unsettled state of the country during the past quarter has almost entirely closed direct trade with foreign ports—consequently there are no arrivals or departures of American Vessels to report.

Florins

Imports to this Port from the United States in 1865 Flor. 382.396
Imports to this Port from the United States in 1864 Flor. 293.270
showing a small increase over the previous year

The Exports from this district to the United States during 1865 viz

Glass Beads.	Florin	s81.915
Straw Goods	Francs	65.191
Photographic views)	d.o	8.274
)		
& Instruments)		
Antique furniture &c	£	5.743
Statuary	Francs	1.500
Mosaics	d.o	.613
Oil Paintings	Florins	.560

The excess of imports to Venice during the year 1865 from all countries exceeds

her exports 57 per cent!

A careful calculation for the past five years will not reduce this excess below 50 per cent: which fact taken in connection with her poverty is a practical lesson to our own country whose pesent prosperity and extravigant expenditure for the products of foreign industry and consequent drain of the precious metals, will insure financial trouble in the future

Total Exports of Venice in 1865 Florins 28.403.623 d.o Imports " " 44.218.538 Arrivals of Ships (none under American flag)

					ships	Tonage	
Arrivals	from	the "U.S	8." in	1865	6	2.407	
,,	2.3	Austrian	Ports		2523	191.729	
2.3	2.2	Other	2.2		555	99.950	

Comparing English (British) ships which enter this port with Italian we have a Characteristic comparison of the shipping of the two powers at this period. In 1865 Entered, 68 British Ships with tonage 39.43 [last figure not readable] In 1865 Entered, 227 Italian Ships with tonage 10.99 [last figure not readable] being more than three times the number of Italian ships with only one fourth the aggregate tonnage. The value of British goods imported into Venice amounts to five millions florins in 1865 the same ships carrying away nearly an equal amount of the raw products of the country.

In regard to the future prospects of Venice it may be said that a railway line at present connects it with Trieste in Austria, and Mılan & Genoa on the

opposite coast-a short line of road connecting Rovego & Ferrara will be completed in few months thereby perfecting the railway connection of Venice with all her sister states of Italy. The completion of those two most stupenduous fetes of modern engineering, which promise to span the Alps at Mount Cenis, and the Tyrol by way of the Brenner pass; -will connect Venice with the cities & ports of France by the one and Germany and northern Europe by the other route-both of which will be completed in 1867. Still another line is projected with considerable prospect of success connecting Venice direct by way of Botsen with central Germany, through the Val Sugana which will be of incalculable benefit to Venice as a centre of transhipment.

Great hope is felt by the friends of this old city, that the completion of the Istmus of Suez Canal, in 1867, will once more bring back a portion of that great Eastern trade which formerly belonged almost entirely to this port, carried on by means of immense caravans aided by the extensive marine of Venice, which in those prosperous Eras of Venetian history brought hither the rich products of those distant countries to be resold & reshipped by Venetian merchants to Every part of the then known western world

Venice situated as she is at the head of this long arm of the sea has a position somewhat as Chicago at the head of the lakes, and, if she can likewise have a perfect railway system & connection with the central & northern nations, a bright future may open before her-Capital will be required to Erect & sustain manufacturing, Ships & Steamers will be needed, Machinery of all kinds required, a change of government, the developement of a rich country, the opening of the Suez Canal, the immense trade involved are all matters for grave consideration by the American people, in which they will take a deep interest both in regard to the future prospects and achievements of this regenerated nation; as well in regard to our commercial relations with her, which immediate and energetic action will make most valuable, or by a contrary policy leave for others the treasure which is in our power

I have the honor to be Sir

Your most Obeient & Humble Servant Francis Colton

To the Honorable Wm H Seward Secretary of State U.S.A.

No. 16 The Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State. Sir:

United States Consulate Venice, Italy, 1st Jany, 1867.28

²⁸ MS. archives American consulate, Florence.

Allow me, in forwarding the usual quarterly returns for this Consulate, to say, that so soon after the change of Government of a state, little noticeable alteration of its affairs could be expected.

In my last report, I gave the department such facts as I could gather in regards to the condition of Venezia as a province, and as a seaport, at the moment of its transition from being a dependency of the Austrian government to becoming a constituent part of the Kingdom of Italy.³¹ By this change the Veneto-Italians have entertained unwarrantable expectations of immediate advantages to accrue to their country, and especially to the city of Venice; a sudden impulse was given to every branch of business; the number of shops and value of merchandise was nearly doubled in a few weeks, before new exterior connections could be formed while the ability of the people at home to sustain the regular traffic was diminished rather than increased by the sudden termination of the old government and the consequent closing of the public works, the suspending operations at the arsenal and cigar factories, together with their government shops, throwing out of employment hundreds of employees; indeed the loss in a pecuniary way was no less felt in the withdrawal of a large garrison comprising the corps of occupation.

The loss of these various sources of employment and profit the people in their laudible anxiety for a change of government had scarcely recovered, when the Italian Government desirous of ameliorating the conditions of the people and especially of the very poor began immediately to supply the place of the machinery in the arsenals which were left entirely dismantled by the retiring Austrians. It was found impossible to accomplish a work of such magnitude at once. In the meantime a force of twelve hundred men have been kept under pay at the arsenal without work, awaiting the completion of the requisite machinery. The government has also commenced the manufacture of cigars, which will employ a portion of the idle hands formerly engaged in that branch of industry; several appropriations have been made by the General Government for different purposes in this district which will form a basis for, and encourage a spirit of, public improvements in the city and state.

In regard to the commercial interests of this port much improvement has been effected during the quarter ending with the year. How substantial and permanent this increase of advantages may prove to be is difficult to predict.

The Venetians true to the instincts of a people of their maritime history first bethought themselves of connections by sea for commerce which they hoped for, rather than had any definite plan or prospect of securing.

A regular line of steamers now connects Venice with Liverpool touching at all intermediate Italian ports. . . [The rest of the report deals with the resumption of trade relations with Austria, a fact which proved that the people

had become reconciled. . . trade also with the East. . . through the Suez as soon as it is completed. . . railroad connection with Rome. . .]

[Signed] Frank Colton²⁹

U. S. Consul

No. 20

United States Consulate,³⁰ Venice, Italy, July 15, 1867.

The Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State. Sir:

I beg leave to say in rendering the regular quarterly report to the Department from this Consulate that there is a fair increase in the activity of business at this port. Although perhaps not fully realizing the hopes of the Venetians formed prior to the annexation with Italy, yet for the short time elapsed since that event the prospects may be considered very encouraging.

An extra English steamer has lately been put upon the Liverpool line. There are now three British lines of steamers connecting Venice with Great Britain established within the present year. One line connects Venice with London, and one with Liverpool and Glasgow.

The completion of the Brenner Pass Railway in August will doubtless largely increase the carrying trade to and from this point, as Southern Germany will naturally make Venice its seaport and it will also be a shorter route to other portions of the interior than to their present ports of Genoa and Trieste. Thus a new life will be infused into the trade of Venice by bringing hither northern merchants and capital and northern energy.

Much of the merchandise of the coast of the Adriatic and especially from Venice finds its way to America in English bottoms. It is a matter of regret to Americans residing abroad that our countrymen are such small sharers in the profits of the many sea routes which enrich our maritime rival.

It may be remarked that there are many projects on foot for the improvement of this city and its harbor; among which the most important is the remodelling of the old arsenal in order to adapt it to the construction of modern vessels of war and with a view of making this the chief naval station of the Kingdom. Also the deepening of the harbor entrance and the channels of approach to the city in order that the largest sized war vessels and merchantmen may enter without impediment.

The early completion of the Brenner Pass Railway and the Suez Canal has induced the belief that the carrying trade of Venice will be largely increased and will warrant a weekly line of steamers between this port and

30 MS, archives American Consulate, Florence.

²⁹ Francis Colton of Illinois was appointed American Consul at Venice on April 10, 1866; he arrived there on June 12, 1866 and left on April 1, 1869. He died at Washington, D. C., on March 9, 1913. [Letter to the editor from Mr. E. Wilder Spaulding, Chief, Division of Research and Publication, Department of State, Washington, October 23, 1944].

Alexandria direct. There are now three transportation companies negotiating with the authorities of the city for the contract. Prominent among them is a company under the direct patronage of the Vice Royal of Egypt whose agent proposes to furnish five new iron steamers for this route. I had hoped in this report to definitely advise the Department in regard to the conclusion of these negotiations but at the present writing nothing is settled.

It is most probable that the Royal Egyptian Company will be successful, as the Venetians feel their interest to be more intimately connected with that

country than with any others.

In closing I will say that the business of this Consulate has largely increased since my arrival in Venice. In the present quarter more invoices have been certified than during any other quarter previously recorded in the Consular Books, being equal in number to the invoices certified at Genoa and more than double that of Trieste.

[Signed] Frank Colton Consul

No. 25.

United States Consulate, Venice, Italy, October 12, 1867.³¹

The Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

Enclosed I beg leave to forward the usual reports from this Consulate for the Quarter ending 30th ultimo, including two lists of letters, received and sent, a transcript of the Invoice Book, and also the "Annual Report" for the consular year just closed.

Will the Honorable Secretary do me the favor of personally perusing the last named paper, as it contains in the brief form such information and suggestions as the Consul can furnish upon the present very interesting condition of affairs in this ancient centre of trade and commerce which, in sympathy with the spirit of the age, seems to be awakening into new life. The circumstances are most propitious for development of commerce at this port. The new connections formed by land and by sea are very extensive and would naturally indicate that this city would become a point of transit for a very extensive trade.

In view of all these developments and the many advantages existing for more extended commercial relations with our country, and the earnest desire on the part of the Venetians for such connections it would seem to be a lost opportunity if our people did not share the advantages arising therefrom. Venice is only one of the many points on the Adriatic the entire coast of which is a rich field for commerce and will yearly become more so as the great Indo-European transit trade and travel become more and more drawn in this direction. At present this trade is monopolized by English and French

³¹ MS. archives American consulate, Florence.

traders and shipping. It is a source of regret to those more intimately conversant with the subject that our flag is not more commonly seen in these waters. Doubtless some course will suggest itself to the Government by which our trade may be encouraged and extended in this direction.

[Signed] Frank Colton (U. S. Consul).

Annual Report Statistical

Despatch No. 24

United States Consulate³² Venice Italy 12th Octo '67

Sir:

Allow me to say, that the year ending the 30th ultimo, has been one of unusual interest, in this district, which includes that portion of country formerly held by the Austrian government, as a province of that Empire, under the name of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom; which at the opening of this Consular year was, as the result of the short war in which Italy participated, as an ally to Prussia against Austria, transferred to and incorporated into the Italian Kingdom. The relations of this Consulate were, in accordance with the change of government, in this district, transferred, and a Royal Exequatur promptly forwarded from Florence.

The first years experience, under the new government, has demonstrated that the change has, on the whole, been beneficial to the general interests of the people; although, in many respects, the provincial government bestowed benefits upon the masses, the loss of which have since been severely felt by the poorer classes: But tho strong predjudices & sympathies of the Venetians favored a change—which tended to encourage a more active spirit of enterprise among the people; and it must be said to their credit that during the past year, under many trying circumstances arising from poverty and new political and financial conditions, they have bravely and faithfully wrought out the change, with a wonderful degree of self control and subordination to the new government, even when their most cherished hope of entire freedom seemed in jeopardy, by certain acts of the Italian ministry, which at the time seemed judicious to the government, but, which by a firm and resolute stand taken by the people were soon revoked, and a settled principle of entire freedom of speech established. Thus the political revolution, which originated in the new province of Venetia, was safily passed, no less peaceful in its conduct than potent in its final results.

Immediately upon the change in the government of Venetia a strong desire was awakened for more extended commercial relations. The connections formed by land and by sea, by new and regular lines of communication, during the past twelve months, have been very considerable, and of the greatest

³² MS The National Archives, Washington, D. C. Records of the Department of State. Consular Despatches, Venice, volume 3.

importance to the interests of Venice as a commercial city. Within ninety days after the union of Venetia with Italy a line of railway was completed connecting Venice direct with Florence and Rome, and by diverging lines bringing this city into communication with all the principal cities of Italy. Three new lines of steamers were established between this port and Great Britain, at London, Liverpool and Glasgow; which lines also formed valuable connections between this and other Italian and Mediterranean ports. The Austrian line of tri-weekly steamers, continues to bring Venice into communication with Austria at Trieste, and thence with the Levant; and via Ancona to Alexandria in Egypt and the far East. A new and direct line of steamers will soon ply regularly between this port and Alexandria, the chief commercial city of the north African coast, thereby much shortening the route and diverting a large and valuable trade from its former channel via Trieste, and bring it directly to and through Venice. This connection has long been under negotiation between the agent of the Vice-Roy of Egypt and the Municipal Authorities of Venice; and although there are some hindering causes preventing its immediate consumation, yet, doubtless at an early date the line will be opened, and a direct trade established through Alexandria with the whole East. The transit trade alone, of this important route, will be of immense value to the Venetians, and tend greatly to their future Commercial prosperity. In connection with this route should be announced the Completion and successful opening of the "Brenner Pass" railway, one of the most important events of the year for Venice, as it is one of the greatest achievements in civil engineering of the century. The opening of this railway through the Tyrol Mountains by way of the "Brenner Pass" to Innsbruck and Munich, last month, has greatly encouraged the business men of this city in the hope and belief that through this means of communication, Venice will become the sea-port of that great interior country lying along either side of the Tyrol including a large portion of Southern Germany and Eastern Switzerland, which area of territory will be reached by this, the shortest, land-route to the sea, and the most direct and cheapest channel for their trade with the Levant and farther Eastern countries. The products of that vast region of industrial skill and manufacturing will by this route find their way through Venice, for exchange, with the Eastern nations, for the natural products of the plains and mountains of Syria Egypt and India, and especially for the raw cottons & wool requisite for supplying the looms of the German and Swiss factories. Trieste, which has formerly been the sea port of this trans-Tyrolian country, will, on account of distance and political antipathies, become more and more seperated from its fromer customers, while Venice, from the opposite causes, will yearly attract hither the capital and business talent of Germany and Switzerland, thereby more intimately uniting the interests of that great inland district with this, its natural sea-port.

The trade of Venice, under the Austrian dominion, has been gradually

decreasing during the past five years, which together with the unnatural ballances, as shown by the following comparative statement, is a warning to any nation which would not wish to become, likewise exhausted

Year	Imports	Exports	Ballances against Venice
	Lire	Lire	•
1862	133.014.842	82.963.736	51.051.106 Lire
1863	123.285.012	74.257.147	49.027.865 "
1864	117.431.239	77.049.854	40.381.385 "
1865	110.796.341	71.009.059	39.787.282 "
1866	98.739.457	63.321.674	35.417.783

The suicidal ballance of her yearly account, ranging from 50 to 70 per cent Excess of imports over exports, made it a problem easy of solution, that it was only a matter of time when the machinery of trade must stop entirely. for want of anything to make up the yearly deficiency.

It is difficult to promise that the year 1867 will materially alter the appearance of her account current; but if there is any safety in predicting future events from present appearances, it may be safely calculated that the lowest point of financial decrepitude has been reached, and that the new life of National freedom, and the opening of new routes of travel and trade by land and sea will gradually usher in an era of prosperity, which will satisfy the most ardent friends of this ancient city, which was once the great commercial emporium of the world. By refference to "Statement A", detailing the naval movements at the port of Venice, it will be seen that the proportion of shipping to the three most prominent nationalities, controlling heretofore the carrying trade of Venice, is as follows.: viz.

Austria	6	tenths
England	2	33
Italy	1	,,
All other nations	. 1	2.7

The value of exports to the United States from this port, as also the class of merchandize will be seen by refference to "Statement" "B", which may be condensed as follows.

viz.

										Francs	
1st	Quarter	ending	31	decr.	'66	Certified	31	Invoices	Total	33.092.03	
	l do		31	Mch	'67	do	36	do	3.2	57.328.80	
3rd	do	"	30	June	'67	do	70	do	,,	118.519.08	
4th	do	"				do				110.424.63	
Tot	al for th	e year			1	nvoices 2	10	V_{i}	alue 3.	19.364.54 F1	ancs

which shows an increasing trade between the two Countries—the present year being the largest on the records of the consulate; while the number of individual "Invoices" compares favorably with any other Italian port-

The imports from the United States, for the year just Closed (1866)

Consists entirely of Tobacco in the leaf and Petroleum, and are valued according to their prime cost, as follows viz Petroleum Francs 302.400

Tobacco " 124.224

Total 426.624 Frs.

showing a ballance of trade in favor of the United States of Francs 107.260—or about 33 prct in excess of our purchases; in which is not included the transportation, which is a large item to our credit.

It is not generally known, that Venice has for many centuries been the largest manufacturer of beads, in the world. The principal buyers are French and English Merchants, who realize a large profit in the trafic, especially in their commercial intercourse with barberous nations, a branch of trade our own tradesmen should more fully understand. There are likewise many other articles such as hemp, flax, wax, oil, wine, straw goods, gloves and fancy goods, which would form profitable articles of enchange for many of our own products, if our merchants would turn their attention in this direction; and the yearly Statements from Adriatic ports might be corrected, much to the profit of our trade and commerce.

In closing I may repeat what I expressed in a former report, that the Venetians earnestly desire more intimate and extended commercial relations with our country; and it will be all the more profitable to our merchants that Venice, in her present condition, lacks the means of transportation to sustain an extensive trans-Atlantic trade, as we can thereby add to the profits of the Exchange of commodities, the transportation in American bottoms, of the merchandise & products of both countries to and from the Adriatic.

I have the honor to be Sir Very respectfully Your most Obedient Servant Fran.s Colton U. S. Consul

To the Honorable Wm. H. Seward Secretary of State U.S.A. Washington D.C.

Statement "A" and "B" connected with Report from U. S. Consulate
— at Venice Italy — for the year ending 30 Sept 67

(Report dated 12 Octo '67)

Statement B

For the Consular Year ending 30 Sept 1867
Showing the items and amounts of Exports to the United States from Venice Italy

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th .	4th Grand Total in
articles of merchandise	Quarter	Quarter	Quarter	Quarter	
	ending 31 Dec 1866	1866 ending 31 mch 1867	ending 30 June '67	7 ending 30 Sept '67	'67 each article
Glass Beads	13.233.78	34.563.07	45.285.58	47.515.38	140.574.81
S				4.362.50	4.362.50
Violin Strings	2.250.00		8.700.00	3.550.00	14.500.00
spo			450.00	7.372.00	7.822.00
Painted Pictures	9.582.50	8.340.00	1.600.00	1.743.00	21.265.50
Photographic Articles	5.375.75	4.037.73	11.653.50	21.181.75	42.248.73
Antiquities	2.650.00	10.388.00	35.880.00	24.700.00	73.618.00
Marble			15.000.00		15.000.00
Totals for Each Qr.	Frs. 33.092.03	Francs 57.328.80	Frs. 118.519.08	Francs 110.424.63	319.364.54

	Tonnage	×	0.670	4.165	38.422	×	1.514	5.821	202.552	7.856	270.000	299.329	
he year 1866	No. vessels cleared - Where loaded -	Cargoes from other ports	do - Venice	op - op	do - do,	do - other ports	do - Venice	op - op	op - op	do - do	Total (Italian) Venice	Grand Total	
Showing the movements of shipping at the port of Venice for the year 1866	No. vessels cleared	9	29	30	52	56	2	42	2.042	42	1	2.813	
of shipping at t	-Tonnage	2.157	3.796	3.622	59.706		3.033	4.189	191.805	10.378	278.686 26.010	304.696	
owing the movements	Number Ships Arrived -Where from	United States	Egypt	Turkey	Great Britain	do	France	Ionian Islands	Austria	All other nations	Total	Grand Total	
Sho	Number Ships An	9	19	39	108		17	34	2.219	49	2.491	2.886	COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PLEBISCITES IN EASTERN POLAND, 1939

by Edward Bonatt

HE Council of the People's Commissars has resolved to base its activities in the question of the nationalities of Russia on the following principles: (1) the equality and the sovereignty of the nations of Russia; (2) the right of the nations of Russia to free self-determination to the point of separation and the formation of an independent state . . . " By this clause, inserted in the "Declaration of the rights of the nations of Russia," the Russian Revolution proclaimed the right of self-determination for the nations included in the empire of the Tsars. This Declaration, bearing the signatures of Lenin and Stalin was broadcast many times after its proclamation and was included in the first Soviet Constitution of Russia, July 10, 1918.²

Many years later this principle still finds emphasis in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia.³ As laid down by the Soviet government, it seemed to be in accordance with the principles of President Wilson's famous Fourteen Points of January, 1918. A decree issued by the Council of the People's Commissars on August 29, 1918, stated that all former agreements and acts concluded by the Russian imperial government with the royal imperial governments of Prussia and Austria regarding the partitions of Poland were annulled forever because they were contrary to the principles of the self-determination of nations and the revolutionary concepts of the Russian nation which recognized the imprescriptible right of the Polish nation to union and independence.⁴

However, in spite of these declarations, the Russian armies did not wait for the self-determination of the Baltic, Ukrainian and Polish peoples who had already begun to organize themselves into independent states, but in the autumn and winter of 1918 they crossed the historic frontiers

¹ Collection of laws and orders of the Workers' and Peasants' Government (Sobranye yzakoneniy i rasporyazheniy rabotchage i krestyanskage pravitelstva) no. 2, Dec. 2, 1917, ch. 18. (hereafter referred to as "Collection"). This is the official publication of Soviet laws.

² "Collection," art. 4, no. 51, July 20, 1918, ch. 582.

³ N. Tchelyapov, "Declaration of rights of the Nations of Russia" (Deklaratsya prav narodov Rossii), Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Bolshaya Sovyetskaya Enciklopedia), (Moscow, 1931), XXI, pp. 92-93.

^{4 &}quot;Collection," No. 64, Sept., 1918. See also: Polish-Soviet Relations 1918-1948, Documents (New York, 1943), Doc. No. 1 (hereafter referred to as P. S. R.).

and attacked the armed forces of these new nations.⁵ After considerable fighting, Russia concluded a peace with Poland and the Baltic States.⁶ The treaty with Poland was concluded at Riga, March 18, 1921, and established the frontier between the two countries. Both parties bound themselves not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other. The frontier was recognized by the Council of Ambassadors on March 15, 1923,⁷ and subsequently by the United States.

The Soviet Union adopted the principle of the renunciation of war as enunciated in the Kellogg-Briand Pact⁸ and moreover she concluded a special treaty with her western neighbors, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Rumania, confirming the operation of this principle in the relations between these states. In addition, the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression pact with Poland to last until the end of 1945. Upon her entry into the League of Nations, Russia also assumed the obligations of the Covenant, and it was at Russia's suggestion that the London Convention of July, 1933, defined an aggressor.⁹

* * *

The German-Russian non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939,¹⁰ was followed in a week by the German invasion of Poland.¹¹ A few days later the Moscow correspondent of the London *Times* noted that according to Hitler's pronouncement, German and Russian troops would act in accord.¹² In more than a fortnight of heavy fighting, the German armies succeeded

⁵ See the following articles in the London *Times*: "Appeal from Baltic provinces," Nov., 7, 1918; "Invasion of Baltic provinces—Bolshevists take Dvinsk," Nov., 1918; "Poland at the Conference," Dec. 6, 1918; "Threat to Poland, Bolshevist Army on the Frontier," Dec. 6, 1918; "Poland Threatened with Invasion, Bolshevist Army Gathering, New Republic's Peril," Dec. 22, 1918; "The Bolshevists are Making Military Preparations to advance on Kovno and Vilna," Dec. 27, 1918; "Baltic Provinces Invaded, Bolshevists Cross the Dvina," Dec. 19, 1918.

⁶ League of Nations Treaty Series: "Russia (Soviet) with Esthonia in Dorpat (Tartu), Feb. 2, 1920," XL, No. 289, p. 30; "Russia with Latvia in Riga, Aug., 11, 1920," II:3, No. 67, p. 196; "Russia with Lithuania in Moscow, July 12, 1920," III:2, No. 94, p. 106; "Russia with Poland in Riga, March 18, 1921," VI, No. 149, p. 52. See also Republic of Poland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs—Official Documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations 1933-1939 (London, 1940), Doc. 148, pp. 162-165 (hereafter referred to as P. W. B.) This is the Polish White Book. See also P. S. R., doc. 3.

^{7.} League of Nations Treaty Series, XV, No. 398, p. 260; P.W.B., doc. 149, p. 165; P. S. R., doc. 4. The United States note of April 15, 1923 delivered by Ambassador Hugh Gibson in Warsaw.

⁸ P. W. B., doc. 150; P. S. R., doc. 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14.

⁹ P. W. B., doc. 151, 157; P. S. R., doc. 6, 7.

¹⁰ P. W. B., doc. 168; P. S. R. doc. 15.

¹¹ P. W. B., doc. 164, 168, 116, 117, 119; P. S. R., doc. 16 ff.

¹² London Times, Sept., 4, 1939.

in subduing a large part of Poland, but probably less than half since Polish forces still held the environs of Warsaw, Modlin, Kutno in the center, and the peninsula of Hel in the north. According to a map which appeared in *Pravda*, ¹³ the Germans did not advance farther than the Ossowiec-Brest line on the Bug river.

It is well perhaps at this point to distinguish between mere invasion and occupation. "Invasion" may be said to consist of the presence and warlike actions of enemy troops, while "occupation" is invasion plus the taking possession of a country for the purpose of holding it.¹⁴ On September 17, 1939, the German forces were merely invading Poland. They could not yet be said to be in occupation of that country. It should also be pointed out that even complete occupation of a state's territory does not necessarily mean its extinction. An example from Poland's past will show this. In the middle of the seventeenth century almost all of Polish territory was occupied by enemy forces and yet Poland did not cease to exist. Indeed, soon afterwards under Sobieski the Poles were instrumental in driving the Turks from the Gates of Vienna. Similarly, Napoleon's occupation of Moscow certainly did not mean the end of Russia. That Russia did not fear occupation of all of Poland seems to be indicated in Commissar Molotov's statement that, "The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the U.S.S.R. and Germany is of tremendous positive value, eliminating the danger of war between Germany and the Soviet Union."15 According to the Russian view the non-aggression pact had only security and peace in mind. 16 Yet on September 17, 1939, Russian armies crossed the Polish frontier.

In defence of this action, M. Potemkin, Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in a note to the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, stated among other things¹⁷ that, "The Polish State and its government have, in fact, ceased to exist"; that, "The Soviet government further cannot view with indifference the fact that kindred Ukrainian and White Russian people, who live in Polish territory and who are at the mercy of fate are left defenseless"; and that, "The Soviet government proposes to take all measures to extricate the Polish people from this unfortunate war . . . and to enable them to live a peaceful life." This note the Polish Ambassador refused to accept, making immediate protest to the Soviet government and also in-

¹³ Pravda, Sept. 17, 1939.

¹⁴ L. F. Oppenheim, *International Law*, 6th ed. by H. Lauterpacht, (London and New York, 1940) II, p. 339.

¹⁵ V. Molotov, Soviet Peace Policy, Speeches (London, 1941), p. 11.

 ^{16 &}quot;Dogovor o nyenapadenyi i neytralitetye" (Pact of non-aggression and neutrality)
 in Bolshaya Sovyetskaya Enciklopedia (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), XXII, p. 837.
 17 Pravda, Sept., 18, 1939; P. W. B., doc. 175; P. S. R., doc. 18.

forming Great Britain and France of this protest. 18 The titles of articles in the London *Times* quite sharply defined the situation 19 as did Mr. Churchill—then First Lord of the Admiralty—in his speech of October 3, 1939, when he said, "We could have wished that the Russian armies should be standing on their present lines as the friends and allies of Poland, instead of invaders." 20

The reasons for Russia's action given by M. Potemkin seem quite in contrast with the obligations assumed in the various Russo-Polish pacts and treaties. They appear also to be incompatible with the expressed ideals of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party.

The first argument, that the Polish State had ceased to exist, has actually no foundation in fact. For at the very moment when the Russian note was handed the Polish Ambassador on September 17, the President of Poland and the Polish government were still on Polish soil,²¹ and the Polish army fought on as a regular army until October 5 and later as a guerilla army against the Germans.²² Russia herself realized the fallacy of this argument when on July 30, 1941, she concluded a treaty with the government of General Sikorski.²³

The second argument, the protection of kindred peoples, also seems unsound, since it appears that neither the White Ruthenians, nor the Ukrainians, nor the Poles had any great desire for this Russian protection. And, indeed, Soviet political theory seems to say that racial affinity can never justify aggression. Russian writers said of the *Anschluss*, "The forcible annexation of Austria was a glaring imperialistic seizure of foreign territory."²⁴ The principle of the self-determination of nations has never been abandoned in theory by the Soviet Union.

The third excuse, the desire "to extricate the Polish population from this unfortunate war," was carried out by force against the resistance of the Polish armies. 25 Moreover, the gains made by the Russians did not

¹¹⁸ P. W. B., doc. 174, 176, 177, 178; P. S R., doc. 19, 20.

¹⁹ London Times, Sept. 18, 1939.

²⁰ P. D. Novel, Light on Moscow, Soviet Policy Analysed (London, 1940), p. 142. See also Mr. Churchill's speech of October 1, 1939.

²¹ P. W. B., doc. 178.

²² N. N. Mieczyslaw, The Defense of Poland (September, 1939), (London, 1941) pp.

²³ P. S. R., doc. 31.

²⁴ P. S. R., doc. 26. See also the History of the Communist Party of the Societ Union, Short Course (Moscow, 1939), p. 332.

²⁵ P. S. R., doc. 26.

afterward prove of much value to them, for when attacked by the Germans in June, 1942, they abandoned these territories in one week.

If there were any Polish civilians or soldiers in remote sections of the country who believed the Russians were coming to help against the Germans, they were soon undeceived, and in spite of the overwhelming odds against them, the Polish forces offered stout resistance, ²⁶ although the bulk of them were engaged on the German front. Their character as regular soldiers of a regular army obeying regular State authorities was recognized by the Commander of the White Ruthenian front of the Soviet army, Michael Kovalev, who issued a proclamation in leaflet form to the soldiers of the Polish army to surrender. In this proclamation their standing as a regular army was clearly recognized.

While hostilities were still in progress, Russia and Germany concluded on September 28, 1939, an agreement, establishing the so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov line "as the frontier between their respective State interests in the territory of the former Polish State . . ."²⁷ In this both nations violated a primary rule of international law according to which the right of the occupants is merely a right of administration, and according to which they may neither annex, divide or cede the territory while the war continues.²⁸

The Polish people, however, in no wise accepted such a conclusion to the affair, and on October 3, 1939, the London *Times* informed its readers of the formation of a new Polish cabinet under General Sikorski.²⁹ But with many Polish soldiers the prisoners of the Germans, and with many others making their way to foreign countries and finally to the Allied armies, further resistance within Poland itself could not be effectively

²⁶ London Times, Sept. 30, 1939: "In 'liberated' Poland . . . Bands of Poles whose total strength may probably be counted in tens of thousands, are continuing the fight in the Augustow and Bielowiez forests, the Pinsk swamps and elsewhere." Loc. cit., Oct. 3, 1939: "A new Polish unity. Ministry of all the parties. Guerilla bands in North Poland harassing Russian invaders." Loc. cit., "The Polish Colonel Dombrowski, at the head of a strong detachment of Partisans is causing annoyance to the Russian troops occupying the provinces of Bialystock and Vilna . . . Other detachments are active in the Pinsk marshes and even in Galicia, nearer to the U. S. S. R. Operations in the Pinsk region against Admiral Czarnawski, who led the main guerilla band composed chiefly of sailors of the river flotilla were more successful. A few days ago the detachment, it is reported, was surrounded and the admiral captured . . . A great number of Roman Catholic priests have either been arrested, have escaped or have disappeared mysteriously." See also Stalin's radio speech of July 3, 1941, The American Review on the Soviet Union, Aug., 1941, IV, no. 3, p. 165.

²⁷ P. W. B., doc. 179.

^{2,8} L. F. Oppenheim, op. cit., II, p. 342.

²⁹ London Times, Sept. 30, 1939, Oct. 3, 1939.

organized although guerilla warfare continued for some time. Meanwhile the Russian authorities began the organization of the Polish provinces in their possession. In the Russo-German agreement of September 28, 1939, the Russians had already expressed some ideas for "the necessary State reconstruction" of the territory "east of this line"—the Ribbentrop-Molotov.³⁰

Upon entering the towns and villages, the Soviet miltiary authorities immediately compelled residents to raise the Russian flags on their houses. Mass arrests and deportations of persons³¹ without regard to religion, race, or nationality³² seem to have been the order of the day. Instead of observing that article of the Hague Convention which prescribes "the respect of the life of individuals and private property," the invaders, indeed, seemed determined to put into operation all the revolutionary methods designed to bring about the complete dislocation of the former legal order as soon as possible. The occupied provinces were arbitrarily divided into "Western Ukraine" and "Western White-Ruthenia" and the city of Vilno and its environs was ceded to Lithuania by an agreement of October 10, 1939. These divisions and cessions were not recognized by any power.

The Russian occupation forces consisted of at least thirty divisions of infantry, twelve motorized brigades and ten cavalry divisions,³³ a force far exceeding the peacetime strength of the Polish army. A modest estimate places the number of Russian elements engaged in the occupation at about 700,000 or about one soldier to every eighteen Polish inhabitants of all ages.³⁴ However, if we remember that the male population of Poland had decreased considerably as a result of the war, and if we discount the children, it is found that there was one Russian soldier to watch less than seven Polish adults.

The Polish administration was, naturally, replaced immediately by Soviet officials. In the towns, so-called Temporary Town-Committees, headed by officers or political agents of the Russian political police (N.K.V.D.), recent arrivals from the U.S.S.R., and two or three persons called "representatives

³⁰ P. W. B., doc. 179. See also: Pravda, Sept. 29, 1939.

³¹ The Soviet Occupation of Poland, Introductory note by J. B. Morton. Free Europe Pamphlets, No. 3, (London) pp. 35.

³² Even such old politicians as Prof. Stanislaw Grabski of Lvov University, who professed to believe in the good relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R. See his letter to the editor, *The Nineteenth Century and After*, CXXI, April, 1942, pp. 189-192. See also his pamphlets, *The Eastern Frontiers of Poland* (New York, 1943), p. 36.

^{\$3} V. Molotov, op. cit., pp. 33, 76.

³⁴ Jacques de Carency, "The So-called Plebiscite in Eastern Poland," Free Europe, Feb. 11, 1944, p. 42.

of local inhabitants," were set up. These latter were chosen by the Soviet authorities chiefly from Russian agents sent to Poland before the war or from among the members of the usually very weak local communist party. In rural areas "Peasant Committees" were organized in a similar fashion. These committees were given the task of dividing the lands and live stock of the owners of more than 300 acres among the peasants. These committees were also busy distributing propaganda under the auspices of the Red Army. This propaganda took the usual form of posters, leaflets, the radio, films and concerts.

All this was obviously prepared in and directed from Russia, and its primary aim was to instill in the population a hatred for everything Polish and a love for the promised new and happy life under the Soviet regime. The russification of these lands, in which the Russian-speaking population had always been small, 35 was immediately begun by the teaching of the Russian language. 36 In all these activities and the accompanying intimidation and terrorization of the population the soldiers of the Red Army took a leading part. 37 Besides the army, regular police units from Russia were brought to many towns and villages. District authorities were set up in much the same manner, the political administration always working in close co-operation with the authorities of the Russian Army.

On October 6, 1939, the Russian commanders Timoshenko and Kovalev on the "Ukrainian" and "White Ruthenian" fronts respectively, made known their decisions to hold elections on October 22, and to summon the "People's Assemblies" in Lvov for "Western Ukraine" and in Białystok for "Western White Ruthenia" four days later. Simultaneously, the military authorities issued bylaws, patterned partly after Soviet laws, according to which the "elections" were to be carried out by special "committees for organization of elections" in the cities of Lvov and Białystok. These committees were also largely composed of Soviet citizens and officials. The electoral bylaws were displayed on a few posters, and a small number of brochures were issued for official use only and not for circulation. Afterwards, both

³⁵ Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland, September, 1939—June, 1941 (London, 1941). According to the census of 1931 and according to an estimate of August 31, 1939, one per cent or 134,000.

³⁶ Pravda, Oct. 17, 1939.

³⁷ Ibid., Sept. 22, 1939. See also Izvestya, Sept. 28, 1939.

³⁸ M. S. Grechukha, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and A. J. Korneichuk, afterwards Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union; N. J. Natalevich, Chairman of the Presidium and N. G. Grekova, member of the Supreme Council of the White Ruthenian Soviet Republic. The following Soviet army

the names of those responsible for the decision of the elections and the legal electoral provisions were omitted in all Russian publications. The electoral campaign was begun again under a different name. Tass, the official Soviet news agency, issued official communiqués on October 10-11, 1939, reporting from Lvov and Białystok³⁹ that there were "Temporary Town Committees" which had come forward with a proposal for elections to the "Peoples Assemblies of Western Ukraine" and "Western White Ruthenia." But these reports neglected to state the character of these committees, that they were in no way representative of the local population.

The electoral bylaws were published in pamphlets under the heading "Law for the Elections to the People's Assembly of the Western Ukraine." Similar pamphlets published the election laws in White Ruthenia. According to Article 1, all citizens were to take part in the elections according to principles of universal and equal right of election. The voting was to be secret. Article 1 defined the term "universal" as follows: "All citizens of the age of eighteen or over, independent of race, nationality, denomination, education, domicile, social class, property status or previous activity have the right to participate in elections of deputies and be elected to the West Ukrainian People's Assembly." Although the term "universal," thus defined, excluded no one over eighteen, obviously many were excluded by means of deportation and arrests. Naturally those absent in prisoner-of-war camps and Polish citizens in sections occupied by Germany were unable to vote. On the other hand, newcomers from the U.S.S.R. and even foreigners from other countries were encouraged by every means to vote. Some of the persons leaving districts in Eastern Poland to return to their homes on the German side of the Ribbentrop-Molotov line were required to vote or lose permission for returning.

The lists of persons entitled to vote were prepared in a few days by the local Soviet police officials without any pretension to accuracy. They made up the lists by visiting the houses and warning the inhabitants that voting was obligatory. The same Soviet authorities appointed the election officials without consulting the population.

The electoral campaign lasted only two weeks, but was very intensive. It was carried on by election experts brought from the U.S.S.R. and by members of the Soviet armed forces. "In the period of preparation for

officers and officers of the N.K.V.D. are found listed among the members of the "Western Ukraine" committee: Marsko, Yeremyenko, Gorbatenko, Gruleno, Grishchak, Begna, and Lukin. On the "White Ruthenian" committee are found Gaysia, Mrkieyev, Spasov. See Izvestya, October 11 and 12, 1939.

³⁹ Pravda, Oct. 12; 1939; see also Izvestya, Oct. 14, 1939.

the election to the People's Assembly of the Western Ukraine, thousands of soldiers and officers carried on enormous political activity among the population . . . "40 At this time the population was completely cut off from the outside world while the campaign was carried on according to Soviet customs.

It is interesting to note that Stalin himself, in 1925, said that a Soviet election was "a senseless official procedure calculated to smuggle in delegates by using a number of tricks and pressures exerted by a handful of men who are afraid to lose power." Since that time the technique has been perfected and the totalitarian character of these procedures is well known. 42

According to Article 20 of the Bylaws, "The candidates for delegates are proclaimed in the electoral constituencies. The right to propose [nominate] rests with the peasant provisional committees, the meetings of factory workers, of workers' guards and of the intelligentsia. Remark: These meetings elect the men of confidence in the district quarters who then at the district meetings agree about the common candidate for the district [constituency]." In practice the candidates were proposed at meetings of persons convoked sometimes at random from committees and members of workers' trade unions set up only a few days previously during the occupation. At first the workers did not understand the Soviet electoral machinery and tried in some places to nominate candidates of their own choice. But the Communist agents and militia present at every meeting prevented any deviations from their methods. Whenever an independent candidate was proposed, the Communist agents demanded that he be "discussed," i.e., that he should step upon the platform, relate his past, describe his political views, etc.43 In the Soviet regime no opposition is admitted and any attempt at opposition would be suicidal.

The candidates nominated by the meetings had to register with the regional electoral committees set up and controlled by Soviet authorities. There was no mention of the obligation of regional electoral committees to carry out such registration; therefore, any undesirable candidate could be easily stricken from the list. The number of registered candidates proved to be smaller even than the number of delegates required by the bylaws—one for every five thousand voters.

⁴⁰ Izvestya, Nov. 2, 1939.

⁴¹ Josef Stalin, Problems of Leninism. Trsl. into Polish from the 9th Russian edition (Moscow, 1933), p. 164.

⁴² M. T. Florinsky, Towards an Understanding of the U.S.S.R., a Study in Government Politics and Economic Planning (New York, 1939), pp. 229 ff.

⁴³ Such an incident is described by V. Katyev in Pravda, Oct. 18, 1939.

Only one candidate could be nominated for each electoral district.⁴⁴ According to the Soviet press, about 1,500 candidates were registered in Western Ukraine while in western White Ruthenia 929 candidates were registered. In the latter several districts registered none at all. Among the candidates nominated, many were actually not Polish citizens at all but Soviet citizens such as Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov, Marshal Voroshilov and President of the Ukrainian Supreme Council Greczucha.⁴⁵

The polling took place throughout the entire occupied territory on October 22, 1939, except in the town and part of the district of Vilno, which was ceded to Lithuania and where the "election" took place in July, 1940, together with the Lithuanian districts. On election day the propaganda campaigns reached their peak. Electors were rounded up at their working places and led by the Soviet police in columns to the polling places.

Article 29 of the Bylaws stated that the elector, in the room used as a polling booth, should mark his ballot by leaving the name of the candidate for whom he was voting and deleting the others. He was then to pass to the room where the electoral board was sitting and drop his ballot in the urn. In practice, however, the voter had no choice, since only one candidate was nominated for each constituency and thus only one name was printed on the ballot. Every elector had to place his envelope with the ballot in the urn. Anyone who declined to do so or who changed his ballot revealed himself as a dissentient. If, in theory, he could delete the only name on the paper, in practice it was impossible to do so because everyone was watched both in the queue and in the room with the balloting urn. N.K.V.D. agents were present, chatting with the voters, during the whole electoral procedure. Whoever wished to record a "subversive" vote exposed himself, his family and friends to imprisonment and deportation. Therefore, the balloting could in no way be called secret.

No better was the situation of those who refused to take any part at all in the "elections." On the afternoon of election day, members and officials of the election committees, who consisted principally of members of the Red Army or militia called the "Workers' Guard" (i.e., occupational police), visited the residences of the reluctant and "persuaded" them to take part in the election and with a more or less threatening manner they invited and led them to the polling places. Excuses of illness and fatigue were not accepted. For sick persons transportation was provided.

⁴⁴ Pravda, Oct. 19 and 20, 1939.

⁴⁵ Pravda, Oct. 19 and 22, 1939.

⁴⁶ Pravda, Oct. 23 and 25, 1939.

On the other hand, the Soviet authorities aimed at creating on the electoral premises a festive atmosphere. In many places there were orchestras and dancing. Buffets with good food at cheap prices were accessible to everyone.

According to Pravda⁴⁷ the results of the voting were as follows: The so-called "Western Ukraine"

Area	quinN	er of		Votes		. Vo	tes
	Electors		%	"for"	%	Invalid	Deleted
WHOLE OF THE TERRITORY	4.776.275		92.83	4.032.154	90.93	75.925	325.918
Lvov province	1.345.561		91.59	1.088.371	88.3	14.631	129.464
City of Lvov	268.382		89.66	241.068	93.48	1.631	15.103
Tarnopol province	1.074.387		88.03	875.169	92.48	33.566	37.013
City of Tarnopol	27.317		93.32	24.567	96.36	382	544
Stanisłavov province	979.735		96.13	877.851	93.2	6.045	57.934
City of Stanisłavov	49.990		92.72	43.671	94.21	42	2.640
Volhynia	1.376.592	1.313.953	95.44	1.190.763	90.62	21.683	101.507
City of Łuck	31.075		92.49	26.308	92.53	170	1.953

Elections of 1484 delegates of of 1495 districts were registered. The so-called "Western White Ruthenia"

Area	QuinN	er or		v ores		0 >	res.
	Electors Voter	Voters	%	"for"	%	Invalid	
WHOLE OF THE TERRITORY	-2,763.191	2.672.280	96.71	2,409.522	90.67	14.932	
Polesie Polesie	715.043	708.049	99.02	696.734	98.57	1.205	
City of Brześć nad Bugeim (Brest-on-the Bug)_	44.622	44.647	97.82	41.831	96.00	69	
City and County of Pińsk	117.177	116.253	99.2	114.466	98.51	65	
Białystok Province	859.010	803.871	93.9	678.930	85.00	5.547	
City of Białystok	83.035	81.873	98.6	78.961	9.96	167	
City and County of Grodno	. 138,018	134.904	97.4	123.650	92.00	478	
Nowgródek Province	656.974	644.415	80.86	588.834	92.1	4.937	
City and county of Nowogródek	95.536	94.547	98.96	93.050	98.76	228	
City and county of Stonim	79.078	78.401	99.14	77.171	98.5	95	
City and county of Baronowicze	103.860	102.624	98.8	99.361	97.3	498	
Counties of the Vilno Province	532.164	515.945	97.00	445.024	8'98	3.243	

^{4.7} Pravda, Oct. 25, 1939; see also the London Times, Oct. 26, 1939.

Elections of 927 delegates out of 929 districts were registered. The counting of votes was not public. The method of counting them is unknown. Representatives of those interested were not admitted to the counting nor were any neutral, impartial observers, such as neutral journalists.

The accuracy of the figures is rendered doubtful by the very nature of the difficulties in the way of carrying out an orderly election at that time The administration was newly organized. Hostilities had ceased only a few days previously in some places while in others fighting was still in progress At the same time a large-scale and disorderly migration was going on.

In spite of the pressure exerted by military authorities, according to Soviet official statement there were 664,601 voters who did not vote "for." Of these, 401,843 were from "Western Ukraine" and 262,758 from "Western White Ruthenia." They decided to bear repression rather than submit to the Soviet regime.

On October 26, 1939, the deputies elected in the foregoing manner (October 22) gathered as "Peoples Assemblies" for "Western Ukraine" in Lvov. For "Western White Ruthenia" they gathered in Białystok on October 28. The powers of these assemblies were never revealed before their actual meeting. There was no official publication of complete lists of the deputies who took part; it is, therefore, impossible to tell who were among them, whether residents or natives of the Eastern provinces of Poland or newcomers from the Soviet Union.

The assemblies voted the introduction of a Soviet regime in their provinces and incorporation into the U.S.S.R. The vote was unanimous except for that of a Ukrainian lawyer in the Lvov assembly, Vinnichenko, who was ultimately sentenced to eight years of imprisonment. On November 1-2, 1939, the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. decided to consent to "the request for incorporation" and to include the provinces in the U.S.S.R.⁴⁸ Then followed constitutional procedures to incorporate them with the Ukrainian Soviet and the White Ruthenian Soviet republics

The voting in the city of Vilno and its environs took place with only slight differences on July 14 and 15, 1940. Vilno had been seized by the Soviet Army on September 19, 1939, and ceded by Russia to Lithuania on October 10 over Poland's protest. When the U.S.S.R. introduced their garrisons into Lithuania, they set up temporary authorities friendly to

⁴⁸ Izvestya, Nov. 2 and 3, 1939.

⁴⁹ P. W. B., docs. 181-183; see also P. S. R., docs. 29, 36, ff.

Russia and finally in the ultimatum of June 14, 1940 demanded: (1) Prosecution of General Skudas, Lithuania's Minister of the Interior; (2) Formation of a new cabinet friendly to the Soviet Union; (3) Entrance into Lithuania of an unlimited number of Soviet troops (which amounted to at least half a million men. Since the population of Lithuania and Vilno together number around 2,880,000, there would have been one soldier for every six inhabitants). Since these conditions were unacceptable to Lithuania, President Smetona and the Lithuanian government went abroad, while the Soviet army marched in and set up the communist government of Mr. Gustas Palecki, June 17, 1940.

This new government carried out elections similar to those in Eastern Poland in 1939, with, however, some differences. The Soviet army took an active part not only in the propaganda activities but in the voting. All Lithuanian and Polish parties and organizations were dissolved The whole campaign lasted only nine days. The nomination meetings were under stricter control of the Communist Party, the police and the Red Army. There were no lists of electors whatsoever The electoral board sealed passports with the word *Belsavo* (voted). Passports and identity cards were supplied by them to persons without their papers in the polling place itself. Even some American citizens were obliged to vote.

Official results concerning the whole of Lithuania and Vilno together were as follows: Of the 1,450,000 entitled to vote, 1,386,000 or 95.62% voted, and the candidates received 1,375,349 votes or 99.19% of the votes. On August 3, 1940, the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. adopted the Lithuanian Republic with Vilno into the U.S.S.R.⁵⁰

This account of the voting in Eastern Poland and Vilno is not complete. It would take a much more detailed study to present fully the events that took place there This article is concerned especially with the relation of these plebiscites to international law.

They certainly differ in several respects from the practice of other plebiscites held in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. First of all, a single plebiscite campaign has never witnessed such large-scale measures for the essential change of population and of the legal and political status of any country. Never before have votes been recorded under so great a pressure from military authorities and members of an occupying army. The voters in Eastern Poland were given no choice other than to vote for

⁵⁰ London Times, July 22 and 23, 1940, "On the surface all this appears to be voluntary and unanimous, but those who have recent knowledge of the Baltic States know that it is not so."

the candidate presented by the controlling power. They were not allowed to abstain from voting, to vote against the candidate, nor to vote for any other solution. These facts should be judged from the point of view of the doctrine of international law rather than from the point of view of Soviet revolutionary doctrines or practices.⁵¹

The doctrine of international law is, perhaps, still undecided concerning the details of plebiscites, but some general rules as to their connection with the cession of territory and free expression of the will of the population are clearly established.

The plebiscite is considered to be an accompaniment of the cession of territory. First a decision of the cession of territory must be made by a competent state in an international agreement. If it is conditional, the plebiscite then only confirms or validates the agreement by the consent of the inhabitants of the territory. Or the plebiscite may be the decisive factor, in which case the whole decision as to the future of the territory is entrusted to its inhabitants. In the first case the voter has a choice between the status quo or the new nationality. In the second instance, he may have even several alternatives: His present state, the new state (the other party of the international agreement) or the formation of an independent state. In either case, the consent of the state which previously extended its sovereignty over the territory is necessary. In the case of the Eastern Polish provinces not only had Poland's territorial integrity been violated but a formal protest had been registered.

Although an authority comments that "it is doubtful whether the law of nations will ever make it a condition of every cession that it must be ratified by a plebiscite" and another student, discussing the whole problem of plebiscites, concludes that "the plebiscite can never be a serious act," there still remains the civilized world's opinion of what is meant by the free expression of the will of the population.

An American scholar, Sarah Wambaugh, in her work, *Plebiscites Since* the World War,⁵⁴ formulates certain requirements for the holding of plebiscites. It is interesting to compare the plebiscites in Eastern Poland with some of the conditions which she lays down. The first requirement is that "the plebiscite must be held under the formal agreement of both

 ⁵¹ T. A. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law (New York, 1935).
 52 L. F. Oppenheim, International Law, 5th ed. by H. Lauterpacht, (London and New York, 1937) I, p. 435.

 ⁵³ Bonfils-Fauchille, Traité de droit international public, 8th ed. (Paris, ca. 1921).
 54 Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War (Washington, D. C., 1933),
 I, p. 506.

parties." Poland did not agree to the elections but protested instead. 55 She says, "The area must be neutralized and the agreement must clearly provide this." Eastern Poland was, of course, under temporary occupation of the overwhelming forces of the U.S.S.R. Again, "On the signing of the agreement the area must be put at once under international control." Not only was there no international control, but not even were neutral witnesses, such as foreign press correspondents, allowed. "All troops of both parties must be evacuated at once." Some Polish units were still carrying on guerilla fighting and the forces of the U.S.S.R. were in threatening proportion to the whole of the population. "The suffrage must include women as well as men; it should also include illiterates and prisoners." A large number of political and other prisoners were excluded. Other conditions mentioned by Miss Wambaugh were not fulfilled.

The comparison of theory with reality in the case of the Polish elections leads to the following conclusions from the point of view of international law:

- 1. The principle of fair and equal opportunity for all interested parties was ignored;
- 2. The essential conditions for expressing the free will of the population were lacking;
- 3. The voting in Eastern Poland arranged by the U.S.S.R. can in no way be considered an international plebiscite.

This opinion agrees with the protest of the Polish government of General Sikorski, which stated on October 21, 1939:

"The Polish Government hereby declares that the holding of such a plebiscite in areas of military occupation is contrary to international law. Therefore they will consider it as null and void, and in no case will they recognize it as having legal force." 65

LONDON, ENGLAND

⁵⁵ P. S. R., docs. 25, 29, 36; also P. W. B., docs. 180, 182, 183.

⁵⁶ P. W. B., doc. 183.

RUSSIA AND BULGARIA

1878 - 1944

by James F. Clarke

WICE within the last two-thirds of a century the Russians have "liberated" the Bulgarians: the first time from the Turks, following the bitterly contested war of 1877-1878; the second time from the Germans in September, 1944, after a week's bloodless campaign. Some interesting parallels and contrasts are furnished by these two liberations.

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was preceded by predominantly Russian-inspired Bulgarian underground and revolutionary activity which provoked the Turks to acts of reprisal, furnishing the casus belli for the Russians, and temporarily at least tying the hands of British Russophobes and Austrian imperialists. The Bulgarians had already won their religious freedom from the Greek Orthodox Church. The success of Russian arms brought Bulgarians virtual political independence from the Turks; and the abortive treaty of San Stefano dangled before Bulgarian eyes the dream, which eventually became a nightmare, of "integral" Bulgaria. Fearful of Russian expansion southeastwards towards the Straits and the Mediterranean, England and Austria-Hungary looked upon the new Russian-sponsored state in the Balkans with suspicious eyes, whereas Bulgaria's already constituted Balkan neighbors — Rumania, Serbia and Greece — showed jealoucy and resentment, which Serbia carried to the extent of war in 1886.

In Bulgaria the Russians helped inaugurate the succession of German rulers, set up a Russian pattern in administration and the army, and presided over the stormy birth of constitutional and political life. It is to this initial period of Bulgaria's constitutional history from 1878 to 1885 that Dr. Black devotes an excellent and thorough monograph,* originally presented to Harvard University as a doctoral dissertation.

The book is divided into three parts: an introductory chapter is assigned to analyzing the extent to which the Bulgarians were ready for self-government by 1878; about 100 pages are devoted to the framing of the controversial Tirnovo Constitution of 1879; and an equal amount of space is allotted to describing the progress of constitutional government to 1885.

The author shows that the experience of the Bulgarians before 1878 had provided them with more practical and theoretical training for political

^{*} Black, C. E., The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria. Princeton Studies in History, Vol. 1. Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1943. Pp. 344. \$3.75.

life than has ordinarily been supposed, although he later points out that the ignorance and inexperience of the members of the Constitutional Assembly explains some of the shortcomings of the constitution, and states that "the lack of political experience and tradition both on the part of the leaders and on the part of the people . . . undoubtedly accounts for a great deal of the trouble" during the first years of Prince Alexander's reign.

Dr. Black disposes of some other historical misconceptions. No longer may it be said that the Bulgarian constitution (based on the Serbian of 1869 and not on the Belgian of 1831) was one of the most liberal in Europe. His analysis of Russia's interest and influence is also somewhat unorthodox. A lesser myth exploded is that Bulgarian Robert College graduates, trained in parliamentary practice, played an important rôle in the constitutional debates at Tirnovo.

The summary of the social and intellectual background of the constitution furnishes a rapid review of the sources and channels through which western political ideas found their way to Bulgaria. Russia was the principal intermediary in this process and in introducing Bulgaria to independent political life and to the forms at least of constitutional government. Brief sketches of the three principal pre-liberation political thinkers and revolutionaries—Rakovski, the elder Karavelov, and Botiov—furnish the setting for the late political debates and alignments.

The Tirnovo debates molded political thinking and parties into two forms: the Moderates (Conservatives) and the Extremists (Liberals). Using the Prince's desire to increase his authority and the Russians' determination to maintain their control, these two sides vigorously campaigned against each other until the reopening of the Eastern Question on an international scale in 1885 put constitutional issues into the background. But the strategic issues were complicated by tactical maneuvers. The Russians were not averse to working with the Prince and later with the Liberals against him; the Conservatives and Liberals united temporarily to dislodge the Russians from their constitutional alliance with the Prince. Battenberg's decision in 1883 to ditch his Russian generals' cabinet and restore the Tirnovo Constitution, at the insistence of the Liberals, was a turning point in his career which led to his downfall.

Stambolov's name and career are perhaps better known, but it was the younger Karavelov (Petko) who, according to the author, set the course of Bulgarian government for several generations, through his doctrine that the government should exercise an active, paternalistic control over the social and economic life of the country—but in the interest of the people and

through the national assembly. Less effective was his conviction that "the best cure for most, if not all, public evils is freedom" and that the government should consist only of "such men as enjoy the full confidence of the freely elected representatives of the collective national will," namely the voters (p. 258).

Although Russian policy may have seemed at times inconsistent, the Russians, says the author, "were planning to make Bulgaria a Russian province and they wanted all Bulgarian civil servants to serve as tools of that policy" (p. 234). High-handed methods were used in pursuit of this goal. For example, Russian agents openly campaigned for the Prince and the Conservatives in the election of 1881. The few Liberal Party leaders elected were refused admission to the assembly. Prestige was very important: although by 1883 the Russians favored the re-establishment of the constitution, the fact that it was accomplished without their blessing evoked bitter opposition. The same situation arose three years later with the union of north and south Bulgaria. Yet Russia's rôle in Bulgaria was comparatively impartial and beneficial.

The nature of the subject and the author's purpose and method inevitably cause some repetition. The line-up and arguments before the liberation and in 1879, 1881, 1883 were similar; yet it is good to have them set down logically and chronologically, and the author handles the complex and minute threads of policy and personalities with skill. Most of what has been written about this episode of the Eastern Question has centered on the more romantic and intriguing aspects of the career of Alexander Battenberg and on the hide-and-seek of big power diplomats. Dr. Black has restrained himself from going over the same ground. Instead he has concentrated on the domestic Bulgarian political scene, combing the extensive literature on the subject, putting together the latest Russian and Bulgarian findings, and adding the results of his own researches in unpublished and unused British and Austro-Hungarian archival material on the Bulgarian constitutional struggle. For this the author was well qualified by his familiarity with Bulgaria, with the sources and literature of the subject and with the necessary languages. Hence there is small chance that the results will have to be revised in any major aspect.

There is an appendix containing a bibliographical survey of the sources and literature of modern Bulgarian history, the texts of the principal constitutional documents under discussion, and a scheme for transliterating Bulgarian (drawn up jointly with the reviewer and followed by the author in this book). A brief outline of the later vicissitudes of the Tirnovo

Constitution, which remained essentially the law of the land until 1934, would have contributed to the completeness and usefulness of the book, especially now.

Russia's second "liberation" of the Bulgarians took place under basically different circumstances but so far with similar results. With the Germans already on the run and the Muraviev Government about to declare war on the Germans, the Russians moved in from Rumania, declared war on Bulgaria (the Boris-Filov regime had obstinately refused to send any Bulgarians to the Eastern Front during the period of German control), and in less than a week the Russian-inspired and Communist-dominated Fatherland Front underground movement was in control of the country. Again Russian-trained political émigrés returned to take over key positions in the new government and Russian officials, together with their Bulgarian adherents, set to work to apply Russian forms to politics, administration, army, economics, and life in general. But this time it is not the unexpectedly democratic contribution of the Tsarist Russia of 1878 but the essentially Communist system of the Soviet Russia of 1944. Instead of the Rakovskis, Karavelovs, Botiovs and Stambolovs, Bulgarians now have the Dragoichevas, Kolarovs, Pavlovs, and Dimitrovs. Again Russian generals, working through the Fatherland Front, play the rôle of Alexander's Russian generals. Once more regents, cabinets, coalitions, electoral laws, opposition parties and the press are the issues. There are also contrasts. Serbia (Yugoslavia) and Rumania are now more than cordial due to a community of interest and sponsorship; the Church, revolutionary and schismatic in 1878, is now reunited with the Orthodox world with the blessing of the Russian Church. The series of German rulers ushered in with the approval of the Russians seems fairly on the road to eclipse. Agitation over "integral Macedonia" replaces or carries on the arguments over "integral" Bulgaria.

In the 1880's England and Austria, while disclaiming spheres of influence, admittedly were combatting Russian power in Bulgaria. Britain is still suspicious of Russians in Bulgaria, while Austria is replaced by the United States, but with a considerable difference.

In 1878, American interest in Bulgaria was largely confined to eleemosynary concern for the Christian minorities of the Ottoman Empire together with mild diplomatic seconding of demands for reform presented by British ambassadors. An undercurrent of American hostility to the encroaching of autocratic Russia was also apparent. Because Bulgarians had proved relatively receptive to the efforts of Protestant American missionaries, Bulgaria was becoming better known in America than many other parts of

the Ottoman Empire. In fact American missionaries became Bulgaria's best press agents at home and abroad and were largely responsible for preventing a break in relations during the last war. The support given to Bulgaria by the American peace delegation is as much proof of the good press which Bulgaria got in this country as it is of the merits of the Bulgarian case.

Bulgaria's declaration of war on the United States on December 13, 1944 no doubt shocked and worried Bulgarians more than it did Americans. Bulgarians may try and even succeed in justifying their alliance with Hitler in March, 1941. But to say that the declaration of war against the United States was merely a token of loyalty to an ally is, in the light of three-quarters of a century of friendly American-Bulgarian relations, as flimsy an argument as was Russia's pretext for declaring war on Bulgaria in September, 1944. On the other hand, to maintain that the members of the Filov government were executed because of the declaration of war against the United States is oversimplification.

Dr. Black's account of the first years of Bulgaria's semi-independent existence, with its detailed analysis of the struggle for democratic forms and procedures and against Russian interference, should be of great interest not only to historians and students of government, but also to the many Americans who have been or may be interested in Bulgaria. This book is a timely contribution because it deals in detail with aspects usually passed over in conventional treatments of this period of Bulgarian history and because of the current interest in and importance of constitutional government, free elections, and Russian influence in Bulgaria.

Washington, D. C.

BOOK REVIEWS

MOODIE, A. E., The Italo-Yugoslav Boundary, A study in Political Geography. London: George Philip & Son, 1945. Pp. viii, 241. 8s. 6d.

The problem of the boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia is one that has larger implications than appear in its local nature, for the region of this boundary is one of the pressure points of Europe, the meeting place of three large racial blocs of that continent: Teutonic, Slavic, and Mediterranean of Latin. The region, throughout its history, has served the double function of barrier and gateway between the Mediterranean and the Danubian areas.

Having made this clear, the book proceeds to define the region, a territory roughly bounded by the Isonzo River, the post-1920 frontier of Italy, and a line running from Trieste to Fiume. The area consists of two distinct parts, the northern section of the Julian Alps, separated by the Isonzo-Bača-Sora line from the southern section of the Julian Karst (Carso). The region as a whole is properly described as a border region, hence the difficulty of any attempt to draw a linear boundary in it. But in the present stages of political development of Europe linear boundaries seem inevitable.

The problem is considered under three aspects: the geographic, the ethnic, and the economic. The final determination of the linear or political boundary will be the result of the relative weight given to these components. In regard to the geographical aspect, the distinction is emphasized between the two abovementioned sections. The northern lends itself to the drawing of a linear boundary along the clearly defined crest of the Julian Alps, but in the south any boundary is bound to cut across the northwest-southeast direction of the lines of the Karst which is really an extension of the Dinaric system. As a result, the southern part of the boundary has been much more contested and has been the object of far more numerous proposals than the northern.

Even in the north, however, the "natural" or strategic line does not coincide with the ethnic, for the Slovene population has spilled over the western side of the divide. The ethnic factor is relatively new in its effects, but, given the force of nationalism in modern Europe, it is now of prime importance.

Quite rightly much weight is given to economic considerations. They further complicate the problem, for they cut across the others. On the local level, we find here, as well as in Istria, areas of predominantly Italian towns in a predominantly Slav (Slovene and Croat) countryside; the two cannot be disentangled. But, even more important than the local aspect, is the relation of the region to a large section of Europe; specifically, Trieste and Fiume are the natural trade outlets of much of the former Austria-Hungary. This function is analyzed in detail. From that point of view, neither port is Italian, and their incorporation in Italy has proved detrimental to the former and ruinous to the second. The railroads connecting them with their hinterlands and the control of these railroads

and of the passes through which they must go has been a major factor in determining the Italian demands.

Much of the book is taken up with tracing through history the combined rôles of barrier and avenue of communication of the Julian region, from Roman days, through the period of the barbarian invasions and the time when it was the meeting point of Austrian, Venetian, and Ottoman pressure, to the triumph of the first during the nineteenth century and the temporary dominance of the Italian influence after the First World War.

The treatment of the period of that war and of the settlement that followed it is open to a certain amount of criticism. As a result of too much condensation and of the failure to use available sources (to cite but one illustration, despite an extensive bibliography, no mention is made of Toscano's essential work on the Treaty of London of 1915), misleading impressions are sometimes conveyed. The uninformed reader may easily be confused between Wilson's memorandum to Orlando of April 14, 1919, not public at the time, and his public manifesto of the 24th. It is the latter which precipitated the crisis and the departure of the Italians from the Conference. Likewise the discussion of the Pact of Rome of 1918, of Wilson's acquiescence in the Brenner frontier, and of the so-called Tardieu proposal of May, 1919, is open to question.

The author makes a good case for the Wilsonian compromise and is highly critical of the frontier eventually obtained by Italy. Through a close and careful analysis of the geography, he shows how the Italians consistently violated to their advantage the principle of a frontier along the divide in the Julian Alps, a principle on which they laid so much stress elsewhere. As he correctly points out, the small strategic advantage gained by Italy was indicative of a narrow outlook and was no compensation for Yugoslav enmity and suspicion. These criticisms are well taken, yet in fairness the local situation should be set in the larger context of the whole settlement of the Italian problem. The Italians did yield Dalmatia, and the fact that the settlement left them with a sense of grievance was due not only to their own petty and foolish behavior, but also to the behavior of their allies.

In conclusion, the author is highly skeptical of the possibility of drawing any satisfactory linear boundary in this border region. He does not make any specific proposals of his own. His plea for minimizing the importance attached to frontiers is eminently sensible, but the grounds for hopefulness that he finds in the principles of the Atlantic Charter and in the possibility that the close of the Second World War would "find the peoples of the world ready to approach international problems in a spirit of greater tolerance and justice," seems, to this reviewer at least, utopian.

Despite certain shortcomings, this is a useful book. The numerous, clear and simple maps which illustrate it are a most desirable asset.

Barnard College Columbia University RENE ALBRECHT-CARRIE

Rosinski, Herbert, The German Army. New revised edition. Washington, D. C.: The Infantry Journal, Inc., 1944. Pp. vii, 220. \$3.00.

Among the various books which have been published during this war on the German army and the German General Staff, sometimes with sensational titles, the book under review stands out as the only one of permanent value since its author combines keen and broad understanding of his subject with accuracy in details.¹ It is the second (American) edition of a book which was first published in England in 1939.

Rosinski's book gives in the first chapters a history of the Prussian army down to World War I not only in military but also in social terms. This part of his book has hardly changed since the first edition. The men who built this army and shaped the thinking of its General Staff, such as Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, Moltke, and Schlieffen, are well characterized and their strategical and organizational ideas made understandable. The author stresses that the thinking of the Prussian General Staff developed from Napoleon's revolutionary strategy, that its most important tenets were diluted or even abandoned by the men responsible for the disposition of forces and operations in World War I, but that its implications were developed to their last consequences by the German strategists of World War II.

While the material presented in these chapters is not new, those which deal with Co-ordination and Command in World War I, the *Reichswehr* period of the German army, and the organization of the German military machine, its ideas, and strategy in the present war have no counterpart in the English literature and are of the greatest value. The same is true of the highly technical chapter on the General Staff System which, however, because of the course of events is now losing some if its interest.

After the defeat of the German army the most interesting question seems to be: how was it possible that an officers corps, which was as conservative as the Prussian, became allied with the most revolutionary movement which Europe has ever seen? This question is not posed in Rosinski's book, but the following answer is contained therein. In 1918 the downfall of the monarchies, to which the German officers had been tied, in their thinking and way of life, for more than a century, left them without rudder and compass. Regardless of the terrific shock they did not acknowledge defeat and started immediately working for what they considered national resurrection, as was always European tradition. The key-rôle which Seeckt played in planning for this resurrection is well described. But in so doing, being without rudder and compass and a rigid human type unable to make the necessary adaptations to a changed world, the German officers made those frightful blunders by which they not only betrayed themselves, but also their noblest traditions and their country which they meant to serve.

That this betrayal became possible is due to a tragic concatenation of circumstances. On the one hand the 1918 defeat had broken established lines of

¹ There is an ugly misprint twice on the same page 146.

authority which fact was severely felt by the officers and former officers. On the other hand, among the men the war created were the "storm troopers," fighters par excellence, (fighters for fighting's sake), with utmost nihilistic consequences. These men were becoming part and parcel of the Nazi movement, and the two groups found each other when the foundation of our civilization seemed to be breaking down in the world economic crisis. Extremely nationalistic and limited in their outlook the German officers were willing to ally themselves with anybody, who would help them to restore the nation to its pre-war glory,—even with the devil. They were certain that, if necessary, they would be able in time to cheat the devil out of the compact. But in this they deceived themselves. When they discovered the true character of their allies, rearmament had reached a dangerous stage. In that moment they could not upset the apple cart and a few years later the would-be masters had become the slaves of the devilish power which they had helped to build.

Other factors played a part in this connection. Being an officer had meant a way of life with high ethical standards which had been upheld since the days of the first emperor. After that time soldiering was rapidly becoming a profession, and Rosinksi has well shown that Ludendorff represents the decay of the old aristocratic, ethical spirit of the German officers corps. After World War I the German officer became more and more an expert and a technician, one of those experts who, without broader outlook, have become a danger to our civilization in many fields, all over the world. When these military experts described above allied themselves with the Nazis they lost their honor, and honor was the traditional cornerstone on which all European officers corps had rested.

This reviewer feels that Rosinki has not made it sufficiently clear that, regardless of the continuity, it was essentially not the old, but a revolutionary German army which entered this war. In many respects it was more democratic than any German army had been before. It had been revolutionized by embodying the implications of the latest technical development in its tactical and strategical thinking. Finally, as well described by Rosinski, it had for the first time in its history an officers corps which was not homogeneous. This fact had far reaching consequences. As little as is known about the attempt on Hitler's life in the summer of 1944. it is certain that the lack of cohesiveness among officers, together with the political awareness of the men, unheard of in the old army, led to the failure of the venture. The officers who was supposed to arrest Goebbels started discussions with him and finally disobeyed orders. The men at the switch boards did not transmit without questioning the orders given to them because party loyalty came before military discipline. Thus the officers' counterrevolution broke down. Only the later historian will be able to decide whether this failure was of far reaching consequences for the course of history.

In one respect this reviewer is not fully satisfied with the book. Nowhere, except in the chapter on the German General Staff System, does the author draw parallels with other contemporaneous armies. Therefore the reader never learns

where a certain military organization or certain tactical and strategical ideas stand when viewed in the course of world military history. Such omission, of course, does not detract from the positive value of the material which is given in the book.

Belmont, Massachusetts

FRITZ REDLICH

HANUS, FRANCIS, Church and State in Silesia Under Frederick the Great (1740-1786) A Dissertation. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1944. Pp. x, 432.

Here is a study dealing with a subject centuries old in a timely way. The question of the relation of Church and State is nothing new. The country chosen for investigation, however, is what gives it its timeliness and what arouses curiosity and interest.

In this doctoral dissertation Dr. Hanus has given us a very excellent, thorough, and, on the whole, a very objective study and treatment of a difficult and delicate subject in a country which has been very much to the fore in recent years.

The material is well organized, and its treatment is natural and logical. It is divided into five parts. In Part I Dr. Hanus reviews eight hundred years of Church and State in Brandenburg, refreshing the mind of the intelligent reader with the introduction of Christianity into and the organization of the Church in the Mark together with the changes produced by the Reformation in the relations of Church and State both in Brandenburg and in Prussia prior to the accession of Frederick the Great in 1740. Part II is devoted to a study of Frederick the Great, his background, his training, his temperament, his reaction to the ideas of the Enlightenment, his attitude toward philosophy, religion, and the Church, and his conception of kingship and of the State as supreme in all things. Part III gives a brief and rapid survey of the historical changes in the political, cultural, and ecclesiastical conditions and relations of Silesia from the middle of the twelfth to the middle of the eighteenth century. In Parts IV and V Dr. Hanus comes to grips with his subject, dealing with Frederick the Great's stand toward the Catholic Church in Silesia, specifically toward the Prince Bishopric of Breslau and its Cathedral Chapter, toward the abbeys and monasteries of the province, toward the Jesuits, and toward Rome itself, and with the problem of "royal patronage" of Frederick the Great as understood and exercised by him in his domains. A comprehensive bibliography of primary and secondary source material and an excellent index supplement the study.

The actual problem of the relations of Church and State in Silesia under Frederick the Great was very much the same that existed in other countries after the Reformation, and that is still confronting modern states today namely, the

problem of single or of dual supreme power in the State.

Prussia, prior to the conquest and annexation of Silesia, was practically a Protestant country. The power of the Prussian king was absolute and his authority supreme within his domains over all institutions, including the Church. Within his domains he was not only king, but, as regards the Church, also summus

episcopus. Through the conquest and annexation of Silesia "the number of Catholic inhabitants of Prussia had increased eightfold." Also, "the monarchy had received as a subject its first Catholic Bishop. Thus, a problem had been created that had to be solved. The year 1740 is, therefore, the beginning of a new period in the relations between the Prussian State, on the one hand, and

the Catholic Church, on the other" (pp. 78-79).

Frederick the Great was, as regards religion, very broadminded, liberal, and tolerant. "He could not be convinced that only Protestantism, and not all religions, had a right to exist. At an early age we see this trait of humanity and tolerance developed in Frederick, and he remained loyal to it, more or less, up to his death. His motto was: 'In my States everybody may live according to his fashion'" (pp. 85-86, 78). Nevertheless, "when Silesia became a Prussian province, Catholicism lost its position as the preferred and dominating faith" (p. 126). To be sure "by the Peace Treaty of Berlin, July 28, 1742, which gave Silesia to Prussia, the king obligated himself in Article 6 to leave the Catholic religion in Silesia to its status quo" (p. 127). According to the opinion of the Provincial Minister Graf Schlabrendorf (1755-69), "the guarantee of the status quo referred only to the 'credenda and the church service', but not to the traditional privileges in law and liberty of the Catholics, including the temporalia of the clergy" (p. 128). Frederick the Great could not reconcile himself to the idea of any of his subjects owing allegiance of any kind to any power outside himself and his domains. Within his domains he was actual summus episcopus, not only of his Protestant but also of his Catholic subjects (cf. p. 129). To make his supreme authority effective, Frederick the Great claimed the right of appointment of suitable candidates to all Church offices from the highest to the lowest (cf. pp. 380-81). In 1748 the Pope finally "conceded the King the right of patronage of positions which had also been under sovereign patronage under Austrian rule" (p. 380). The King, however, interpreted it in his own way, proceeded usually as he pleased, and claimed supreme power for himself and his royal government in all Church appointments.

Church historians in general, and those interested specifically in the question of the relations of Church and State, will find Rev. Dr. Hanus' book not only interesting, but also profitable and helpful.

Chicago, Illinois

PAUL FOX

GOOCH, G. P., GINSBERG, M., WILLOUGHBY, L. A., BUTLER, E. M., STIRK, S. D., PASCAL, R.: *The German Mind and Outlook*. Issued under the auspices of The Institute of Sociology. With a Summary by A. Farquharson. London: Chapman & Hall, 1945. Pp. 226. 9s. 6d.

This book will come as a surprise to those who feel that too many books have recently been devoted to a discussion of the German problem: it fills, in fact, a serious gap in our knowledge of Germans and things German. It is true, the studies here printed were first prepared for the London Institute of Sociology

as far back as 1942. Yet, this only adds a special flavor to the scientific approach chosen by these six experts. To have remained detached, unaffected by the nightly horror of air bombardment and the beastliness of Hitlerian warfare and Goebbelsian onslaught is a fine feat of intellectual integrity—taken for granted in our Western world, and yet a satisfactory affirmation of our common standards. Since, moreover, the six writers deal with the attitude of mind discernible in Germans their papers are not dated and have lost nothing through the war-time delay of belated publication. Perhaps they can be read now with even greater profit.

In an instructive opening paper Dr. G. P. Gooch, the historian, surveys "German views of the State," done-as may be expected from his pen-in a truly masterly manner. He is followed by the Professor of Sociology in the University of London, Morris Ginsberg, who contributes an interesting, if necessarily somewhat inconclusive, study of "German views of the German mind." The third essay, without doubt the most charming and attractive of the six (most of which have to paint a sombre picture indeed) is Professor L. A. Willoughby's who speaks of "Goethe and the modern world." Had the book been planned and issued in peace, and not in war, his should have been the last since it alone contains a program and message for the future. If L. A. Willoughby, Professor of German at University College in London, is almost the dozen of his craft in Britain today, the next contributor, Miss E. M. Butler, who has just been promoted to the German chair at Cambridge, has a lecture on "Romantic Germanentum" which is the most provocative—and unbalanced—of the six. The most methodical approach is exemplified in Dr. S. D. Stirk's penetrating study of "Myths, types and propaganda, 1919-39." The final contribution, by Roy Pascal, is full of understanding, written with sad sympathy, and deals with "Nationalism and the German intellectuals."

Dr. Gooch first shows German views of the state in harmony with western ideas right down to the end of the eighteenth century. He then shows in greater detail the parting of the ways, prepared in the days of reaction and almost carried to completion by Treitschke "of whom I was one of the last hearers at Berlin." Of the four and a half pages devoted to the Weimar experiment almost three are given up to the forces which attacked the democratic form of life—an illustration of the German disease which burst forth, in full force, through Hitler's assumption of power. Dr. Gooch's pages are almost a tour de force, yet they should prove indispensable to any serious student of the subject, especially if they lead him to more detailed research along the lines indicated throughout this paper.

Professor Ginsburg is not certain "whether we can speak with any accuracy of a German mentality or a German national character" since there is so little continuity and so little unity in the social structure of the German State. Nevertheless he gives interesting examples of German views of their own mind even if the voices actually chosen seem often without representative value. "Perhaps," he concludes, "the really important question about the Germans is not so much what they think of themselves as why they think so much of and about them-

selves." Except for hints Ginsberg has no answer to either question. But if he remains stimulating throughout, Professor Butler succeeds in being merely provocative. She "slashes" Hölderlin, Fichte, Nietzsche and George, all of whom she treats as forerunners of Hitler, Himmler and Goebbels. Many of her quotations are, of course, detestable, but her self-sure condemnation appears in doubtful taste coming as it does from a writer who-only in 1935-tried to show that Greek thought exercised an unwholesome influence on the (presumably pure) German mind and to propagate Stefan George without a single word of condemnation in her "Tyranny of Greece over Germany." This reviewer, at the time, repudiated her attack on yet another link between the western world and the German mind since Miss Butler's description of Greek tyranny could only strengthen the hands of those who were busily engaged in cutting the German mind adrift from the last bonds with the west. Incidentally, Professor Butler has a strange view of the philosophy of idealism which she describes as one of "contempt for reality"! Neither can it be said that George "removed himself to Switzerland when Hitler came to power in which same fateful year the poetprophet died." George was given state honors by Goebbels.

Dr. Stirk's "myths, types and propaganda" is wholly admirable:—he shows the various myths (of Langemarck, Prussia, the Reich) and the types (of the hero, the Prussian, the front-line soldier, the worker à la Jünger) as they appear in German modern literature and as they were used for the benefit of Nazi propaganda. To his stimulating and surprisingly complete survey Roy Pascal has added a note on the emergence of German nationalism throughout the nineteenth century. Once again Treitschke dominates the scene, to be followed by Nietzsche, and Spengler. Never has treason been committed by the "clercs," by the intellectuals, on a scale similar to the high treason committed by German writers, poets and philosophers who prepared the way for Nazism. There is no moral indignation here, in Roy Pascal's analysis, but the sharper and the more definite is the condemnation of the evil thing Hitlerian rabid nationalism stood for:-German democracy had remained a class-society, the poison of an international scramble for foreign possessions had not been made innocuous, had not been cut out. Pascal is scrupulously fair. His implied and pronounced judgment on the wrong route taken by Nazi Germany is the more weighty.

Finally, there is L. A. Willoughby's guide to Goethe—and the future. With him we leave behind the horrors of the German disease and turn to a world of sanity, nay wisdom. Conscious living (which recognizes the reality of the unconscious and makes it an additional source of true living) is the way to salvation. Goethe's views on education, on craftsmanship, on the need for understanding one thing completely, the ever strong force to wonder; his attitude towards religion and finally the State: they are passed in review, and shown to be ready to heal the wounds. "Goethe's faith rests on reason and persuasion, rather than on dogma and compulsion."

This symposium has an index. It should be used as a reference book by all who give thought to or act on behalf of German regeneration.

Charterhouse, Godalming, England

F. W. Pick

SETON-WATSON, HUGH, Eastern Europe between the Wars 1918-1941. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1945. Pp. xv, 442.

This excellent study by the son of one of Great Britain's foremost authorities on the history of Central and Southeastern Europe was completed at the time of the El Alamein campaign in October, 1942. Its preface was written in November, 1943. The book finally came off the press in 1945. With the exception of the last chapter no attempt has been made to bring the information "up to date." Yet this in no way impairs the timeliness or the importance of the study which despite its almost complete omission of references to sources, is perhaps one of the most "scientific" of all British and American books published in recent years on the history of the area lying between Germany and the Soviet Union. In dealing with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Jugoslavia, and Bulgaria, Seton-Watson uses the generic term "Eastern Europe" although with respect to Czechoslovakia it can be applied only with some reluctance.

The author has traveled extensively in Eastern Europe and claims knowledge of most of the languages spoken in that region. Much of the material contained in the book is based upon personal observations and upon conversations with Eastern Europeans. The book is by no means, however, another journalistic effort of the John Gunther variety, for Seton-Watson is not only thoroughly familiar with original printed source material but also has a bold and searching approach to Eastern European political and economic problems which are among the most complex and controversial in modern European history.

Three of the five introductory chapters, which comprise almost one third of the book, deal with the geographic and historic background of Eastern Europe. These chapters are individual masterpieces of clarity and concentration. Chapters four and five on the peasantry, stressing the paramount importance of a clear understanding of the agrarian problem in the whole areas, and on the political systems of the different countries also show the author's wide knowledge and comprehension of his subject. The central chapters, six and seven, trace separately the inner-political development of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Jugoslavia, and Bulgaria, and deal with the minorities and mixed populations. The problems of the German and Jewish minorities and the Transylvanian and Macedonian questions are singled out as the most illustrative. This chapter leads to the last part of the work dealing with Eastern Europe in world affairs between the World Wars. A penetrating deductio ad absurdum of the "small-power imperialism" of the Poles, Hungarians, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbians is followed by the two closing chapters—on the relations between the states of Eastern Europe and "the effect on Eastern Europe as a whole of the plans and intrigues of the Great Powers."

The author's intimate familiarity with the region and a refreshing sense of humor enliven the narrative. Although his father tried his best to explain (before the First World War) Croatia's position in the Hapsburg Empire, Seton-Watson frankly confesses that "the mysteries of Croatian constitutional law" are a subject beyond the grasp of any non-Croatian mind." And although his father had written, as early as 1939, one of the best diplomatic histories of the year preceding the outbreak of the Second World War (From Munich to Danzig), the son who is equally pitiless in his condemnation of Chamberlain's appearement policy (Munich "the greatest defeat of the greatest blow to prestige suffered by Britain since the loss of the American colonies" (p. 396), asks a series of questions which will have to be taken up by future scholars trying to evaluate the Munich Agreement.

In a book of such a scope many points are unavoidably debatable. To mention only a few: Recent scholarship on the Ottoman Empire, for instance, has challenged the customary picture in hasocical literature of the infamous "tribute in children" for the recruitment of the Janissaries (p. 36); see Maximillian Braun, "Türkenherrschaft und Turkenkampf bei den Balkanslawen," in: Die Welt als Geschichte, 6th year, 1940, No. 3-4, p. 129-130. The author mentions only in passing the "Minority Treaties" imposed after the European War by the Great Powers on the Successor States (p. 269). These nevertheless were of great importance since they were made the basis of the boldest attempt of justifying Hitler's expansionist policy by a brand-new amalgamation of geopolitics and legal theory: Carl Schmitt interpreted them as establishing, through the "universalistic" League of Nations, a right of control and intervention of the "fremdräumige" Western Powers on the European "Ostraum," Germany's exclusive sphere of influence (Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte. Berlin-Wien: Deutscher Rechtsverlag, 1939, pp. 55-65). In discussing the Polish policy of the Central Powers in the First World War, the author asserts that the main reason for proclaiming a Polish State was their thinking of the Poles as "a source of cannon-fodder for use on the Western front" (p. 54). If there is no slip of the pen ("Western" instead of "Eastern"), then the case will be difficult to prove; for all available testimony, military (Hindenburg, Ludendorff, von Beseler) as well as civilian (Bethmann-Hollweg) points distinctly to the Eastern front in discussing possible Polish military aid under German command.

The author has to be complimented for his restraint in using statistics. The shakiness of statistical information on the Balkans is illustrated by the fact that Seton-Watson in discussing Transylvania had no choice but to compare the results of the Hungarian census of 35 years ago with those of the Rumanian census of 15 years ago. And in the case of the Rumanian Jews, where the official figure in 1930 was 562,000 for the whole of the Greater Rumania and "certainly well under a million" if assimilated Jews are included (p. 289), it must be recalled that in special literature anti-Semite estimates range from 700,000 to

about 2,000,000 (see Hans Schuster, Die Judenfrage in Rumänien. Leipzig: Meiner, 1939, p. 121-124: Die rumänische Judenstatistik, and Alfred Malaschofsky, Rumänien. Berlin: Junker & Duennhaupt, 1943, p. 42).

Four maps and several appendices (Land distribution; "price scissors"; racial and religious statistics) and an index add to the value of the book which will doubtless become one of the truly indispensable works on the reference shelves of scholarly libraries as well as of chancelleries.

Washington D. C.

FRITZ T. EPSTEIN

Wellesley, Sir Victor, Diplomacy in Fetters. London: Hutchinson, 1944. 16s.

The former Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Victor Wellesley, has written an extremely interesting book in which he draws the lesson learnt during the three odd decades he spent inside the British Foreign office. His two final chapters, on the qualifications needed by the modern diplomat and on the "Thinking Shop," a better organization of the Office itself, remind the reader forcibly of Hugh Gibson's similar plea in his recent Road to Foreign Policy. They concern the specialist rather than the general reader who cannot very well judge what technical alterations seem necessary in order to make the foreign policies of the democracies more effective than they have proved so far. Incidentally, it is the more regrettable that the publishers printed an insufficient number of copies (even officials inside the Foreign Office were unable to procure them).

Sir Victor Wellesley thinks that diplomacy is hampered—or fettered, as he prefers it—by Parliament, by Public Opinion, by the Dominions and by Finance. To each of them he turns without flinching, but also without irritation. The book is full of sound and often shrewd remarks, but it suffers from a good many self-contradictory statements. In fact, the careful reader will soon discover that Sir Victor appears to have addressed himself to most of these fundamental questions only after his retirement:—if his book is any evidence he turned to thinking shop only after the time for action had passed. The result is rather unsatisfactory in that much of what he says will have to be thought out once more before definite conclusions can safely be drawn. His book, thus, is truly thought-provoking.

"Of all the factors that bind diplomacy," he sighs, "none is heavier than public ignorance when brought into action." This is a familiar complaint. One way out is, obviously, not to bring it into action at all—which leads to the totalitarian system. The other way out is, clearly, to enlighten public opinion. Yet, Sir Victor draws no such conclusion. In fact, he does not even see that a strong case can be made against the disturbing secretiveness of the British Foreign Office which even prevented the publication of volumes V and VI of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, ready for publication by the State Department since early 1944. "Wireless propaganda," he says, almost naively, "should conform strictly to policy and to truth, and for that reason must be under the supervision of the Foreign Office." Surely, the author has to think again.

Sir Victor Wellesley makes the interesting comment that the peacemakers of Vienna overlooked the forces of self-determination whereas the men of Paris in 1919, while belatedly recognizing self-determination, overlooked the need for inter-dependence and collaboration, particularly in the economic field. He might well be right. But he seems to hope that we can now forget all about selfdetermination—and thus be even more reactionary than were the peacemakers of Vienna in 1815. Again, this is not the conclusion he draws. Instead, he classes self-determination with the reasons which made the Paris settlement fail so quickly. Yet, he cannot deny that Austria, the Sudeten land, Silesia and Danzig-where that principle had to be slighted—were amongst the danger spots of the last uneasy peace. How to combine self-determination with modern integration Sir Victor does not show. His proposal, to suppress self-determination, is a sham solution which can only be explained by his doubts of democracy. "Democracy has now become to mean government by the ignorant many than by the expert few" (p. 124). To him, democracy is "essentially negative in outlook"—he defines it as a minimum of state interference. Here, for once, the author is quite logical. He doubts "the will of the people" ("largely a myth," to him) and he therefore also repudiates self-determination as a pointer to real peace. "War is nature's way of regulating the flow of human life," he says equally frankly; "the most we can do is by hard thinking and honest dealing, to space out the intervals between wars" (p. 42). This reviewer repudiates these views all and sundry. The author need think again:—he has to search his own heart before he can discover all the fetters that prevented timely action.

Yet, Sir Victor looks for effective guarantees of peace. He fears they can be found only in "some kind of pooling of sovereign rights." Here his search stops—the time for this, he states, is not yet. He turns away from the right road. The next League should reduce itself to a discussion club of unpolitical, purely humanitarian subjects. Mussolini, he thinks, would probably have been content with a portion of Abyssinia but for the League. Thus even to-day he does not think that the peace could have been saved by quicker action of the free world. On the other hand, he admits that the Balance of Power brings no peace either. So what? Integration of Europe is his answer. It is all very contradictory and, on the whole, unsatisfactory. He is without compass or chart since he has cast adrift from the basis of democratic belief—trust in the individual (he even dislikes the present system of general suffrage).

His chapter on the British Commonwealth suffers from similar inconsistencies. He quotes the Anglo-Turkish Treaty and the Locarno Pact as two instances where the Dominions were faced by faits accomplis in foreign affairs in order to prove his point that they should not ask for an independent position in the international field. Alas, the one was signed in 1923, the other in 1925—as Sir Victor knows, of course—and thus before the Dominion Status was defined at the Imperial Conference in 1926. About Eire he is almost funny:—he says that the "Sovereign of Eire" (sic) remained in diplomatic relations with Germany and Japan while at war with them as King of England and of the other Dominions—"because it suited Germany and Japan." Since Eire herself does not admit

the existence of the "Sovereign,"—why should Germany or Japan?

He condemns Ottawa severely since it meant that Britain and the Empire too went in for that self-same economic nationalism they condemned in others. Imperial preference stimulated the wicked *Lebensraum* idea, our author maintains. Yet, he ends not with a plea for freer trade but with a plea for a single and united Commonwealth foreign policy. Again the voice of the Dominions themselves doesn't seem to reach his inner ear.

Thus the book is revealing and ought to be studied with care. Unconsciously it sheds a good deal of light on one of the leading members of the British Foreign Office during a critical time. It also states innumerable problems, as yet unsolved, and very often in a self-contradictory manner which will require much hard thinking before we can resolve them and find an answer. The very absence of the great principles that underlie the structure of our democracies at home and must therefore also underlie our action abroad should lead the reader to their rediscovery and confirmation. Without them no peace can be gained.

Charterhouse, Godalming, England

F. W. PICK

KEETON, GEORGE W. & SCHLESINGER, RUDOLF, Russia And Her Western Neighbors. London: Jonathan Cape, 1942. Pp. 160. 8s 6d.

Two distinguished English scholars have undertaken to bring Great Britain and Soviet Russia closer together, to improve the "marriage of convenience" of 1941, and expand Anglo-Soviet understanding into one between England, Soviet Russia and the United States, with a view to guaranteeing a European peace settlement. The authors believe that the Atlantic Charter should be the cementing force of the triumvirate, but the authors believe also that "international law is necessarily based on balance of power politics" (p. 9). In analyzing the bases of Russia's foreign policy, they come to the conclusion that it is Russian "because Russians remain Russians no less for being communists." Russia's primary aim, according to the authors, is to obtain security for its western borders. It desires to dominate territories which are of the first importance from the standpoint of the control of the Baltic, which in German hands would be a menace. Finland may survive, but economically it must be closely connected with Soviet Russia. Some hopes are also expressed for the survival of independent democratic Baltic States, if the neutralization of the region could be arranged, as Soviet Russia had agreed several years ago. The authors speculate on the possible sympathies of the Baltic peoples for the Soviet system after the end of the German oppression. The authors, however, admit that the Baltic peoples are neither German nor Slav, that they are not anti-Russian, but that important elements resisted the change in 1940 in the Baltic. (Since then even Baltic social democrats and leftist trade unionists have joined the resistants).

The authors also agree that conditions of modern warfare exclude any

barrier politics. It is also clear that Soviet Russia will profit from stabilized conditions in Eastern Europe. The authors visualize a Poland friendly to Russia after the Curzon line problem has been eliminated, and the creation of a Danubian federation consisting of Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary, and of a Balkan League, in which all could co-operate. Poland should be connected economically closer with Soviet Russia. The Balkan League of peasant democracies would be materially supported by Great Britain and America. The authors believe that there is small likelihood that Eastern Europe will turn communistic or desire to be included in the U.S.S.R.

If the United States hesitates to commit itself to future action in defence of the specifically European settlements, then only Moscow together with England can become their co-guarantor. In any case, the U.S.S.R., although it considers itself to be the main factor in human progress and the sole bulwark of social progress (p. 13), and Great Britain can grow mutually more tolerant. However, the introduction of the Soviet system in England is not to be thought of. The farthest that England could go, they admit, is state capitalism, although as a flexible system and by the machinery of federalism and the ideology of communism—the authors surmise—sovietism can be swiftly and easily extended whereever conditions are favorable if particularly the Red army and soviet political police are at hand.

The authors conclude their book with the expressed hope that the Soviet system is no longer transient, but has become static, and that the U.S.S.R. should not hesitate to become a partner in a world-wide system, nor be opposed to the ideology of Great Britain and the U.S.A. To that effect British efforts should not be spared The book is richly dotted with facts, although not always correct, particularly in regard to chronology. The interpretation is often controversial—but it is ever stable in current policies.

A good map of Europe is included, but there is no bibliography. The index is very helpful.

One would wish that more such books would appear. Scientists should help practical diplomats and statesmen by supplying analytic works of world conditions.

Washington, D. C.

ALFRED BILMANIS

NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (E. A. M. WHITE BOOK, MAY 1944—MARCH 1945). (Trikkala, February 1, 1945). Reprinted in Athens. New York: Greek American Council, 1945. Pp. 137. \$1.00.

The White Book of the Greek National Liberation Front (E. A. M.) consists of a collection of 121 documents and covers the period from the Lebanon Agreement, the conference that brought about the basis of a government of

National Unity, (March 20, 1944) to the Varkiza Agreement, the conference that brought to an end the Greek civil war (February 12, 1945).¹

These documents chronologically enumerate the events which led to the clash between ELAS, the forces of the E.A.M., on the one hand and the British on the other:

The Lebanon and the Caserta Agreements.

The arrival of the Mountain Brigade in Athens (November 8, 1944), precipitating a crisis over the military question and Premier Papandreou's refusal to dissolve both the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion, in spite of his former declaration that the basis of the Greek National Army for the future shall be a "regular military conscription." (Premier Papandreou claimed that the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion constituted a part of the regular army, while the E.A.M. held that both of these two units were made up of volunteers like its own forces.)

With the conflict on, Premier Papandreou offered to resign and asked Sofoulis, the aged leader of the Liberal Party, on December 5th, 1944, to form a new government but the British Ambassador informed Sofoulis that "the British Premier was not in accord with any changes in the person of the President of the Government in the present situation"; and to General Scobie's request that he support Premier Papandreou, Sofoulis answered, "... if I consented to support the Papandreou government this would mean that I would be supporting the dictatorship, a thing which I cannot do." (Document No. 64). At the conference of the Greek political leaders following the visit of Churchill and Eden in Athens, December 25, 1944, Cafantaris spoke decisively:

I am not a defender of the left wing. I did not say all that I said about the Mountain Brigade in order to defend the left, but in order to show that it was a mistake for Mr. Papandreou to lead us to a conflict for the sake of the Mountain Brigade. If Mr. Papandreou thought that it was necessary to bring about the conflict, he ought to have chosen other pretexts, not the matter of keeping in their posts 2000 praetors especially when he had agreed to see them disbanded, and changed his position later. (Document No. 80.)

Documents Nos. 87 to 102, inclusive, deal with the terms of Armistice signed on January 11, 1945 between the British forces and ELAS.

Much has been written about atrocities committed by ELAS. Mr. Bikel, the Red Cross representative, made the following statement to the press:

Many things were heard in Athens to the effect that ELAS ill-treated the English prisoners, that it deprived them of their clothes and shoes, that it withheld the food and the other articles dropped for them by the English airplanes. I have ascertained with my own eyes that nothing is more inaccurate

¹ In the English text, Document No. 1 is dated March 20, 1944, and the last, No. 121, March 12, 1945. The chronological discrepancy between the title page and the body of the text is apparent; not having, however, at my disposal the original publication, I cannot venture an explanation.

than these rumors. The English prisoners are wearing the new clothes and shoes they had on the day they were captured . . . They unanimously answered me that they are perfectly satisfied . . . I asked them if they received the articles which are being dropped to them from airplanes and they answered that they receive them up to the last article. I must state that from none did I hear the slightest complaint . . . What I saw and heard I am obliged to bring to the knowledge of the British authorities and to proclaim them to public opinion as well. (Document No. 96.)

The E.A.M. has stated its case with a large number of apparently formidable documents. It is evident that the E.A.M. tried to avoid the clash with both the Greek and the British governments, but had to combat the decision of both Premier Papandreou and Mr. Churchill to eliminate its influence from the political arena of Greece.

Wright Junior College

Kostis T. Argoe

HUOT, LOUIS, Guns for Tito. New York: L. B. Fischer, 1945.

In this book, Major Louis Huot gives a straightforward story of the establishment of supply lines to Tito's Partisan forces across the Adriatic from the port of Bari. Early in 1943, the Office of Strategic Services (the name of this super-secret organization is not mentioned in the book) put the author in charge of certain American secret operations in the Balkans. At that time, the name of Marshal Tito was little known to the American public. The State Department continued to give its support exclusively to King Peter's Minister of War General Draja Mihailovich, although the Balkan Desk was in possession of adequate documentary evidence showing that Tito's Partisans were the only armed units in Yugoslavia effectively fighting the Germans. This documentary evidence was available to Major Huot, for it came mostly from the operatives of the Office of Strategic Services who worked in Yugoslavia under his personal supervision. Much of this evidence was also available to the present reviewer who was then employed by the Foreign Economic Administration as a specialist on Yugoslav affairs. But none of this evidence appears in Major Huot's book. Because of his position with the OSS, the author had to submit his manuscript for approval to the "policy-making officials" of the State and War Departments. 'The approval was given with the understanding that all discussions of the Tito-Mihailovich feud would be eliminated and that the author should confine himself strictly to a factual account of his assignment and of the manner in which it was carried out. As a result, Major Huot's book is essentially an adventure story.

In spite of the operation performed upon it by the censors, however, this work should be useful to the students of history who are too often inclined to judge the course of human events in terms of tons of pig iron and technological advance rather than in terms of the capacity of human beings to fight, suffer and die for an ideal. Major Huot's book explains better than any other work so far published in the English language what sort of man Tito is, what kind of

people his Partisan followers are and how and why they fought the Nazis for four long years without anaesthetics, surgical instruments or medicines, without anti-aircraft guns, completely surrounded by the enemy and forgotten by their Allies. But the book is more than a story of Partisan courage alone; it is also a story of the courage of Lieutenant Tim Faulkner, of the United States Army, Lieutenant Taylor, of the Royal British Navy, the crew of HMS Gall, and of the author himself. Furthermore, it gives a valuable account of how international red tape functions in a theater of war and how the success of a venture, affecting thousands of lives, depends on the word of one individual, capable of disposing, on his own responsibility, of men and ships, munitions and supplies of all kinds. Finally, the political sympathies of the author are stated without any ambiguity. He is an ardent admirer of Marshal Tito and of the aims of the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia.

It is to be hoped that after Major Huot returns to civilian life, he will find the time to write a study of the forces that produced the Partisan revolution against the invaders and against the political and social system that prevailed in Yugoslavia from 1919 to 1941.

Washington, D. C.

VASO TRIVANOVITCH

GOLDSCHMIDT, SIEGFRIED, Legal Claims Against Germany. New York: The Dryden Press, 1945.

No single group in modern history has been subjected to so systematic, so all-inclusive and so barbaric a persecution as the Jews and "non-Aryans" of Germany and of the occupied territories. Dr. Goldschmidt in the present volume examines with meticulous care and with remarkable erudition the means by which victims and heirs of Nazi persecution can be helped juridically under the aspect of international law. Excluded from his analysis are all claims that may either exist or would have to be established with regard to states overrun by the Germans where governments under the pressure of the invaders have adopted legislative, executive, or judicial measures modeled after those of the Third Reich. In view of the fact that at present a considerable proportion of the surviving victims live abroad and in view of the problem of monetary transfer to be expected in regard to Germany, claims against non-German governments may be of appreciable importance. Since the author is primarily motivated by legal and not by economic considerations and since legal claims against Germany and Germany only are at stake he limits himself to stating that the German government is responsible for arbitrary and discriminatory acts committed in the occupied regions. It should be noted too that no attempt is made in the present treatise to construe claims against Germany on the basis of German municipal law which would entail the argument that all German government actions perpetrated by virtue of and after the famous enabling law of 1933 were illegal and in contravention to the basic principles and the enumerated civil rights of the Weimar constitution. For discernible reasons

the author abstains from kindred judicial observations and concentrates upon the aspects of international law with the resulting advantage for the victims that international organs will have to examine claims under international law.

What then, under present international law, is the legal position of a citizen harmed by the acts of his own government? Quae sit actio? Significantly the author starts with an exposition based upon the law of nature. This approach in an age — alas so alarmingly positivistic — may be interpreted as an implied acknowledgement of weakness. Is the law of nature, if generally recognized at all, strong enough to protect the citizen against his own state? Perhaps, it may be asked, has the German so-called legal evolution performed the final reductio ad absurdum of a judicial doctrine that makes a fetish out of legal positivism? Such may be—such should be—considerations de lege ferenda. De lege lata, however, it seems doubtful, whether, without any further contractual basis, international forums would recognize claims of this kind based upon the law of nature, not to speak of the difficulty of making individual persons subjects of international law, whereas traditionally the locus standi has been, at least in general, reserved for sovereign states. If for similar, although perhaps less cogent reasons. subjects of other states should try to sue their governments before international courts because of religious, racial, or political discrimination, the sacro sanct of of domestic jurisdiction, expressly upheld in the San Francisco Charter, would seem to stand in the way of such a generous interpretation.

No more hopeful appears the attempt to base liability under international law upon violation of minority rights. Germany, after the last war, was not made to sign specific minority treaties such as were imposed upon many of the new states. It is true that the German government of that time was very eager to procure minority protection and declared officially in a note addressed to the Allied and Associated Powers: "Germany on her part is resolved to treat minorities of alien [sic!] origin in her territories according to the same principles [of equality]." The author is inclined to interpret this as a juridical obligation whereas it might just as well be considered an expression of intention to pursue a certain kind of policy.

Dr. Goldschmidt's penetrating analysis—if it does nothing else—proves sufficiently that the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations Organization will have to go a long way if civic rights are to enjoy a moderate degree of universal protection.

Fortunately the author does not limit himself to the analysis of prevailing international law. He makes very detailed suggestions as to how the claims of the victims should be dealt with by a specifically created international court of adjudication. The procedural as well as the substantive side of the proposed jurisdiction are commented upon methodically and the motive of the author remains always judicious.

Precisely because of the weakness of existing international law concerning individual rights the victorious powers should not overlook that humanity owes

as it were a moral debt to the surviving victims of Hitlerian persecution and that, therefore, specific provisions for their benefit should be inserted in the peace treaties. Dr. Goldschmidt's book, which to a lawyer and to one interested in international relations makes stimulating reading, has opened the discussion on this subject at a very appropriate moment.

Michigan State College

HANS L. LEONHARDT

STEEL, JOHANNES, The Future of Europe. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1945. Pp. 256. \$3.00.

Mr. Steel's volume, discussing postwar Europe and its background, surveys the history and analyzes contemporary problems of the major European states. Approximately 25 per cent of the space is devoted to Germany; Russia, except in general relationship to the countries considered, is not included; the Balkans and the Baltic states (Finland is given a separate chapter) are each treated in a chapter.

To judge this book by the canons of critical scholarship is perhaps unfair since it appears to be intended for the general reader rather than the specialist. But the work falls between two stools. It is too inaccurate for the scholar, and certainly the tired business man deserves a better palliative for the Readers' Digest than that furnished here.

It is difficult for this reviewer to decide whether the author's worst offense is his tendency to seize upon a certain event—to the omission of other more pertinent ones—as a foundation for broad generalization, or the more frequent misstatement of what the dust cover calls "harsh, unyielding" facts. For example, in attempting to explain the fall of Léon Blum, the author writes: "After Blum had—however unwittingly—permitted the French fascists to strangle the Spanish Republic, the electorate of 1940 was through with him" (p. 169). Mr. Steel has implied that the Blum ministry was driven from office on the Spanish intervention issue. What are the facts? Blum resigned on June 19, 1937, after the Senate refused his demands for emergency fiscal powers. Later, March 13-April 10, 1938, he was still unable to gain Senate support for a government. It was seemingly the directors of the Banque de France, the Two Hundred Families, and the upper middle class of French society who indeed never accepted the Front Populaire and worked unceasingly to accomplish its destruction. Moreover, what is the use of discussing the French electorate in 1940 when as Mr. Steel himself points out (p. 177) the elections of May-June, 1940, were postponed for two years by the deputies? And the Wehrmacht extended his postponement two additional years. (The French electorate gave its earliest opinion in October, 1945, and what an opinion!)

It is claimed that the German commercial league was founded in 1833 after the resistance of Bavaria and Würtemberg was overcome (p. 115). The Zollverein was conceived in 1818; Schwarzburg-Sonderhausen was the first state

to enter in October, 1819; and in 1829 Bavaria and Würtemberg joined. Prussia did not conclude a secret offensive alliance with Italy against Austria early in 1864 (p. 115) but on April 8, 1866. In reflecting upon the statement: "The French, who since Napoleon's time have never invaded any European country ..." (p. 184) the reviewer recalls that the French invaded Spain (April, 1823), and that French troops invaded European Russia in 1854. Likewise, students who have followed the literature on the French debacle of 1940 will be surprised to learn "there is no reason to suppose that the French Army was inferior to the German in any way except in numbers" (p. 169).

There are other decisions which seem to the reviewer to be unfortunate. Granted that lack of adequate space made the problem of providing this historical background formidable, the selection of the empirical data has not been as considered as it might have been, nor has it been organized as advantageously as

would be desirable.

The analysis of the agrarian question in Poland, the Balkans, and Prussia is sound, and the solutions offered are reasoned. Indeed, the author appears to know his ground better and to be less emotional when he is east of the Vistula. For that reason—and others—the absence of a chapter on Russia is to be lamented in a volume dealing with "The Future of Europe." Throughout the work the book is favorable to economic and social reform, though as far as the reviewer could ascertain, no distinction has been made between the Anglo-Saxon type of democracy and the Russian.

Would it not be more in line with our idea of procedure and Justice to shoot members of the twelve categories of Germans (listed on p. 157) if guilty after trial rather than as suggested without trial? Such statements as the above shatter the balance of the existing well-conceived ideas of Mr. Steel's book.

University of Colorado

RICHARD M. BRACE

DALLIN, DAVID J., The Big Three: The United States, Britain, Russia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945. Pp. 292. \$2.75.

This is a book of documentation and analysis giving a persuasive evaluation of the new international situation as created by World War II.

Along with the Big Three of today the new organization of the United Nations will have neither a policy of its own nor a separate force to achieve its goals. The United States emerged from this war as first among the powers and will have to take its part in every international affair. Since there are still uprisings and revolts, war and rumors of war in the world, it is not to be expected that America can look forward to a long period of peace after this war. America is bound to go together with Britain on the European continent and Britain will actually be "the European agent of the two policies." Conflicts may occur in the future, but Dallin feels that a rapprochement between the two policies is already far advanced. And one must infer from Chapter IV that the British-American policy in Europe shall consist in supporting the independent existence

of small and medium-sized European nations, in order to avoid the all-European hegemony by any single power. As for Russia, communistic propaganda will run parallel with the expansion of Soviet political and military power. Acquirements of the former Imperial policy, nationalism (Slavdom, "democracy" and "antifascism") religious movements, railroads and oil concessions, as well as "friendly governments" are used before the public opinion among the allied nations as means for Soviet expansion strategy. Russia is striving toward a hegemony over the Baltic-Adriatic zone, and the "Middle Tier," from Finland to Albania, with 40 per cent of Europe's population. In Germany the Russian zone embraces a population of about 30 millions, and a pro-Soviet government in that area may appeal to the rest of Germany to unite under it. And then a revival of German industry to strengthen the new Russian-German bloc will be necessary.

The power politics of the U.S.A., Britain and Russia in the Middle East are illustrated with suggestive political and oil maps. In the Far East America should logically succeed to the rôle of guiding nation. But there still is another Asiatic power—the Soviet Union. A new two-power system of activity? Dallin is not sure of that. Dallin ventures that the reëmergence of Japan as a buffer and ally either of Moscow or America and Britain may be a possibility.

Certainly the coming period in world history will be, at best, one of armed peace. Nations other than the Big Three will soon arise: Australia, South Africa France. After a time Germany will again acquire a degree of influence in European politics by economic means. And the same pattern applies to Japan, even if ousted from the Asiatic continent.

Dallin wrote his book before the Atomic Bomb, the collapse of Japan and the experiences of joint occupation in Germany. Now it would appear that Communism in Europe is rather at ebb-tide. Previously synonymous with Russia, if not Democracy, to the European proletariat and bourgeois "liberals," it has since lost very much of its mysticism and today is supported in Germany and other Russian-occupied areas of Europe merely by ration-cards, prison camps and leveled guns. However, one must share the author's belief that only political freedom and civil liberties in Russia as elsewhere might act 'as a brake on tendencies toward conquest and subjugation of alien nations" and, hence, assure a Peace of Liberation.

Long Island

KAAREL R. PUSTA SR.

Demographic Studies of Selected Areas of Rapid Growth. Proceedings of the Round Table on Population Problems. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1944. Pp. 158. \$1.00.

Seven papers on various aspects of population growth are presented in this monograph by sociologists and other experts on demography. Ranging from studies of the population problem in Japan and India to Egypt and the Near East they contain material little known to the general public and often hard to obtain by the specialist.

In analytical technique the several authors are about the same, using orthodox procedures that are time-tested and strictly inductive, even when dealing with population policies, the past existence of which, nation-wise, is at least debatable, and the future of which must be projected with extreme care.

For readers of this *Journal* the paper on agricultural population and rural economy in Eastern and Southern Europe by Wilbert Moore is of particular interest. Admittedly a partial analysis and resting on incomplete data, his hypothesis is nonetheless significant.

Moore holds that Southern and Eastern Europe is suffering from a disparity in the ratio of mouths to food. Rural population is growing rapidly, but agricultural production is still in a quasi-feudal stage. Peasant holdings are too small and generally reflect tenancy rather than proprietorship. The landless farm worker is not well off where huge estates prevail, and even worse off where moderate sized family farms are the rule. "Surplus" populations could be reduced somewhat by better techniques of cultivation but the underlying social and economic structure is so strong a bar that there are "little grounds for optimism about the future economic position of the Eastern and Southern European peasants."

Without intending to do so, Moore illustrates clearly the reason for Communism's appeal to many of the agricultural proletariat, or the appeal of any ism offering an alternative to the present morass of drudgery leading to no future but poverty and death.

And, more pertinent to the scholar perhaps, his essay, along with the other six, demonstrates that no phase of the Central European problem can be tackled alone or merely by one tool: the combined attack of the historian, sociologist, economist and others is as necessary in theoretical analysis as the co-operation of the peoples concerned is needed in the practical resolution of their difficulties.

University of Colorado

WILLIAM S. BERNARD

FITZGERALD, WALTER, The New Europe. An Introduction to its Political Geography. London: Methuen, 1945. Pp. x, 256. 28 Maps. 14s.

This is a geographer's view of Europe's political problems at the end of the war. To the political student (not to mention the historian) a good deal in this introduction must appear elementary. Nor should the reader expect the mature judgment he can look for on every page of Isaiah Bowman's masterpiece on The New World. But in its own limits this book by the newly appointed Professor of Geography of Manchester University serves a good purpose. If it is not original it is written with great sincerity and a true appraisal of the vexing difficulties that beset the path of the politician anywhere in Europe. Geography, he says at the outset, hardly knows frontiers—yet political geography seems to deal with hardly anything else. The search for satisfactory defense lines, he is convinced, is one of the most fruitless to which statesmen still appear committed. The suspicions which bedevil Europe more than any other continent can be allayed

only "by the application of impartial justice to the claims of the various national groups for territorial rights; but it would be advisable not to expect impartial justice . . . " This is not written with a cynical sneer but is meant as a factual survey.

The book is weak in definitions—in spite of its promising preface and a whole chapter entitled "The Concept of Political Geography"; but it is strong in inarticulate convictions which underlie all judgment and which do honor to the sound tradition out of which the author has grown. Without ever saying so Professor Fitzgerald judges each question in strict accordance with the ethnic principle of self-determination. His strictures and his commendations correspond to the degree in which the principle of self-determination has triumphed or has been rejected. "Geographical limits of nationality" is the way he puts it when speaking of Czechoslovakia. This reviewer, of course, agrees with the author in the belief that he has chosen the right approach to Europe's problems; that self-determination, or self-government, is indeed the condition sine qua non; without it no peace can be established (even if more than this will be necessary in order to reach a real settlement). On the other hand, it seems a pity that Fitzgerald did not define these principles, explain and defend them explicitly in a world where the self-appointed "realists" try to ride rough-shod over the wishes of small peoples.

The author is severely critical of Europeans, says nothing (one way or the other) about Britain's rôle in Europe, but devotes a whole chapter to the evolution of the United Kingdom in relation to its geographical setting—and becomes almost lyrical in his praise of the Soviet Union where he cannot detect a single unsolved problem. To quote a few of his more striking judgments: Alsace-Lorraine, he believes, still remains "a European problem of the first magnitude"; Walloons speak "archaic" French (he also speaks of an "Aryan language"—he is poorly served when he goes outside his own sphere of geography); he makes the startling remark that Tsarist Russia, in 1914, could rely on its citizens because they were all Slavs, only one in ten being non-Slav; equally startling, if not equally absurd, is his belief that French military prestige in 1914 was "supreme." About Poland Fitzgerald will, no doubt, be read with care. He doubts her need of access to the sea, would be ready to give her East Prussia if Germany were compensated by "a narrow strip of Posen territory, not exceeding 15 miles in east to west extent." Few capitals are to his liking: he prefers Leipzig to Berlin, Brno to Prague and disapproves of Belgrade. Which all goes to show that this world is not made by geographers alone.

In his uncritical acceptance of all official Soviet publications Professor Fitzgerald goes so far as to speak of "elections" which made Estonians, Letts and Lithuanians vote for annexation by the Soviet Union. He quotes "Professor Vaabel"—does he mean Vares?—as evidence. Furthermore he believes that "certain countries of Central Europe" would like to join the Union. It is small wonder then that to him Small Nations are "diminutive" units—their greatness,

truly, cannot be measured on the geographer's map—and that he accepts the notion of giant powers which are to rule the world. He thus undoes most of his own book and of his own judgments which, as far as they are sound, are based on the principle of self-determination. Lack of definition which strikes the reader right from the beginning thus leads to self-contradiction.

Each chapter has a selected bibliography which appears incomplete rather

than select.

Charterhouse, Godalming, England

F. W. PICK

International Currency Experience—Lessons of the Inter-War Period. League of Nations: Economic, Financial and Transit Department, 1944. Pp. 249. \$3.25.

The purpose of this recent volume of the still intellectually vigorous economic section of the League of Nations is the enumeration of lessons learnt from the story of international monetary experiences during the inter-war period and thus to assist in the formulation of future international monetary policies.

Freely fluctuating currencies involve three serious disadvantages: (1) As an additional element of risk added to the normal variables of the market place, they discourage foreign trade. If forward exchange markets exist, such risks may be covered by hedging, but even if possible will add to the cost of trading and thus diminish the volume of foreign trade and financial transactions. (2) As a means of adjusting balances of payment, such fluctuations mean constant shifts of factors of production between production for domestic and foreign markets. Such frequently occurring shifts create frictional unemployment and are wasteful and costly if exchange rates determining the allocation of resources are temporary. For new shifts in resources allocation become mandatory once a temporary disequilibrium has been removed. (3) As a stimulation of anticipatory feelings of further exchange movements, additional speculative capital transfers of a disequilibrating kind are likely to occur. Thus changes required for the balancing of normal transactions are greatly accentuated. Even normal transactions may be, of course, affected by speculative anticipations and an initial disequilibrium is thereby intensified.

The study, by implication, enthusiastically approves the flexible exchange rates temporarily visualized by the delegates to the Bretton Woods International Financial and Monetary Conference. For "it is extremely difficult to ascertain and establish the correct equilibrium rates of exchange when economic relations are resumed after a global war." The book likewise, by inference, seconds the limited discretionary power granted to nations to revaluate their currencies as contained in the Bretton Woods agreements "so as to eliminate as far as possible any chronic and structural disparity between price levels and exchange rates in different countries."

The pre-1914 gold standard required that countries should not attempt to control national income and outlay by deliberate measures, i.e., that nothing

should be done to offset automatic effects which gold movements might produce in the domestic credit supply and hence upon the prevailing price level. But with the growing desire for economic security in the inter-war period, an adequate employment level became the paramount criterion for national monetary policies and the practice of neutralizing the effects of gold movements was increasingly accepted. Such policy to be effective requires, however, the maintenance of international currency reserves as buffer in case a country by suitable national fiscal policies maintains a high national income in the face of depressed economic conditions elsewhere. Such a liquidity reserve will enable a country to meet the adverse balances likely to develop under such conditions. But poor and impoverished countries can only maintain such reserves if an adequate volume of international development and reconstruction loans is forthcoming. (Hence the World Bank as a companion institution to the International Monetary Fund!)

What happened in the 1930's was, of course, that international currency reserves were not large enough to meet the disequilibrating short-term capital movements occasioned by the phenomena of flight capital and panic withdrawal of short-term credits. In the absence of adequate reserves, countries had to resort to exchange controls intended to prevent not only an exodus of domestic capital but also to prevent foreigners from withdrawing funds lent upon expiration of the loan contract. This, in turn, stopped all international capital transactions. Needless to say, in a number of cases such as in the case of the German mark or the French franc, prior to the fall of 1936, exchange controls were needed to protect seriously overvalued currencies. Hence, "the reduction in trade should be attributed to the inappropriate exchange rates rather than to exchange controls as such."

Evaluating the inter-war experience, the study feels that: (1) "International monetary relations especially in the years before the Tripartite Agreement of 1936 suffered greatly from the absence of an established machinery or procedure of consultation in the matter of exchange rates." This comment would stress the consultative function of the International Monetary Fund, a function so little stressed in the recent debates here and in England. (2) "The basic criterion by which exchange adjustments should be judged is whether they serve as a 'buffer' of as a 'beggar-my-neighbour' policy." If a currency has to be devaluated because only thus can that country's international currency reserve be preserved, such policy might be regrettable but necessary. But when exchange dumping is engaged in, then an improvement in the trade balance of one country means a deterioration in the trade balance of other countries and since depreciation cannot be obtained without the consent of others, the others in turn devaluate and so restore the original position. Such exchange dumping via competitive devaluation' is obviously nothing but economic warfare.

The study concludes by saying that the need for exchange adjustments and/or controls will be less if: (1) countries have large reserve funds (or, by implication, have access to funds such as proposed under the Bretton Woods agree-

ment); (2) large and steady volumes of international investment capital exist; and (3) national policies or income, employment, and prices, particularly in the leading countries, are better co-ordinated.

The traditional gold standard imposed a rather high degree of co-ordination in national monetary policies and business conditions. But it constituted a synchronization of cyclical movements and as such became definitely unacceptable to individual nations. Considering the ubiquitous national demands for economic stability and social security, "the only form of synchronization compatible with this demand is a co-ordination of policies aiming at a stable level of good employment."

This, no doubt, is the great lesson learnt from the inter-war period, coupled with the understanding that price stability (the quest of all international monetary conferences of the 1920's) does not insure income and employment stability. The only way it can be achieved in the long run is through stable income and

employment.

The committee at work on this study has provided a compact volume on recent monetary history. For classroom or reference purposes it will be indispensable. Above all, through the dark clouds of twenty years of inter-war history, a ray of hope shines brilliantly. For in its final paragraph the study says: "Just as the gold standard grew up through the spontaneous recognition of a common primary objective (exchange stability), so a new international currency system may develop from a common acceptance of the need to maintain employment and economic stability."

University of Vermont

PHILIPP H. LOHMAN

Kuczynski, Jurgen, Germany: Economic and Labour Conditions under Fascism. New York: International Publishers, 1945. Pp. 234. \$2.50.

To anyone interested in following the future development of the German people, a careful perusal of author Kuczynski's book would seem to be a prerequisite. But the reader will do well to exercise some caution in reading the book. For to Mr. Kuczynski "science divorced utterly from the needs and existence of the people" (i.e., science without propaganda) does not exist. Moreover, in view of his extreme left-wing tendencies, "Social-Democratism" comes in for a severe mauling at his hands. To Mr. Kuczynski, "Social-Democratism" is "labour policy of compromise with capitalism at the expense of the working class." Still his point is well taken that Germany's Social Democrats must share a considerable part of the blame for Hitler's rise to power because of their opposition to mass action advocated as late as January, 1933 by the German Communist Party.

Author Kuczynski's struggle to depict an organic development of Fascism along the lines of Marxian teaching seems overdone at several points. At others, extraneous matters such as stabs at "Trotskyite" James Burnham of Managerial-Revolutionary-fame and U. S. "big monopolist concerns" employing "a private

military or police force for use against their workers," detract from an otherwise scholarly piece of work.

On the whole, the source material has been carefully culled from annual reports of German factory and mine inspectors prior to 1938; from such official German sources as the *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, and others; League of Nations, and Bank for International Settlements reports; and wartime editions of German and other European newspapers. The inferences drawn from such sources seem on the whole substantiated by developments since November, 1943, which date marks the closing entries of the study.

What happened to the workers under Fascism? Labor Feudalism. The German worker was turned into a serf, a "talking tool," attached and fixed to his job, whether agricultural or industrial. Later during the war, the number of workers attached to an establishment constituted almost its sole value so that with materials shortages and machinery breakdowns, the sole revenue for the entrepreneur was to farm his workers out.

What happened to wages? Already prior to 1937, wage rates had actually declined. While gross wages increased because of the increased hours per worker, real income by 1943 had decidedly declined. Moreover, fascism had completely transformed the function of wages in determining the workers' standard of living. With deterioration in qualities of goods still supplied, with food shortages, black markets for food, clothing, flats and even single rooms, money wages lost their significance. "The fact that a worker may have relatives in the country, or that his wife is a friend of the butcher's wife, or that he lives in a town with many armament factories (Workers in armament factories and miners were next to the army best provisioned by the government!) may considerably change the value of his wages."

Prior to 1939, many consumer goods' workers were working short weeks so that, as Kuczynski estimates, "the real income of almost half the German workers was lower than at the time of the worst economic crisis in the history of Germany"—i.e., 1932.

Long before 1939, the accident rate had increased (70% over 1932 by 1937) and health conditions had deteriorated. Because of increased hours and speedup, poorer food, and bad working conditions, illness per worker had mounted so that even official reports admit a 33 1/3% increase over 1932. This despite Fascist admonitions to stay on the job! According to the Deutsche Tuberkulose-Blatt about 60% of Germans with open tuberculosis were working —250,000 people, often working overtime or on night work.

Old age pensions went down as old people, often above 70, were pushed back to the factory. Other social welfare services declined so that the social insurance system became an auxiliary tax system—a method of taxing the worker for benefits never extended to him.

A chapter consisting almost entirely of quotations from reports of factory inspectors makes one think of the early nineteenth century. There was employ-

ment of children under 12 years of age with hourly wages of 5 pfennigs per hour. There was abuse of the apprenticeship system; in one engineering work there were 95 apprentices to 120 skilled and unskilled workers. The ten-hour day had become the standard below which no overtime was paid. A 16 to 20 hour day was no exception. Working conditions in many shops were below a minimum health and decency standard. This was the land which was to be a labor paradise via "Strength through Joy" and "Beauty of Work." Both organizations ceased to exist when their functionaries were drafted for the front or war work.

No wonder that despite the technical and organizational progress in the armament industries since 1932, productivity per worker in 1943 was on the way back to the 1932 level. The consumption goods industries showed already in

1937 an almost 10% decline in productivity below 1932 levels.

Thus as fascism wanted to increase production further, it had to rely more and more on extensive exploitation, i.e., more workers. Hence the importation of foreign slave labor with concomitant scenes reminiscent of Roman slave markets. But foreign workers, especially Poles and Russians, had to pay a special racial equalization tax on their meager wages—the Poles 15% and the Russians 75%. If Jews, Poles, and Russians died off, so much the better. "The Fascists treated them as the Romans treated their slaves during a period when slaves were still available in large quantities and when a rich Roman did not mind occasionally cutting up a slave in order to feed his gold-fish."

For whose benefit? Says Mr. Kuczynski: "For the new ruling class, the result of a marriage between the old bourbons of exploitation and a new generation of gangsters." He cites convincing illustrations of the combination of Nazi party gangsters and representatives of heavy industries as evidenced in the membership of the Rüstungsrat—the armament council. From here on the reader need but look at the news from Nürnberg.

University of Vermont

PHILIPP H. LOHMAN

LONDON, KURT, Backgrounds of Conflict: Ideas and Forms in World Politics. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945. Pp. ix, 487. \$5.00.

The book under review is an attempt to present the conflicting ideologies of the modern world, totalitarianism and democracy, primarily with a view to acquainting the intelligent citizen of a democracy with the nature of the totalitarian ideology. It is Dr. London's belief that the menace of this ideology will persist after the destruction of Nazism and that only a democray intensely aware of its own ideology and its contrast with totalitarianism can grapple with the latter.

The book, which is largely a textbook, is a careful one, and it furnishes useful information. Dr. London has first several pages of introduction in which he deals with his concepts, totalitarianism, democracy, ideology, the nature of the ideological war, of totalitarian economy, Soviet-Marxian economy. In conclusion he furnishes here a kind of table to show the opposing views of democracy

(America), and totalitarianism (Nazi Germany) in re (a) the state, (b) culture, (c) society, (d) economy, (e) foreign policy, prefacing this with the statement.

When in the end the ever-growing interdependence among the nations made a clash inevitable, two groups of ideologies faced each other, both containing a variety of political trends but each representing and defending a fundamental platform. One group fought for the Nazi-Fascist brand of totalitarianism; the other for the ultimate goal of a social democracy (p. 30).

Part I of the book proceeds with studies of *The Enemies of Democracy*, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Japan. As is frequent, the historical introductions are too compressed to be useful to the average reader for whom they are written; but the writer has done well to emphasize in the studies proper the ways in which the totalitarian states control all means of communication and education in the interest of the spread of their ideologies.

A study of Russia as a totalitarian state, but one with a variant of totalitarian ideology and with a differing aim and end product from the enemy states, occupies Part II. Dr. London faces the fact that East and West in Europe and America must co-operate for world peace, though they confront each other with conflicting ideologies. It is in such a situation that the differing ideologies show up clearly, and Dr. London can speak only generally as to how the conflict may be resolved:

The responsibility therefore rests clearly with the Western Allies as well as with the Soviet Union. The only possible way to live up to this responsibility is an honest compromise on the basis of which one may hope that ideological and political differences of opinion may be ironed out gradually. The more progressive the social and economic postwar policy of the United States and Britain becomes and the less totalitarian the dictatorship of the proletariat shows itself to be, the easier should it be to reach such a compromise (p. 325).

The last section of the book, Part IV (Part III deals briefly with Vichy France), touches rapidly, and largely by way of contrast, on Britain and the United States as practising democracies.

The book makes no effort to be original or provocative. Although it deals with ideologies, its approach is not philosophical, but historical and socio-analytical. For this reason it does not really emphasize the implications of totalitarianism for individualism, freedom, creativeness, social justice so much as one might wish. To be sure, there are wise statements about these implications, and the comparison in these matters with democracy is made to the full advantage of democracy. But the logic of the subject and of events requires an even greater interest in totalitarianism as a whole than in its national manifestations. It would be useful for the reader to change the emphasis for himself as he reads.

Washington, D. C.

PAULINE R. ANDERSON

SHORTER NOTICES

MILLER, DOUGLAS, Via Diplomatic Pouch. With a Foreword by William L. Shirer. New York: Didier, 1944. Pp. 248. \$3.00.

In this book the author of You Can't Do Business with Hitler, who was Commercial Attaché at Berlin, 1925-1939, has published a selection of the reports which he sent to Washington between the dates of November 11, 1931, and October 21, 1937. Since about 80 percent of the material is taken from the years 1933 and 1934, the beginnings of the Nazi regime are best described. As one might expect, economic conditions, particularly trade, are the primary concern, although broader aspects of Nazi ideology and practice are frequently mentioned

and commented upon.

Shirer is correct in saying that Miller has the right to "stand up and say: 'I told you so' " if anyone in, this country has, and that it was a mistake on the part of Washington not to print some of these reports when they were written. It is doubtful, however, if they serve a useful purpose now. If there is anyone who has not already been convinced of the unsoundness and rottenness of the Nazi system by such works as Millers' own previous book and by the revelations that have been coming out of Germany since its surrender, it is not likely that these documents will do the trick. For the serious student of the political, economic, and social history of Nazi Germany they are too fragmentary to be of much value. Furthermore, they add little that is new on this subject. Pending fuller publication of archival material, however, they contribute a few pieces to the mosaic of American foreign relations, particularly in matters of trade. They are, moreover, models of clear and convincing exposition worth emulation by any aspirant for the foreign service.

Clark University

DWIGHT E. LEE

BENES, Eduard, Návrat do vlasti, with Introduction by Ján Papánek. New York:

Czechoslovak Information Service, 1945. Pp. 46.

Shortly before leaving London to return to Czechoslovak soil, President Beneš made a formal report to the Czechoslovak State Council. This report (here printed in Slovak) is a general survey of the work for Czechoslovak liberation which Dr. Beneš undertook with the aid of other democratic leaders who managed to escape from the "Protectorate." At times during the intervening six years the cause of Czechoslovak freedom seemed very faint, but at no time has Beneš despaired of its eventual fulfilment. It is, of course, one thing for a statesman to claim prescience after the event, quite another thing for him to be able to document his judgment of what the final outcome would be. Beneš' record is quite clear. He has frequently, even in the gloomy days of 1940 and 1941, when a complete German victory seemed assured, gone on record as convinced that Nazism could not endure, that the might of America and Russia would inevitably be combined with that of the British Empire to crush aggressive Germanism.

In this report Beneš outlines the world-wide contour of the Czechoslovak struggle. From the first, it was a planned campaign, with complete co-operation between Czechosolvaks in Russia, Great Britain, America and in the homeland.

The warm reception of Beneš and his interim government by the homeland, a circumstance quite unique among the emigré governments, completely substantiates this part of the story. The excellent communication between "free elements" in the homeland and the emigré government in London, the repeated assurance given by Beneš and the ministers there that they regarded themselves only as trustees for the people at home, and their obvious responsiveness to the will of "our people at home" (naši doma) have all combined to make the transition from German occupation or puppet state (Slovakia) to a re-established and reunited Republic easy and propitious. The introduction by Minister Ján Papánek is directed to American Slovaks and emphasizes the fact that Beneš' Czechoslovak—as opposed to a Czecho-Slovak—policy has been amply justified by events in Slovakia.

MURAN, J. B., We fight on . . . Slovak Rising in the German Rear. London: Lincolns-Prager, 1945. Pp. 44. 2s. 6d.

Because of the complete encirclement of Slovakia by Germany or her puppets for six long war years, there has not been much chance for the outside world to gain a very clear picture of the course of events in the puppet "Republic." The little news that has leaked out, however, has told of some spasmodic, some concerted and much passive resistance to the Germans and their puppets Tiso, Mach and Tuka. This little booklet gives a somewhat clearer picture of the event of the armed resistance and particularly the spirit motivating it than we have hitherto had.

Many Slovaks, either from the Slovak army or from civilian life, escaped to the Red Army in 1942 and the word began to spread within the country of the power and progress of the Soviet military effort. But the partisan movement did not begin to take shape until 1943, and the separate elements soon began to develop a common command. The Slovak National Council was formed, from underground leaders, at Christmas, 1943 and its authority was never thereafter questioned. Early in 1944 the proportions of the movement were so serious as to call for action by Tiso's military, though his own soldiers fraternized with the partisans. The strategic importance of Slovakia to German defense against the Soviet advance was so great that, even when German arms were being pushed back in Belgium and northern France by the Allies, a number of crack divisions were sent to eastern Slovakia to bolster the German line against the Red Army.

The Slovak strike for independence was made on August 28, 1944, and on September 1 the Slovak National Council declared the revival of the Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovaks were in no position to get outside help in men or matériel as the Red Army was at no point closer to the partisan-held area than 70 miles of rough terrain. Completely surrounded by German troops the Slovak patriots held their lines for two months, and even after the Germans had retaken Bánska Bystrica, the Slovak partisan capital, Slovak guerilla bands, moving up into the mountains, harrassed the Germans for months, causing much loss in personnel and supplies and damaging communication, in such a way as to facilitate in large measure the Soviet advance from east, north and south.

The political and moral results of the uprising were fully as great as the

military, and the Slovak National Council gained deserved prestige from its conduct of the uprising and its rallying of the Slovak will for freedom. A complete history of the uprising, based on more adequate information than the present sketch, remains to be written. It will be a dramatic and heroic chapter in the moral history of the war.

P. F.

WHYTE, A. J., The Evolution of Modern Italy, 1715-1920. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1944. Pp. 275. 18s.

This is political history, with only such attention to non-political matters as is necessary, in the author's opinion, to make his story hang together. Judged within this self-imposed limitation, Dr. Whyte has done a good job. So far as this reviewer can see, the author has no important revelation to make or any startlingly new interpretations to suggest. He has relied on the usual sources, largely secondary, but by telling the story in a straightforward and interesting

style he has managed to add a certain freshness to it.

The account follows the conventional pattern in emphasizing the events of the Risorgimento—122 pages out of 263 are devoted to the years between 1848 and 1870. However, unlike some writers, Dr. Whyte carries the story of "the preparation" for freedom and unity back through the eighteenth century. He concludes his synthesis with a brief account of Italy's rôle in World War I and at the Peace Conference. His terminal point is the Treaty of Rapallo in 1920 rather than the March on Rome in 1922. By thus ending his volume before the Mussolinian Era he has, of course, saved himself many critical headaches and much inevitable criticism. But from the point of view of the general reader—whoever he is—the story stops short of the final act, leaving him in mid-air.

The bibliography is a brief but on the whole well-selected list of works in English, French and Italian. There are three pages of "Notes," and an index referring almost exclusively to proper names. The volume would have profited by more careful attention to the exactness of historical details and the correct spelling of names. Despite these minor matters, this is a good book—one that

students of modern history will find useful to have around.

Denver University

ROBERT GALE WOOLBERT

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

- Acheson, Dean, "Problems of Security and Understanding in American-Soviet Friendship." Dept. of State Bulletin, November 18, 1945, 787-789.
- "The Aims of the Czechoslovak Currency Reform." Cent. Eur. Obs., November 2, 1945, 313.
- Balcanicus, "Bulgaria After the Elections." Cent. Eur. Obs., November 30, 1945, 352-353.
- Braun, Charlotte E., "The Balkan States and London." Current History, November, 1945, 447-451.
- Brockwell, Ronald, "The City of German Destiny." Cent. Eur. Obs., November 30, 1945, 350.
- Coleman, Arthur P., "Area and Language Courses in Slavic and East European Studies." Amer. Slavic and East Eur. Review, August, 1945, 185-208.
- Cressey, Paul Frederick, "Chinese Traits in European Civilization: A Study in Diffusion." Amer. Sociological Review, October, 1945, 595-604.
- Czubatyj, Nicholas D., "The meaning of 'Russia' and 'Ukraine'." Ukrainian Quarterly, September, 1945, 351-364.
- Danés, Jean, "What President Beneš Told Me . . . " Cent. Eur. Obs., December 14, 1945, 391-392.
- De Carency, Jacques, "The Hungarian Experiment." Free Europe, November 2, 1945, 109.
- Dobriansky, Lev E., "Ukraine in Mid-Twentieth Century." Ukrainian Quarterly, September, 1945, 330-341.
- Dorpalen, Andreas, "Russia and the West." Virginia Quarterly Review, Winter, 1946, 59-74.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., "Displaced Persons in Germany." Dept. of State Bulletin, October 21, 1945, 607-609.
- Fisher, A. J., "Yugoslav Republic." Cent. Eur. Obs., December 14, 1945, 368.
- Flanigan, M. L., "Some Origins of German Petroleum Policy." Southwestern Soc. Sci. Quarterly, Sept., 1945, 111-126.
- Fredericks, Pierre, "In Budapest Today." Cent. Eur. Obs., October 5, 1945, 284-285.
- "The Future vs. the Past—Issue of Yugoslav Elections." The Bulletin, October, 1945, 1-2.
- Henry, Paul, "Histoire de Roumanie," Part I. Revue Historique, January-March, 1944, 42-65.
- Henry, Paul, "Histoire de Roumanie." Part II. Revue Historique, April-June, 1944, 132-150.
- Jackson, Wayne G., "Fuel Needs in War-Torn Countries: The European Coal Organization." Dept. of State Bulletin, December 2, 1945, 879-881.
- Jaeger, Hans, "Old and New Parties in Germany." Free Europe, October 5,1945, 85.

Jones, Arnold, "The 'Big Four' and German Unity." Free Europe, October 5, 1945, 84.

Kalmer, Joseph, "New-Old Austria." Cent. Eur. Obs., December 14, 1945, 367. Lach, Donald F., "What They Would Do About Germany." Journal of Modern History, September, 1945, 227-243.

Lauterbach, Albert, "The Future of German Finance." The Journal of Politics, November, 1945, 378-410.

Lawther, Will, "Back from Czechoslovakia." Cent. Eur. Obs., November 16, 1945, 329-330.

Lovitt, John V., "Survey of Economic Policy Toward the European Neutrals." Dept. of State Bulletin, November 18, 1945, 777-780, 796.

Ludwig, Emil, "Germany in 1955—A Pessimistic Prediction." Free Europe, November 2, 1945, 107-108.

Lynd, "Planned Social Solidarity in the Soviet Union." Amer. Journal of Sociology, November, 1945, 183-197.

Maixner, Adolph, "Munich at Prague Castle." Cent. Eur. Obs., October 19, 1945, 300-302.

Manning, Clarence A., "The Russian Communist Unification." Ukrainian Quarterly, September, 1945, 311-321.

Marx, Hugo, "The Indemnification of Victims of Nazi Persecution." Jewish Social Studies, July, 1945, 265-274.

Matz, Adolph, "Uniformity in German Cost Methods." National Association of Cost Accountants, September 15, 1945, 59-71.

Menczer, Bela, "The Hungarian Elections." Free Europe, November 30, 1945. 119.

"Military Government of Germany." Dept. of State Bulletin, October 21, 1945, 596-607.

Nemenyi, Paul F., "The Record of the German Left." Current History, November, 1945, 439-446.

Oplatka, Josef, "Economic Life in Liberated Czechoslovakia." Cent. Eur. Obs., September 21, 195, 265.

Orlowski, Jaroslaw, "Polish National Economy To-Day." Cent. Eur. Trade Review, October, 1945, 186-187.

Parker, John, "Soviet Policy on the Peace Settlement." The Political Quarterly, July-September, 185-195.

Rie, Robert, "The Habsburg Problem." Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, September, 1945, 143-168.

Pribichevich, Stoyal, "Yugoslavia in the Balkans and Central Europe." International Affairs, October, 1945, 448-458.

Price, Byron, "Relations Between the American Forces of Occupation and the German People." Dept. of State Bulletin, December 2, 1945, 885-892.

Prince, Charles, "A Psychological Study of Stalin." Journal of Social Psychology, November, 1945, 119-140.

Ribar, J. A., "The New Hungary." Cent. Eur. Obs., November 2, 1945, 317-318. Riddleberger, James W., "U. S. Policy on the Treatment of Germany." Dept of State Bulletin, November 25, 1945, 841-849.

Rosenstein-Rodan, P. N., "How Much Can Germany Pay?" International Affairs,

October, 1945, 469-476.

Roucek, Joseph S., "American Misconceptions about Central-Eastern Europe." Ukrainian Quarterly, September, 1945, 342-350.

"Russia and Europe." Free Europe, October 19, 1945, 93-94.

Sazonova, Julia, "The German in Russian Literature." American Slavic and East European Review, August, 1945, 51-79.

Selby, Sir Walford, "Austria Before the Anschluss and a View of Her Future Prospects." International Affairs, October, 1945, 477-484.

Senn, Alfred, "Lithuanian Surnames." American Slavic and East European Review, August, 1945, 127-137.

Shuster, Zachariah, "Must the Jews Quit Europe?" Commentary, December, 1945, 9-16.

Salvemini, Gaetano, "The Italo-Jugoslav Frontier." Foreign Affairs, January, 1946, 341-346.

Taylor, A. J. P., "National Independence and the 'Austrian Idea'." The Political Quarterly, July-September, 1945, 234-246.

Warwick, Peter, "Agrarian Revolution in Germany." Cent. Eur. Obs., November 30, 1945, 349.

Young, E. P., "New Era in Czechoslovakia." Cent. Eur. Obs., December 14, 1945, 365-366.

Zucker, F., "The Present Intellectual Situation and the tasks of Education in Germany." Association of American Colleges Bulletin, October, 1945, 377-383.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Allen, W. E. D. and Muratoff, Paul, The Russian Campaign of 1941-1943. New

York: Penguin, 1945. \$.25.

Azcárate, P. de, League of Nations and National Minorities: An Experiment. Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945. \$2.00.

Beveridge, Sir William, The Price of Peace. New York: Norton, 1945. \$2.00. Bilmanis, Alfred, Baltic States and World Peace and Security Organization. Washington, D. C.: Latvian Legation, 1945.

Bieligk, K. F., Progress to World Peace. London: Hutchinson, 1945, 1s. 6d.

Bojano, Filippo, In the Wake of the Goose-Step. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1945. \$2.50.

Bonné, A., The Economic Development of the Middle East. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1945. \$4.00.

Brailsford, H. N., Our Settlement With Germany. New York: John Day, 1944.

Cardwell, Ann Su, The Case for Poland. Ann Arbor: Committee of Americans for Poland. \$.25.

Dennen, Leon, Trouble Zone: Brewing Point of World War III. Chicago: Ziff-Davis. \$1.50.

Dickinson, R. E., The Regions of Germany. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1945.

Gollancz, Victor, Nowhere to Lay their Heads. London: Gollancz, 1945. 6d.

Gonella, Guido, A World to Reconstruct: Pius XII on Peace and Reconstruction. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1945. \$3.50.

Gross, Felix, The Polish Worker. New York: Roy, 1945. \$3.00.

Grossman, Vassili, With the Red Army in Poland and Byelorussia, London: Hutchinson, 1945. 5s.

Heymann, Hans, We Can Do Business With Russia. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1945. \$2.50.

In Tyrannos. London: Lindsay Drummond, 1944. 16s.

Janowsky, Oscar I., Nationalities and National Minorities. New York: Macmillan, 1945. \$2.75.

Kirkien, Leszek, Russia, Poland and the Curzon Line. London: Caldra, 1944.

Listowel, Judith, Hungarian Record. London: MaxLove. 1s. 6d.

Loewenstein, Prince Hubertus zu, The Germans in History. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1945. \$5.00.

Lončar, Dragotin and Klančar, Anthony J., The Slovenes: A Social History. Cleveland: American Jugoslav Printing and Publishing Co., 1939.

Machray, Robert, The Problem of Upper Silesia. London: Allen & Unwin, 1945. 6s.

Manning, Clarence A., Taras Shevchenko, Poems. Jersey City: Ukrainian National Association, 1945.

Matuszewski, Ignacy, Did Britain Guarantee Poland's Frontiers? Edinburgh: Polish Bookshop. 1s. 6d.

Mikhailov, N. N., The Russian Glory. London: Hutchinson, 1945. 7s. 6d.

Myerson, M. H., Germany's War Crimes and Punishment. New York: Macmillan, 1945. \$2.75.

Normano, J. F., The Spirit of Russian Economics. New York: John Day, 1945. \$2.00.

Padev, Michael, Marshal Tito. London: Muller, 1944. 5s.

Pipinelis, M. P., Caitiff Bulgaria. London: Hutchinson, 1944. 6s.

Rubin, E., 700 Years of Jewish Life in Poland. London: Foyle, 1944. 2s. 6d.

Salomone, A. W., Italian Democracy in the Making, The Giolittian Era, 1900-1914. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press. \$2.50.

Sprout, Harold and Margaret, eds., Foundations of National Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945. \$4.25.

Trainin, A. N., Hitlerite Responsibility Under Criminal Law. London: Hutchinson, 1945. 8s. 6s.

Vlahovic, Vlaho S., Two Hundred Fifty Million and One Slavs. New York: Slav Publications, 1945. \$3.00.

Weis, P. and Graupner R., The Problem of Statelessness. London: World Jewish Congress, 1944. 2s.

